Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-17365
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 27 March 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Darko Torbica
COMPOSITION:
Martín AULETTA (Argentina), Deputy Chairperson
Stefano SARTORI (Italy), Member
Calum BEATTIE (Scotland), Member
CLAIMANT:
Darko Torbica, Croatia
Represented by Evgenii Efremov
RESPONDENT:
Lynx FC, Gibraltar
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-17365
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 20 August 2024, the Croatian player, Darko Torbica (hereinafter: the Player or the
Claimant), and the Gibraltarian club, Lynx FC (hereinafter: the Club or the Respondent),
entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract) valid as from 23 August
2024 until the end of the 2024/2025 season.
2.
As stipulated in art. 1 (v) of the Contract, the Claimant undertook to “arrive with an
acceptable level of fitness and free from injury at the start of his Contract, in accordance with
the date in Clause e. If he fails to meet these criteria, his Contract will be terminated with
immediate effect.”
3.
As per the terms of art. 1 (vii) of the Contract, the Claimant also undertook to “attend all
scheduled training sessions and Club matches (both competitive and friendly) regardless of
whether he is selected; not selected; injured or otherwise disposed, as and when these are
arranged by the Club unless the Club accepts a Player’s reasoning for non-attendance. The
Player is to remain for the whole duration of each match, regardless of whether he has been
substituted, unless released by a member of the Technical Team.”
4.
As per art. 6 of the Contract, the parties convened the dispute resolution mechanisms,
quoted verbatim:
“6. DISPUTE
6.1
The Player and the Club agree that any dispute arising in relation to the content of
this Agreement shall initially attempt to be resolved by the Player and the Club (or
their respective representatives) adhering to the procedure set out in the Club’s
Rules without the involvement of the GFA.
6.2
In the event that the dispute is not resolved in this manner, the Player or Club shall
write to the GFA requesting their involvement. The GFA will then have sole discretion
to nominate an independent Panel of 3 persons to hear and resolve the dispute in
question or direct the Player to an Independent Conflict Resolution Board. The
Player and the Club acknowledge and accept that the resolution passed in this
hearing, or by the Board, will be final and binding.
6.3
Any dispute can only be adjudicated within the Courts of Gibraltar.”
5.
In accordance with art. 11.1 of the Contract, the Respondent undertook to pay to the
Claimant, inter alia, “1,000 Euros (Net) per calendar month. The salary will be paid in arrears,
commencing 22 September 2024”.
6.
The Club also undertook to provide accommodation for the Player as per art. 11.3 of the
Contract.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-17365
7.
On 25 August 2024, the Player played an official match of the Club against Mons Calpe.
8.
On 1 September 2024, the Player played an official match of the Club against Europa Point.
9.
On 14 September 2024, the Player was on the bench for the official match against
Manchester 62.
10. On 26 September 2024, the Player received a letter from the Club stating that they were
terminating the Contract because of his lack of fitness. The letter stated that the
termination would take effect on 30 September 2024, quoted verbatim:
“Dear Darko,
PLAYER RELEASE FROM LYNX FOOTBALL CLUB
Following your discussions with the Managing Director, we have sadly terminated our
agreement with you in accordance with your current Player Contract Agreement. As
discussed, your level of fitness upon arrival was very poor, and despite numerous
opportunities to improve, you have been unable to reach the level required, and indeed,
unable to play competitive matches at the correct level of performance. You are therefore
unable to carry out your duties as a Player, to the best of your ability.
This is in breach of your Player Contract Clause 1.1v and Clause vii.
The Club is therefore releasing you, as discussed. The release will be with effect from Monday
30 September 2024, after which your agreement with the Club will end. Your salary will be
maintained until this date. Once you have signed the attached Termination Agreement, and
as a gesture of goodwill, the Club pay you one additional month’s salary.
On behalf of the Club, we wish you all the very best in your chosen future footballing career.
If you have not already done so, you are kindly requested to return all Lynx clothing issued
by the Club, to Mr Jeky Buhagiar, and hand back any Club accommodation, before your
departure.
Thank you.
Regards”
11. On the same day, the Player received additional documents from the Club, namely a letter
entitled “Proof signed by former club that there is no TPO of the player’s economic rights”, a
second letter entitled “Proof of Contract End Date”, and a “Contract Termination Agreement,”
which the Player did not sign.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-17365
12. On 10 October 2024, the Player, through his legal representative, sent a default notice to
the Club, putting them in default for breach of contract, and claiming the residual value of
the Contract which he valued at EUR 6,000.
13. On 18 October 2024, the Club replied to the default notice, stating the Player did not fulfil
his contractual obligations of maintaining an acceptable physical condition and, that as a
result, the Club was entitled to terminate the Contract, and he was not entitled to any
compensation.
14. On 11 November 2024, the Player sent a communication to the Gibraltar Football
Association (GFA) detailing the situation and “ask[ing] for [their] intervention in resolving the
situation that has arisen, to consider and resolve the dispute on the merits, to pay the Player the
amount of remuneration due in full and to take liability measures against the Club that has
violated the terms of the Contract”.
15. The above letter was entitled “Notice – Breach of Contract” and it was sent by email to the
general email addresses of the GFA.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
16. On 5 December 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
17. The Player claimed that the Club terminated the Contract without just cause and that he
was therefore entitled to compensation for breach of contract as per art. 17 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations).
18. The Player submitted that as per the Contract, he was entitled to EUR 7,000, payable in 7
instalments of EUR 1,000.
19. He admitted having received a payment of EUR 1,000 at an unspecified date.
20. The Player asserted that the Club should pay him the residual value of the Contract as from
the termination of the Contract, on 30 September 2024, until the contractually agreed end
of the Contract, on 16 March 2025, for a total of EUR 6,000.
21. The Player also requested that 5% interest p.a. be applied on the claimed amount as from
30 September 2024.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-17365
22. The Claimant’s requests for relief, were the following, quoted verbatim:
“1. FIFA DRC shall accept the claim of the Claimant.
2.FIFA DRC shall order the Respondent to pay to the Claimant Euro’s 6,000 net as
Compensation, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 30 September 2024 until the date of effective
payment.
3.FIFA DRC shall impose sportive sanctions on the Respondent.”
b. Reply of the Respondent
23. In its reply, on 15 January 2025, the Club submitted that the FIFA Football Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to hear the present matter.
24. The Club stated that “clause 6 of the Contract included two, jurisdictional possibilities in the
case of a dispute between the parties. Chiefly, either (i) the GFA NDRC, or alternatively (ii) the
national labour courts of Gibraltar”.
25. The Club considered the communication sent by the Player on 11 November 2024 to be a
claim before the Gibraltarian National Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the
Gibraltarian NDRC).
26. Indeed, the Club raised that at the end of its “Notice of Termination of the Contract”, the
Player mentioned “We kindly thank you for attention to our Claim and stand at your disposal
for any further clarification […].”
27. The Club considered that the usage of the word “Claim” was self-definitory, that the letter
should be considered as a Claim brought before the Gibraltarian NDRC, and that by doing
so the Player was merely following the provision of art. 6 of the Contract.
28. The Club raised that the Player’s communication to the GFA was identical in nature to the
present claim before the FIFA Football Tribunal, and that therefore there were concurrent
claims before two different bodies. It further raised that the parties, factual matters, causa
petendi, legal arguments and request for relief were the same.
29. Relying on a previous decision issued by the Football Tribunal under ref. no. FPSD-6063,
the Club requested that this claim be declared inadmissible.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-17365
30. The Respondent’s request for relief, as quoted verbatim, was the following:
“Requests the Player’s Status Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal to issue a decision ruling
that:
i. the claim of mr darko torbica is inadmissible.”
c. Replica of the Claimant
31. On 31 January 2025, the Player submitted his replica.
32. The Player pointed out that the Club did not dispute that it had proceeded to the
termination of the Contract on the basis of his level of physical fitness and highlighted that
the Club brought no evidence as to the validity of the termination of the Contract.
33. The Player also insisted that a termination on the basis of physical fitness contradicted
FIFA’s regulations.
34. In addition, the Player mentioned that the limitations as to the jurisdiction of the Football
Tribunal contained in the Contract were not valid, as they would limit the Player’s possibility
to be heard before the tribunal whose jurisdiction was assigned by the regulations
governing the Contract.
35. The Player submitted that from 11 November 2024 until 26 January 2025, he never received
communications from the GFA regarding his letter, and that he had no information about
the consideration, the resolution or decision on the merits of his claim.
36. The Player raises that the factual circumstances of the present case were different than
those of case FPSD-6063 relied upon by the Club, as the Gibraltarian NDRC had not
rendered a decision regarding his case. He also argued that there was no procedural bad
faith on his part.
37. The Player informed that “in the event that a similar dispute is currently being considered by
the GFA NDRC […] the Player will withdraw the documents from the GFA and will wait for a fair
and legal decision from FIFA”.
38. Ultimately, the Player restated his request for relief contained in his initial claim.
d. Duplica of the Respondent
39. In its duplica, on 7 February 2025, the Club submitted that the Player had not disputed that
his letter to the GFA was intended to be a complete and valid claim, that the content of this
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REF. FPSD-17365
letter and the claim before the FIFA Football Tribunal were identical, and that he had not
made any attempts to contact the GFA to enquire about the status of his request.
40. The Club contested the position of the Player that the dispute resolution clause contained
in the Contract was not valid.
41. The Club raised that the Player admitted the competence of the Gibraltarian NDRC by
signing the Contract, and that he lost the power to challenge the competence of the
Gibraltarian NDRC by filing a claim before it.
42. In addition, the Club claimed that the Player has not submitted any proof of contact with
the Gibraltarian NDRC to request an update on his claim, and that his claim to the FIFA
Football Tribunal was filed 3 weeks after his claim to the Gibraltarian NDRC.
43. Ultimately, the Club mentioned that the Player’s offer to withdraw the documents
submitted to the GFA would be “irrelevant to the present matter” as it would not cure the
procedural inconsistency. In support of its position, the Club cited the decision passed by
the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber dated 23 April 2020 (Balah).
44. Ultimately, the Club made the following requests for relief, quoted verbatim:
“(1) Undisputedly, the Player filed a full and valid claim with the GFA before filing a claim with
FIFA.
(2) This claim was in line with the jurisdiction clause included in the Player’s employment
contract, which he fully consented to, without impairment.
(3) The Player’s decision to file a new claim only three weeks later with FIFA, therefore,
constitutes a violation of the prohibition on forum shopping
(4) The new arguments raised by the Player, only in the second round of submissions - namely,
that the GFA is ‘unprofessional’, and that he filed a claim with FIFA only because of a lack of
response from the GFA – are entirely contrary to the facts of the matter and separately
constitute a violation of venire contra factum proprium.
(5) Even if the Player was to now withdraw his claim before the GFA NDRC, before a decision
is taken, then in line with the jurisprudence of the DRC, this would not be an action capable
of curing his procedural inconsistency.
(6) Therefore, in view of all the above, the Player’s claim is inadmissible.”
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-17365
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
45. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 5 December 2024 and submitted for decision
on 27 March 2025. Taking into account the wording of art. 31 and 34 of the January 2025
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
46. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (January 2025 edition), the DRC would in principle be competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between a Croatian player and a Gibraltarian club.
47. However, the DRC took note of the fact that the Respondent contested the admissibility of
the claim and FIFA’s jurisdiction, both of which shall be addressed in turn.
48. The DRC noted that the Respondent challenged the admissibility of the dispute at stake,
alleging lis pendens. In particular, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant had
already lodged a claim with the same parties and object in front of the GFA, on 11
November 2024, before being notified of the claim lodged by the Claimant at FIFA on 5
December 2024.
49. In this regard, the DRC recalled that, on the basis of the principle of lis pendens, a decisionmaking body is not in a position to deal with the substance of a case, which has already
been brought before and is still pending before another -competent- deciding body. The
principle of lis pendens is applicable if cumulatively and necessarily the parties to the dispute
and the object of the matter in dispute are identical.
50. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the DRC analysed the documentation relied upon by the
Respondent in support of the allegation of lis pendens. The evidence in this respect
consisted of the Claimant’s communication to the GFA of 11 November 2024, entitled
“Notice –Breach of Contract”, filed by the Claimant in support of the present claim, despite 2
rounds of submissions.
51. Based on the aforementioned documentation, the DRC noted that indeed the Claimant had
contacted the GFA, on 11 November 2024, to raise the present situation and requested its
intervention to “consider and resolve the dispute on the merits, to pay the Player the amount
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REF. FPSD-17365
of remuneration due in full and to take liability measures against the Club that has violated the
terms of the Contract”.
52. However, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not file any evidence of answer, or
acknowledgement of receipt from the GFA regarding the communication of the Claimant,
and that it has not provided any evidence of commencement of the proceedings by the
GFA, or evidence that the communication would be of the nature of introducing a claim
before the GFA or its bodies, as per their regulations.
53. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the DRC was not satisfied that the dispute
brought before the Football Tribunal was affected by lis pendens.
54. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber took note that the Respondent contested its
jurisdiction on the basis of art. 6 of the Contract, which allegedly provided for the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Gibraltarian NDRC.
55. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Player insisted on FIFA’s jurisdiction to
decide on this matter.
56. In this context, the DRC first recalled that art. 26 par. 1 lit c) of the Regulations (February,
June and October 2024, and January 2025 editions) establishes that “Article 22 paragraph 1
b) and c) shall apply only to cases brought to FIFA as from 1 January 2025. Any other case shall
be assessed according to the previous regulations”. As a result, the DRC decided that it had to
assess this part of the claim using the May 2023 edition of the Regulations, as this claim
was brought to FIFA before 1 January 2025.
57. The DRC then emphasised that in accordance with art. 22, par. 1, lit. b) of the Regulations
(May 2023 edition), FIFA is, in principle, competent to hear an employment-related dispute
between a club or an association and a player of an international dimension. Nevertheless,
the parties may explicitly opt in writing for such dispute to be decided by an independent
arbitration tribunal that has been established at national level within the framework of the
association and/or a collective bargaining agreement, and which must guarantee fair
proceedings and respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. Any
such arbitration clause must be included either directly in the contract or in a collective
bargaining agreement applicable on the parties.
58. Additionally, the DRC referred to the Circular no. 1010, which establishes the minimum
principles that decision-making bodies must adhere to.
59. In light of the above, the Chamber pointed out that it should, first and foremost, analyse
whether art. 6 of the Contract constituted a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour
of the Gibraltarian NDRC.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-17365
60. The Chamber recalled that this provision provided as follows, quoted verbatim:
“6.1. The Player and the Club agree that any dispute arising in relation to the content of this
Agreement shall initially attempt to be resolved by the Player and the Club (or their
respective representatives) adhering to the procedure set out in the Club’s Rules without the
involvement of the GFA.
6.2 In the event that the dispute is not resolved in this manner, the Player or Club shall
write to the GFA requesting their involvement. The GFA will then have sole discretion to
nominate an independent Panel of 3 persons to hear and resolve the dispute in question or
direct the Player to an Independent Conflict Resolution Board. The Player and the Club
acknowledge and accept that the resolution passed in this hearing, or by the Board, will be
final and binding.
6.3 Any dispute can only be adjudicated within the Courts of Gibraltar.”
61. Having analysed the wording of the abovementioned clause, the Chamber noted that: (i)
although art. 6.2 requires that the relevant claimant request the GFA’s intervention in the
event of a dispute, it does not make any reference to the Gibraltarian NDRC; and (ii) it
makes reference to an “ independent Panel of 3 persons” or to “an Independent Conflict
Resolution Board”.
62. In addition, the Chamber noted that art. 6.3 of the Contract mentioned, quoted verbatim,
“Any dispute can only be adjudicated within the Courts of Gibraltar”, as raised by the Club.
63. The Chamber considered that a clause constructed or interpreted as establishing
alternative forums contravenes the criteria of a “clear and exclusive” jurisdictional clause
that allows parties to exclude the competence of the FIFA Football Tribunal. In other words,
the mention in the Contract of two potential forums for the dispute to be heard goes
against the essence of the notions of clarity and exclusivity.
64. The Chamber, therefore, concluded that the Parties did not agree on a clear and exclusive
jurisdiction clause in favour of the Gibraltarian NDRC and, consequently, decided that the
Club’s challenge to FIFA’s jurisdiction in favour of the NDRC shall be rejected.
65. As a result, the Chamber determined that the Football tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the
present claim as to the substance.
66. In continuation and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber considered relevant to
point out that, in any case, the Club has not brought forward evidence that the Gibraltarian
NDRC meets the minimum standards mandated by circular no. 1010.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-17365
67. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with
its art. 29, the January 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand
as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
68. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
69. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
70. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and took note of the fact that it
is a claim of player against a club for termination of contract without just cause.
71. The DRC recalled that, according to the Claimant, the Club terminated the Contract without
just cause, citing the Claimant’s allegedly insufficient fitness level and his inability to
perform his professional duties in competitive matches.
72. Conversely, the DRC noted that Respondent had submitted very few arguments regarding
the merits of the case, but had mentioned that it remained “ entrenched in the view that (i)
the Player showed a flagrant disregard to his contractual provisions through his persistent
failure to reach an acceptable level of fitness, and (ii) contrary to the Player’s remarks, the
persistent failure to improve fitness an –in accordance with the jurisprudence of the FIFA DRC
and CAS –constitute just cause to terminate an employment contract”.
73. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to confirm whether the Club
had just cause to terminate the Contract and, if applicable, the consequences deriving
therefrom.
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REF. FPSD-17365
74. First, the Chamber observed that it is undisputed that the Contract was terminated on 30
September 2024, by means of the document titled “Proof of Contract End Date”, unilaterally
issued by the Club.
75. This document was preceded by another document entitled “Player Release From Lynx
Football Club,” also unilaterally issued by the Club on 26 September 2024. From this
document, the DRC noted that the Club based its decision to release the Claimant on his
poor fitness level. Specifically, the Chamber noted that this document mentioned, inter alia,
the following (quoted verbatim):
“ As discussed, your level of fitness upon arrival was very poor, and despite numerous
opportunities to improve, you have been unable to reach the level required, and
indeed, unable to play competitive matches at the correct level of performance. You
are therefore unable to carry out your duties as a Player, to the best of your ability
This is in breach of your Player Contract Clause1.1v and Clause vii”.
76. Since the above-referenced correspondence cited art. 1.1 (v) and (vii) of the Contract, the
DRC also recalled that these clauses were as follows:
art. 1.1. (v) “The Player must arrive with an acceptable level of fitness and free from
injury at the start of his Contract, in accordance with the date in Clause e. If he fails
to meet these criteria, his Contract will be terminated with immediate effect.”
art. 1.1. (vii) “ ‘The Player will attend all scheduled training sessions and Club
matches (both competitive and friendly) regardless of whether he is selected; not
selected; injured or otherwise disposed, as and when these are arranged by the Club
unless the Club accepts a Player’s reasoning for non-attendance. The Player is to
remain for the whole duration of each match, regardless of whether he has been
substituted, unless released by a member of the Technical Team.”
77. In this respect, the DRC confirmed that the Club terminated the Contract based on (i) poor
fitness level and (ii) invoking a clause that, in principle, allowed it to terminate the Contract
at any time if it was not “satisfied” with the Player’s fitness level.
78. At this stage, the Chamber considered it was useful to recall the long-standing
jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal regarding poor (sporting) performance, which has
held that such grounds cannot constitute just cause for a club to unilaterally terminate a
contract, even if a clause to that effect is included in the contract, as this would allow for
termination of contracts based on the subjective appreciation of one of the parties, leaving
the continuation of the employment relationship at the mercy of one of the parties to the
contract, thus rendering such clauses to be potestative in nature. Taking into account the
similarities between the aforementioned performance-related termination and the case at
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-17365
hand, the Chamber determined that a similar approach should be warranted under the
circumstances of the present case.
79. More specifically, the Chamber noted that art. 1.1 (v) of the contract appeared to be of a
potestative nature, as this “acceptable level of fitness” of the Player stipulated therein as
grounds for termination was indeed a subjective assessment to be made exclusively by the
Club. The Chamber noted that such a condition left the decision to terminate the
employment contract at the sole discretion of the Club, which goes against the spirit of the
Regulations vis-à-vis contractual stability. Moreover, the Chamber highlighted that the Club
failed to provide any evidence in this respect. Hence, the Chamber determined that neither
such a clause nor the grounds cited by the Club for termination could be upheld in this
case.
80. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber noted the Club’s reliance on CAS 2022/A/9248,
however, upon careful review of the Respondent’s submission and evidence in this respect,
the Chamber remained unconvinced that the reasoning in the above-referenced case could
be extended to the present matter.
81. In addition, the Chamber deemed relevant to recall its long-standing jurisprudence,
according to which only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the
termination of a contract. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do
not reasonably permit to expect the continuation of the employment relationship between
the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. A premature termination of an
employment contract can only be an ultima ratio measure.
82. Consequently, considering all of the above, the DRC determined that the Club terminated
the Contract without just cause and, therefore, must bear the consequences.
ii. Consequences
83. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of such unjustified breach of contract committed by the Respondent.
84. The Chamber first observed that the Player confirmed having received his salary for the
month of September and therefore confirmed that there was no remuneration
outstanding at the time of the termination.
85. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing so, the Chamber
firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount
of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the
contract at the basis of the dispute, taking into account the damage suffered, according to
the “positive interest” principle, having regard for the individual facts and circumstances of
each case, and with due consideration for the law of the country concerned.
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REF. FPSD-17365
86. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as
to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber
established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at
the basis of the matter at stake.
87. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Club to the Player had to be assessed in application of the
other parameters set out in art. 17, par. 1 of the Regulations. In this respect, the Chamber
recalled that, as a general rule, the compensation to be paid to the Player by the Club shall
be equal to the residual value of the Contract that was prematurely terminated, unless the
Player signed a new employment contract following the termination of his previous one (cf.
art. 17 par. 1 lit. i)).
88. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber proceeded
with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the Contract
from the date of its unilateral termination until its end date. Consequently, the Chamber
concluded that the amount of EUR 5,785.71 net to the Claimant (i.e., EUR 1,000 multiplied
by the residual 5 months plus EUR 785.71 for the residual 22 days of March 2025) should
serve as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of
contract.
89. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of
which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant
practice of the DRC as well as art. 17 par. 1 lit. ii) of the Regulations, such remuneration
under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the
amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.
90. In this respect, the Chamber found that the Player was not able to mitigate his damages,
as he was now registered with a Serbian club as an amateur, without earning a fixed salary.
91. Consequently, on account of all the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities
of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of
EUR 5,785.71 net to the Claimant, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified
amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.
92. Lastly, taking into consideration the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of
the Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest
on said compensation at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 30 September 2024 until the date of
effective payment.
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REF. FPSD-17365
iii. Compliance with monetary decisions
93. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
94. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
95. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
96. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
97. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
98. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
99. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
100. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-17365
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Darko Torbica.
2.
The claim of the Claimant, Darko Torbica, is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Lynx FC, must pay to the Claimant the following amount(s):
- EUR 5,785.71 as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as from 30
September 2024 until the date of effective payment.
4.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
6.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
7.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
8.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-17365
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 18