Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-17802
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 19 March 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Lamine Sylla
BY:
Dana MOHAMED AL-NOAIMI, Qatar
CLAIMANT:
Lamine Sylla, Côte d'Ivoire
Represented by Sport Makers
RESPONDENT:
Qadesya, Libya
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-17802
I. Facts of the case
1.
The parties to this dispute are:
•
The Ivorian player, Lamine Sylla (hereinafter: the Player or the Claimant); and
•
The Libyan club, Qadesya (hereinafter: the Club or the Respondent), affiliated to
the Libyan Football Federation (LFF).
2.
On 1 October 2024, the parties allegedly entered into an employment contract (hereinafter:
the Contract) valid from the date of signing “until the end of the 2024-2025 sports season”.
3.
Pursuant to clauses 2 and 3 of the Contract, the Club undertook to pay the Player the
following remuneration:
•
USD 17,000, payable as follows, in verbis: “Contract advance ($ 8,500) first payment,
second payment ($ 4,250) between the first and second legs ($ 4,250) at the end of the
24/25 sports season”.
•
“Housing, food and travel tickets”.
4.
The Contract is on the Club’s letterhead but does not include the Club’s contact details. The
document is signed by the Player and a person identified as the Chairman of the Club’s
Board of Directors.
5.
On 12 November 2024, the Player sent a notice of default to the LFF, in which he referred
to the Contract and alleged that he had been excluded from the Club’s training sessions in
breach of his contractual rights. The Player requested that the LFF forward the
correspondence to the Club and, ultimately, that he be provided with a flight ticket to join
the Club.
6.
On 1 December 2024, the Player entered into a new employment contract with the Libyan
club, Nujum Benghazi Club, which was valid from the date of signing until the end of the
2024/2025 season.
7.
On 26 December 2024, the Player sent a further notice to the LFF, this time terminating the
Contract due to the Club’s failure to pay his salary and to make travel arrangements. The
Player also referred to art. 14bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(hereinafter: the Regulations).
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-17802
II. Proceedings before FIFA
8.
On 15 January 2025, the Player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ position is detailed below.
a. Position of the Player
9.
The Player first stated that, after signing the Contract, he was never provided with a work
permit / visa or flight tickets, despite the fact that he asked the Club “many times to finalize
the aforementioned matters”.
10. The Player also claimed that he did not receive any of the payments provided for in the
Contract.
11. As a result, the Player explained that he had attempted to resolve the situation by sending
a notice of default through the LFF. The Player explained that “the Club’s email address
remained unknown to [them]” and that he therefore decided to contact the LFF as the
governing body of football in the country.
12. According to the Player, he terminated the Contract with just cause in accordance with both
art. 14 and 14bis of the Regulations and should therefore be entitled to the outstanding
remuneration and compensation for breach of contract.
13. The Player requested the following relief, quoted verbatim:
“In view of all the above, we request this honorable chamber:
1) To accept this claim against the Respondent; and
2)To condemn the Respondent to pay the Claimant the overdue amount of USD 8,500 +
5% interest rate p.a. as from 01 October 2024; and
3)To order the Respondent to pay the Claimant a compensation as follows:
i)
ii)
USD 8,500 as residual value + 5% interest rate p.a. as from 26 December
2024; and
USD 8,500 as specificity of sport + 5% interest rate p.a. as from 01 October
2024; and
4) To impose on the Respondent whatever sanctions the DRC deems fit; and
5)To fix a sum of USD (5000) “Five Thousand” NET, to be paid by the Respondent to the
Claimant, to help the payment of its legal fees and costs”.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-17802
b. Position of the Club
14. The Club did not respond to the claim.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
15. First of all, the Single Judge of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Single Judge)
analysed whether she was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, she
took note that the present matter was presented to FIFA on 15 January 2025 and submitted
for decision on 19 March 2025. Taking into account the wording of art. 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
16. Furthermore, the Single Judge referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (January 2025 edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal
with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an
international dimension between an Ivorian player and a Libyan club.
17. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, she confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par.
1 and 2 and 29 of the Regulations (January 2025 edition) and considering that the present
claim was lodged on 15 January 2025, the January 2025 edition of the Regulations is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
18. The Single Judge recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Single Judge
stressed the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which she may
consider evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence
generated by or within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
19. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Single Judge
entered into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Single Judge started by
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REF. FPSD-17802
acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the
documentation on file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that in the following
considerations she will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence,
which she considered pertinent for assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
20. The Single Judge then moved to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerned a
claim for outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract brought by
a player against a club.
21. On the one hand, the Single Judge outlined that the Player claimed that he terminated the
Contract on 26 December 2024 with just cause because the Club failed to pay him his salary
and to take the necessary administrative measures to enable him to provide his services
(e.g., visa, work permit, flight tickets).
22. On the other hand, the Club failed to respond to the claim, thus leading the Single Judge to
conclude that any decision must be taken solely on the basis of the evidence provided by
the Player (cf., art. 21, par. 1 of the Procedural Rules).
23. In this context, the Single Judge recognised that her task was to decide on the date and the
circumstances of the termination, as well as on the consequences, if any, to be drawn
therefrom.
24. The Single Judge then moved to the analysis of each of these issues in turn.
A. THE TERMINATION
25. As a starting point, the Single Judge recalled that in his claim, the Player argued that the
Club withdrew from the Contract as soon as it was signed, by not paying him and not taking
the necessary steps to enable him to perform his services.
26. The Player also claimed that he did not have the Club’s email address or postal address
and that he had therefore tried to contact the Club through the LFF, but to no avail.
Consequently, the Player claimed that he had no other option but to terminate the Contract
on 26 December 2024.
27. Notwithstanding the above, the Single Judge noted that the Player had already signed with
another club in Libya by the time he claimed to have terminated the Contract.
28. In view of the above and by stressing that a footballer cannot sign two (or more) contracts
for the same period (cf., art. 18, par. 5 of the Regulations, as detailed in the Commentary
on the Regulations, p. 240 et seq.), the Single Judge determined that the date of the
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-17802
termination of the Contract was not 26 December 2024, but rather 1 December 2024 i.e.,
the date on which the Player started the parallel employment relationship.
29. As a result, the Single Judge concluded that the Player de facto terminated the Contract on
1 December 2024 instead.
30. Next, the Single Judge moved on to analyse whether the Player had a just cause for doing
so.
31. In this respect, while the Single Judge found it to be true that the Player was entitled to an
advance payment of USD 8,500 and that this sum represented a significant part of his
contractual compensation, the Single Judge emphasised that his only documented attempt
to communicate with the Club was the notification of 12 November 2024, in which he asked
for air tickets through the LFF.
32. In light of the above, the Single Judge decided that the requirements set out in art. 14bis of
the Regulations were not met in this case, and therefore the termination could only have
been for just cause if it had been based on art. 14 of the Regulations.
33. Having established the above, the Single Judge recalled that the abovementioned art. 14 of
the Regulations provided:
“14. Terminating a contract with just cause
1. A contract may be terminated by either party without consequences of any kind (either
payment of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions) where there is just cause.
In general, just cause shall exist in any circumstance in which a party can no longer
reasonably and in good faith be expected to continue a contractual relationship.
2. Any abusive conduct of a party aiming at forcing the counterparty to terminate
or change the terms of the contract shall entitle the counterparty (a player or a club)
to terminate the contract with just cause.”
(emphasis added by the Single Judge)
34. With the above in mind, the Single Judge recalled that the Player claimed that he could no
longer expect the continuity of the employment. However, the Single Judge was again not
convinced by his argument, as detailed in continuation.
35. Firstly, the Player expressly confirmed that he did not know the Club’s postal or email
address. In this context, and in the absence of any explanation or document in the file to
this effect, the Single Judge was uncertain as to how the Player was even able to sign a
contract with the Club in the first place.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-17802
36. Secondly, the Single Judge also found it significant that the Player claimed to have
contacted the Club “on several occasions” in order to execute the Contract, but did not
provide any evidence to support his claim. Indeed, the Player contradicted himself by
stating that he did not have the Club’s contact details but then claiming that he had
proactively attempted to perform the Contract without success.
37. Thirdly, the Single Judge considered that the only evidence provided by the Player in
support of his position that he ever tried to comply with the Contract was the notice of
default dated 12 November 2024. However, this notice was sent to a third party (i.e., the
LFF) and the Single Judge found no evidence on file that the LFF ever acknowledged receipt
and/or signalled to the Player that it had forwarded the notice to the Club.
38. Fourthly, in addition to the doubts as to the legitimacy of the Player’s warning through the
LFF, the Single Judge also considered it essential that the Player did not even mention the
overdue payables in his notice of default or until the notice of termination (i.e., when the
Contract had already been terminated for 28 days).
39. In light of the above, the Single Judge decided that: (i) even if the advance payment claimed
by the Player was indeed significant in relation to the full value of the Contract, the Player
failed to submit any evidence that he had attempted to collect the monies at the risk of
termination; and (ii) the 12 November notice was not sufficient to establish that the Club
had engaged in any abusive conduct towards the Player or that the Player had attempted
to remedy the situation in any way – especially considering that the Player did not obtain
confirmation of delivery and then signed another contract before the effective notice of
termination.
40. Therefore, on the basis of the (lack of) documentation on file, the Single Judge concluded
that the Player could not corroborate the breach of contract by the Club in a way of
triggering the severe consequences of a premature termination.
41. As a result, the Single Judge was not convinced that there was a just cause for terminating
the Contract. Hence, she decided that the Player is not entitled to compensation for breach
of contract.
42. In addition, the Single Judge remarked that the alleged outstanding remuneration (i.e., the
advance payment) could, by its very nature and differently from a sign-on fee, be
considered as an amount paid “in advance” for services to be rendered in the future.
However, as the Player confirmed that he did not provide any services, the Single Judge
saw no regulatory or contractual basis for awarding any consideration.
43. In conclusion, the Single Judge dismissed the Player’s claim in its entirety.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-17802
d. Costs
44. The Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Single Judge decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
45. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge recalled the contents of art.
25 par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
46. Lastly, the Single Judge concluded her deliberations by rejecting any other requests for
relief made by any of the parties.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-17802
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Lamine Sylla, is rejected.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-17802
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 57 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 11