Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-17785
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 29 May 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Aleksandr Stavpets
COMPOSITION:
Lívia SILVA KÄGI (Brazil & Switzerland), Deputy Chairwoman
Johan VAN GAALEN (South Africa), Member
Jorge GUTIÉRREZ (Costa Rica), Member
CLAIMANT:
Aleksandr Stavpets, Russia
Represented by Ilia Zotov
RESPONDENT:
ML Vitebsk, Belarus
Represented by Christoforos F. Florou
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-17785
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 11 March 2024, the Russian player Aleksandr Stavpets (hereinafter, the Claimant) and
the Belarusian club ML Vitebsk (hereinafter, the Respondent) concluded an employment
contract (hereinafter, the Contract) valid as from 11 March 2024 until 9 December 2024.
2.
In accordance with Clause 1.1 of the Contract, the Claimant was employed by the
Respondent as an “athlete-instructor”.
3.
Pursuant to Clause 3.1 of the Contract, the Respondent undertook to pay the Claimant
(hereinafter, jointly referred to as the Parties) the following remuneration:
“3. Conditions of Employment and Payment
(…)
3.1.1 [The Claimant] is entitled to an hourly wage rate (or base salary) of 1,116.00 BYN as
of the date of signing this Agreement
3.1.2 The hourly wage rate (or base salary) may subsequently be adjusted in accordance
with labor legislation, collective agreements, or by mutual agreement of the Parties.
4.
Clause 6.2 of the Contract stipulates as follows:
“Matters not covered by this agreement are governed by the legislation of the Republic of
Belarus and the regulatory documents of FIFA, UEFA, and ABFF. Labor disputes arising from
this agreement shall be resolved in court”.
5.
On 17 December 2024, the Claimant put the Respondent in default, requesting the
payment of 6.675 USD. The Claimant granted the Respondent a deadline of 10 days to fulfil
its contractual obligations.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-17785
II. Proceedings before FIFA
6.
On 14 January 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
Parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
7.
The Claimant initially pointed out that, despite the provisions of Clause 3.1.1 of the
Contract, he was not entitled to an hourly wage rate of BYN 1,116. In this regard, the
Claimant “supposes that the [Respondent’s] management made a genuine mistake when they
were drawing up this Contract. This sum was supposed to be equal to 337,5 USD because the
Football Player was paid double the amount each month (775 USD)”.
8.
The Claimant argued that the Club also undertook to pay him an “unofficial salary” in the
amount of USD 2,225 per month. According to the Claimant, the existence of this monthly
payments is evidence by the bank statements submitted and the Telegram chat between
the Claimant and the Respondent’s owner, Mr Artyom Leonov.
9.
The Claimant contended that the Respondent has failed to pay this “unofficial salary” for
the months of September, October and November 2024, in the amount of USD 2,225 each,
as well as the pro rata value up to 9 December 2024, in the amount of 645.97 USD.
10. The Player requested the following relief:
“Considering the aforementioned facts, the Claimant hereby requests the FIFA Football
Tribunal to:
1) Order [the Club] to comply with the Employment Agreement № 158, dated March 11,
2024, and to repay the debt in the amount of 7 320,97 USD net plus 5% interest p.a. as
from the date of payment agreed upon by the Parties until the date of effective payment”.
b. Reply of the Respondent
11. In its reply, the Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of FIFA to hear the present dispute,
arguing that the Contract refers to the national court of Belarus for resolving any disputes
related to the employment relationship between the Parties, based on Clauses 5.7 and 6.2
of the Contract. In addition, the Respondent sustained that the Claimant’s employment
status, namely, an “athlete-instructor”, does not grant jurisdiction to FIFA, as he was not in
possession of a valid coaching licence, and only civil courts have jurisdiction over this
matter.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-17785
12. As to the substance, the Respondent contended that the Claimant was entitled to BYN
2,030.57 per month, which corresponds to USD 620.85. In this respect, the Respondent
claimed that the Claimant has been fully paid for the amounts requested.
13. Based on the above, the Respondent requested the following relief:
“On these grounds the Respondent requires that:
1. For all the above-mentioned reasons, you are kindly requested to reject the Claimant’s
claim as inadmissible in front of FIFA Football Tribunal since the FIFA Football Tribunal
does not have jurisdiction to deal with this matter.
Or
2. In case, the Chamber decides that it is competent to hear this matter in substance, then
FIFA DRC shall reject the Claimant’s request for reliefs as unreasonable”.
c. Replica of the Claimant
14. In his replica, the Claimant insisted on the jurisdiction of FIFA to entertain his claim, arguing
that Clause 6.2 of the Contract can have three separate meetings, namely, that the disputes
between the Parties can be resolved “(1) through judicial proceedings, (2) through legal
proceedings, (3) in court”. According to the Claimant, he translated the aforementioned
clause as “in court”, although he considered the first option to be the most accurate. In this
regard, the Claimant submitted the translation of the third option because it was the
simplest, “but it is now evident that it only gave an opportunity to the Respondent to abuse this
clause”. The Claimant contended that Clause 6.2 of the Contract does not give a clear
reference to the specific judicial body, and it is not exclusive. The Claimant also argued that
he played in official matches for the Respondent, and therefore he was employed as a
professional football player and not as an “athlete-instructor”.
15. As to the substance, the Claimant reiterated his entitlement to the amounts claimed,
arguing that that the chats submitted prove the existence of an agreement regarding these
payments.
16. The Claimant reiterated his request for relief.
d. Duplica of the Respondent
17. In its duplica, the Respondent reiterated its arguments regarding the jurisdiction of the
national court of Belarus, based on Clauses 5.7 and 6.2 of the Contract and the fact that
the Claimant was an “athlete-instructor” without a valid coaching licence. In addition, the
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REF. FPSD-17785
Respondent argued that the Claimant did not prove that he has participated in matches
for the Respondent.
18. The Respondent insisted on the inexistence of a written agreement for the amounts
claimed.
19. The Respondent reiterated its request for relief.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
20. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter, the Chamber or the DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 14 January 2025 and submitted for decision
on 29 May 2025. Taking into account the wording of art. 34 of the January 2025 edition of
the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter, the Procedural Rules),
the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
21. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the January
2025 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter, the
Regulations), the DRC is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter at stake, which
concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a
Russian player and a Belarusian club.
22. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber noted that the Respondent challenged the
jurisdiction of FIFA in favour of the civil courts of Belarus based on the following:
o Pursuant to Clause 1.1 of the Contract, the Claimant was employed as an “athleteinstructor”. In this regard, since the Claimant was not in a possession of a valid
coaching license, only civil courts have jurisdiction over this matter.
o In accordance with Clause 6.2 of the Contract, the Parties agreed to refer their
disputes to the national court of Belarus.
23. The Chamber also noted that, for its part, the Claimant insisted on the jurisdiction of FIFA,
sustaining that (i) he played in official matches for the Club and he was therefore employed
as a professional football player, and (ii) Clause 6.2 of the Contract is not clear and
exclusive.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-17785
24. In this context, the members of the Chamber went on to analyse the Contract at stake, and
indeed noted that, according to its Clause 1.1, the Claimant was employed by the Club as
an “athlete-instructor”. In this regard, the Chamber opined that while the term “athleteinstructor” is indeed closer to coach, the description of the activities and/or functions for
which the Claimant was employed does not allow the conclusion that he was either a coach
or a player. In particular, the Chamber noted that the Contract did not clearly define the
Claimant’s role in the Club, but used a description of roles and responsibilities that was
rather generic.
25. Along these lines, the Chamber also noted that the Claimant failed to submit any evidence
regarding his alleged participation in matches as a player for the Respondent.
26. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber further noted that the Claimant’s transfer to
the Respondent, along with a copy of the Contract, was registered in TMS. As a result, the
Chamber concluded that the fact that the Respondent registered the Claimant’s transfer in
TMS is proof enough of the nature of his employment relationship as a player with the
Respondent, since TMS is the system for processing international transfers of players.
27. Having established that the Claimant was employed by the Club as a player, and therefore
that the DRC has jurisdiction ratione personae, the Chamber went on to analyse the Club’s
challenge to the jurisdiction of FIFA in favour of the national courts of Belarus.
28. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that, pursuant to art. 22 caput of the Regulations, FIFA
has jurisdiction over employment-related disputes between a player and a club with an
international dimension “without prejudice to the right of any player (…) or club to seek redress
before a civil court for employment related disputes”.
29. The Chamber then emphasised that art. 22 caput of the Regulations provides for a clear
hierarchy in favour of contractual autonomy, which has been consistently confirmed by the
Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
30. The Chamber also recalled that the well-established jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal
dictates that jurisdiction clauses must be sufficiently clear, including at the very least the
designation of a specific place or (civil) court. Furthermore, this clause must also be
exclusive, in favour of the relevant court to exclude the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal.
31. Consequently, the Chamber determined that it had to establish whether, as argued by the
Respondent, the Parties had indeed agreed on a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in
favour of the civil courts of Belarus.
32. The Chamber noted that, pursuant to Clause 6.2 of the Contract, as translated by the
Claimant:
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REF. FPSD-17785
“Matters not covered by this agreement are governed by the legislation of the Republic of
Belarus and the regulatory documents of FIFA, UEFA, and ABFF. Labor disputes arising from
this agreement shall be resolved in court”.
33. After having carefully analysed the wording of the foregoing provision, the members of the
Chamber unanimously concluded that Clause 6.2 of the Contract did not provide for the
jurisdiction of the civil courts in Belarus. In fact, the Chamber noted that Clause 6.2 of the
Contract only referred to “courts”, without designating a specific place or (civil) court in line
with the well-established jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal.
34. In view of the above, and considering that the Parties did not clearly agree on the
jurisdiction of the civil courts of Belarus, the Chamber decided that the Respondent’s
objection to the jurisdiction of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected, and
that the DRC does have jurisdiction, based on art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the Regulations, to
consider the present matter as to the substance.
35. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
January 2025 edition of the Regulations, the aforementioned edition of the Regulations is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
36. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
37. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
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REF. FPSD-17785
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
38. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and took note of the fact that
the Parties strongly disputed the Claimant’s entitlement to the “unofficial salary” requested.
39. In this regard, the members of the Chamber went on to analyse the Parties’ submissions,
starting with the Claimant, according to whom he was entitled to an “unofficial salary” of
USD 2,225 in addition to the amounts agreed under the Contract. Because the Club failed
to remit this “unofficial salary” for the months of September to November 2024 (i.e., total of
USD 6,675) as well as the pro rata value up to 9 December 2024 (i.e., 645.97 USD), the
Claimant claimed to be entitled to USD 7,320.97 in total.
40. The Chamber then recalled the Respondent’s position, who contended that the Claimant
failed to prove the existence of any agreement between the Parties regarding the “unofficial
salary”, and that it has already fully complied its contractual obligations towards the
Claimant.
41. In this context, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that their task was to analyse
whether the Player was entitled to the “unofficial salary” claimed.
42. The Chamber first noted that, as argued by the Claimant, this “unofficial salary” was not
included in the Contract at hand. Consequently, the existence of an agreement between
the Parties regarding this alleged “unofficial salary” and its amount had to be addressed
based on the other evidence on file.
43. The Chamber started the aforementioned analysis by recalling the principle of burden of
proof, as stipulated in art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, and underscored that the
Claimant bore the burden of proving the existence of the “unofficial salary” claimed.
44. With the above in mind, the Chamber went on to analyse the evidence submitted by the
Claimant, and noted that there is no evidence on file regarding an agreement between the
Parties on the “unofficial salary” claimed by the Claimant or his entitlement to USD 2,225 on
a monthly basis on top of the amounts agreed under the Contract.
45. The Chamber also noted that there is no reference to the “unofficial salary” or monthly
payments of USD 2,225 in the bank statements or the correspondence exchanged by the
Parties.
46. On account of the foregoing, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that
the Claimant did not comply with his burden of proof regarding the “unofficial salary”, and
therefore the Chamber decided that the claim of the Claimant must be rejected.
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REF. FPSD-17785
d. Costs
47. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the Parties.
48. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
49. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the Parties.
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REF. FPSD-17785
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Aleksandr Stavpets.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is rejected.
3.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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REF. FPSD-17785
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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