Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-14572
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 27 March 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Nikolai
Solovev
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member
Mario FLORES CHEMOR (Mexico), Member
CLAIMANT:
FC Zenit JSC, Russia
RESPONDENT 1:
Nikolai Solovev, Russia
Represented by Sila International Lawyers
RESPONDENT 2:
OFK Grbalj, Montenegro
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-14572
I. Facts of the case
1.
The relevant parties to the dispute are:
−
FC Zenit (hereinafter: Claimant), a club headquartered in the city of St. Petersburg,
Russia, and affiliated to the Football Union of Russia (hereinafter: FUR);
−
The Russian player, Nikolai Solovev, born on 10 June 2004 (hereinafter: the First
Respondent); and
−
OFK Grbalj (hereinafter: the Second Respondent), a club headquartered in the city of
Radanovici, Montenegro, and affiliated the Football Association of Montenegro
(hereinafter: FAM).
2.
On 20 June 2022, the Claimant and the First Respondent concluded an employment
contract (hereinafter: Contract) valid as from 1 July 2022 until 10 June 2023. Previously, the
First Respondent had been registered in the Claimant’s academies as an amateur.
3.
According to the Contract, the Claimant undertook to pay the First Respondent a monthly
salary of RUB 30,000.
4.
Clause 11.3 of the Contract reads as follows:
“11.3. If any dispute relating to the Agreement arises between the Parties, it shall be
settled through negotiations. If the dispute is not settled by the Parties, it shall be
submitted exclusively to the FUR Dispute resolution chamber. The Parties agree that
the decision of FUR Dispute Resolution Chamber may be appealed to Court of
Arbitration for Sport/ Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (Lausanne) in accordance with the
FUR Regulations on dispute resolution and in accordance with the Code of Sportrelated Arbitration.”
5.
In the beginning of October 2022, the First Respondent left Russia.
6.
On 10 October 2022, the Claimant put the First Respondent in default and requested him
to (a) provide an explanation as to his absence within 2 business days, indicating that the
First Respondent had been absent from trainings as of 5 October 2022, (b) cease breaching
the Contract and (c) resume his duties, to no avail.
7.
On 17 October 2022, the Claimant sent a new notice to the First Respondent, reiterating its
previous correspondence and informing the First Respondent that if he did not resume his
participation in training events on or before 19 October 2022, the Contract would be
terminated with just cause on 20 October 2022.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-14572
8.
Also on 17 October 2022, the First Respondent sent an e-mail and a letter attached thereto,
which was dated 10 October 2022, whereby the First Respondent responded to the
Claimant. In doing so, he stated as follows:
“I, Solovev Nikolai Nikolaevich, with reference to provisions of Article 77, Part 1, Clause
3, Article 80, Article 348.12 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, ask to be
dismissed of my own free will on 11 November 2022.
The motive for making the decision to be dismissed at my own request was the actual
exclusion of me as an athlete from the game process, transfer to participate in training
events in the younger training age group, that, in turn, completely blocks the
opportunity for me to improve sportsmanship and professional growth, makes the job
meaningless.”
9.
On 20 October 2022, the Claimant replied to the First Respondent, and stated inter alia as
follows:
“On 10 October 2022 and 17 October 2022, FC Zenit JSC (hereinafter referred as to “FC
Zenit”, “Club”) sent you the demand to stop breaching the Contract entered into
between you and the Club on 20 June 2022. Nevertheless, you have not resumed
execution of your labor obligations; the Club has received neither response to the
Club’s request, nor any explanation of the reasons of your absence in the workplace.
Thus, during the period from 05 October 2022 through 20 October 2022 you were
absent from the workplace without just cause and did not fulfill your labor obligations,
which is the valid reason for termination of the Contract by the Club with just cause.
Moreover, on 18 October 2022 the Club received your letter of dismissal on your own
will without just cause. We draw your attention that by the date you sent the letter of
dismissal to FC Zenit, you had not executed your labor obligations for the long time,
to be exact for 13 days.
In light of the above, based on article 81 (6.a) of the Labor Code of the Russian
Federation (unauthorized absence), we hereby inform you of termination of the
Contract at the Club’s initiative on 20 October 2022 (the last day of your employment
at FC Zenit). We ask you to arrive at the Club immediately to sign the order of dismissal.
We draw your attention once again that the Club intends to claim compensation from
you and/or your future football club, as well as the application of sporting
disqualification to you.”
10. On 14 December 2022, the Claimant put the First Respondent in default and requested
payment of RUB 911,221 as compensation for breach of contract, to be paid within 10 days,
to no avail.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-14572
11. On 8 February 2023, the First and Second Respondent entered into an employment
agreement, valid as from the same date until 20 June 2023, for a monthly remuneration of
EUR 450.
12. On 9 February 2023, the Second Respondent wrote to the Claimant and enquired about
the First Respondent’s status.
13. On 10 February 2023, the Second Respondent entered a transfer instruction in the FIFA
Transfer Matching System (hereinafter: TMS) to “engage the player out of contract” on a
permanent basis. On the same date, the FUR confirmed the First Respondent’s identity in
the relevant instruction in line with Title V, Annexe 3 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players, and the FAM requested the First Respondent’s International
Transfer Certificate (hereinafter: ITC).
14. On 11 February 2023, the FUR delivered the First Respondent’s ITC to the FAM, without any
distinctive issues.
15. On 13 February 2023, the Claimant informed the Second Respondent that the First
Respondent was obliged to pay compensation for breach of contract and warned that, in
case the Second Respondent registered him, the Claimant would sue the Second
Respondent before FIFA.
16. Also on 13 February 2023, the First Respondent was registered with the FAM and the
Second Respondent.
The First Claim before FIFA
17. On 31 May 2023, the Claimant filed a first claim against the Respondents (hereinafter: the
First Claim), which was filed under case ref. FPSD-10407. Each party timely submitted their
respective positions. It is to be noted that the Second Respondent challenged the FIFA’s
jurisdiction to hear the First Claim.
18. On 3 August 2023, the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber rendered its decision in the First
Claim and ruled that the Football Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute due to
a lack of international dimension under art. 22 par. 1 lit a) and b) of the FIFA Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Decision). The grounds of the
Decision were communicated to the parties on 14 August 2023.
The Appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
19. The Claimant subsequently lodged an appeal against the Decision before CAS.
20. On 6 May 2024, CAS rendered its award and overturned the Decision, ruling that the DRC
had jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Claimant on the basis of art. 22 par. 1 lit. a)
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-14572
(hereinafter: the CAS Award). It accordingly referred the case back to the DRC for
adjudication on the substance of the matter.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
21. On 8 May 2024, the FIFA general secretariat took due note of the CAS Award and invited
the parties to file additional submissions regarding the substance of the dispute, which
they did in a timely manner. A summary of the parties’ respective positions is detailed
below.
a. Position of the Claimant
22. According to the Claimant, the First Respondent’s termination of the Contract was a result
of mala fide behavior. The Claimant argued that the First Respondent's actions were
untrustworthy, in that he unilaterally and unreasonably stopped performing his duties
without any explanation, was absent from training sessions and team matches, and left the
country without notifying or seeking permission.
23. To this effect the Claimant recalled it sent letters ordering the First Respondent to resume
his duties, but he did not respond. As a result, the Claimant’s trust in the First Respondent
was significantly affected, leading them to believe that they could no longer continue the
employment relationship. They further argue that the Claimant's termination notice was
merely a formality, as the First Respondent had already decided to terminate the
agreement without just cause.
24. In continuation, the Claimant stated that the sequence of events established that the
termination was a result of the First Respondent's behaviour, and the Claimant made
efforts to maintain the employment relationship with him. The Claimant further contended
that the First Respondent's allegations of exclusion from the game process and being
transferred to participate in training events in a younger age group were not valid
justifications for unilaterally terminating the Contract. Moreover, the Claimant argued that
the First Respondent failed to provide any evidence to support these claims and did not
follow the proper procedure for addressing his concerns.
25. The Claimant further maintained that the First Respondent's reasons for termination did
not meet the criteria for just cause as outlined in the Contract and relevant FIFA regulations.
In addition, even if the First Respondent did have just cause to terminate the Contract, he
missed the deadline for doing so.
26. As to the compensation owed for the termination without just cause, the Claimant
maintained it was entitled to compensation in the amount of EUR 15,077.00. The Claimant
calculated the compensation as follows:
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-14572
“A) the sum of salary and insurance fees that would have been paid to the Player
under the Contract for the period from the date of its early termination until the
initially supposed date of its expiration in the amount of RUB 301,465.00 (Exhibit
12);
B) the sum of Player's health insurance {Exhibit 13) and the cost of his medical
treatment in the total amount of RUB 113,133.00 (Exhibit 14);
C)the sum of the training compensation paid by the Claimant to Player's former
clubs (sporting schools) due to signing of first professional contract with the Player
under the FUR Regulations on the Status and Transfer of players, in the amount of
RUB 496,623.00 (Exhibit 15)
(…)
The compensation for the unilateral termination of the Contract in the amount of
RUB 911,221.00 (Nine hundred and eleven thousand two hundred and twenty-one
rubles) net can be paid to the Claimant in euros. A correspondent sum is equal to
EUR 15,077.00 (Fifteen thousand and seventy-seven euros) net and shall be
calculated as follows:
911,221/60.4371, where:
911,221 -is a sum of compensation for the unilateral termination of the Contract in
Russian rubles;
60.4371-is an official currency exchange rate of the Bank of Russia (EUR 1 = RUB
60.4371) for 21 October 2022, which is the date immediately following the date of
unilateral termination of the Contract by the Player (the latter being the due date for
compensation payment).
The official exchange rate (RUB/EUR) for 21.10.2022 can be checked at the official
website of Bank of Russia.”
27. In addition, the Claimant submitted that the Second Respondent should be held jointly and
severally liable for paying the compensation owed to the Claimant, arguing that the Second
Respondent, as the new club that entered into an employment agreement with the First
Respondent after his termination with the Claimant, should bear the responsibility for the
First Respondent's actions and the resulting breach of contract.
28. The Claimant pointed out that the Second Respondent was aware of the ongoing dispute
between the Claimant and the First Respondent, as they had inquired about the First
Respondent's status in a letter sent to the Claimant. Despite being informed by the
Claimant about the First Respondent's obligation to pay compensation for the breach of
contract, the Second Respondent proceeded to register him without addressing the
compensation issue or responding to the Claimant 's warning.
29. The Claimant filed the following request for relief:
“1. To declare that:
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-14572
A) The First Respondent and the Second Respondent shall pay FC Zenit EUR 15,077.00
(Fifteen thousand and seventy-seven euros) net, being the amount of compensation
for the unilateral termination of the Contract;
B) The First Respondent and the Second Respondent shall pay the annual interest of
5% on the amount of compensation starting from 21 October 2022.
2. In addition to the above, the First Respondent and the Second Respondent shall
bear any and all additional costs (including procedural costs) of the proceedings that
the Dispute Resolution Chamber may deem appropriate to levy as a result of
consideration of the case in question.”
b. Position of the First Respondent
30. According to the First Respondent, the Claimant terminated the Contract without just cause
and, in any event, is not entitled to compensation.
31. First, the First Respondent, while referring to the principle of ultima ratio, asserted that the
Claimant terminated the Contract without just cause and highlighted that he was only
called back to attend training sessions and not play official matches. He highlighted in this
respect that he was not called for two of the Claimant’s matches on 7 and 14 October 2022.
32. Second, despite the Claimant describing the First Respondent as “valuable,” the First
Respondent argued that the Claimant’s actions suggested otherwise, in that the First
Respondent was rarely included in the team’s matches, and the Claimant even sent him to
train with the younger team. To the First Respondent, this treatment indicated that the
Claimant did not genuinely value his services.
33. Third, the First Respondent confirmed he did not wish to continue his employment with
the Claimant due to the lack of opportunities to train and compete with the appropriate
age group. He added in this respect that both parties demonstrated a lack of interest in the
First Respondent’s employment. While the Claimant did not treat him as an important
asset, the First Respondent also felt dissatisfied with the lack of opportunities provided by
the Claimant. As a result, the Contract termination could not lead to compensation in the
Claimant’s favour.
34. In continuation, the First Respondent submitted that, after terminating the Contract, the
Claimant’s behaviour suggested a lack of genuine interest in seeking compensation. Rather
than being proactive, they remained reluctant for an extended period of 223 days. This
delay raised questions about their commitment to pursuing their claim. The First
Respondent pointed out that, in disciplinary cases and those involving sporting succession,
FIFA and CAS have consistently emphasized that a creditor should promptly assert their
claims. Applying this principle to the present case, the First Respondent was of the view
that the Claimant’s lack of “vigilance” prevented them from obtaining a favourable decision.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-14572
35. In this respect, the First Respondent further underlined that the Claimant had
opportunities to challenge the issuance of the ITC but remained silent. Their failure to
object to the RFU further complicated matters. Even if the First Respondent had terminated
the Contract without just cause, the Claimant’s behaviour significantly contributed to the
situation.
36. In addition to the foregoing, the First Respondent addressed the issue of the war in Russia
and stated that the legal foundation for conscription in Russia derived from the Decree of
the President of Russia issued on 21 September 2022. This document served as the sole
basis for any conclusions regarding the First Respondent’s possible conscription. Notably,
the Decree did not include exceptions for “young conscripts”. While it provided for
deferment rights for citizens working in military-industrial organizations, it did not
specifically exempt “young conscripts,” potentially putting the First Respondent at risk of
conscription.
37. The First Respondent then explained that he turned 18 in June 2022, making him an adult
under Russian law. Consequently, he could be subject to mobilization as the Decree did
not contain any provisions releasing him from the obligation to join the national armed
forces. The First Respondent thus sought to rebut the Claimant’s argument in its claim
suggesting otherwise. The First Respondent also underlined that, given the start of
conscription measures, he was at that point in time potentially at risk of involvement in
armed conflict until the partial mobilization, which officially ended on 28 October 2022.
38. As a final matter, the First Respondent submitted that, in case any compensation was
awarded, it should be reduced with respect to the amount sought by the Claimant.
39. In this sense, the First Respondent argued that the sums in the dispute, originally claimed
in EUR, should be recalculated in RUB. The First Respondent agreed to the currency rate of
1 EUR = 60.4371 RUB, which was applicable on the day of termination of the Contract.
Moreover, the First Respondent’s monthly salary under the Contract was RUB 26,100 net.
The Claimant should not include any tax deductions in the calculation, as confirmed by CAS
jurisprudence. During his employment with the Second Respondent, the First Respondent’s
monthly salary in EUR was EUR 450, which converts to RUB 27,197 using the agreed
currency rate. Thus, the average salary for calculation purposes was RUB (26,100 +
27,197)/2 = RUB 26,648.50 net. In addition, the Claimant terminated the Contract on 20
October 2022, although it should have expired on 10 June 2023. The average remuneration
for the period from 21 October 2022, until 10 June 2023 amounted to RUB 204,878.25.
40. The First Respondent also contested other items included in the Claimant's calculation, as
follows:
-
Transfer fee and agent's commission: the Claimant did not imply any transfer fee
or agent's commission related to the acquisition of the First Respondent's
services. Therefore, any further monetary claims by the Claimant should be
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-14572
rejected.
-
Insurance fees: The First Respondent emphasized that art. 17 of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players does not include "insurance
fees/premiums" as part of the compensation for termination of contract without
just cause. The Claimant did not demonstrate the relevance of insurance
premiums to the compensation criteria. Furthermore, there was no
documentation confirming whether any insurance premiums were paid or who
was involved in the transaction.
-
Medical expenses: The First Respondent emphasized that art. 17 of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players does not include "medical
expenses" as part of the compensation for termination without just cause. The
Claimant did not demonstrate the relevance of medical expenses to the listed
criteria for compensation. Contrary to the Claimant’s argument, medical
expenses are not directly related to the acquisition of the First Respondent's
services. Clauses 4.4 and 4.5 of the Contract specifically outlined the Claimant's
responsibility to provide adequate medical care during the employment.
Furthermore, there were no records or documents indicating that the Claimant
incurred any medical expenses specifically for the First Respondent. As a result,
this submission should be rejected.
-
Training compensation: The First Respondent reiterated that art. 17 of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players does not include "training
compensation" as part of the compensation for termination of contract without
just cause. The Claimant failed to demonstrate the relevance of training
compensation to the listed criteria for compensation. In addition, training
compensation is normally paid upon a player's initial registration as a
professional in accordance with arts. 21 and 22 of the RFU Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players. It arises from the registration, not from the
acquisition of the player's services.
-
The Claimant's calculation of the amount of RUB 496,623.06 allegedly paid as a
refund lacked clarity. The attached documents show an agreement with a football
academy ("Kolomyagi") for total compensation of RUB 226,556. However, the
payment order covered only half of this amount (RUB 113,278), and the payment
to the RFU lacked supporting documentation.
-
The Claimant included alleged payments to "SPB GBU SHOR for Football Zenit" in
the calculation. The First Respondent believed that this academy was directly
linked to the Claimant, contrary to the Claimant's allegations.
-
The First Respondent proposed three alternative options for the calculation of the
compensation, to be amortized over the duration of the Contract with the
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-14572
Claimant.
o
o
o
-
First option: Only amounts due to the "Kolomyagi" Academy (excluding any
amounts paid to the RFU) should be considered. The Claimant may receive a
maximum of RUB 76,504, to be amortized over the term of the Contract.
Second option: Consider the amounts due to "Kolomyagi" Academy and RFU
under their contract. The Claimant may receive a maximum of RUB 153,008,
to be amortized over the term of the Contract.
Third option: Amortization of all amounts requested by the Claimant over the
term of the contract. The Claimant may not receive more than RUB 335,400.50
rubles.
Specificity of sport: the First Respondent sustained this argument presented by
the Claimant was not well founded and should be dismissed.
41. The First Respondent’s requests for relief were the following:
“The Player respectfully requests the FIFA Football Tribunal to rule as follows:
1. The appeal filed by Football Club Zenit is dismissed.
In the alternative:
2. The football player Nikolai Solovev has no obligations towards Football Club “Zenit”
on repayment of compensation for breach of contract and/or any other pecuniary claim.
3. No sporting sanctions are imposed on the football player Nikolai Solovev.”
c. Position of the Second Respondent
42. According to the Second Respondent, neither party to the Contract was interested in
continuing the employment relationship. The Claimant lost interest in the First
Respondent’s services, and the First Respondent could not tolerate potential damage to his
career due to the Claimant’s attitude.
43. The Claimant alleged that the Second Respondent benefited from the early contract
termination. However, the Second Respondent approached the First Respondent after a
significant time had passed since the termination of the Contract. Therefore, no actual
benefits from the early termination existed. The Claimant’s reference to the initial contract
term did not provide a factual or logical basis for their submissions. As such, the Second
Respondent cannot be held jointly liable for the breach of contract, if any.
44. The calculation made by the Claimant was erroneous and therefore the Second
Respondent echoed the arguments presented by the First Respondent in this sense.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-14572
45. The Second Respondent argued that no sporting sanctions should be imposed on it under
art. 17 par. 4 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players due to the
absence of any inducement to breach of contract. They emphasize the following:
-
-
The liability of a new club cannot be presumed and should be analysed on a case-bycase basis.
FIFA rules must be interpreted to reflect their true meaning.
Art. 17 par. 4 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players aims to
ensure contractual stability and punish clubs who are behind or abetting a player’s
breach of contract.
The Second Respondent is not the club responsible for the First Respondent’s
contractual breach.
Before the termination of the Contract, no negotiations or agreements occurred
between the First and Second Respondents.
The alleged inducement had no interest at that time due to registration periods and
external circumstances.
The escalation in Ukraine and Russia’s mobilization announcement qualify as “urgent
matters” and “unforeseen circumstances”.
46. The Second Respondent’s requests for relief were the following:
“The Football Club Grbalj respectfully requests the Football Tribunal to rule as follows:
1. The claim filed by Football Club Zenit is dismissed.
2. No joint and several liability is imposed on FC Grbalj.
3. No sporting sanctions are imposed on FC Grbalj.”
d. Additional comments of the Claimant regarding the Interim Regulatory
Framework
47. On 7 February 2025, the FIFA general secretariat invited the Claimant to amend its claim, if
it so wished, exclusively in relation to the possible consequences of the application of the
new interim regulatory framework adopted by the Bureau of the FIFA Council on 23
December 2024 (hereinafter: the Interim Regulatory Framework). The FIFA general
secretariat also highlighted that any submission that went beyond the scope of the
mentioned request would be disregarded.
48. In its reply, the Claimant relied on the principle of tempus regit actum and sustained that
the January 2025 edition of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
cannot apply to these proceedings because, at the time the dispute arose, substantive
aspects of contractual stability (joint and several liability of the new club as well as the new
club’s burden of proof regarding inducement) were regulated differently.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-14572
49. The Claimant also highlighted that the CAS Award established that the “various regulations
of FIFA and more specifically, the RSTP, as in force at the relevant time of the dispute (Edition
May 2023) constitute the applicable law to the matter […].”
50. Finally, the Claimant noted that, in accordance with EU law, the decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Union in case C-650/22 directly affects only those football
stakeholders which are in the 27 member states of the EU, whereas neither the Claimant
nor any of the Respondents are domiciled in or have any affiliation with an EU member
state.
51. Therefore, the Claimant objected to the potential application of the January 2025 edition
of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
e. Additional comments of the First Respondent regarding the Interim
Regulatory Framework
52. Both the First and Second Respondents filed a priori unsolicited comments in reply to the
invitation from the FIFA general secretariat to the Claimant regarding the potential
application of the Interim Regulatory Framework. Nevertheless, as both Respondents
would have otherwise been invited to provide comments precisely on this matter
immediately thereafter, and for the sake of procedural efficiency, the FIFA general
secretariat decided to exceptionally admit such comments.
53. In this sense, the First Respondent sustained that the January 2025 edition of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players was applicable to the case at hand, citing
its art. 26. Furthermore, he argued that, in line with art. 17 par. 1 of the aforementioned
regulations, the Claimant has not actually suffered damage as a result of the First
Respondent’s breach (quod non), and that, in particular, the Claimant’s contentions
regarding specificity of sport lack legal basis in view of the new regulations.
f. Additional comments of the Claimant regarding the Interim Regulatory
Framework
54. The Second Respondent similarly sustained that the January 2025 edition of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players was applicable to the case at hand, citing
art. 29. Moreover, the Second Respondent highlighted that the new regulations eliminated
the presumptions of joint liability and inducement, reiterating that, as extensively
demonstrated in its submissions, even if the First Respondent breached the Contract, there
was no inducement and no joint liability or sanctions may be imposed. In addition, the
Second Respondent submitted that art. 17 par. 1 of the January 2025 edition of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players does not change the approach of the
Football Tribunal, and is in line with the constant jurisprudence that compensation is
assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account all circumstances.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-14572
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
55. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) noted that
the present matter was referred back to FIFA pursuant to the CAS Award dated 6 May 2024.
56. In this respect, it is necessary to clarify that, even though the DRC may have its own views
as to the general application of certain provisions of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players as set out in the Decision, it is in any case bound to abide by the
conclusions and orders of the CAS regarding the present dispute, as established in the CAS
Award.
57. Indeed, as per articles 49 and 50 par.1 of the FIFA Statutes (2024 ed.), FIFA has elected to
confer upon the CAS the jurisdiction to rule on appeal from final decisions of the FIFA
bodies and to, consequently, decide on the application of the relevant provisions of the
FIFA regulatory framework. As the first instance tribunal, this Chamber shall therefore
respect the dispute resolution system implemented by FIFA and abide by the instructions
provided by the CAS as the higher court within the system.
58. The Chamber found it equally important to note that the CAS Award was not appealed
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and the CAS Award, therefore, became final and binding
regarding the matters on which it ruled.
59. Having confirmed that it is bound to abide by the instructions contained in the CAS Award,
the Chamber noted that the CAS Award concluded that the dispute between the parties fell
under the scope of art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players, and, therefore, its mandate was essentially limited to deciding on the merits of
the Claimant’s claim (cf., CAS Award, par. 82 et seq.).
60. In continuation, the Chamber recalled that the matter is submitted for decision by the DRC
on 27 March 2025. Considering the wording of art. 31 and 34 of the January 2025 edition
of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules),
the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
61. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 and art. 24 par. 1 lit. b) of the Procedural
Rules and observed that, in accordance with the CAS Award ex positis and art. 23 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (January 2025 edition), the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake.
62. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the parties submitted
comments in relation to the regulations applicable to the substance of the dispute.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-14572
63. Having due consideration for the parties’ respective comments as well as the relevant
provisions of the Interim Regulatory Framework, the DRC considered that art. 29 of the
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (January 2025 edition) was clear, and
confirmed that, in accordance with the aforementioned article, the January 2025 edition of
said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the
substance.
b. Burden of proof
64. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
65. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
66. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and considered that the issues
to be examined were, on one hand, how and when the Contract was ultimately terminated,
and on the other, whether there was just cause to terminate the Contract, as well as the
consequences deriving therefrom.
67. In this sense, the Chamber took note of the fact that the parties strongly dispute the
manner of termination and the existence of just cause for such termination.
68. As to the first point, whereas the Claimant indicated that it was the First Respondent who
initiated the termination via his e-mail from 17 October 2022 attaching the letter dated 10
October 2022 (see par. 8 above), the First Respondent rejected such a position and
contended that it was the Claimant who terminated the Contract via its letter dated 20
October 2022 (see par. 9 above).
69. In this respect, the Chamber looked to the sequence of the correspondence exchanged
between the parties, noting that the Claimant first put the First Respondent in default on
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REF. FPSD-14572
10 October 2022, and then subsequently issued another correspondence on 17 October
2022 asking the First Respondent to resume his duties within 2 days or his Contract would
be terminated.
70. The majority of the DRC then highlighted that, in the First Respondent’s reply to the
Claimant, he employed terms such as “ask[ing] to be dismissed of my own free will on 11
November 2022” and “making the decision to be dismissed at my own request,” in reference to
a provision of the Russian Labor Code. In this sense, the majority of the Chamber
understood that this correspondence from the First Respondent could not be interpreted
as an unequivocal or unqualified declaration of termination of the employment
relationship. Rather, the majority of the members of the DRC drew particular attention to
the specific wording employed in the Claimant’s subsequent correspondence of 20 October
2022, which stated that “[…] we hereby inform you of termination of the Contract at the Club’s
initiative on 20 October 2022 […].”
71. Considering all the above and on the basis of the elements in the file, the majority of the
Chamber considered it was sufficiently established that it was the Claimant who terminated
the Contract via its correspondence dated 20 October 2022.
72. Having established that the Claimant terminated the Contract, the majority of the DRC
moved on to consider the issue of just cause. In doing so, the majority of the Chamber
referred to the arguments raised by the parties.
73. As to the matter of the existence of just cause, the First Respondent argued that the
Claimant did not have just cause, that it was clearly not interested in his services, and that
he ultimately proposed to have the Contract terminated by asking to be dismissed for the
reasons set forth in his letter. In addition, the First Respondent highlighted that the country
was at war and he was afraid of being conscripted to the army. Conversely, the Claimant
disputed this assertion and claimed that, on the basis of Russian legislation, the First
Respondent requested a termination – or effectively caused the Contract to be terminated
– while the Claimant only exercised its right, as the First Respondent had abandoned his
position. In the Claimant’s view, it was entitled to do so and it was further entitled to seek
compensation.
74. To begin, the majority of the Chamber first referred to art. 14 of the Regulations, according
to which, "A contract may be terminated by either party without consequences of any kind
(either payment of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions) where there is just cause.
In general, just cause shall exist in any circumstance in which it can no longer be reasonably
expected in good faith from a party to continue a contractual relationship."
75. In other words, and in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber, the
termination of a contract should always be an action of last resort. Hence, if there are more
lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employer to assure the employee’s
fulfilment of his contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an
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REF. FPSD-14572
employment contract. In other words, as consistently held by this Chamber, a premature
termination of an employment contract can only be an ultima ratio measure.
76. Moreover, the Chamber underscored that, when determining the existence of just cause
in cases submitted to FIFA’s jurisdiction – as the parties have elected to do in this instance
–, the Regulations shall prevail over national law chosen by the parties on this
determination, in accordance with the DRC’s longstanding practice and the scope of
application of the Regulations. Hence, the Claimant’s arguments pursuant to Russian law
in this respect shall be dismissed.
77. In light of the above context, and to aid in their analysis of the existence of just cause, the
majority of the Chamber considered it was worth to once again recall the facts leading up
to the termination of the Contract. Particularly, it was recalled that:
-
On 10 October 2022, the Claimant put the First Respondent in default and
requested him to (a) provide an explanation as to his absence since 5 October
2022, (b) cease breaching the contract and (c) resume his duties.
-
On 17 October 2022, the Claimant sent a new notice to the First Respondent,
reiterating its previous correspondence and informing the First Respondent that
if he did not resume his duties within 2 days, the Contract would be terminated.
-
On the same day via e-mail, with a letter dated 10 October 2022 attached thereto,
the First Respondent responded to the Claimant. In doing so, he, inter alia, asked
to be dismissed at a future date in reference to certain provisions of the Russian
Labor Code.
-
On 20 October 2022, the Claimant replied to the First Respondent, and expressly
stated that it terminated the Contract, indicating that “we hereby inform you of
termination of the Contract at the Club’s initiative on 20 October 2022.”
78. With the above in mind and after having carefully analysed the parties’ respective
submissions, the majority of the Chamber concluded that, under the specific circumstances
of the present case, an absence of 15 days (or 13, as stated in the Claimant’s termination
letter) cannot be deemed as a substantial breach of an employment contract capable of
triggering the consequences of an unlawful termination under the Regulations.
79. In particular, the majority of the Chamber was comfortable with the above conclusion upon
recalling: (i) the reasons cited by the First Respondent for his departure from Russia, (ii) the
language employed in the First Respondent’s correspondence regarding his request to be
dismissed in a month’s time, which could not be interpreted as an unequivocal or
unqualified declaration of termination of the employment relationship, as set out above,
(iii) the fact that he was a young player and his parents had also departed Russia, (iv) the
war outbreak (which, while not expressly mentioned in the First Respondent’s notice, was
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REF. FPSD-14572
a known circumstance), (v) the fact that the Claimant requested the First Respondent’s
return within a mere 2 days and the request was to return to training and the immediate
termination on 20 October 2022, and, consequently, (vi) the apparent lack of interest in
the First Respondent’s services.
80. Hence, under the totality of the circumstances of the case as outlined above, the majority
of the DRC considered there were more lenient measures to be taken by the Claimant,
instead of abruptly terminating the Contract within a span of 10 days after its first
communication to the First Respondent regarding his absences; particularly, considering
that it only granted the First Respondent a single deadline of 2 days to return to his duties
prior to terminating the Contract (cf. the Claimant’s letter dated 17 October 2022).
81. In light of the foregoing, the majority of the DRC held that the Claimant did not have just
cause to terminate the Contract and its claim for compensation shall therefore be rejected.
d. Costs
82. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
83. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
84. Lastly, the majority of the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests
for relief made by any of the parties.
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REF. FPSD-14572
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, FC Zenit JSC, is rejected.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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REF. FPSD-14572
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 57 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 20