Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 5 December 2019,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Alex andra Góm ez Bruinew oud (The Netherlands ) , member
S tijn Boey kens (Belgium ), member
S tefano La Porta (Italy ), member
Abu Nay eem S hohag (Banglades h), member
on the claim presented by the club,
Club Atlético Paranaens e, Brazil,
represented by Mrs Regina Tânia Bortoli and
Mr Gustavo de Paula e Silva Rocha
as Claimant
against the player,
Marcos Antonio Silv a S antos , Brazil
represented by Mr Rafael Botelho
and the club,
as First Respondent
GD Estoril Praia, Portugal,
represented by Mr Rafael Botelho
as Second Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 13 June 2014, Club Atlético Paranaense (hereinafter: the Claimant), a club
affiliated to the Confederação Brazileira de Futebol (hereinafter: CBF), the
Brazilian player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos (hereinafter: the player or the First
Respondent), born on 13 June 2000, and the player’s father acting on his behalf,
signed a “Contrato de Formação Desportiva” (hereinafter: sports training
contract).
2.
Clause 1.1. of the sports training contract stipulated that it was signed “without
entailing an employment link between the parties”. The said sports training
contract was meant to run as from the date of signature “until the date on which
the PLAYER completes 20 (twenty) years of age, according to art. 29 of Law
9.615/98”.
3.
According to clause 4.1 of the sports training contract, the player was entitled “as
the financial support, as an apprenticeship grant” to the following amounts:
(1) BRL 400 per month, “as of the execution of this instrument”;
(2) BRL 500 per month, “during the season in which the player is fifteen years
old”;
(3) BRL 800 per month, “during the season in which the player is sixteen years
old”;
(4) BRL 1,000 per month, “during the season in which the player is seventeen
years old”;
(5) BRL 1,200 per month, “during the season in which the player is eighteen years
old”;
(6) BRL 1,600 per month, “during the season in which the player is nineteen years
old”;
(7) BRL 1,800 per month, “during the season in which the player is twenty years
old”.
4.
Pursuant to clause 5.1 of the sports training contract, the player “undertakes to
execute with [the Claimant], as from the age of 16 (sixteen) years of age, the first
Special Sports Employment Contract, whose term shall not exceed five (5) years”.
5.
Clause 13 of the sports training contract provides that “the minimum conditions
of the First Special Sports Employment Contract to be entered into between
PLAYER and [the Claimant] are hereby established, if the latter exercises the right
provide for in art. 29, caput, of Law 9.615/98:
a) Term: up to 5 years, at the discretion of [the Claimant];
b) Initial Salary: […] monthly grant on the date of termination of the Sports
Training Contract […] plus 50%;
c) Salary readjustment per year: every year of a contractual term, a 20%
readjustment shall be applied;
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d) National Sports Indemnity Clause: equivalent to 2,000 times the average value
of the PLAYER’s salary, at the maximum predicted by law”;
e) International Sports Indemnity Clause: EUR 30,000,000 (thirty million euros)”;
f) Sports Compensation Clause: total value of monthly salaries to which the
PLAYER would be entitled as from the date of termination of the contract until
the end of the term of the contract”.
6.
On 1 November 2016, the First Respondent cosigned with his mother, Mrs Valdelia
De Silva, an “Aditivo ao Contrato de Formação Desportiva” (hereinafter:
Addendum) with the Claimant, amending clause 4.1 of the sports training
contract and leaving the rest unaltered. By means of the new provision – as of
that date – the player was entitled “as monthly financial support, as an
apprenticeship grant” to the amount of BRL 2,500.
7.
On 19 February 2018, the Claimant informed the CBF that, notwithstanding the
fact that the First Respondent had “a non-professional relationship” with it, “it
seems that he dropped out from his sporting training with [the Claimant] as from
January 11, 2018, no longer attending training since then”.
8.
On 10 April 2018, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the Portuguese
club GD Estoril Praia (hereinafter: Estoril or the Second Respondent), informing it
that “the PLAYER has a non-professional relationship with [it], registered with the
Brazilian Football Confederation, through a Sports Training Contract with a
football apprenticeship grant, effective until 13/06/2020, in the lines of a
professional contract”. With the same correspondence, the Claimant also
“intended to ask ESTORIL not to hire the PLAYER”.
9.
On 11 May 2018, the Second Respondent replied in writing, stating that, to date,
there was “no agreement or formalization […] to hire the Player, even because
Player is a minor”. The Second Respondent deemed to inform the Claimant that,
however, “the Player’s non-professional link with [the latter] is irregular” and,
thus, not preventing it from registering the player in case, at a later stage, it
would reach an agreement with him.
10.
By a further letter dated 22 May 2018, the Claimant replied that, on the contrary,
its contract with the First Respondent was valid and informed the Second
Respondent that its “insistent disrespect of the legal relationship between the
Player and [the Claimant] will be reflected and pursued, to the last ratio, in terms
of indemnity and sports sanctions”.
11.
On 24 May 2018, in reply, the Second Respondent asked the Claimant to provide
copy of the power of attorney authorising the First Respondent’s legal
representative to act on his behalf as well as the “employment pre-contract”, in
order to “allow proper evaluation of the consistency of the allegations by your
club”.
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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12.
On 29 May 2018, the Claimant communicated in writing to the Second
Respondent that the latter had “all means to obtain the documents requested”.
13.
By a further correspondence dated 8 June 2018, the Second Respondent
reiterated in writing that it was mandatory for the Claimant to “present a copy of
the documents it alleges to exist in connection with the player” in order to verify
the “validity and efficacy of the contractual relationship claimed”.
14.
On 2 July 2018, the First and the Second Respondent signed an employment
contract, valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2022.
15.
On 30 August 2018, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (PSC)
authorised the FPF to provisionally register the player with Estoril.
16.
On 24 January 2019, the Claimant lodged a claim against the player and Estoril in
front of FIFA, maintaining that the former breached the contract without just
cause and asking:
(1) EUR 30,000,000 as compensation for breach of contract;
(2) that Estoril be declared jointly and severally liable and that sanctions be
imposed on it;
(3) that Estoril’s conduct be reported to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee “for
consideration of possible violations against article 19 of [the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter also referred as: FIFA RSTP or
Regulations)]”;
(4) 5% interest p.a. “over any and all amounts the Respondents are ordered to
pay to the Claimant”.
17.
The Claimant maintained that, on 13 June 2014, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Brazil federal law n 9.615/98 (hereinafter: the Pelé Law), it had signed with the
First Respondent’s legal representative a sports training contract, which in Brazil
should be considered an amateur contract.
18.
However, the Claimant maintained that the said sports training contract is to be
considered for the present purposes and in light of art. 2 of the RSTP a
professional contract. In this respect, the Claimant pointed out that the contract
provided the player with housing, transportation, food, education, training,
medical insurance and, on top of that, monthly payments in a progressive order
(cf. I./3. above).
19.
That said, the Claimant recalled that – following the signature on 1 November
2016 – of an Addendum modifying his financial entitlements (cf. supra point 6),
the player refused to sign the “Contrato Especial de Trabalho Desportivo” and, as
of 11 January 2018, failed to report for training sessions at the Claimant’s
facilities.
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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20.
In the Claimant’s opinion, although the player was not to be considered a
professional under the Pelé Law (according to which a professional is a player
who signs a “Contrato Especial de Trabalho Desportivo”), but it has to be
considered as such under art. 2 of the RSTP. That clarified, the Claimant argued
that the RSTP should prevail over the Pelé Law. In this respect, the Claimant
pointed out that, according to the CAS jurisprudence, “in case of inconsistency
between a CBF provision and a FIFA provision, the FIFA provision should prevail”
(CAS 2008/A/1370 & 1376, para 105) and that the notion of professional player is
“autonomous from the corresponding national regulations” (TAS 2009/A/1895).
21.
With the foregoing in mind, the Claimant concluded that it had a professional
contract in place with the First Respondent since they had concluded a written
contract providing emoluments surpassing the expenses effectively incurred by
the player. More specifically, the Claimant concluded that “although from a
formal perspective the contract was in principle an amateur contract […] and the
player was registered with the CBF as an amateur, in practice both requirements
of [art. 2 RSTP] are undisputedly fulfilled”.
22.
Alternatively, should the player not be considered a professional, the Claimant
maintained that it had signed with the latter a pre-contract (i.e. the sports
training contract) containing all the essentialia negotii. In this context, the
Claimant argued that, contrary to what its clause 13 allegedly established, the
player refused to sign the “Contrato Especial de Trabalho Desportivo” (i.e. the
First Special Sports Employment Contract) without any valid reason. Therefore,
according to the Claimant, the player breached the sports training contract
without just cause.
23.
In light of the above, the Claimant maintained that it was entitled to EUR
30,000,000 established in clause 13 of the sports training contract as “penalty
clause for international transfers”, plus 5% interest p.a., pursuant to art. 104 of
the Swiss Code of Obligations.
24.
Furthermore, the Claimant argued that Estoril breached art. 18 para. 3 of the RSTP
by inducing the player into breaching his sports training contract, as well as art.
19 RSTP, as it “probably started negotiating” with him when he was still a minor.
25.
In their joint reply to the claim, First and the Second Respondent firstly deemed
important to remark that the Claimant used “selective memory” in submitting the
exchange of correspondence occurred between the two clubs after April 2018, as
it left out those containing the Second Respondent’s requests of documents. That
said, the Respondents took position on the claim in an analogous fashion as
follows (points D and E raised by the Second Respondent only):
26.
On the existence of the sports training contract, the Respondents claimed that
there was no valid contract in place between the Claimant and the player for two
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reasons: (a) the sports training contracts was null and void because it had been
signed “without valid representation”. According to the Respondents, given that
the player entered the said contract when he was 14 years old, the private deed
appointing Mr Ed Carlos Ribeiro Dos Santos was not valid, as - under Brazilian law
- at 14 people are considered “completely incapable of performing acts with legal
repercussion” and a public power of attorney was needed to assign parental
rights; and (b) the validity of the sports training contract had expired, in any case,
on 12 June 2017. In this respect, the Respondents pointed out that, in light of the
fact that the said contract was meant to run as from 13 June 2014 until the
player’s age of 20 (i.e. 13 June 2020), the player at the age of 14 entered in to a
six-year contract with the Claimant, thus violating art. 18 para 2 of the FIFA RSTP.
In this regard, the Respondents recalled that, according to the said provision,
“Players under the age of 18 may not sign a professional contract for a term
longer than three years. Any clause referring to a longer period shall not be
recognised”. Consequently, according to the Respondents, as of 12 June 2017 the
sports training contract had already expired.
27.
In relation to the player’s amateur status, the Respondents argued that the player
“was to be considered amateur for all legal and regulatory purposes”. In this
respect, the Respondents pointed out that: (a) the sports training contract was an
amateur contract “in its essence”; (b) the player was registered before the CBF as
an amateur; (c) the player’s earnings provided for in the sports training contract
were “way below the minimum wage in Brazil” and, in any way, “not enough to
cover more than his expenses”. In this respect, the Respondents maintained that,
at less than EUR 100 per month, the sports training contract established a grant in
“ridiculously low amounts”, as such that there was “not one single scenario in
which [this] can be construed as more than the expenses effectively incurred by
the player” and (d) that the Claimant itself recognised in its submission that the
sports training contract “is formally an amateur contract”.
28.
Then, the Respondents highlighted that, however, should their previous
arguments be dismissed, the “liquidated damages clause” contained in the sports
training contract (i.e. clause 13 lit. e) should be disregarded and the request of
EUR 30,000,000 considered “outrageous and completely out of proportion”.
29.
In this respect, the Respondents - bearing in mind arts. 44 and 163 of the Swiss
Code of Obligation (CO) - asked that, should compensation be awarded in favour
of the Claimant, be reduced to EUR 220,000, which “corresponds to the sum of
the Player’s apprenticeship grant under the Contract”.
30.
The Second Respondent further pointed out that the chronology of the events
made it impossible for it to induce the player into breaching the sports training
contract, should it be deemed that there was a valid employment contract with
the Claimant in the first place. In this regard, the Second Respondent explained
that it had been approached by the player’s representative on 15 January 2018,
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i.e. “after the player had notified the termination of the contract (11 January
2018) and over six months after the Contract had become invalid under article 18,
para 2 of FIFA Regulations (12 June 2017)”.
31.
Finally, as to the alleged violations of art. 19 of the FIFA RSTP, the Second
Respondent explained that: (i) the player turned eighteen on 13 June 2018; (ii) it
had signed the employment contract with him on 2 July 2018 and (iii) its
registration occurred on 28 August 2018. Therefore, given that all the foregoing
occurred after the player’s eighteenth birthday, according to the Second
Respondent there could be no violation of art. 19 RSTP.
32.
In its replica, the Claimant explained that nothing prevented Mr Ed Carlos Ribeiro
Dos Santos from acting on the player’s behalf. More in particular, according to the
Claimant, in light of both Brazilian and Swiss law, parents who want to delegate
the power to act on behalf of a minor to a legal representative do not need to do
so by means of a “public deed”. In this respect, the Claimant pointed out that the
Respondents failed to refer to any legal provision stipulating such formality. In
any case, the Claimant added that the player cosigned with his mother the
Addendum when he was 16 years old, thus remedying “any possible defect in the
form” of the sports training contract.
33.
The Claimant recognised that the sports training contract had a validity longer
than 3 years, but maintained that it was “based on article 29, par. 4, of the Pelé
Law, which allows Contratos de Formação Desportiva to be concluded for the
period running from the players fourteenth to the twentieth-first birthday”. In
this respect, the Claimant added that, according to the RSTP Commentary of art.
18.2, “after the end of the third year, the player is free to leave the club unless he
explicitly or de facto accepts the extension”. According to the Claimant, by
signing the Addendum on 1 November 2016, the player accepted the duration of
the sports training contract. Moreover, the Claimant explained that the player’s
described stance induced it to believe that the sports training contract would
remain “in full force and effect”. In any case, in the Claimant’s opinion, the 3-year
term should run from 1 November 2016, when the player signed the Addendum.
34.
On the Respondents’ argument concerning the unilateral extension of the
contract, the Claimant pointed out the CAS had already established that unilateral
extension options “are not per se invalid under the FIFA RSTP”. According to the
Claimant, the contractual scenario at hand respected all the criteria that the
jurisprudence devised in order for these kind of clauses to be valid, amongst
others especially the increased remuneration.
35.
Concerning the status of the player, the Claimant started by explaining that –
although not a typical employment contract – the sports training contract is
“undisputedly a type of employment-related contract”. Moreover, the Claimant
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pointed out that, in accordance with art. 28 of the Pelé Law, only when a player
turns 16 years old, he can be formally registered as a professional.
36.
The Claimant reiterated that, under the Pelé Law, the sports training contract is
indeed an amateur contract, however, to be considered de facto a professional
contract for the present purposes.
37.
Turning its attention to the financial requirements for a contract to be considered
professional under the RSTP rules, the Claimant pointed out that, starting from 1
November 2016, the player was earning at least three times as much as the
minimum wage in Brazil.
38.
In addition, the Claimant recalled that, according to art. 163 CO, the parties are
free to determine the amount of the contractual penalty. Moreover, the Claimant
maintained that, for a judge to intervene and reduce the amount of a penalty
there must be a substantial imbalance in the penalty clause.
39.
That said, the Claimant thought worth it to bear in mind the following: (i) the
First Respondent “was considered to be one of the most talented players of the
Claimant’s youth squad”; (ii) the Claimant gave the player, inter alia, the
opportunity to “develop his career to the highest level” and that (iii) the player
“simply breached the legitimate expectations of the Claimant […] with no legal
grounds”. For all the foregoing, the Claimant maintained that the penalty clause
was “unquestionably proportionate” and, thus, enforceable.
40.
With regards to the inducement, the Claimant maintained that the Second
Respondent had initiated talks with the player before the e-mail that the player’s
representative addressed to the Second Respondent on 15 January 2018, without
informing the Claimant, thus violating art. 18 para. 3 of the RSTP.
41.
In this respect, the Claimant, argued that – “in the spirit of article 19.1 of FIFA
RSTP” – clubs “have to wait until the eighteenth birthday of a player to negotiate
an international transfer”. In other words, although the acts were formally
concluded after the player’s 18th birthday, by starting the negotiations prior to
that moment, in the Claimant’s view the Second Respondent had circumvented
art. 19 para. 1 of the RSTP.
42.
In their rejoinders, their rejoinders, the Respondents entirely reiterated their
position.
43.
More in particular, the Respondents pointed out that, in its reply, the Claimant
maintained that the player was a professional, whereas it had previously stated
before the Single Judge of the PSC that he was an amateur with an amateur
contract.
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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44.
Moreover, the Respondents reiterated that any arguments concerning the
applicability of Brazilian law, with specific regards to the duration and legality of
the pre-contract, should be dismissed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Respondents pointed out that, according to Brazilian law, in order to contract on
behalf of their children, parents need to be previously authorised by a court
anyway. Thing that did not happen in the case at stake.
45.
The Respondents insisted that the facts of the case show all the elements to
reaffirm the player’s status as an amateur.
46.
The Respondents further explained that, by not offering to the player a
professional contract, the Claimant showed that it was “never really interested in
retaining [his] services” and that the same conclusion had been reached by the
Single Judge of the PSC when issuing the decision for the provisional registration
of the player with Estoril.
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or
Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In
this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to
FIFA on 24 January 2019. Consequently, the 2018 edition of the Rules Governing
the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand
(cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and
confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a)
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition October 2019),
the Dispute Resolution Chamber is be competent to deal with the matter at stake,
which concerns a dispute between a Brazilian player and a Brazilian club in
relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC
request.
3.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the
matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition October 2019)
and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 24
January 2019. Therefore, the DRC concluded that the June 2018 edition of the
Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the DRC continued by
acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following
considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
5.
First of all, the DRC acknowledged that the Claimant and the player entered into
a sports training contract on 13 June 2014, when the player was 14 years old, and
that, according to clause 1.1 of said agreement, the contractual relationship
would be valid until the player turns 20 years old, i.e. 13 June 2020.
6.
The member of the Chamber also duly noted that pursuant to clause 5.1. of the
sports training contract, the player “is obliged to enter into the first Special Sports
Labor Agreement with [the Claimant], upon completing sixteen (16) years of age,
with a term not exceeded five (5) years”.
7.
Subsequently, the Chamber observed that clause 13. lit. “e” of the sports training
contract established an “International Sports Indemnification Clause” in the
amount of EUR 30,000,000.
8.
The DRC further observed that the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA
against the player and Estoril seeking payment of the amount of EUR 30,000,000
plus 5% interest p.a., as compensation in accordance with clause 13. lit. “e” of the
contract, along with sanctions to be imposed on them, as well as additional
disciplinary sanctions on Estoril for allegedly breaching art. 19 of the Regulations.
9.
In this respect, the Chamber observed that the Claimant argued that, although
the player was not to be considered a professional under the Pelé Law, he has to
be considered as such under the Regulations. That clarified, the Claimant argued
that the Regulations should prevail over the Pelé Law.
10.
In addition, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant stated that the player
was bound by a valid contract which contained an “International Sports
Indemnification Clause [of] EUR 30,000,000 (thirty million Euros)” and that the
Second Respondent induced him to breach his contract without just cause by
entering into a new contract with the player on 2 July 2018.
11.
Furthermore, the DRC observed that the player and Estoril, for their part, stated
that the sports training contract is by all means an amateur contract and that,
however, according to the Regulations players under 18 years old cannot sign
professional contracts for a period longer than 3 years (cf. art. 18 para 2 of the
Regulations). What is more, the Respondents were of the opinion that, in any
case, the “International Sports Indemnification Clause” should be considered
disproportionate and be dismissed or alternatively largely reduced.
12.
Subsequently the DRC duly acknowledged that the Respondents sustained that
the player was undoubtedly an amateur when he signed a contract with it on 1
August 2016. Nevertheless, the player and Estoril declared that the player was too
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young to sign a professional contract when signing the sports training contract
with the Claimant, and that besides said agreement was of a duration exceeding
the maximum duration permitted by art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations.
13.
Having said that, the Chamber concluded that the key arguments raised by the
parties in the present matter are related to the validity of the sports training
agreement, which is indeed contested by the player and Estoril.
14.
In this respect, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before
the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties.
Moreover, the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the FIFA
regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the
football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be
achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on
every dispute brought to it. This should apply, in particular, also to the
termination of a contract. In this respect, the DRC wished to point out that it is in
the interest of football that the termination of contract is based on uniform
criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerable from
one country to another. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not appropriate
to apply the principles of a particular national law to the termination of the
contract but rather the RSTP, general principles of law and, where existing, the
Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.
15.
Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 2 of the Regulations, which
stipulates that “A professional is a player who has a written contract with a club
and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively
incurs. All other players are considered to be amateurs”.
16.
Taking into consideration the criteria set out in art. 2 par. 2 of the Regulations as
well as the amounts payable to the player on the basis of sports training contract,
the members of the Chamber concluded that it was beyond a doubt that the
player was in fact paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he
effectively incurred. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that a
player’s remuneration as per the criteria set out in art. 2 par. 2 of the Regulations
constitutes the decisive factor in the determination of the status of the player and
that the legal nature or the designation of the contract is of no relevance in this
regard.
17.
Equally, the Chamber highlighted that the second element contained in said art. 2
par. 2 of the Regulations, i.e. the existence of a written contract, is met. On
account of all the above, the Chamber concurred that the sports training contract
fulfill the requirements that art. par. 2 of the Regulations established in order to
be considered as a professional contract.
18.
This being established, the members of the Chamber paid particular attention to
clause 1.1 of the sports training contract, and duly noted that the agreement has
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a length of 6 years with an unilateral extension option of 5 years and that it was
signed when the player only 14 years old.
19.
The Chamber recalled the provisions set out in art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations,
according to which players under the age of 18 may not sign a professional
contract for a term longer than three years and that any clause referring to a
longer period shall not be recognised.
20.
As such, the DRC emphasised that the Claimant and the player entered into an
agreement for a duration clearly exceeding the maximum duration permitted in
the provisions set out in art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations, and that these
provisions unequivocally stipulates that such clause “shall not be recognised”.
21.
Consequently, the DRC had no other option but to conclude that the length of
the sports training contract was not in line with the Regulations and cannot be
recognised. Consequently, it can be concluded that, after 3 years, i.e. on 13 June
2017, the player was no longer under a valid contract with the Claimant and could
validly sign a contract with a new club, including Estoril.
22.
As a result, and in view of all the above, the Chamber rejected the claim of the
Claimant.
*****
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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III.
Decision of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1. The claim of the Claimant, Club Atlético Paranaense, is rejected.
*****
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The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee
or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at
the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to
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Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).
Note related to the appeal procedure:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must
be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and
shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the
CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the
statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal
arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
Club Atlético Paranaense, Brazil / Player Marcos Antonio Silva Santos, Brazil / Club GD Estoril Praia, Portugal
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