Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF FPSD-4300
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 9 June 2022
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Cristian
Anderson Penilla
COMPOSITION:
DE WEGER Frans (The Netherlands), Chairperson
COLUCCI Michele (Italy), member
RIESTRA Iñigo (Mexico), member
CLAIMANT:
Cristian Anderson Penilla, Ecuador
Represented by Daniel Crespo
RESPONDENT:
New England Revolution, USA
Represented by Centrefield LLP
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I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 12 January 2018, the Ecuadorian player Cristian Anderson Penilla (hereinafter: the Claimant),
the Major League Soccer (hereinafter: MLS) and the Mexican club Pachuca signed a loan
agreement valid until 31 December 2018 (hereinafter: the Loan Agreement).
2.
On 16 January 2018, the Claimant and the MLS signed an employment contract valid until
31 December 2018 (hereinafter: the Contract).
3.
On 19 February 2018, according to the information available in the Transfer Matching System
(TMS), the Claimant was registered with the American club, New England Revolution (hereinafter:
the Respondent).
4.
Clause 9 of the Contract reads inter alia as follows:
(d) All disputes arising under this Agreement are disputes under the CBA. Except for a proceeding
pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph 9, the parties agree that all disputes relating to or arising
out of this Agreement shall be subject to the grievance procedures set forth in Article 21 of the CBA.
(e) The Player and MLS hereby expressly waive all rights to bring for resolution on the merits any claim,
action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal, including any right(s) either may have pursuant
to the FIFA Regulations Governing the Status and Transfer of Football Players (including without
limitation the Application Regulations referenced therein and the dispute resolution, disciplinary and
arbitration system set forth in Chapter XIV). The Player and MLS agree that once a judgment has been
rendered pursuant to this Paragraph 9, either party may immediately take such judgment to the relevant
FIFA body or tribunal to be entered and enforced are as set forth in the CBA and this Agreement. The
Player therefore hereby waives any right to bring for resolution on the merits any claim, action, dispute
or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal, including any right(s) he may have pursuant to Chapter XIV,
Article 42 of the FIFA Regulations Governing the Status and Transfer of Football Players. As set forth
above, the Player understands and agrees that once a judgment has been rendered pursuant to the
mechanism and appeals process provided for above, either MLS or the Player may immediately take
such judgment to the relevant FIFA body or tribunal or any court having jurisdiction to be entered and
enforced.
5.
Clause 10 of the Contract reads inter alia as follows:
10. Non-Applicabilitv of FIFA Regulations:
(a) The Player hereby agrees that the following provisions in the FIFA Regulations Governing the Status
and Transfer of Football Players (including the Application Regulations referenced therein) shall not
apply to this Agreement:
v. Chapter XIV. Dispute resolution, disciplinary and arbitration system, Article 42. The Player agrees that
the sole and exclusive dispute resolution procedures available for resolving any dispute between himself
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and MLS are as set forth in the CBA and this Agreement. The Player therefore hereby waives any right
to bring for resolution on the merits any claim, action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal,
including any right(s) he may have pursuant to Chapter XIV, Article 42 of the FIFA Regulations Governing
the Status and Transfer of Football Players. As set forth above, the Player understands and agrees that
once a judgment has been rendered pursuant to the mechanism and appeals process provided for
above, either MLS or the Player may immediately take such judgment to the relevant FIFA body or
tribunal or any court having jurisdiction to be entered and enforced.
6.
Clause 11 of the Contract reads inter alia as follows:
“This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with federal common labor law under Section 301 of
the National Labor Relations Act and in accordance with generally accepted interpretive principles
applicable in labor arbitration in the United States. The parties agree that in the event there is a conflict
between the terms of this Agreement and the rules, regulations and/or guidelines of FIFA, the terms of
this Agreement shall prevail. The parties further agree that in the event a provision in this Agreement is
inconsistent with or in contravention of a rule, regulation and/or guideline of FIFA, the provision shall
be deemed valid and enforceable. Finally, the parties agree that the language of this Agreement shall be
construed neutrally and without regard for which party drafted the Agreement.”
7.
The signature page of the Contract includes the following provision in English and Spanish:
“The Player acknowledges and agrees, by signing this Agreement below, that he understands in full and
agrees to be bound by the terms of this MLS Standard Player Agreement, the CBA and the MLS Player
Substance Abuse and Behavioural Health Program and Policy (copies of which are on file in the Union
and MLS offices).”
8.
Clause 2 of the Schedule to the Contract reads as follows:
“2. Extensions.
a. Option through 2019: We may, by giving you written notice on or before December 1, 2018, extend
your employment with us for an additional twelve months (i.e., until December 31, 2019) for a base
salary of Five Hundred Thousand And No/100 Dollars (U.S.$500,000) per month, gross of taxes”.
b. Option through 2020: We may, by giving you written notice on or before December 1, 2019, extend
your employment with us for an additional twelve months (i.e., until December 31, 2020) for a base
salary of Six Hundred Thousand And No/100 Dollars (U.S.$600,000) per month, gross of taxes.
c. Option through 2021: We may, by giving you written notice on or before December 1, 2020, extend
your employment with us for an additional twelve months (i.e., until December 31, 2021) for a base
salary of Six Hundred Thousand And No/100 Dollars (U.S.$600,000) per month, gross of taxes.”
9.
Annex IV of the Contract reads as follows:
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“By singing this document, you hereby acknowledge and agree that MLS has the unilateral right to extend
your playing services pursuant to the following three (3) unilateral extension option (s) as set forth in
Section 2 of your Player Schedule:
• Option 1: From January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019.
• Option 2: From January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020.
• Option 3: From January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021”.
10. On or around 31 July 2018, the MLS and the Claimant signed an amendment to the Schedule in
order to correct a drafting error in Clause 2 of the Schedule.
11. Around the end of October 2018, MLS decided to exercise the Permanent Transfer Option to
acquire the Player’s permanent registration and extended the Contract for a further year.
12. On 31 October 2018, the MLS informed the Claimant that the option to extend his contract for
further 12 months was exercised.
13. On 1 November 2019, the MLS informed the Claimant that the option to extend his contract for
further 12 months was exercised.
14. On 4 February 2022, the Claimant sent a notice to the Respondent stating that he deemed the
Contract to had been automatically renewed.
15. On 22 February 2021, the Claimant sent a notice to the Respondent requesting to be integrated in
the team.
16. On the same date, the MLS replied to the previous correspondence stating that the Contract had
not been automatically extended.
17. On 15 June 2021, the Claimant signed an employment contract with the Ecuadorian club SD Cuenca
valid until 15 June 2022. The monthly salary of the Claimant is USD 660.
18. On 29 December 202, the Claimant signed an employment contract with the Ecuadorian club SC
Barcelona valid from 1 January 2022 until 31 December 2022.
II.
Proceedings before FIFA
19. On 15 November 2021, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A brief summary of the
position of the parties is detailed in continuation.
a. Position of the Claimant
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20. According to the Claimant, Clause 2 of the Contract is a unilateral faculty in favour of the employer,
which is “absolutely unacceptable”. Likewise, the Claimant deems that Annex 4 of the Contract is
invalid.
21. In the Claimant’s view, Clause 2 provides for “unacceptable advantages to the employer in comparison
with the rights and faculties of the employee”.
22. The Claimant submits that there are two possible ways of making the continuation of the contract
subject to sporting performance:
(1) to fix its duration for several years, but giving the employing club the unilateral power to
terminate it early, or
(2) to fix its duration for one year and give the employing club the unilateral power to extend it for
more years.
23. The Claimant underscores that both ways are different, but in both cases, the same disparity and
imbalance between the rights of the strong party (the club) and those of the weaker party (the
player), thus ostensibly affecting the principle of contractual stability, which is the central pillar of
FIFA's regulations governing the FIFA regulations governing the employment relationship between
clubs and players. In both cases, the aim is to ensure the club's power to release itself, without
economic or disciplinary consequences, from a player's disciplinary consequences, of a player
whose sporting performance was not as expected. performance was not as expected.
24. The Claimant sustains that the Respondent never informed him of the execution of the unilateral
extensions. Furthermore, he deems that it is “only inadmissible that the EMPLOYERS, in relation to
the year 2021, invoked, only then, the lack of communication of the exercise of the contractual extension
when they had never done so before.”
25. Hence, the Claimant argues that “the EMPLOYERS' own previous acts which undoubtedly created in
the PLAYER the confidence that the contract would remain in force during the last of the agreed seasons
and for which the PLAYER was awarded a salary of USD 600,000”.
26. The Claimant further refers to the principle venire contra factum proprium and to art. 334 of the
Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO).
27. Based on the above, the Claimant sustains that “In view of the need for contracts between players
and clubs to be established for a fixed term, if the contract is tacitly extended beyond the originally
agreed duration in relation to the CLUB, it should be considered to be in force until the maximum
duration of the contractual relationship agreed in relation to the PLAYER, i.e. until 31 December 2021”.
28. The Claimant submits that the Respondent did not exercise the option for 2021 because he
sustained an injury and therefore the Respondent failed to take “due attention and care of the
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worker's health in the event of an accident suffered during the work and until his full recovery (art.328
a. CO). It has ultimately violated due respect for the worker's personality, an imperative and
fundamental rule of Swiss labour law (art. 328 CO)”.
29. The Claimant further submits that “The logic of the application of the principle of article 334.2 CO,
which determines that the tacit renewal of an employment contract turns a fixed-term contract into an
open-ended one. As in sports law contracts are fixed-term contracts, the application of this principle
determines that the tacit renewal means that the contract remains in force for the whole of its term.”
30. The Claimant refers to the jurisprudence of this DRC, which in his view has clearly stated that "such
clauses authorising a unilateral renewal of the contract in favour of the club constitute abusive clauses
and are contrary to the principles of contractual freedom and freedom of work, legal principles
recognised by international public law... (Dispute Resolution Chamber, 24 October 2005)”.
31. The Claimant underlines that “this unacceptable and disrespectful conduct in the conclusion and
execution of the contract towards the employee can already be seen in the very text of the contract
provided by the MLS, in the event that the contract violates any FIFA rules. And it expressly states: in the
event of a breach of a FIFA regulation, the contractual text prevails. But what does this clause mean,
that the contract should not be subject to the regulations of the Association to which the creator of the
contractual text and conditions is affiliated?”.
32. The Claimant concludes that “two paths lead us to the same conclusion: the contract between the
parties was valid for four years because no legitimate reason could limit or diminish its duration. The
first path leads us to this conclusion, since the unilateral will of the employer to continue or terminate
the contract at will is not admissible. And, also, by the second path, because the two previous tacit
extensions determined that the silence in the third period was a cause of prolongation and not of
termination.”
33. The Claimant files the following request for relief:
Therefore, we request that the CLUB be ordered to pay the PLAYER the agreed amounts for the 2021
season, i.e. the amount of USD 600,000 (Art. 17 para. 1 i RETJ).
b. Position of the Respondent
34. According to the Respondent, these proceedings have been improperly brought against it given
that:
-
The Respondent is not a party to the Contract which forms the basis of the Claim and therefore it
had no obligations to the Player thereunder and cannot be held liable for any breach of the same;
and, in any event,
-
the Contract contains express jurisdiction provisions specifically negotiated with the MLS Players
Association, the exclusive and authorized bargaining representative of all players in the league, as
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part of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between MLS and MLSPA that operates in MLS, which
require disputes arising thereunder to be determined exclusively by a national dispute resolution
chamber which respects the principle of equal representation of clubs and players (‘NDRC’), as
permitted by the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (the ‘FIFA Regulations’)
35. The Respondent has no doubt that the term of the Contract expired on 31 December 2020.
Thereafter, MLS had no further obligation to the Player on any view and the Player was a ‘free
agent’ who was entitled to become registered with any other club.
36. The Respondent argues that it is not a signatory to the Contract and does not have any obligations
to the Player thereunder. In such circumstances, the Respondent considers that there is no
contractual basis for FIFA to attribute any liability under the Contract to the Respondent.
37. In The Respondent’s view, to impose a liability on the Respondent “pursuant to a contract to which
it is not a party would be contrary to the doctrine of ‘privity of contract’ which is strictly recognised under
US and Swiss law and pursuant to which “a party foreign to a contract may not be obliged by it.”
38. The Respondent submits that “the ‘reality’ (in practice and on paper) is that the Player was employed
and paid by MLS to provide services to New England and New England was merely an agent for MLS.”
39. The Respondent states that “the Player has expressly:
-
waived any rights he may have under the FIFA Regulations to bring a claim against MLS (and
therefore New England) before FIFA’s Football Tribunal; and
-
agreed that in the event of a dispute under the Employment Contract, he will pursue this
exclusively in accordance with the procedure set out in the CBA which provides for the resolution of
disputes by an NDRC, which respects the principle of equal representation of clubs and players
and guarantees fair proceedings”.
40. The Respondent further states that the Player’s waiver and agreement in this regard is entirely
permissible in accordance with the art. 22 of FIFA Regulations.
41. The Respondent underscores that “Player and MLS have entered into a valid arbitration clause, on
clear terms, and that the scope of the Claim falls within it. In the circumstances, only the Grievance
Committee and/or the Impartial Arbitrator have jurisdiction to hear the Claim on the terms set out in
the CBA and FIFA is not competent to do so. Respectfully, therefore, the DRC should to decline jurisdiction
in this matter.”
42. In this regard, the Respondent refers to Article 21 of the CBA, according to which the Player was
required to initiate the Claim (via the MLSPA) “within thirty days of the occurrence or non-occurrence
of the event upon which the Grievance is based” and in this case, the Player failed to do so.
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43. The Respondent deems that the Player “must not be permitted to seek to cure his own procedural
defect (i.e. failing to lodge a Grievance in due time in accordance with the CBA) by bringing proceedings
before FIFA, particularly in circumstances in which he has expressly agreed not to do so and is therefore
in breach of the terms of the Contract”.
44. The Respondent considers that the claim “is a blatant and opportunistic case of ‘forum shopping’
motivated by the fact that the Player has no prospect of succeeding in his claim on the basis of legal
principles, given that the 2021 Option is a clearly drafted unilateral option which has been agreed
between the Player and MLS”.
45. The Respondent reiterates that, against the Claimant’s arguments, he was duly informed in writing
of the exercise of the options for 2019 and 2020, respectively. Therefore, in the Respondent’s view,
the claims made by the Player arising out of MLS’s alleged failure to serve written notice on the
Player are clearly false and must be rejected in full.
46. The Respondent sustains that “the Player did not make any contact with MLS until February 2021,
some three months after the 2021 Option would have been exercised in writing (had that been the
intention of MLS) and two months after the Contract had expired. In such circumstances, it is absurd for
the Player to suggest that he had a legitimate expectation that “The tacit renewal of the first two years
determined that the last year was also tacitly renewed”.
47. As for the jurisprudence cited by the Claimant, the Respondent states that those cases refer to
“challenges to the conduct of a regulator where the doctrine has been used as a defence, to ensure that
where a ‘public authority’ has, by way of promise or practice, conferred on a person a legitimate
expectation of a procedural or substantive benefit, it may not frustrate that expectation, if to do so
would be so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power. These cases are therefore clearly not analogous”.
48. The Respondent argues that “the Player cannot have formed a legitimate expectation that the 2021
Option had been / would be tacitly exercised and in any event he did not take any steps to his detriment
on the basis of such alleged expectation; and to the extent that it is applicable to the Contract, Article
334 SCO confirms that the Contract was a fixed term contract which expired on 31 December 2020”.
49. The Respondent further argues “the jurisprudence of FIFA and CAS is clear that each unilateral option
clause must be assessed on its own merits and properly drafted clauses are acceptable. If FIFA had
intended unilateral option clauses to be universally unenforceable, it could and would have included a
provision to this effect in the FIFA Regulations. The fact that FIFA has not done so is important and
confirms that, contrary to the Player’s submissions, the DRC is perfectly entitled to uphold the validity of
the 2021 Option”.
50. The Respondent submits that in the event the DRC deemed the Option to be invalid, “the effect of
a unilateral option being declared invalid is that such option can no longer be relied upon to extend the
relevant employment contract. In such circumstances, the relevant employment contract is deemed to
have terminated at the end of its original fixed term.”
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51. The Respondent concludes that “the Player’s claim cannot be sustained and must be dismissed in full
by the DRC. However, in the event that the DRC does accept the Claim (or any part of it), the
compensation claimed by the Player must be reduced to reflect: i) taxes and statutory deductions for
which the Player would have been liable on the amount claimed had it been paid under the Employment
Contract; and ii) employment income received by the Player from his new club, Deportivo Cuenca”.
52. The Respondent files the following requests for relief:
“In the circumstances, New England respectfully requests that the DRC orders that the Claim is dismissed
and no compensation is due to the Player from New England because:
the DRC is not competent to hear the Claim as the Employment Contract provides for the mandatory
resolution of employment disputes via an NDRC; and/or
New England is not a party to the Employment Contract and therefore does not have standing to be
sued thereunder; and/or
the Employment Contract validly terminated on 31 December 2020 and MLS (and New England) had no
further obligation to the Player thereunder, such that no compensation is due to the Player under the
Employment Contract.
In the alternative, in the event that the Claim is upheld by the DRC (which it is submitted it should not
be) New England requests that the DRC orders that:
the Player is required to disclose to the DRC all contractual documentation pertaining to his employment
with Deportivo Cuenca; and
compensation to be awarded to the Player shall be calculated on the basis of the net amount which
would actually have been payable to the Player under the Employment Contract, reduced by the amount
of income received by the Player in connection with his employment with Deportivo Cuenca.”
c. Replica of the Claimant
53. The Claimant states that that the documents signed in the context of his contract were the ones
enclosed with the claim and he never signed the so-called “standard contract”.
54. The Claimant submits that he was requested via email the signature of three documents named
"Penilla Option Ack Doc Jan", "Penilla Schedule 2018-2021" and "Penilla-Pachuca Loan Transfer
Agreement Jan 2018".
55. The Claimant states that the Standard Player Agreement provided does not contain any date or
specific reference to the player himself.
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56. The Claimant concludes that “according to the global conditions in which the contract was drafted,
and to how the parties executed it (continuity without exercising the unilateral extension option), the
link should be considered as a fixed-term contractual relationship for the full period of the agreed term,
i.e. until 31 December 2021. In this sense, if the club is unaware of the existence of the contract for the
last year (2021), it should be considered as an early termination of the contract, and therefore it is
appropriate to fix a compensation in the terms of art. 17 RSTP.”
d. Duplica of the Respondent
57. The Respondent states that the signature page of the Contract is hand-signed by the Player and
electronically counter-signed by MLS and in this regard “a party who signs a document of legal
importance without knowing of its precise contents does so as its own risk and is liable to bear the
possible legal consequences arising from the execution of the document”.
58. In the Respondent’s view, “there can be no doubt that the Player was aware (or ought to have been
aware) that the MLS Standard Player Agreement formed part of his contractual relationship with MLS
and as such his submissions to the contrary must be dismissed”.
59. The Respondent reiterates that the “Player’s denial of receipt of written notice of MLS’s exercise of the
2019 Option also constitutes a deliberate attempt by the Player to mislead the DRC”.
60. The Respondent argues that “the Player has been unable to provide any answer whatsoever to the
Respondent’s submission that FIFA is not competent to hear this matter, in light of the dispute resolution
provisions of the Contract and/or that the Player has waived his right to seek a remedy before FIFA by
virtue of the terms of the Contract”.
61. The Respondent “respectfully submits that the Player’s Reply takes matters no further and therefore
reiterates its position and prayers for relief”.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
62. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC)
analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 15 November 2021 and submitted for decision on
9 June 2022. Taking into account the wording of art. 34 of the October 2021 edition of the
Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the
aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
63. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and
observed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (March 2022 edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is in
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principle competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related
dispute with an international dimension between an Ecuadorian player and a club from the United
States.
64. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance
of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (August 2021 edition) and considering that the
present claim was lodged on 15 November 2021, the August 2021 edition of said regulations
(hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
65. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding
bodies in favour of the competent body in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) (hereinafter: the NDRC).
66. The Chamber also noted that the Claimant did not present any further argument in its replica as
to the competence of FIFA to adjudicate the present claim.
67. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 par. 1
lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA is, in principle, competent to
hear an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension.
Nevertheless, the parties may explicitly opt in writing for such dispute to be decided by an
independent arbitration tribunal that has been established at national level within the framework
of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. Any such arbitration clause must be
included either directly in the contract or in a collective bargaining agreement applicable on the
parties. The independent national arbitration tribunal must guarantee fair proceedings and
respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.
68. In this context, Chamber pointed out that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the
employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear and exclusive
jurisdiction clause in favour of the NDRC. In this respect, the Chamber referred to Clause 9 of the
Contract, according to which:
(d) All disputes arising under this Agreement are disputes under the CBA. Except for a proceeding
pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph 9, the parties agree that all disputes relating to or arising
out of this Agreement shall be subject to the grievance procedures set forth in Article 21 of the CBA.
(e) The Player and MLS hereby expressly waive all rights to bring for resolution on the merits any claim,
action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal (…) ”.
69. The Chamber, after analysing the wording of the jurisdiction clause, concluded that such clause
was indeed clear and exclusive in favour of the competence of the NDRC.
70. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber turned its attention to lack of counterarguments
by the Claimant against the competence of a NDRC as argued by the Respondent. The Chamber
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namely noted that the arguments of the Claimant consist of the alleged non-signature of the
standard contract.
71. In this regard, the Chamber noted that, the player disputes having in fact signed the complete
version of the Contract, as he allegedly was solely provided with certain excerpts for signature.
Thus, he deems that, in particular the jurisdiction clause in the Contract should not be applicable
as he had no knowledge thereof.
72. In this respect, Chamber referred to FIFA’s well-established jurisprudence, according to which a
party signing a document of legal significance, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility
and is liable to bear the legal consequences arising from the execution of such document.
73. Therefore, in the present case, the Chamber deems that it is the parties’ responsibility to bear any
legal consequences arising from the execution of the Contract, and by signing the signature page,
the Claimant was indeed acknowledging the existence and his acceptance to be bound by the
terms of the Contract and therefore, his objection in this regard must be disregarded.
74. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the
competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter is accepted and that it is not competent, on
the basis of art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the Regulations, to consider the present matter as to the
substance.
b. Costs
75. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which “Procedures are
free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent, or match agent”.
Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be imposed on the parties.
76. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25 par. 8 of
the Procedural Rules, and decided that no procedural compensation shall be awarded in these
proceedings.
77. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made by any
of the parties.
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IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has no competence to hear the dispute of the Claimant, Cristian Anderson
Penilla.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 57 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party
within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted
version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION
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