Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2020,
in the following composition:
Om ar Ongaro (Italy ), Chairman
S téphane Burchkalter (France), member
Jerom e Perlem uter (France), member
on the claim presented by the club,
FC Vojv odina, Serbia,
represented by Ms Ksenija Damjanovic and Mr Marco del Fabro
as Claimant
against the player,
Dejan Meleg, Serbia,
represented by Mr Mico Petkovic
as First Respondent
and the club,
Kay s eris por Kulubu, Turkey,
represented by Mr Sami Dinç
as Second Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 18 January 2016, the Serbian club, FC Vojvodina (hereinafter: the Claimant) and
the Serbian player, Dejan Meleg (hereinafter: the First Respondent or the player)
signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June
2018 (hereinafter: the employment contract).
2.
According to art. 2.1 of the employment contract, the Claimant and the First
Respondent agreed upon a “monthly remuneration in the amount of the minimum
guaranteed wage (salary) of the Republic of Serbia” .
3.
Furthermore, pursuant to art. 2.2 of the employment contract, the player was also
entitled, inter alia, to the following:
- “2.200 EUR in Serbian Dinars (according to the medium exchange rate of the
National Bank of Serbia) each month, as monthly transfer installment, deducted
for the amount of minimum wage as mentioned above”;
- EUR 10,000 “in February 2016, as a transfer installment”;
- EUR 10,000 “in February 2017, as a transfer installment”;
- “for the period starting from July 2017, up until the end of the contract” EUR
3,000 as “transfer installment”.
4.
According to art. 11.4 of the employment contract, “in case of a dispute, the parties
agree upon the Arbitration/Court of Arbitration of the Football Association of Serbia
(FAS). Both the Club and Player agree not to bring any dispute arising out of this
Contract before ordinary courts”.
5.
On 31 January 2016, by means of a written authorization, the Claimant “exclusively
authorize[d] Mr Michael Stankovic to represent [it] and negotiate regarding the
transfer of [its] professional football player Dejan Meleg during employment
contract with FK Vojvodina, Novi Sad. Minimum transfer fee for the player Dejan
Meleg is 300.000 Eur. Authorization is valid during employment contract with FK
Vojvodina, Novi Sad”.
6.
On 31 January 2017, by means of a different written authorization, the Claimant
“exclusively authorize[d] Sascha Hrnjacki & Partner […] to represent [it] and
negotiate regarding the transfer of [its] professional football player for Meleg Dejan
to Eintracht Braunshweig”.
7.
By letter dated 7 February 2017, the Claimant informed Mr Stankovic that it had to
“cancel the authorization for the professional football player Dejan Meleg, signed on
January 31, 2016”. Such cancellation was informed to Mr Stankovic by means of a
letter sent via e-mail.
8.
On 22 June 2017, the First Respondent and Mr Stankovic addressed a correspondence
to the Claimant, by means of which they informed the latter that the First
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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Respondent had “signed the contract with the Kayserispor from Turkey”. With the
same correspondence, the player and Mr Stankovic asked the Claimant to “send
necessary instructions and valid account of [the Claimant] on which the interested
club from Turkey could pay the prescribed indemnity in accordance with the decision
[…] dated 31 January 2016 in the amount of 300,000,00 (EUR)”.
9.
On 23 June 2017, the Claimant replied that it was “open to all kinds of cooperation
and, therefore, [it] invited you on a mutual meeting in Novi Sad in order to orally
and together consider all details related to the above mentioned offer”.
10. By letter dated 10 July 2017, the Claimant sent a letter to the Turkish club,
Kayserispor Kulubu (hereinafter: the Second Respondent), claiming that the First
Respondent “still has a valid and existing contract with FC Vojvodina, which is legally
valid until the summer transfer window 2018”. With the same correspondence, the
Claimant asked the Second Respondent to inform the First Respondent that he “must
start fulfilling his obligations towards FC Vojvodina” in order for the latter not to
initiate legal proceedings before FIFA.
11. On 14 July 2017, the First Respondent informed the Claimant in writing that he
wanted to “unilaterally terminate the contract with [the Claimant] on the occasion
to the problem [he] ha[s] with [the Claimant] regarding [his] transfer to FC Kayseri
from Turkey”.
12. On 19 July 2017, the Claimant informed the Second Respondent in writing that it had
“received a payment of EUR 300,000” and that it “shall regard this payment as the
first instalment, and we will agree on following instalment in due time”.
13. The Claimant lodged a claim against the First Respondent and the Second
Respondent in front of FIFA, asking to be awarded compensation in the amount of
EUR 926,233, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 June 2017 until the date of effective
payment, and that the Second Respondent be held jointly and severally liable.
14. The Claimant maintained that, although it had a valid contract in place with the
player, on 22 June 2017, it was informed by him and his alleged agent, Mr Stankovic,
that the player had signed an employment contract with the Second Respondent,
thus breaching his employment contract with the Claimant.
15. In relation to the above, the Claimant pointed out that – when it received EUR
300,000 on its bank account from the Second Respondent – it was “obliged to inform
[the latter] that it would consider the received amount as the first instalment of the
compensation”.
16. The Claimant further explained that the “authorization” dated 31 January 2016had
been issued only in order to authorise “the agent to represent the Claimant and to
negotiate a possible transfer considering a minimum transfer fee of 300.000,00 EUR”.
It “did not entitle the agent to terminate the ongoing contract” between the
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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Claimant and the First Respondent. The Claimant further alleged that both the player
and Mr Stankovic were aware that such authorization had been withdrawn on 7
February 2017, in any event.
17. Moreover, the Claimant highlighted that it had always paid the player his salaries.
18. The Claimant further pointed out that the second “authorization” dated 31 January
2017 had been issued “limited to only one concrete club FC Eintracht Braunshweig”.
19. Lastly, the Claimant explained that the compensation for the player’s breach of
contract without just cause should be calculated as follows:
- The average between remunerations until the expiration date of the former
contract and remunerations under a new contract for the same period. In this
respect, the Claimant came to an average of EUR 213,000;
- The loss of the player’s services and profit. In this respect, the Claimant maintained
that the market value of the player at the moment of the termination of the
employment contract with it and the conclusion of the one with the Second
Respondent was EUR 2,000,000. That said, the Claimant explained that, in the
summer transfer window of 2017, it was expecting “the economic profit in the
amount of at least” EUR 1,000,000 from the player;
- The “sports specificity” in the amount of EUR 13,200.
20. From the sum of the above-mentioned amounts, the Claimant deducted the amount
of EUR 300,000 that, on 19 July 2017, it acknowledged having received from the
Second Respondent. As such, the Claimant concluded that it was entitled to the total
amount of EUR 926,233 as compensation for breach of contract.
21. The player firstly contested the competence of the FIFA to hear the present matter.
He pointed out that according to art. 11.4 of the employment contract, he and the
Claimant had agreed upon the Court of Arbitration of the Serbian Football
Association to be competent to resolve any dispute between them arising out of the
contract. Moreover, the player specified that he and the Claimant agreed not to
bring any disputes before ordinary courts.
22. The player maintained that, in any case, the claim is groundless. He recalled having
been a member of the Claimant’s youth academy and having signed on 26 October
2010 a “scholarship player contract” with the Claimant. The player further recalled
transferred at a later stage to the Dutch club FC Ajax, with which he signed a
professional football contract.
23. The player further alleged that, when his contract with FC Ajax came to a mutually
agreed termination, he was offered the possibility to sign another contract with the
Claimant. The player maintained that, in the said context, he and the Claimant had
agreed upon the signature of an employment contract and “a buy-out clause in the
amount of EUR 300,000 to be provided for”.
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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24. Moreover, the player pointed out that the buy-out clause could not be inserted into
the employment contract since in Serbia “players and clubs [are] not free to arrange
their basic mutual rights and obligations on their own will”. Consequently, he and
the Claimant “had to look after another solution”. In this respect, the player further
explained that, on 18 January 2016, the Claimant “committed itself to pay a special
bonus to [him] in case of his transfer to a new club during the validity of the
[employment contract] for the transfer fee in the amount that exceeds EUR 300,000”.
25. In light of the foregoing and the “authorization” dated 31 January 2016, the player
concluded that “the common intention of the parties” was to introduce a clause in
the employment contract allowing him to terminate it against the payment of the
“predetermined amount of EUR 300,000”.
26. Lastly, the player claimed that – in any case – the Claimant calculated the amount of
compensation on the speculative criteria.
27. The Second Respondent, for its part, maintained that it was not possible for it to be
aware of the existence of the contract between the Claimant and the First
Respondent and that it can only be “held responsible […] for the transfer payment”.
Moreover, the Second Respondent pointed out that it had “made its best effort to
research the situation” of the First Respondent. The Second Respondent concluded
by asking the rejection of the claim in its entirety. In the alternative, should it be
decided that the player breached the contract without just cause, the Second
Respondent asked that “the claims of the Claimant towards [it] be rejected”.
28. In its replica, the Claimant entirely reiterated the position and requests expressed
with its claim.
29. On the competence issue raised by the First Respondent, the Claimant mainly
maintained that a local arbitration court cannot rule on the matter at stake due to its
international dimension. The Claimant further argued that the player did not have a
right to terminate the contract by paying EUR 300,000 as buyout clause also because
“the institute of buy-out is not compatible with the Labour Code of the Republic of
Serbia”. Moreover, the Claimant pointed out that, while the player terminated the
employment contract on 22 June 2017, the Second Respondent paid the amount of
EUR 300,000 to the Claimant on 10 July 2017 only.
30. In respect of the above, the Claimant further specified that the amount set in the
authorisation dated 31 January 2016 does not have the meaning of an agreed
transfer fee and “is obviously not final”. Moreover, the Claimant affirmed that the
Second Respondent was obliged to inform it prior to enter into negotiations with the
player pursuant to art. 18, par. 3, of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players and had the obligation to get proper information about the player’s
history and status before concluding an employment contract with him. According to
the Claimant, the Second Respondent induced the player in breaching the
employment contract, as it ignored the content of its letter dated 10 July 2017.
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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31. The player, in his duplica, entirely reiterated his position and further stressed that he
had just cause to terminate the employment agreement. He further explained the he
was entitled to lawfully terminate the employment agreement because the Claimant
had only partially fulfilled its financial obligations towards him. Namely, the player
submitted that the Claimant failed to deliver payment of approx. EUR 14,260 which
were due from January 2016 until July 2017 pursuant to the employment agreement.
The player went on to point out that his decision “to terminate the [employment
agreement] was justifiable and legal”.
32. Additionally, the player submitted that the Claimant did not suffer any damages and
that it “took advantage from the termination of the Contract by the [First]
Respondent”. To this extent, the First Respondent was of the position that “the
Claimant was rewarded for its misbehaviour by being paid EUR 300,000 by the
[Second] Respondent”. In particular, the player emphasized that the Claimant paid
the player EUR 45,681.40 vis-a-vis the employment agreement, which according to
the player “is six times less than the amount of compensation paid to the Claimant
by the Second Respondent”.
33. The Second Respondent, in its duplica, submitted that it had been presented with a
letter containing the Claimant’s letterhead dated 31 January 2016, and that such
authorization letter was supplemented by an official attestation dated 20 June 2017
“of the local competent authority of the town of Wollerau, Switzerland which
carried the stamp and the signature of government officials”. The Second
Respondent submitted that it “had justified reasons to consider the letter of
authorization issued by FC Vojvodina valid”.
34. The Second Respondent also submitted that it considers the letter which annulled
the authorization “to [have been] produced after the transfer of the player to
Kayserispor as the player and the agent representing the player at the time [have]
submitted the same claims persistently which makes us consider [that] the
aforementioned letter of authorization was valid at the time of [the] player’s
transfer to Kayserispor”.
35. The Second Respondent further claimed that clubs must act “like prudent
merchants” and that the Claimant “has failed to meet with this obligation and set a
release clause under the value of the player.” With regards to inducement, it
submitted that “it has never engaged in a such act”. The Second Respondent went
on to claim that it was approached by the agent of the player with a letter of
authority which had carried all the legal aspects of a valid letter of authority”
36. Finally, Kayserispor submitted that it had fulfilled its obligations “arising from the
terms set by FC Vojvodina”, especially considering that it had wired EUR 300,000 to
the Claimant “as stated in the letter of authorization”. The Second Respondent went
further and claimed that the Claimant had accepted such amount and therefore “FC
Vojvodina has lost the right to lodge a claim” with regards to the transfer of the
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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player. The Second Respondent finally requested that the claim filed by the Claimant
be rejected.
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber
or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this
respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 12 March
2019. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition
of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition January 2020) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on
employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international
dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the DRC would, in principle, be competent to decide on a
litigation which involves a Serbian club, a Serbian Player, and a Turkish club
regarding an employment-related dispute.
4.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the First Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 11.4 of the employment
contract, which makes reference to the Court of Arbitration within the Serbian
Football Association (hereinafter: NDRC of Serbia).
5.
On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the
competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by it against the First
Respondent and the Second Respondent.
6.
Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with
art. 22 lit. b) of the January 2020 edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand,
unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and
respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been
established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a
collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an
independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber
referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members
of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute
Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on
1 January 2008.
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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7.
In this respect, the DRC turned its attention to the principle of equal representation
of players and clubs and underlined that this principle is one of the very fundamental
elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be
recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1
of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows:
“The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year
renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by
the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player
representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’
associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a
selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club
representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following:
“The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This
means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and
the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…).
Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group
that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of
the arbitrator list”.
8.
On account of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation
presented by the Respondent, and noted that no evidence has been brought forward
to demonstrate that the NDRC of Serbia is compliant with the aforementioned
regulations, especially in regards to the principle of equal representation.
9.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, the Chamber decided that it cannot be
concluded that the NDRC of Serbia fully respects the principle of equal
representation and hence cannot be considered an independent arbitration tribunal
guaranteeing fair proceedings. Finally, the Chamber reverted to clause 11.4 of the
employment agreement, and concluded that such clause is not an unequivocal and
exclusive jurisdiction clause.
10. Therefore, the Chamber concluded it is competent to deal with the matter at hand
and that the claim of the Claimant is admissible.
11. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this
respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition January 2020), and
considering that the present claim was lodged on 12 March 2019, the June 2018
edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
12. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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arguments and documentation on file. However, the DRC emphasised that in the
following considerations, it will refer only to the facts, arguments, and documentary
evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
13. In doing so, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging that the parties
to the dispute had signed the employment contract on 28 January 2016.
14. In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a claim against the
First and the Second Respondents maintaining that the First Respondent had
breached the contract by terminating it without just cause, on the basis that he
signed a new contract with the Second Respondent during the same period of
validity as the employment contract.
15. Thereafter, the members of the Chamber took note of the reply of the First
Respondent, who alleged that he and the Claimant had agreed upon “a buy-out
clause in the amount of EUR 300,000 to be provided for”, but that such clause could
not be inserted into the employment contract since in Serbia “players and clubs [are]
not free to arrange their basic mutual rights and obligations on their own will”.
16. In this sense, the members of the Chamber observed the First Respondent’s
argument, according to which the Claimant “committed itself to pay a special bonus
to [him] in case of his transfer to a new club during the validity of the [employment
contract] for the transfer fee in the amount that exceeds EUR 300,000”, and that
such document, together with the authorization dated 31 January 2016, denotes that
“the common intention of the parties” was to introduce a clause in the employment
contract allowing him to terminate it against the payment of the “predetermined
amount of EUR 300,000”.
17. What is more, the Chamber also took note of the position of the Second Respondent,
who maintained that it was not possible for it to be aware of the existence of the
contract between the Claimant and the First Respondent, and that it can only be
“held responsible […] for the transfer payment”. Moreover, the Second Respondent
pointed out that it had “made its best effort to research the situation” of the First
Respondent. The Second Respondent concluded by asking the rejection of the claim
in its entirety. In the alternative, should it be decided that the player breached the
contract without just cause, the Second Respondent asked that “the claims of the
Claimant towards [it] be rejected”.
18. Further, the Chamber observed that by means of a written authorization dated 31
January 2016, the Claimant authorized Mr Michael Stankovic to represent it and
negotiate the transfer of the player for a minimum transfer fee of EUR 300,000, and
that on 7 February 2017, such authorization was revoked.
19. Lastly, the DRC took note that on 19 July 2017, the Claimant acknowledged having
received from the Second Respondent a payment of EUR 300,000.
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
Page 9 of 13
20. In this respect, the members of the Chamber took into account that the First
Respondent has, as established above, deemed that the parties have agreed on a
“buy-out clause”. However, after a careful analysis of the contents of the relevant
contract, the DRC deemed that this was not the case. In particular, the Chamber
emphasised that there is no provision in the employment contract establishing a
right for the player to terminate the contract for a specific, clearly predetermined
amount.
21. Based on the aforementioned the Chamber had no other option than to consider
that the player had no contractually stipulated right to prematurely terminate the
contract. Therefore, he had terminated the contract without just cause by means of
the letter dated 22 June 2017.
22. The DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the
player is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant for breach of contract.
Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the
Regulations, the Chamber established that the player’s new club, i.e. the Second
Respondent, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17
par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the
contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract
without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach.
23. Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of
the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so,
the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17
par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in
particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the
dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity
of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and
other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract,
the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as
the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term
of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period.
24. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract.
By examining the contents of the employment agreement, the Chamber concluded
that no such clause exists.
25. In continuation, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of the
other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled
that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.
Therefore, the specificity of sport, and other objective criteria may be taken into
account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution
Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual
breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account
all specific circumstances of the respective matter.
26. In order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present
case, the members of the Chamber first turned their attention to the financial terms
of the former contract and the new contract of the player. The members of the
Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the relevant compensation should
be calculated based on the average fixed remuneration, i.e. excluding any
conditional or performance related payment, agreed by the player with his former
club and his new club, as well as considering the period of time remaining on the
contract signed between the player and the former club.
27. In continuation, the Chamber observed the other objective criteria and elements
brought forward by the parties. In particular, the Chamber emphasized that as per
the authorization granted by the Claimant on 31 January 2016, it agreed to receive
the amount of EUR 300,000 for the transfer of the player.
28. In light of the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the list of objective criteria
foreseen by article 17 para. 1 of the Regulations is not exhaustive and that the broad
scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of
compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party, the Chamber concluded that the
amount of compensation for breach of contract owed to the Claimant is EUR
300,000.
29. As a consequence, the Chamber decided that the First Respondent player has to pay
the amount of EUR 300,000 as compensation for breach of contract to the Claimant.
Furthermore, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 2 of the
Regulations, the Second Respondent shall be jointly and severally liable for the
payment of the aforementioned amount of compensation.
30. Nevertheless, and without losing sight of its conclusion that the First Respondent
terminated the employment contract without just cause, the Chamber duly observed
that the Claimant admitted having received from the Second Respondent, on 19 July
2017, the amount of EUR 300,000. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that since
the compensation due to the Claimant has already been paid, the Claimant’s claim
shall be rejected.
31. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of
the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, it addressed the question of
sporting sanctions against the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the
Regulations.
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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32. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the letter revoking the authorization
dated 31 January 2016 was sent to the player’s agent, Mr Stankovic, on 7 February
2017, and that such document was not addressed to the player himself.
33. Additionally, the Chamber observed that with the assistance of said agent, the player
at all times maintained that the authorization was still valid, which indicates that he
might have been deceived by his representative, or at least not made aware of the
revocation.
34. Given the aforementioned situation and the particularities of the case at hand, the
Chamber concluded that no sporting sanctions shall be imposed on the player and on
the Second Respondent.
35. Finally, the DRC decided that the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs and
expenses is rejected, in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the
Chamber’s longstanding respective jurisprudence.
36. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by
establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.
III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, FC Vojvodina, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
It is established that the First Respondent, Dejan Meleg, has terminated his
employment relationship with the Claimant without just cause.
4.
The claim of the Claimant for compensation for breach of contract is rejected.
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
*****
Note related to the publication:
The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or
the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the
request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to
publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to
the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain
all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within
another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal,
the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS.
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
Avenue de Beaumont 2, CH-1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
Club FC Vojvodina, Serbia / Player Dejan Meleg, Serbia & Club Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey
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