Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-21653
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 9 April 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Maximillian Medwyn R Ryan
COMPOSITION:
Lívia SILVA KÄGI (Brazil & Switzerland), Deputy Chairwoman
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member
Andre DOS SANTOS MEGALE (Brazil), Member
CLAIMANT:
Maximillian Medwyn R Ryan, Great Britain
Represented by Dev Kumar Parmar
RESPONDENT:
Banyule City SC, Australia
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-21653
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 18 March 2025, the British player Maximillian Medwyn R Ryan (hereinafter: the Claimant
or the Player) and the Australian club Banyule City SC (hereinafter: the Respondent or the
Club) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract).
2.
The main provisions of the Contract read as follows, quoted verbatim:
“DATE 18 / 03 / 2025
PLAYER NAME: Max Ryan
CLUB – PLAYER AGREEMENT - 2025 SEASON
This letter sets out the terms on which the entity as specified in Item 1.1 of the Specification
(Club) will casually employ you to play football and the obligations imposed on you and the Club
(Agreement).
[…]
Banyule City will cover accommodation for the player on a temporary basis until the player
organises his own accommodation, up to 2 months.
Once accommodation is organised and no longer requires temporary accommodation, the
match payments for the play will increase to :
Appearance fees (includes Australia Cup)
WIN $ 1000
LOSS $ 1000
DRAW $ 1000
[…]
Appearance fees (includes Australia Cup)
WIN $ 800
LOSS $ 800
DRAW $ 800
Goal Bonus $ N/A
Assist Bonus $ N/A
These Match Payments (if any) are payable for Matches if the Player’s name appears on the
starting list as a starting player or substitute and will be paid on a fortnightly basis by direct
deposit into the player’s nominated bank account or as agreement between club and player
[…]
Where the player is selected for any first team match and be named on the substitutes bench,
player will receive full match payments should he play more than 50% of the match. Where less
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REF. FPSD-21653
than 50% of the match is played, 50% of the match fee. If the player plays no part in the game
but is on the substitute bench, the player will receive 25% of the match fee […]”
3.
On 3 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of the
Club but remained as a substitute and did not play.
4.
On 4 May 2025, the alleged manager of the Club informed the Player via WhatsApp that he
would play on Tuesday night.
5.
On 6 May 2025, an alleged representative of the Club provided the Player via WhatsApp
with the location of the match.
6.
On 9 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of the
Club but remained as a substitute and did not play.
7.
On 17 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of the
Club and played in less than 50% of the match.
8.
On unspecified dates, the Player repeatedly contacted an alleged representative of the
Club via WhatsApp to express his disappointment regarding his outstanding remuneration
under the Contract and to request payment of the corresponding match fees.
9.
On 21 June 2025, the Player put the Club in default and requested payment within 15 days
of AUD 1,600 as outstanding remuneration under the Contract.
10. On 24 June 2025, the Club informed the Player that it would come back to him shortly
regarding this matter.
11. On 7 July 2025, the Player unilaterally terminated the Contract.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
12. On 30 October 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
13. In his claim, the Claimant argued that he terminated the Contract with just cause on 7 July
2025 due to outstanding remuneration. In this respect, the Claimant submitted that he did
not receive any remuneration whatsoever under the Contract, despite having been
selected in 4 official matches of the Respondent, resulting in an outstanding amount of
AUD 1,600 as of the termination date.
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REF. FPSD-21653
14. For the sake of completeness of the foregoing, the Claimant stated that (i) he was duly
named in the matchday squad but remained an unused substitute on 3 and 9 May 2025,
entitling him to AUD 200 per match; (ii) he participated in more than 50% of the match
played on 6 May 2025, entitling him to AUD 800; and (iii) he featured in less than 50% of
the match played on 17 May 2025, entitling him to AUD 400.
15. With respect to compensation for the breach of his employment relationship with the
Respondent, the Claimant asserted that he is entitled to the residual value of the Contract.
In fact, the Player argued that he would have been involved in all eight remaining matches
of the season, as demonstrated by his consistent selection prior to the termination of the
Contract. Thus, it is the position of the Claimant that he is entitled to AUD 8,000 since the
Contract stipulated that match fees increased to AUD 1,000 after he arranged his own
accommodation.
16. The Claimant’s requests for relief were the following:
“a. To enforce FIFA’s jurisdiction as the competent body to hear and determine this matter; and
b. To find that the Respondent, Banyule City Soccer Club, has breached the Contract dated 18th
March 2025; and
c. To order the Respondent, in any case, to pay Mr. Maximilian Medwyn Richard J Ryan the
following amount as overdue payables:
- AUD 1,600.00 (One Thousand Six Hundred Australian Dollars); and
d. To find that the Claimant has terminated the Contract with just cause and to order the
Respondent to pay the Claimant compensation in accordance with Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP as
follows:
- AUD 8,000.00 (Eight Thousand Australian Dollars); OR
e. In the alternative, should the FIFA Judge determine that the compensation payable shall only
be based on the lowest amount earnable by the Player for the remaining games in the Contract,
to order the Club to pay the Player compensation in accordance with Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP
as follows:
- AUD 2,000.00 (Two Thousand Australian Dollars); and
f. In any case, to grant interest at 5% p.a. (Five Per Cent Per Annum) on the amounts stipulated
in point 1. c. and points 1. d. or 1. e. of the requests for relief herein; and
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REF. FPSD-21653
g. To order the Respondent to cover all the costs of proceedings and to bear all the legal fees
incurred by the Player in connection with this matter, the costs to be itemised and sent to FIFA
in due course; and
h. To grant any further or other relief that the Tribunal may deem fit.”
b. Reply of the Respondent
17. Despite being invited to do so, the Respondent failed to reply to the Claimant’s claim.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
18. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or the DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 30 October 2025 and submitted for decision
on 9 April 2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the January 2026
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
19. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake,
which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between
a British player and an Australian club.
20. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
21. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
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REF. FPSD-21653
c. Merits of the dispute
22. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
23. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter and took note, on the one hand,
that the Player argued that he terminated the Contract with just cause due to outstanding
remuneration.
24. On the other hand, the Chamber pointed out that that Club did not respond to the Player’s
claim, entailing that its decision must be made on the basis of the documentation on file,
that is, the argumentation and evidence filed by the Player in line with art. 21 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules.
25. Before assessing the termination of the Contract, the Chamber noted that there is no
evidence on file of the Contract signed by the Club. Accordingly, the Chamber considered
that its first task was to establish the contractual basis governing the parties’ employment
relationship, if any.
26. Within this framework, the Chamber recalled the wording of art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural
Rules, according to which a party claiming a right based on an alleged fact shall carry the
respective burden of proof. On this note, the Chamber considered that it was up to the
Player to prove that the employment relationship on which he claims compensation for the
breach of the Contract from the Club did in fact exist.
27. In this respect, the Chamber referred to its well-established jurisprudence, which dictates
that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from
the consent of both the employer and the employee (usually manifested by the signature
to the relevant agreement), it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment
contract, such as the name of the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the
employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee.
In other words, the Chamber underlined that the actual signature of the Contract is not the
sole (or even a necessary) element to determine whether the parties did in fact agree on
its terms.
28. In the present matter, the Chamber observed that all criteria were established in the
Contract, except for the signature of the Club. Put differently, the Chamber held that the
Contract indeed included all the relevant information at the basis of an employment
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REF. FPSD-21653
relationship between contractual parties. Specifically, the Chamber pointed out that the
Contract provided for the duration of the employment relationship, the remuneration
payable to the Player and it clearly stipulated that the Player is employed as a footballer
with the Club.
29. In the Chamber’s view, the foregoing interpretation was further supported by the evidence
provided by the Player, which supported the conclusion of the Contract with the Club,
particularly the undisputed fact that the Player participated in official matches. Therefore,
the Chamber concluded that the Contract was in fact valid and binding between the Player
and the Club and shall be considered as the contractual basis of the present dispute.
30. In continuation, the Chamber considered that its task was to determine, based on the
evidence presented by the parties, whether the claimed amounts had in fact remained
unpaid by the Respondent and, if so, whether the formal pre-requisites of art. 14bis of the
Regulations had in fact been fulfilled.
31. In this context, the Chamber referred to the wording of art. 14bis par. 1 of the Regulations,
in accordance with which, if a club unlawfully fails to pay a player at least two monthly
salaries on their due dates, the player will be deemed to have a just cause to terminate his
contract, provided that he has put the debtor club in default in writing and has granted a
deadline of at least 15 days for the debtor club to fully comply with its financial obligation(s).
32. In the case at hand, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant argued that his outstanding
remuneration under the Contract as of 21 June 2025 amounted to AUD 1,600,
corresponding to four match fees. Furthermore, the Chamber observed that the Claimant
provided written evidence of having put the Respondent in default on 21 June 2025, i.e., at
least 15 days before unilaterally terminating the Contract on 7 July 2025.
33. Taking into account the wording of art. 14bis of the Regulations and the fact that the
Claimant’s salary was not due on a monthly basis but was exclusively linked to match
selection, match participation and minutes played in matches, the Chamber considered
that the mechanism of “two monthly salaries being overdue” cannot be applied to assess
the termination of the Contract. Put differently, given that the remuneration under the
Contract is entirely variable and cannot be converted into a clear monthly equivalent, the
Chamber concluded that the requirements of art. 14bis of the Regulations are not met in
the present matter.
34. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber recalled that, according to the Regulations, in
general, just cause to terminate an employment contract shall exist in any circumstance
in which a party can no longer reasonably and in good faith be expected to continue a
contractual relationship (cf., art. 14 of the Regulations).
35. The Chamber further recalled the jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal, according to
which only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of
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REF. FPSD-21653
a contract. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably
permit to expect the continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a
contract may be terminated prematurely. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which
can be taken in order to ensure the fulfilment of the contractual duties by the counterparty,
such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature
termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure.
36. With the above principle in mind, the Chamber found that before the termination of the
Contract on 7 July 2025, the Respondent had repeatedly and for a significant period of time
been in breach of its contractual obligations towards the Claimant. In particular, the
Chamber established the following facts:
•
On 18 March 2025, the Player and the Club concluded the Contract.
•
On 3 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of
the Club but remained as a substitute and did not play. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 200 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
•
On 9 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of
the Club but remained as a substitute and did not play. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 200 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
•
On 17 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match
of the Club and played in less than 50% of the match. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 400 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
•
On 21 June 2025, the Player put the Club in default and requested payment within
15 days of AUD 1,600 as outstanding remuneration under the Contract.
•
On 24 June 2025, the Club informed the Player that it would come back to him
shortly regarding this matter.
•
On 7 July 2025, the Player unilaterally terminated the Contract.
37. Considering the foregoing facts, the Chamber emphasised that the fundamental terms and
conditions which formed the basis of the Contract were no longer respected by the
Respondent on 7 July 2025. In particular, the Chamber held that the Player’s outstanding
remuneration under the Contract was significant enough to justify an ultima ratio measure,
notably because the Player was not remunerated in any other manner and the Respondent
had been put in default of payment in this regard and granted a 15-day deadline to comply
with its financial obligations.
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REF. FPSD-21653
38. Thus, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent’s repeated breaches of its contractual
obligations towards the Claimant were of such a severity that the Claimant had just cause
to unilaterally terminate the Contract on 7 July 2025, based on art. 14 of the Regulations.
39. Notwithstanding the existence of just cause for the Claimant to unilaterally terminate the
Contract, the Chamber recalled the specific circumstances of the present matter, in which
the Player’s remuneration under the Contract depended entirely on sporting decisions. On
this basis, the Chamber considered that the compensation for the breach of the Contract
cannot be objectively determined.
40. In other words, the Chamber underlined that since the number of matches for which the
Player will be selected and in which he will participate cannot be predicted in advance, any
calculation of the residual value of the Contract would be purely speculative and
incompatible with the principles governing compensation under the Regulations. In this
respect, the Chamber disregarded the Player’s argument that he would have been involved
in all eight remaining matches of the season, as such assumption is not supported with the
necessary documentary evidence or contractual basis.
41. Consequently, in the absence of any objective contractual basis to determine what the
Player would have earned after the date of termination of his employment relationship
with the Club, the Chamber decided that the Player cannot be awarded compensation for
the breach of the Contract under art. 14 or art. 17 of the Regulations. The Chamber further
considered that this conclusion was consistent with the nature of the contractual
relationship and remuneration agreed between the parties, which was exclusively
performance-based by the Player and therefore contingent upon the occurrence of future
events.
42. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the assessment of the Player’s
outstanding remuneration under the Contract at the moment of its termination. In this
respect, the Chamber considered, on the basis of art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules,
that the Player only met his burden of proof to demonstrate the following facts:
•
On 3 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of
the Club but remained as a substitute and did not play. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 200 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
•
On 9 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match of
the Club but remained as a substitute and did not play. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 200 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
•
On 17 May 2025, the Player was included in the match squad for an official match
of the Club and played in less than 50% of the match. As a result, the Player was
entitled to AUD 400 in accordance with the wording of the Contract.
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REF. FPSD-21653
43. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber stated that the alleged fact that the manager
of the Club informed the Player that he would be playing on 6 May 2025 and provided him
with the location of the match is insufficient to demonstrate that the Player is entitled to
AUD 800 as the fee for said match. In fact, the Chamber pointed out that, unliked the
matches on 3, 9 and 17 May 2025, the Player did not provide any match report confirming
that he was selected for the match on 6 May 2025, or that he participated in or played even
a single minute of that match.
44. Along the same lines, the Chamber underlined that the Player did not provide any evidence
to demonstrate that the person with whom he corresponded via WhatsApp on 4 May 2025
was the Club’s manager at the time. In particular, the Chamber found no evidence on file
establishing this individual’s role, authority, or position within the Club, nor confirming that
he was responsible for or entitled to make decisions regarding player selection.
45. Similarly, and contrary to the Player’s assertion, the Chamber considered that the undated
WhatsApp conversation with an alleged representative of the Club does not demonstrate
any acknowledgement by the Club of the Player’s outstanding remuneration under the
Contract of AUD 1,600. In any event, the Chamber once again found no evidence on file
establishing this individual’s role, authority, or position within the Club, nor confirming that
he had the authority to acknowledge a debt on behalf of the Club.
46. The Chamber then recalled that, in the case at hand, the Respondent bore the burden of
proving that it indeed complied with the financial terms of the Contract concluded with the
Claimant. Nonetheless, the Chamber observed that the Respondent failed to provide any
evidence to prove the payment of the amounts claimed as outstanding by the Claimant.
47. As a consequence, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda,
the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant AUD 800 as
outstanding remuneration under the Contract at the moment of its termination.
48. Lastly, taking into consideration the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of
the Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest
at the rate of 5% p.a. on the outstanding amount as from 30 October 2025, i.e., the day he
lodged his claim before FIFA, and until the date of effective payment.
ii. Compliance with monetary decisions
49. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
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REF. FPSD-21653
50. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
51. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
52. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
53. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
54. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
55. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
56. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
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REF. FPSD-21653
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Maximillian Medwyn R Ryan, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Banyule City SC, must pay to the Claimant the following amount:
- AUD 800 as outstanding remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as from 30 October 2025
until the date of effective payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
5.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
6.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
7.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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