Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-20940
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 20 January 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Tiago
Barbosa Figueiredo
BY:
Michele COLUCCI (Italy)
CLAIMANT:
Tiago Barbosa Figueiredo, Brazil
Represented by Cravo, Pastl e Balbuena Advogados Associados
RESPONDENT:
Birzebbuga St. Peter's, Malta
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-20940
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 18 July 2025, the Brazilian player, Tiago Barbosa Figueiredo (hereinafter: the Player or
the Claimant) and the Maltese club, Birzebbuga St. Peter's (hereinafter: the Club or the
Respondent) entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract) valid “for a
period of three (3) football seasons, commencing on 1st September 2025.”
2.
In addition, the parties agreed on the following:
“The third and final term shall commence on 1st September 2027 and terminate upon the final
official match of the 2027/2028 season, provided that the team participates in the Premier
League, i.e., the Maltese Serie A. Should the team not compete in the Maltese Serie A during
the 2027/2028 season, the player shall be automatically released from the contract at the
end of the 2026/2027 season, with no further obligations on either party.”
3.
According to clause 2 of the Contract, the Player was entitled to a monthly salary of EUR
1,700 net of all taxes and expenses at the end of each month.
4.
According to clause 3.1 of the Contract, the parties agreed that “This Contract shall not come
into force and shall have no binding effect unless and until the Player successfully passes a
medical examination conducted by a medical practitioner appointed by the Club, the
determination of which shall be at the sole discretion of the Club.”
5.
According to clause 3.5, “This Contract may be terminated either upon the expiry of its natural
termination, by mutual agreement between the parties, or unilaterally by one of the parties for
reasons of just cause or sporting just cause according to the regulations of the Malta Football
Association and/or FIFA. Provided that in the eventuality of termination due to a just cause as
abovementioned, the party claiming just cause or sporting just cause shall file a complaint with
the Complaints Board of the Malta Football Association claiming such just cause or sporting just
cause. This Contract shall be deemed terminated only upon the publication of a decision of the
competent Malta Football Association judicial body decreeing such termination.”
6.
On 2 August 2025, the Club sent the following message to the Player:
“Following the meeting yesterday with the committee, coach, and the President, they shared
that they are pleased with your performance. However, they’ve decided not to sign you to the
squad at this time. This decision comes from the President and the coach – not from my side
– as they are ultimately the ones who make the final call.
If you’d like to look for another club here in Malta, no problem – we fully support that.
Alternatively, if you prefer to return to Brazil, we will of course cover your ticket back.
I’m sorry to be the one to share this news – unfortunately, this is part of football sometimes.”
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REF. FPSD-20940
7.
The Player replied that he has already signed a contract with them and the Club stated that
“the contract you sign him to entre to malta like a pass… in not entered in the federation, you
are free right now.”
8.
On 4 August 2025, the Club informed the Player the following:
“We refer to the employment contract dated 18 July 2025, purportedly entered into
between yourself and Birzebbuga St. Peter’s FC (hereinafter “the Club”), and address you
formally on the matter herein.
In terms of Clause 3.1 of said contract, it is expressly stipulated that:
“This agreement is conditional upon the Player undergoing and successfully passing a
medical examination to the satisfaction of the Club.”
This clause constitutes a condition precedent, rendering the contract suspensive in nature
and subject to said condition’s fulfilment. To date, no such medical examination has been
conducted, nor has any fitness clearance been issued. Consequently, the essential
condition for the contract to become operative in law remains unmet.
It is therefore the Club’s unequivocal position that:
- The contract has not come into legal effect;
- No legal or contractual obligations have been triggered thereunder;
- No employment relationship exists or has existed in fact or in law.
Accordingly, and without prejudice to any rights the Club may have at law, the Club shall
not be proceeding with the registration, onboarding, or retention of your services. You are
hereby formally notified that the contract is null and void ab initio, for want of fulfilment
of a suspensive condition explicitly agreed upon by both parties.”
9.
On 10 August 2025, the Player flew from Malta to Sao Paulo, Brazil.
10. On an unspecified date, the Player told the Club via WhatsApp that he had a signed contract
with them and he does not wish to leave the team. The Club answered that it was not happy
with his performance and was trying to find a new club for him.
11. On 30 August 2025, the Player sent the following letter to the Club:
“Initially, it should be stated that the athlete is fully available to fulfill the sports
employment contract entered into between the parties in July 2025, being ready to
participate in training sessions, team camps, official or friendly matches, as well as any
activities determined by the club.
Under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), in particular
Articles 13 and 18.4, it is reaffirmed that the execution of the contract is fully valid. The
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-20940
athlete has always been available to undergo medical examinations, which have not
prevented his participation in training sessions and practice matches organized by the
club, demonstrating the absence of any impediment to the performance of his duties.
On the other hand, it should be stated that the athlete does not accept, and would never
accept, any attempt at unilateral reduction of contractual amounts, which would be
inconsistent with the principle of good faith and could constitute just cause for indirect
termination, pursuant to Article 14 of the RSTP. Furthermore, any loan to another club
depends on his express consent and prior knowledge of the contractual conditions (cessor
club, salaries, benefits, term, etc.), which the athlete is willing to consider expressly and in
advance, his position being supported by Article 18, §3, which protects the athlete’s right
to participate in negotiations affecting his employment relationship.
Accordingly, the notifying athlete places the club in default, reiterating that he is fit to
attend training sessions and participate in matches for the Notified Party. Any
maintenance of the current stance or lack of response to this notice shall be interpreted
as indirect termination or breach of contract without just cause, subjecting the club to the
consequences provided for in Article 17 of the RSTP and disciplinary proceedings before
the FIFA jurisdiction.
In light of the above, the athlete requests the immediate formal written confirmation that
he is duly integrated into the squad and may fully perform his contract, providing him, for
this purpose, with the relevant airline tickets for his reintegration and being fully available
to the club for all acts related to the performance of his contractual obligations.”
12. On 2 September 2025, the Club replied as follows:
“Contrary to the assertions made in your notice, it was the Player himself who elected to
return to Brazil with his family. The Club has in its possession communications exchanged
directly between the Player and Club officials confirming that the Player insisted upon this
course of action.
The Club reiterates that, far from preventing the Player from fulfilling his contract, it
actively offered to facilitate a transition to another Maltese club, a measure that would
have preserved both the validity of the contract and the continuity of the Player’s career
within Malta. This opportunity was declined by the Player, who instead opted to return to
Brazil.
It follows that the current situation is the result of the Player’s unilateral choice, rather
than any purported breach or obstruction by the Club.
The contract signed between the parties clearly establishes that the Player’s services are
to be rendered exclusively to Birżebbuġa St. Peter’s FC, unless otherwise authorised by the
Club. Despite this, the Club demonstrated goodwill and flexibility by offering to explore
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-20940
alternatives with other competitive teams in Malta, which the Player rejected. This fact
further reinforces that the Club cannot be said to have terminated the agreement without
just cause.
The Club notes the reference in your notice to Articles 13, 14, and 17 of the RSTP. These
provisions presuppose a scenario of unilateral termination by the Club. In the present
case, no such termination has taken place. On the contrary:
•
•
•
The Club remained open to the continuation of the contract;
The Player’s departure was voluntary; and
The Player’s refusal of the Maltese opportunities offered amounts to a conscious
decision to discontinue his contractual performance.
Accordingly, the Club cannot be held at fault for the termination of the said contract as
ultimately the Player unilaterally withdrew his obligations, the liability for breach rests
with the Player.
For the reasons set out above, the Club rejects the allegation that it has committed a
unilateral breach of contract. The Club has acted at all times in good faith and in
compliance with the contract and FIFA RSTP”.
13. On 5 January 2026, the Player and the Brazilian club Itabirito Futebol Clube signed a new
employment contract valid as from 6 January 2026 until 6 April 2026 (hereinafter: the New
Contract).
14. According to the New Contract, the Player was entitled to a monthly salary of BRL 2,500.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
15. On 19 September 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
16. The Player lodged the present claim with FIFA for compensation for breach of Contract:
“Within this context, the Claimant would like to gently ask FIFA:
a) Subject to the provisions of article 24.1 of the FIFA RSTP, to admit the Claim and the
competence of FIFA DRC to judge it;
b) to uphold the reasons invoked to terminate the employment contract with just cause,
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-20940
in accordance with the provisions of articles 14 of the FIFA RSTP;
c) to condemn the Respondent to pay to the Claimant the net amount of EUR 59.500,
plus interests of 5% (six percent) per year since the date on which the contract was
terminated by the Respondent without just cause;
d) impose to the Respondent the appropriate sanctions as provided for in paragraph 4
of article 17 of FIFA RSTP;
e) to condemn the Respondent to pay contribution towards legal expenses.”
17. The Player alleged that the Contract had been signed by all parties concerned and was
therefore a valid and binding contract.
18. Finally, the Player asserted that the Club terminated the Contract without just cause,
arguing that the completion of medical examinations cannot be considered a condition for
the validity of the Contract.
b. Reply of the Respondent
19. In its reply, the Club disputed FIFA’s competence stating that according to the RSTP of the
Football Association of Malta (hereinafter: the MFA), any employment or registration
dispute arising between a club and a player must first be addressed before the MFA’s
internal dispute resolution mechanisms, which are the exclusive competent body for
national football matters.
20. In addition, the Club alleged that the Player never registered with the MFA, nor did he
initiate or exhaust any local remedies as required under both Maltese football regulations
and FIFA procedural norms. According to the Club, his claim to FIFA is therefore
procedurally premature and inadmissible, as no valid employment relationship was ever
recognised under the MFA.
21. Furthermore, the Club asserted that the Contract never came into effect for the following
reasons:
-
The Contract was conditional upon the Player’s successful registration and approval
by the MFA;
-
The Player did not complete the necessary registration procedures, including the
issuance of a work permit and the medical clearance, which according to the Club
are essential prerequisites for the validity of any employment contract in Malta.
22. In view of the above, the Club argued that since the Contract never came into effect, it could
have not possibly been breached.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-20940
23. Furthermore, the Club alleged that the Club tried to negotiate a loan or permanent transfer
to another club but the Player, acting in bad faith, refused all the options that were given
to him by the Club.
24. Consequently, the Player requested the following relief:
“Dismiss the claim in its entirety as inadmissible and unfounded, for lack of jurisdiction and
absence of a valid contractual or registration relationship.
Reject all allegations of contractual breach, compensation, and sanctions sought by the
Claimant.
Acknowledge that the Player’s departure from Malta was voluntary, unrelated to any action or
omission by the Club.
Order the Claimant to bear all procedural and legal costs associated with this matter.”
c. Replica of the Claimant
25. In its replica, the Player reiterated that the Club terminated the Contract without just cause
claiming that medical examinations and MFA registration cannot be conditions for
contractual validity under art. 18.4 of the Regulations. He emphasized that the Contract
was duly signed and met all the essential elements to be valid.
26. In addition, he alleged that his departure from Malta was not voluntary but resulted from
the Club’s conduct.
d. Duplica of the Respondent
27. In its duplica, the Club reiterated that the FIFA DRC lacks jurisdiction as the Player was never
registered with the MFA, no ITC was issued and the domestic remedies were not exhausted.
28. The Club argued that the Player left Malta before the season started and refused to
complete registration and issue his work permit.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-20940
e. Contractual update by the Claimant
29. In line with art. 23 par. 2 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal, the
Claimant informed FIFA general secretariat of the New Contract with the Brazilian club
Itabirito Futebol Clube.
30. In this regard, he modified his request for relief as follows:
“Consequently, taking into consideration (a) the provisions of Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players; (b) the fact that the employment contract was
terminated by the Respondent without just cause on 02 August 2025, as subsequently
reiterated on 04 August 2025, when the Player received messages from Mr. Steve Debono
informing him of the Club’s decision to dismiss him; (c) the Player’s monthly salary of EUR
1,700; and (d) the fact that the employment relationship would only have expired in
May 2028,the Club shall be ordered to pay to the Player the amount of EUR 58,308.04 (which
already reflects the deduction of the salaries that would have been payable between
January and March2026, totaling EUR 1,191.96, in accordance with the mitigation principle
set out in Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP) plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum as from the
respective due date(s) until the date of effective payment.”
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
31. First of all, the Single Judge of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Single Judge)
analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took
note that the present matter was presented to FIFA on 19 September 2025 and submitted
for decision on 20 January 2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the
January 2026 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter:
the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to
the matter at hand.
32. Furthermore, the Single Judge referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter
at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension
between a Brazilian player and a Maltese club.
33. The Single Judge noted that the competence of FIFA has been disputed by the Club, stating
that “According to the Football Association of Malta (MFA) Regulations on Status and Transfer
of Players, any employment or registration dispute arising between a club and a player must
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REF. FPSD-20940
first be addressed before the MFA’s internal dispute resolution mechanisms, which are the
exclusive competent body for national football matters”.
34. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge first recalled that in January 2024, FIFA introduced
a new regulatory framework for national disputes resolution chambers in order to provide
clarity and the necessary legal certainty with regard to jurisdiction, structure, applicable
requirements and possible formal and permanent recognition by FIFA of existing National
Dispute Resolution Chambers (NDRC).
35. Most importantly, the aforementioned rules have been incorporated into art. 22, par. 1, lit.
b and c) of the Regulations and is applicable to cases brought before FIFA as from 1 January
2025 (cf., art. 26, par. 1, lit. b) of the Regulations).
36. Considering that this claim was filed by the Player on 19 September 2025, the jurisdiction
of the Football Tribunal must be assessed based on the following provision:
”Without prejudice to the right of any player, coach, association, or club to seek redress before
a civil court for employment- related disputes, FIFA is competent to hear:
b) employment-related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension;
the aforementioned parties may, however, explicitly opt in writing for such disputes to be
decided by a national dispute resolution chamber (NDRC), or a national dispute resolution
body operating under an equivalent name, that has been officially recognised by FIFA in
accordance with the National Dispute Resolution Chamber Recognition Principles. Any such
jurisdiction clause must be exclusive and included either directly in the contract or in a
collective bargaining agreement applicable to the parties.”
37. As this dispute has an international dimension (i.e., Brazilian player vs. Maltese club) and is
employment-related (i.e., claim for breach of an employment contract), it falls within FIFA’s
jurisdiction which in principle, would only be prevented in the hypothesis of (1) a clear and
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Contract in favour of the civil courts; or (2) a clear and
exclusive jurisdiction clause included in the Contract or in an applicable CBA in favour of a
NDRC “that has been officially recognised by FIFA in accordance with the National Dispute
Resolution Chamber Recognition Principles”.
38. It follows that in order for FIFA to decline its jurisdiction in favour of an NDRC, the interested
party challenging the Football Tribunal’s must demonstrate that the parties have validly
agreed to refer any such dispute to the relevant decision-making body and that such body
is recognised by FIFA. These conditions are cumulative and must all be met at the time a
party submits a claim to FIFA.
39. Despite the fact that the Club did not dispute the jurisdiction citing the jurisdiction clause
but instead made a general reference to the MFA’s regulations, the Single Judge considered
that the jurisdictional question must be assessed in light of Clause 3.5 of the Contract,
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REF. FPSD-20940
which expressly incorporates the MFA regulations and the MFA’s dispute resolution
mechanisms.
40. In light of the foregoing, the Single Judge first turned to the analysis of the Contract and
recalled that its Clause 3.5 provided as follows:
“This Contract may be terminated either upon the expiry of its natural termination, by
mutual agreement between the parties, or unilaterally by one of the parties for reasons of
just cause or sporting just cause according to the regulations of the Malta Football
Association and/or FIFA. Provided that in the eventuality of termination due to a just cause
as abovementioned, the party claiming just cause or sporting just cause shall file a
complaint with the Complaints Board of the Malta Football Association claiming such just
cause or sporting just cause. This Contract shall be deemed terminated only upon the
publication of a decision of the competent Malta Football Association judicial body
decreeing such termination.”
41. The Single Judge considered that this provision would only apply in cases of termination
with just cause, and the complaint must be lodged before the Maltese NDRC by the party
claiming just cause. Accordingly, the Single Judge deemed that the above provision does
not apply to the present case, as the claim was lodged by the Player, who alleges
termination without just cause by the Club, a scenario not covered by Clause 3.5 of the
Contract.
42. Notwithstanding the above, and assuming Clause 3.5 of the Contract was applicable to the
present case, the Maltese NDRC was not included in the official list of recognized NDRCs at
the time the claim was submitted—and has not been included since.
43. In view of the above, the Single Judge concluded that the Football Tribunal has jurisdiction
to hear the present claim.
44. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of
the Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand
as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
45. The Single Judge recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Single Judge
stressed the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which he may
consider evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence
generated by or within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-20940
c. Merits of the dispute
46. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Single Judge
entered into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Single Judge started by
acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the
documentation on file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that in the following
considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which
he considered pertinent for assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
47. The Single Judge then moved to the substance of the matter and took note of the fact that
the parties strongly dispute whether the Club had just cause to terminate the Contract.
48. In this context, the Single Judge acknowledged that his task was to establish whether the
Club had just cause to terminate the Contract and the consequences thereof.
49. The Single Judge noted that the Player alleged that the Club terminated the Contract
without just cause, claiming that he had not passed the medical examination and had not
been successfully registered with the MFA. The Player submitted a letter from the Club
stating that his failure to pass the medical exam rendered the Contract invalid and,
therefore, “the contract is null and void ab initio” and the Club would not proceed “with the
registration, onboarding, or retention of your services.”
50. Notwithstanding the above, the Single Judge observed that the Club argued that it did not
terminate the Contract as it never entered into force and it was the Player who decided to
leave the country and not proceed with his work visa and registration.
51. Despite the Club’s assertion that it did not terminate the Contract, the Single Judge
considered that it is evident from the letter dated 2 August 2025 that the Contract was, in
fact, declared null and void by the Club due to the fact that the Player did not pass its
medical examinations. Even though there were various allegations regarding the Player’s
work permit, registration, and voluntary departure, the only reason stated in the first letter
sent to the Player on 2 August 2025, stated that the lack of medical examinations was the
reason why the Contract became null and void.
52. However, the Single Judge reminded that according to art. 18.4 of the Regulations, “The
validity of a contract may not be made subject to a successful medical examination and/or the
grant of a work permit.”
53. In this regard, the Single Judge recalled that according to the well-established DRC and CAS
jurisprudence, clubs are required to conduct medical examination before finalizing a
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-20940
contract with a player. If a club disregards this essential requirement and signs the contract
without confirming the player’s fitness, it assumes full responsibility for that decision. In
such cases, the contract will be deemed valid and binding, and the club cannot unilaterally
terminate it if the player later fails the medical test or does not undergo one. Terminating
a contract under these circumstances is considered termination without just cause (DRC
decision of 9 June 2022, Barbosa).
54. In addition, the Single Judge made reference to the Commentary on the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players (page 236) according to which “A club wishing to employ a
player has to exercise due diligence and carry out all relevant medical examinations prior to
entering into an employment contract with that player. It is, and has always been, the hiring
club’s duty to satisfy itself that the player they intend to contract is in good physical condition. It
is for the club taking on the player, not the club releasing them, to assess whether the player is
fit to play football” (DRC decision of 31 January 2020, Betila, CAS 2008/A/1593 Kuwait
Sporting Club v. Z. & FIFA CAS 2013/A/3314 Villareal CF SAD v. SS Lazio Roma SpA).
55. Consequently, and in view of the above, the Single Judge decided that the Club terminated
the Contract without just cause, in breach of art. 14 of the Regulations.
ii. Consequences
56. Having stated the above, the Single Judge turned his attention to the question of the
consequences of such unjustified breach of contract committed by the Respondent.
57. The Single Judge observed that the Player claimed that there was no outstanding
remuneration at the time of the termination and therefore the Single Judge concluded that
no outstanding remuneration was to be awarded to the Player.
58. Having stated the above, the Single Judge turned to the calculation of the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing so, the Single Judge
firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount
of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the
contract at the basis of the dispute, taking into account the damage suffered, according to
the “positive interest” principle, having regard for the individual facts and circumstances of
each case, and with due consideration for the law of the country concerned.
59. In application of the relevant provision, the Single Judge held that he first of all had to clarify
as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Single Judge
established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at
the basis of the matter at stake.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-20940
60. As a consequence, the Single Judge determined that the amount of compensation payable
by the Club to the Player had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out
in art. 17, par. 1 of the Regulations. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that, as a
general rule, the compensation to be paid to a player by a club shall be equal to the residual
value of the contract that was prematurely terminated, unless this player signed a new
contract following the termination of his previous contract (cf., art. 17 par. 1 lit. i) of the
Regulations).
61. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Single Judge
proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of
the Contract from the date of its unilateral termination until its end date. Consequently,
the Single Judge concluded that the amount of EUR 61,200 net (i.e., EUR 1,700 x 36 months)
serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of
contract.
62. For the avoidance of doubt, the Single Judge recalled that Clause 1.1 of the Contract
provided that that in case the team does not participate in the Maltese Serie A during the
2027/2028 season, the Player shall be automatically released from the Contract at the end
of the 2026/1017 season. However, the Single Judge considered that, despite the presence
of this suspensive condition, the overall duration of the Contract remains three seasons,
with an option for early termination after two seasons, contingent upon the Club’s league
participation. This clause does not alter the initial agreed term but rather introduces a
conditional exit mechanism. In addition, the Single Judge noted that the Club did not
dispute its duration as interpreted by the Player in his statement of claim.
63. In continuation, the Single Judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of
which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant
practice of the Football Tribunal as well as art. 17 par. 1 lit. ii) of the Regulations, such
remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the
calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the
general obligation to mitigate his damages.
64. Indeed, the Player found employment with the Brazilian club Itabirito Futebol Clube valid
as from 6 January 2026 until 6 April 2026. In accordance with the New Contract, the Player
was entitled to a monthly salary of BRL 2,500 (approx. EUR 401.25). Therefore, the Single
Judge concluded that the Claimant mitigated his damages in the total amount of BRL 7,500
(approx., 1,203.75), that is, BRL 2,500 times 3.
65. Consequently, on account of all the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities
of the case at hand, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of
EUR 59,996.25 to the Claimant (i.e., EUR 61,200 minus EUR 1,203.75), which was to be
considered a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in
the present matter.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-20940
66. However, the Single Judge noted that when the Player modified his request for relief when
he informed FIFA about his new employment situation, the Player requested to be awarded
the mitigated compensation of EUR 58,308.04 net.
67. Therefore, in line with the principle of ne ultra petitita, the Single Judge decided to award
the Player the amount of EUR 58,308.04 net as compensation for breach of Contract.
68. Lastly, taking into consideration the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of
the Football Tribunal in this regard, the Single Judge decided to award the Claimant interest
on said compensation at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 2 August 2025 until the date of effective
payment.
iii. Compliance with monetary decisions
69. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Single Judge referred to art. 24
par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
70. In this regard, the Single Judge highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the
failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any
new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The
overall maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and
consecutive registration periods.
71. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must
pay the full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
72. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
73. The Single Judge recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior
to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par.
8 of the Regulations.
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REF. FPSD-20940
d. Costs
74. The Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Single Judge decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
75. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge recalled the contents of art.
25 par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
76. Lastly, the Single Judge concluded his deliberations by rejecting any other requests for
relief made by any of the parties.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-20940
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Tiago Barbosa
Figueiredo.
2.
The claim of the Claimant, Tiago Barbosa Figueiredo, is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Birzebbuga St. Peter's, must pay to the Claimant the following amount:
- EUR 58,308.04 net as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as from
2 August 2025 until the date of effective payment.
4.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
6.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
7.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
8.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-20940
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 18