Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-20346
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 13 November 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Kevin
Alexander López Saldarriaga
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member
Jorge GUTIÉRREZ (Costa Rica), Member
CLAIMANT:
Kevin Alexander López Saldarriaga, Colombia
Represented by Berlin Sports Law
RESPONDENT:
Persik Kediri, Indonesia
Represented by Vitus Derungs
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-20346
I. Facts of the case
1.
The parties to this case are the Colombian player, Kevin Alexander López Saldarriaga
(hereinafter: the Player or the Claimant), and the Indonesian club, Persik Kediri (hereinafter:
the Club or the Respondent).
2.
On 26 March 2025, the Club’s head coach, Mr Divaldo Alves (hereinafter: Mr. Alves or Head
Coach) issued a document titled “draft – Offer Letter Asing Kevin Alexander” (hereinafter: the
Offer) to the Claimant via WhatsApp which stipulated the following (quoted verbatim):
“With this letter, we would like to offer you an exclusive negotiation with the job prospect at [the
Club] as professional Player”
3.
The Offer further indicated as follows (quoted verbatim):
“1. Contract Value
USD 6.000 (Six Thousand US Dollars) per month for a season competition
2025/2026 (12 month total). With the currency following the current transaction
day rate and 1 USD equivalent to IDR 15.500 maximum.
2. Contract duration
• 12 months for 1 (one) season of 2025/2026”
4.
Additionally, the Offer established as follows (quoted verbatim):
“3. Facilities
a. Accomodation home unit only maximum IDR 50.000.000 (exclude internet,
electricity, cleaning service after handover, other bill and fee that obtain related to
the house; the club will decided the house for the player);
b. Car unit only (Xenia/Sigra) exclude fuel;
c. KITAS for the Player;
d. Economy class flight (1x) Jakarta-Colombo (round-trip) for 1 (one) persons, with
the airline and date decided by the club management. The route should be from
the International airport to another International airport , exclude the domestic
route.”
5.
The Offer stipulated that it could be withdrawn by the Club, provided the following
occurred (quoted verbatim):
“4. This Job Offer can be withdrawn at any time by the Club, if:
a. The result of the general check-up is found that there is any injury or any other
reasons that caused the Player to not be able to do his responsibility to the club
b. Fail to pass all the legal and administration requirements validation of PSSI and/or
LIB
c. Liga 1 2025/2026 cannot be implemented / discontinued for any reasons
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REF. FPSD-20346
d. If the foreign player regulation decided differently by the PSSI and the league
operator
e. Only signed by one party. To avoid any doubt both parties need to sign the offering
letter if one of the party do not sign the letter will caused the offering letter is
invalid.
In the case of the occurrence of Point 4 (four) above, the Player, on behalf of himself and/or
his representatives, agrees to release and discharges the Club florm any form of liabilities
to the Player and/or his representatives.”
6.
Finally, the Offer stipulated as follows (quoted verbatim):
“With signing this letter, the Player has agreed upon the above points and the Official Team
and/or his representatives will not conduct any negotiation or sign with any other football
club.”
7.
The Offer only contained the Claimant’s signature.
8.
On 16 April 2025, the Claimant contacted Mr Alves and inquired the following (freely
translated from Portuguese to English by the Claimant):
“Player’s agent: Good morning, coach, how’s everything? I hope you’re doing very well. I
wanted to ask when Kevin’s contract would be ready. Or the pre-contract…?
[Mr Alves]: Hello. On Saturday we have an important match. After that, I’ll start pushing so
that everything moves forward.
Player’s agent: There are some people from PSM (the coach and two representatives) who are
chasing Kevin everywhere to make him sign with them. They’re driving me crazy with
messages.
[Mr Alves]: Kevin signed with us.
Player’s agent: Yes, that’s what I told them.”
9.
Between 14 and 15 April 2025, the Player’s agent held various WhatsApp conversations
with third persons and discussed potential employment offers for the Player.
10. On an unspecified date, the Player’s agent engaged in a WhatsApp conversation with an
individual identified by the Claimant as a representative of the Club. In this exchange, the
agent inquired about the timeline for the formalisation and announcement of the Player’s
contract. In response, the alleged Club representative indicated that a draft contract would
be sent shortly and requested the Player’s personal documents to initiate the visa
registration process.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-20346
11. Subsequently, the same individual purportedly communicated that, due to the Club’s
decision not to continue its relationship with Mr. Alves, it would also not proceed with the
Offer made to the Player.
12. On 13 June 2025, the Claimant issued a default notice and requested the Club to comply
with its obligations and proceed with the payment of the amounts due, USD 72,000 in
concept of salaries and IDR 50,000,000 in concept of accommodation, within 10 days.
13. On 8 July 2025, the Player signed an employment contract with the Indonesian club PSBS
until 31 May 2026 with a monthly remuneration of IDR 100,000,000.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
14. On 13 August 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
15. According to the Claimant, the Respondent sent the Offer on 26 March 2025 and returned
it to the Respondent with his signature, therefore accepting all the proposed terms in good
faith.
16. The Claimant argued that the Offer included all essentialia negotii and therefore constitutes
a valid and binding contract. While the document was not countersigned by the Club, the
Respondent’s subsequent conduct confirmed acceptance of the terms.
17. According to the Claimant, the Respondent, through its official representative,
acknowledged the conclusion of the agreement, stating in writing via WhatsApp: “Kevin
firmou con nosotros” (freely translated from Portuguese to English by the Claimant to: “Kevin
signed with us”).
18. The Claimant indicated that the parties subsequently coordinated the expected date of
travel and pre-season arrangements via WhatsApp, where the Club confirmed that the
Player had been included in the team’s project and requested documentation to initiate his
work visa and federation registration process, stating that a draft contract would follow.
19. The Claimant argued that, relying on the validity of the agreement and the Club’s ongoing
instructions, the Claimant declined several offers from other clubs.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-20346
20. According to the Claimant, on 11 June 2025, he received a message from the Respondent
unilaterally withdrawing from the Offer, on the basis that the Club had decided to dismiss
Mr. Alves.
21. The Claimant subsequently issued a default notice to the Respondent, who failed to reply
or make any payment within the deadline.
22. The Claimant therefore contended that the Respondent’s conduct in the present case
constitutes a unilateral termination without just cause and therefore it must be held liable
for such termination and for the payment of the corresponding compensation.
23. The Claimant asserted that, considering that the Contract was terminated on 11 June 2025,
the residual value corresponded to all salaries from 1 July 2025 until 31 June 2026, totalling
USD 72,000.
24. The Claimant’s requests for relief were the following (quoted verbatim):
“In light of the above, and considering the Respondent’s clear breach of contract without
just cause, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the
FIFA Football Tribunal:
a) Rules that the present claim is fully admissible;
b) Acknowledges that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the Contract without just
cause;
c) Orders the Respondent to pay the Claimant the total amount of USD 72,000 (seventytwo thousand US Dollars) as compensation for breach of contract without just cause;
d) Orders the Respondent to pay interest at a rate of 5% per annum on the abovementioned amounts, as from 11 June 2025 until the date of effective payment;
e) Orders the Respondent to bear the full procedural costs of the present matter;
f) Imposes the corresponding sanctions upon the Respondent, in accordance with Arts
17, par. 4, and 24, of the FIFA RSTP.”
b. Reply of the Respondent
25. In its reply, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s allegations in their entirety.
26. The Respondent stated that the document presented by the Claimant as evidence of an
employment agreement was never signed by the Club. Similarly, the document was not
provided by an authorized representative of the Club, but by Mr. Alves, who lacked legal
authority to represent the Club in contractual matters, as such power was not stipulated in
his contract.
27. According to the Respondent, the Club’s Director, Ms. Souraiya Farina Alhaddar, was the
only person authorized to represent the Club in legal and contractual matters, and she
never signed or acknowledged the document.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-20346
28. The Respondent argued that, under Swiss law a contract requires mutual intent and
expression. According to the Respondent, the Club neither intended nor expressed intent
to enter into a contract with the Claimant.
29. The Respondent argued that the Claimant only returned the signed document to the Head
Coach and therefore does not constitute a valid legal communication.
30. Additionally, the Respondent argued that the other communications presented by the
Claimant were amongst unidentifiable parties and thus cannot be considered as binding
or representative of the Club’s intent.
31. The Respondent contended that the Claimant’s own communications suggest he did not
consider himself bound to the Club, as he was open to accepting better offers from other
clubs even after signing the document.
32. Finally, the Respondent maintained that no valid employment relationship was ever
established between the parties, and therefore the claim should be rejected.
33. The Respondent’s requests for relief were the following (quoted verbatim):
“In the name and on account of the Respondent, we hereby request that
a. the Claimant’s claim be rejected.
b. in the alternative, that
i. the Claimant be obliged to provide his employment contracts with the
Portuguese club Caldas SC and the Indonesian Club PSBS Biak valid
between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026;
ii. the Claimant’s claim be reduced by his earnings from these clubs and
potential other employers between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026;
iii. all further claims of the Claimant be rejected.
c. the procedural and legal costs be borne by the Claimant.”
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
34. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 13 August 2025 and submitted for decision
on 13 November 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-20346
35. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake,
which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between
a Colombian player and an Indonesian club.
36. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
37. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
38. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
39. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter and took note of the fact that the
Claimant argued that the Offer contained all essentialia negotii to be considered a valid and
binding contract between the parties and thus the Respondent must be held liable for
unilateral termination without just cause. Furthermore, the Claimant submitted that the
Respondent’s subsequent conduct and communications confirmed its acceptance of the
terms of the Offer.
40. On the other hand, the Respondent argued that in addition to the Offer missing the
Respondent’s signature, the document was not issued by an authorized representative of
the Club and therefore shouldn’t be considered as a valid agreement. Moreover, the
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REF. FPSD-20346
Respondent submitted that the communications presented by the Claimant were amongst
unidentifiable parties and thus cannot be considered as binding or representative of the
Club’s intent.
41. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to determine the
enforceability of the Offer and the consequences thereof.
42. To address this matter, the Chamber first recalled that, according to the Respondent, the
only person authorised to represent the Club in legal and contractual matters was the
Club’s Director. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Mr. Alves, extended the Offer to the
Claimant on 26 March 2025 via WhatsApp.
43. The Chamber noted that the Offer bore the official letterhead of the Club and included
detailed terms and conditions. This presentation gave the document an appearance of
formality and authenticity.
44. That being said and considering that Mr. Alves was employed by the Respondent at the
time the Offer was made, it is evident that he acted in his capacity as head coach when
communicating with the Claimant. His role, while not formally authorising him to conclude
contracts, placed him in a position of trust and visibility within the Club’s recruitment
process.
45. With the above in mind, the Chamber is not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that
the Offer extended by Mr. Alves cannot be attributed to the Club merely because he lacked
formal authority to bind it contractually. The Club did not dispute the existence or content
of the Offer; it only argued that it was not sent by an authorised representative. This
suggests that the Club was aware of the Offer and chose not to take any steps at the time
to clarify or limit Mr. Alves’ authority vis-à-vis third parties. In doing so, the Club allowed a
situation to develop in which Mr. Alves appeared to act on its behalf.
46. In this context it is reasonable to conclude, that the Offer was sent on behalf of the Club.
The Club’s failure to distance itself from the document or to correct any misrepresentation
of authority at the time it was issued supports the inference that Mr. Alves was acting within
the scope of apparent authority. As such, the Chamber recalled that Club’s generally bear
responsibility for the representations made by their employees, particularly when those
representations are made using official Club materials and in the course of their
professional duties.
47. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with consistent
jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal, an employment contract is deemed valid and
enforceable only if it includes the essentialia negotii of such an agreement. These elements
typically comprise the identification of the parties and their respective roles, the duration
of the employment, the agreed remuneration, and the mutual consent of both parties.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-20346
48. In continuation, the Chamber recalled art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to
which a party claiming a right based on an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of
proof. On this note, the Chamber found that it was up to the Player to prove that the
employment relationship on which he claims outstanding remuneration from the Club did
in fact exist.
49. The Chamber noted that, in the present case, the Offer included all the relevant
information at the basis of an employment relationship between contractual parties except
the signature of both parties. Specifically, the Chamber observed that the Offer provided
for the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable to the
Player and clearly stipulated that his role was that of a professional player with the Club.
50. Accordingly, the Chamber found it pertinent to assess whether the consent of the parties
can be inferred from the evidence submitted to the file.
51. In this respect, the Chamber first observed that the Claimant did sign the Offer. However,
the mere presence of a signature does not, in itself, establish that the Claimant accepted
the Offer as a binding agreement. Acceptance must be assessed in light of the Claimant’s
overall conduct and communications. In particular, the WhatsApp exchange between the
Claimant and Mr. Alves indicates that the Claimant understood the Offer as a preliminary
step, anticipating the conclusion of a subsequent contract or pre-contract: “Good morning,
coach, how’s everything? I hope you’re doing very well. I wanted to ask when Kevin’s contract
would be ready. Or the pre-contract…?”.
52. Most decisively, the conversations held between the Claimant and representatives of other
clubs on 15 and 16 April 2025 demonstrate that, even after signing the Offer, the Claimant
was actively exploring alternative opportunities with other teams (freely translated from
Spanish to English by the Claimant): “Look, Kediri’s conditions are higher vs your proposal”;
“Hello, my friend, honestly the offer does not match the one we have”; “Look, honestly, it’s about
presenting an offer that surpasses what we have.”
53. The Chamber found this conduct to be inconsistent with the existence of a binding
agreement. Accordingly, the Claimant did not appear to treat the Offer as a definitive and
enforceable contract, which undermined his assertion that the Offer reflected a binding
commitment.
54. The Chamber considered it imperative to also address the terms of the Offer itself,
particularly Clause 4, which outlines conditions under which the Offer may be deemed
invalid. Paragraph e) specifically states: “Only signed by one party. To avoid any doubt both
parties need to sign the offering letter if one of the party do not sign the letter will caused the
offering letter is invalid.” Clause 4 further states: “In the case of the occurrence of Point 4 (four)
above, the Player, on behalf of himself and/or his representatives, agrees to release and
discharges the Club florm any form of liabilities to the Player and/or his representatives.” In this
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-20346
context, the absence of the Respondent’s signature is a relevant factor that supports the
conclusion that no contractual relationship was formed.
55. The Chamber concluded that the Claimant did not meet his burden of proof to
demonstrate that an employment relationship was ever initiated with the Club and
therefore his claim lacked any contractual basis whatsoever.
56. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the present claim.
d. Costs
57. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
58. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
59. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-20346
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Kevin Alexander Lopez Saldarriaga, is rejected.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-20346
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 13