Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-20150
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 10 September 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Milena Aparecida de Paula Silva
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Alexandra GÓMEZ BRUINEWOUD (Uruguay & The Netherlands), Member
Iñigo RIESTRA (Mexico), Member
CLAIMANT:
Milena Aparecida de Paula Silva, Brazil
Represented by Filipe Orsolini Pinto de Souza
RESPONDENT:
Puskás Futball Club KFT, Hungary
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-20150
I. Facts of the case
1.
According to the Brazilian player Milena Apreciada de Paula Silva (hereinafter, the Player or
the Claimant), on 27 May 2025, the Hungarian club Puskás Futball Club KFT (hereinafter,
the Club or the Respondent) sent her an offer of employment (hereinafter, the Offer) for one
year.
2.
The Offer, which bears the signature of Mr Halászi Kinga and the Club’s stamp, as well as
the Player’s signature, reads as follows:
“Dear Mr. Hamilton!
We’re happy to give an offer for one of your players – Milena de Paula to become one of our
players and join our team.
Hereby you can see our offer:
- Professional contract (1+1 year)
- Monthly salary 1350 EURO net
- Second year: if the club raises her salary from 01.06.2026, the contract will be
automatically extended + 1 year, and the salary will be: 1550 EURO net
- Premium (based on games won)
- First eleven: 150 EURO
- Substitute player, enters the field in the given winning match: 75 EURO
- Substitute player, not playing on the game: 37,5 EURO
- Flight ticket (to Budapest, back home)
- Accommodation in Felcsút
- Lunch every weekdays [sic].
The offer only becomes official if the player passes the medical tests.
If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to us”.
3.
On 3 July 2025, the Club issued the so-called “Official Invitation Letter”, also signed by Mr
Halászi Kinga and stamped by the Club, according to which:
“Dear Sir/Madam,
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that MILENA APARECIDA DE PAULA SILVA (…) has
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REF. FPSD-20150
been invited on work matter as a player to [the Club] during the period of time 03 July 2025
until 30 June 2026.
Should you have any questions and comments do not hesitate to call (…)”.
4.
Also on 3 July 2025, the Player flew from Brazil to Munich, arriving on 4 July 2025.
5.
On 17 July 2025, the Player travelled back to Brazil from Budapest.
6.
On 21 July 2025, the Club sent to the Player’s agent a letter with subject “Withdrawal from
Letter of Intent” (hereinafter, the Withdrawal Letter), which was also signed by Mr Halászi
Kinga and stamped by the Club:
“Dear Mr. Hamilton!
With reference to our conditional letter of intent dated 27 May 2025, in which we stated that
the effectiveness of our offer was subject to football player (Milena de Paula) passing the
medical examination, we hereby inform you that, based on the medical report attached to
this letter, the condition has not been fulfilled.
Accordingly, we hereby withdraw from the letter of intent.
In view of this withdrawal, we kindly ask you to take the necessary steps, in particular to
ensure that the football player is duly informed”.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
7.
On 30 July 2025, the Player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
8.
In her claim, the Player alleged that, on 27 May 2025, the Club sent her the Offer to employ
her as a professional football player as from 27 May 2025 until 31 May 2026, and with a
monthly salary of EUR 1,350 net.
9.
According to the Player, the Offer contained all the essentialia negotii of an employment
contract, as it included the identification of the parties, the object of the contract, the
duration of the agreement, the remuneration and the signatures of both parties.
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REF. FPSD-20150
10. The Player further argued that, following her acceptance to the Offer, the Club provided
her with a flight ticket to travel to Europe, where she arrived on 4 July 2025. Upon her
arrival, she started her job by taking part in training sessions alongside other players.
11. The Player asserted that, after a brief period of training with the Club, she was dismissed
and received a return flight ticket to Brazil scheduled for 17 July 2025.
12. Furthermore, the Player contended that the Club issued the Withdrawal Offer indicating
that she had failed to pass the medical examination as the sole reason for her dismissal.
According to the Player, this constitutes a unilateral termination without just cause.
13. In light of the above, the Player argued that the Club unilaterally terminated the contract
without just cause on 17 July 2025 and claimed to be entitled to compensation in the
amount of EUR 16,200 net, representing the residual value of the alleged employment
contract concluded between the parties.
14. The Player requested the following relief:
“In view of all the above, the Claimant requests:
a. The DRC to send this claim to the Respondent with a time limit for a statement or a reply,
pursuant to art. 21.1 the FIFA Procedural;
b. The DRC to accept this claim and declare that the Contract was terminated without just
cause by the Respondent on 17 July 2025, according to the article 18.4 of the FIFA RSTP;
c. The DRC to accept this claim and order the Respondent to pay the Claimant the total net
amount of EUR 16,200 (sixteen thousand and two hundred Euros), plus interest of 5%
p.a. as from the termination date on 17 July 2025;
d. The DRC to accept this claim and sanction the Respondent in accordance with article 17.4
of the FIFA RSTP.
e. The DRC to accept this claim and include the consequences of the failure to pay the
relevant amounts in due time, pursuant to article 24 of the FIFA RSTP”.
b. Reply of the Respondent
15. Despite being invited to do so, the Club failed to reply to the claim.
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REF. FPSD-20150
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
16. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter, the Chamber or the DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 30 July 2025 and submitted for decision on
10 September 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January 2025
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter, the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
17. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter, the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an
employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Brazilian player
and a Hungarian club.
18. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
19. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
20. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
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REF. FPSD-20150
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
21. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and took note that it concerned
a claim by a player against a club regarding the existence of a valid and binding
employment contract between the parties, its alleged unilateral termination by the Club
and its legal consequences.
22. The members of the Chamber initially noted that the Player claimed to have entered into
a valid and binding employment contract with the Club after accepting the Offer sent by
the latter. According to the Player, the Offer contained all the essentialia negotii of an
employment contract. The Player further asserted that the Club unilaterally terminated the
alleged employment contract on 17 July 2025 by providing her with a flight ticket back to
Brazil, and that this decision was based on her failure to pass the medical examination.
Accordingly, the Player contended that the Club terminated the employment contract
without just cause and claimed entitlement to EUR 16,200 net as compensation,
representing the residual value of the alleged employment contract.
23. The DRC also noted that, for its part, the Club failed to reply to the claim despite being
invited to do so. The Chamber therefore underscored that the decision will be made based
on the arguments and evidence on file (cf. art. 21 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules).
24. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to analyse the following
questions:
I.
Does the Offer constitute a valid and binding employment contract between the
parties?
II.
If so, did the Club have a just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment
contract?
III. If not, what are the legal consequences?
***
I.
Does the Offer constitute a valid and binding employment contract between the
parties?
25. The members of the DRC began their analysis of the first issue by recalling the wellestablished jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal which dictates that, in order for an
employment contract to be considered valid and binding, apart from the consent of both
parties (which is usually manifested by the signature of the relevant contract), it should
contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the
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REF. FPSD-20150
contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration
payable by the employer to the employee.
26. The Chamber further recalled the content of art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules,
according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the
respective burden of proof. Accordingly, the Chamber emphasized that it was incumbent
upon the Player to prove the existence of the employment relationship on the basis of
which she claimed compensation for breach of contract.
27. Bearing the above in mind, the DRC proceeded to analyse the evidence submitted by the
Player in support of the existence of a valid and binding employment contract between the
parties, and noted the following:
o The Offer dated 27 May 2025 was not directly addressed to the Player, but rather to
what appears to be her agent.
o Nonetheless, the Offer includes the role of the parties, the duration of the
employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the Club to the Player, as
well as other fringe benefits.
o Although the Offer does not specify the starting date of the employment relationship,
this is clearly indicated in the Official Invitation Letter issued by the Club on 2 July
2025, which states that the employment relationship would be valid from 3 July 2025
until 30 June 2026.
o The Offer was conditional, stating that it would “only become official” if the Player
passed a medical examination.
o The Offer is signed by Mr Halászi Kinga. While the Offer –and indeed no other
document submitted by the Player– specifies his role within the Club, the Offer bears
the Club’s official stamp.
o Although the Player signed the Offer, it does not contain a designated space for her
signature.
o The Player travelled to Hungary and joined the Club, participating in training sessions.
o According to the Withdrawal Letter, the Club withdrew from the Offer on the grounds
that the Player failed to pass the medical examination.
28. After carefully analysing the evidence provided, the DRC determined that the Offer,
together with the Official Invitation Letter, contains the object, the parties, the
remuneration, and the duration of the employment relationship.
29. Regarding the parties’ consent or intention to be legally bound, the Chamber found that
the Club’s intent can be inferred from the two aforementioned letters. The Club not only
issued an initial letter expressing interest in the Player’s services but also followed up with
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REF. FPSD-20150
a second letter confirming this interest, stating that “[the Player] has been invited on work
matter as a player to [the Club],” and specifying the relevant period. Both letters were signed
and stamped by the Club, and their authenticity was not disputed.
30. As for the Player’s consent, the Chamber found it to be evident and not requiring further
analysis. For the sake of completeness, the DRC noted that although the Offer did not
include a designated space for the Player’s signature, she nonetheless signed it and
travelled to Hungary to join the Club. This is corroborated by the flight tickets and
photographs submitted, which, in the Chamber’s view, confirm the commencement of the
employment relationship and the provision of services by the Player. While it is true that
the Player did not submit evidence of having explicitly communicated her acceptance of
the Offer to the Club, the issuance of the Official Invitation Letter and, subsequently, the
Withdrawal Letter, demonstrate that the Club was aware of her acceptance. This is further
supported by the fact that the Player signed the Offer, travelled, and joined the Club. In
other words, had the Player not accepted the terms, she would not have taken these
actions.
31. The DRC therefore concluded that the Club made a formal offer of employment to the
Player which, together with the Official Invitation Letter, contained all the essential terms
of an employment contract. This demonstrated the Club’s intention to be legally bound and
created a legitimate expectation on the part of the Player of a valid and binding
employment relationship. Likewise, the Player accepted these terms and travelled to
Hungary to join the Club, thereby also expressing her intention to be legally bound.
32. In light of the above, the Chamber determined that the Player had sufficiently
demonstrated that both parties had consented to enter into an employment relationship
as of 3 July 2025. Consequently, the Offer, together with the Official Invitation Letter,
constitutes a valid and binding agreement between the parties and represents the
employment contract at issue in the present case.
II.
Did the Club have a just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment contract?
33. Having established that the Offer, together with the Official Invitation Letter, constitutes a
valid and binding employment contract between the parties, the next issue to be analysed
is whether, as argued by the Player, the Club unilaterally terminated the employment
contract without just cause.
34. According to the Player, the employment contract was unilaterally terminated by the Club
on 17 July 2025 when it provided the Player with a flight ticket to return to Brazil. The
Chamber considered that, although the evidence submitted does not confirm that it was
the Club who issued the flight ticket, this is consistent with the fact that, a few days later,
the Club sent to the Player’s agent the Withdrawal Letter, informing her about the Club’s
withdrawal of the Offer based on the fact that the Player failed to pass the medical
examination.
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REF. FPSD-20150
35. In view of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Club unilaterally terminated the
contract de facto on 17 July 2025.
36. With this in mind, the Chamber recalled the longstanding jurisprudence of the Football
Tribunal and the wording of art. 14 par. 1 of the Regulations, pursuant to which a contract
may only ever be unilaterally terminated where there is just cause, and such just cause is
given rise to where the conduct of the counterparty does not permit the reasonable
continuation of the Contract by the terminating party. A premature termination of a
contract may only ever be an ultima ratio measure.
37. In the case at hand, there is no evidence of the Player having been in breach of its
contractual obligations (nor was this invoked by the Club). The Chamber noted that the
only apparent justification for the termination of the contract was that the Player had failed
to pass a medical examination.
38. In this respect, the Chamber first reminded the parties of the clear and explicit wording of
art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations, according to which the validity of an employment contract
cannot be made subject to a successful medical examination and/or the grant of a work
permit. Referring also to the obligation of the parties to maintain contractual stability, the
Chamber underlined that a club willing to engage a specific player should perform any
medical examination prior to concluding any employment contract with the player. Any
contractual provision contrary to art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations shall be considered as
invalid.
39. The members of the Chamber further recalled the longstanding jurisprudence of the
Football Tribunal, which has repeatedly established that clubs have a specific obligation to
organise a medical examination before signing a contract with a player. If a club fails to
abide by this fundamental principle, and instead decides to sign the contract before it
receives confirmation that the player is fit and healthy, it does so at its own risk. A contract
signed under these circumstances will be considered valid and binding and the club will
not be permitted to terminate it unilaterally if the player goes on to fail medical
examination. The Chamber emphasized that a contract terminated in this way is
considered to have been terminated without just cause (in this regard, inter alia, DRC
Decision of 9 June 2022, Barbosa).
40. As a result, considering all the abovementioned factors, the Chamber unanimously decided
that the Club terminated the Contract unilaterally and without just cause, and is therefore
liable for the consequences that follow.
ii. Consequences
41. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the legal
consequences of the breach of contract.
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REF. FPSD-20150
42. The Chamber observed that the outstanding remuneration at the time of termination,
coupled with the specific requests for relief of the Player, is equivalent to the July 2025
salary under the contract, amounting to EUR 1,350 net.
43. As a consequence, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda,
the Chamber decided that the Club is liable to pay to the Player the amounts which were
outstanding under the contract at the moment of the termination, i.e., EUR 1,350 net as
detailed.
44. In addition, taking into consideration the Player’s request as well as the constant practice
of the Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided to award the Player interest
at the rate of 5% per annum on the outstanding amounts as from 17 July 2025 until the date
of effective payment.
45. The Chamber then turned to the calculation of the amount of compensation payable by
the Club in the case at stake. In doing so, the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in
accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be
calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of
the dispute, taking into account the damage suffered, according to the “positive interest”
principle, having regard for the individual facts and circumstances of each case, and with
due consideration for the law of the country concerned.
46. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as
to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by them in
the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such
compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter
at stake.
47. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Club to the Player had to be assessed in application of the
parameters set out in art. 17, par. 1 of the Regulations. In this respect, the Chamber recalled
that, as a general rule, the compensation to be paid to the player by the club shall be equal
to the residual value of the contract that was prematurely terminated, unless the player
signed a new contract following the termination of his previous contract (cf. art. 17 par. 1
lit. i)).
48. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Player, the Chamber proceeded
with the calculation of the monies payable to the Player under the terms of the contract
from the date of its unilateral termination until its end date. Consequently, the Chamber
concluded that the amount of EUR 14,850 net (i.e., 11 monthly salaries of EUR 1,350 net)
serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of
contract.
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REF. FPSD-20150
49. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Player had signed an employment
contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which she would
have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the
Football Tribunal as well as art. 17 par. 1 lit. ii) of the Regulations, such remuneration under
a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to
mitigate their damages.
50. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Player remained unemployed since the
unilateral termination of the contract.
51. The Chamber referred to art. 17 par. 1 lit. ii) of the Regulations, according to which, in case
the player did not sign a new contract following the termination of their previous contract,
as a general rule, the compensation shall be equal to the residual value of the contract that
was prematurely terminated.
52. Consequently, on account of all the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities
of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Club must pay the amount of EUR 14,850
net to the Player, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of
compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.
53. Lastly, taking into consideration the Player’s request as well as the constant practice of the
Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided to award the Player interest on said
compensation at the rate of 5% per annum as of 17 July 2025 until the date of effective
payment.
iii. Compliance with monetary decisions
54. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
55. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
56. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
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REF. FPSD-20150
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
57. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
58. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
59. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
60. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
61. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
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REF. FPSD-20150
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Milena Aparecida de Paula Silva, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Puskás Futball Club KFT, must pay to the Claimant the following
amount(s):
o EUR 1,350 net as outstanding remuneration plus 5% interest per annum as from 17
July 2025 until the date of effective payment.
o EUR 14,850 net as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest per annum
as from 17 July 2025 until the date of effective payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
5.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
6.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
7.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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