Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-19269
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 14 August 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player John Steven
Mendoza Valencia
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. HENDEL (USA & France), Deputy Chairperson
Dana MOHAMED AL-NOAIMI (Qatar), Member
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member
CLAIMANT:
John Steven Mendoza Valencia, Colombia
Represented by Evandro Luis Rezende Forte
RESPONDENT:
Santos Futebol Clube, Brazil
Represented by CCLA Advogados
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-19269
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 5 February 2024, the Colombian player John Steven Mendoza Valencia (hereinafter: the
Player or the Claimant) and the Brazilian club Santos Futebol Clube (hereinafter: Santos, the
Club or the Respondent) concluded a contract titled “Instrumento Particular de Transação de
Direitos Decorrente de Contrato Especial de Trabalho Desportivo Extinto por Comum Acordo”
(hereinafter: the Termination Agreement), by which they, inter alia, settled the financial
consequences arising from the termination of their previous employment relationship.
2.
Pursuant to clause 3 of the Termination Agreement, the Club undertook to pay the Player
as follows (free translation provided by the Player, quoted verbatim):
“Clause Three - FORM OF PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT
3.1 The PARTIES agree that, as a result of the early and mutually agreed termination of
the contracts listed in clause 2.1 above, SANTOS shall pay the PLAYER the following
amounts:
a) R$ 310,191.66 (three hundred and ten thousand, one hundred and ninety-one
Brazilian Reais and sixty-six centavos) net, corresponding to the employment sums in
arrears and already owed to the PLAYER, due on the day this TERMINATION AGREEMENT is
signed; and
b) R$ 4,910,191.67 (four million, nine hundred and ten thousand, one hundred and
ninety one Brazilian Reais and sixty seven cents) net, in 23 (twenty-three) consecutive
monthly instalments, the first of which in the amount of R$ 510,191.67 (five hundred and
ten thousand, one hundred and ninety-one reais and sixty-seven cents), due on 29/2/2024,
and the other instalments in the amount of R$ 200.000,000 (two hundred thousand
Brazilian Reais) each, due on the last working day of the following months, referring to
amounts owed under the EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT and the CETD and under the IMAGE
CONTRACT;
3.2 The Parties agree that, in the event of non-payment of the amounts on the date of
signature stated in this contract, the same will lose its validity, releasing the PLAYER from
the obligation to sign the termination and federation documents, with the EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT, CETD and IMAGE CONTRACT existing between the Parties remaining active.
3.3 SANTOS will deliver to the PLAYER, upon signing this instrument, all documents
relevant to the termination, as well as for any movement of the account linked to the FGTS.
3.4 The payments established in clause 3.1., above, must be paid by SANTOS to the
PLAYER, by means of a transfer of funds, to the following bank account:
[…]
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-19269
3.5 The PLAYER waives the deadline provided for in article 477, paragraph 6, of the CLT,
and the Parties recognise that any default will be considered after any delay of more than
10 working days in the instalments provided for in the clause. Late payment of two
subsequent instalments will result in early maturity of the debt, with a fine of 10% (ten per
cent) on the total amount due, plus monthly interest of 1% (one per cent), from the due date
until the date of actual payment (“ACCELERATION CLAUSE”). SANTOS hereby agrees that it
will not contest the content and application of the ACCELERATION CLAUSE, the fine, as well
as the applicable default interest indicated herein, since they are the result of a fair and
equitable negotiation between the PARTIES.
3.6 Once SANTOS has paid the amount set out in this TERMINATION AGREEMENT, the
PARTIES will give each other the broadest, general and irrevocable discharge, and will no
longer be able to claim anything from each other, in any capacity, time or judgement,
whether from the EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, the IMAGE CONTRACT or the CETD.
[…]”
3.
On 1 May 2025, the Player put the Club in default by issuing a formal notice (hereinafter:
the Notice). The Player granted the Club a period of ten (10) days to settle outstanding
amounts totalling BRL 400,000, corresponding to the instalments due for the months of
March and April 2025.
4.
The case file contained no evidence that the Club responded to the Notice.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
5.
On 16 May 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
6.
The Player argued that the Club failed to pay the instalments due for March and April 2025
under item b) of clause 3.1 of the Termination Agreement. He emphasized that the Club
had been placed in default through the Notice, which remained unanswered, thereby
triggering the application of art.12bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (hereinafter: the Regulations).
7.
Based on the clause 3.5 of the Termination Agreement (hereinafter: the Acceleration Clause),
the Player argued that the Club’s default rendered all remaining instalments (from May to
December 2025) due and payable, along with a contractual penalty of 10%.
8.
Considering the above, the Player requested the following relief:
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-19269
“FIRST - To uphold the present Claim in full;
SECOND - To order the Club to pay the Player R$ 200,000 due as the outstanding instalment
owing for March 2025, plus interest at a rate of 1% per month as of 1 April 2025 until the
date of effective payment;
THIRD - To order the Club to pay the Player R$ 200,000 due as the outstanding instalment
owing for April 2025, plus interest at a rate of 1% per month as of 1 May 2025 until the date
of effective payment;
FOURTH - To order the Club to pay the Player R$ 1,760,000 due early maturity of the debt,
plus interest at a rate of 1% per month as of 16 May 2025 until the date of effective payment;
FIFTH - To ban the Club from registering any new players, either national or internationally,
for 2 entire and consecutive registration periods;
SIXTH - To open the proceedings regarding the present dispute and notify the Club
immediately; and
SEVENTH - To confirm that the ongoing proceedings are free of any costs.”
b. Reply of the Respondent
9.
In its reply dated 6 June 2025, the Club stated that it had consistently complied with the
terms of the Termination Agreement since its beginning. However, it admitted that the
instalments payable by 31 March and 30 April 2025 were not paid on time, citing “cash flow
issues” as the reason for the delay.
10. The Club submitted the following timetable, quoted verbatim:
a) On 31 March, the ’first instalment‘ became due and was not paid;
b) On 30 April, the ‘second instalment” became due and was also not paid;
c) On 01 May, the first day after the second instalment became due a national holiday (the
International Labour Day) in Brazil, the Player allegedly sent a notice at 00h07, granting
Santos a 10 (ten) days deadline to pay the overdue amount; and
d) On 16 May the Player filed his claim.
11. Nevertheless, the Club asserted that the delayed amounts had already been paid by the
Club, respectively on 16 May 2025 and 23 May 2025. In this context, the Club argued that
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-19269
the Player acted in “extreme bad faith” by not informing FIFA about said payments within
his claim.
12. As to the Notice, the Club argued that it was improperly delivered, having been sent on a
national holiday at 00:07 a.m. to the Club’s ouvidoria (ombudsman) email address, which is
not designated for receiving legal correspondence. The Club emphasized that said e-mail
address is a public-facing channel intended for general feedback from fans, members, and
employees, not for formal legal notifications.
13. The Club further argued that the Notice was written in English, sent by a Brazilian user, and
lacked a clear subject line—factors that contributed to it being flagged as spam and
redirected to the junk folder. The Club asserted that its legal and financial departments
were never made aware of the Notice, and had it been properly addressed to the legal
department, appropriate action could have been taken on appropriate time. The Club
contended that it was contradictory for the Notice to be sent to the ombudsman’s email
address while the claim itself was directed to the legal department’s email.
14. As such, the Respondent held that the Notice cannot be considered valid or effective.
Moreover, the Club highlighted that, despite not properly receiving the Notice, both
instalments were paid, and any failure to act within the applicable deadline was not due to
bad faith but rather to irregularities attributable to the Player.
15. Regarding the applicability of art. 12bis of the Regulations, the Club contended that the
formal requirements were not met. It reiterated that the Notice could not be deemed valid,
and therefore, the Club was never properly placed in default.
16. Furthermore, the Club emphasized that the Player, through the Notice, demanded
payment of the March 2025 instalment exactly 30 days after it became due, and the April
2025 instalment a mere 7 minutes after its due date. It asserted that such timeframes did
not satisfy the conditions stipulated in art. 12bis of the Regulations, which requires a
minimum delay of 30 days before the submission of the default notice.
17. Regarding the applicability of the Acceleration Clause, the Club contended that, even if the
Notice were considered valid, it failed to reference this topic, which was not raised until the
claim filed on 16 May 2025.
18. In this context, and considering that the Acceleration Clause stipulates that a delay is only
recognized after 10 working days, the Club argued that it had until 30 May 2025 to settle
the outstanding payments before the debt was accelerated. However, the Club fulfilled its
payment obligations on 16 and 23 May 2025, within the permissible timeframe.
19. Alternatively, it argued the Notice was issued on 1 May 2025, a national holiday in Brazil.
Given that the following day (2 May 2025) was also not considered a working day due to
the customary extended holiday weekend, the first working day was 5 May 2025. Counting
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-19269
10 working days from that date, the earliest payment could be considered overdue was 16
May 2025, the same day the March installment was paid.
20. As a result, on 16 May 2025, only one installment (March 2025) was due, and it was paid on
time. By 30 May 2025, both installments had already been settled. Therefore, the
Respondent argued that the conditions required to trigger the Acceleration Clause were
never fulfilled.
21. Considering the above, the Club requested FIFA to reject in full the Player’s claim.
c. Replica of the Claimant
22. On 14 June 2025, the Player submitted his replica.
23. As a preliminary matter, he requested that the Club’s answer to the claim be disregarded
and that the legal consequences of revelia be applied, on the grounds that the Club’s
submission was erroneously addressed to the Players’ Status Chamber (PSC) instead of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).
24. As to validity of the Notice, the Player outlined the Termination Agreement did not
require any specific form of notification or designate a particular email address for such
communications. Since the only publicly available email on the Club’s website was
“[email protected]”, the Player reasonably used it to send the Notice.
25. He further claimed that the Club had responsibility for monitoring its official email
accounts, including checking spam folders, in line with the jurisprudence of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Therefore, he concluded that the Notice was properly sent and
received, and the Club’s objections lack contractual or legal basis.
26. As to the Acceleration Clause, the Player argued that no notification was required. He
complemented that “the only mandatory requirement, stipulated in clause 3.5 of the
Termination Agreement, was to wait for a 10-working-day deadline to elapse before such an
instalment was considered overdue and, if two consecutive instalments were due, the
acceleration clause would be automatically triggered, and the total debt would fall due early”.
27. The Player further asserted that, although the Termination Agreement did not require
formal notification to place the Club in default, the Player still sent the Notice on 1 May
2025, granting a 10-day deadline for payment. Separately, the Acceleration Clause
provided a 10-working-day period before a payment would be considered overdue.
28. Since 1 May 2025 was a national holiday in Brazil, both deadlines effectively began on 2
May. This means the notice-based deadline expired on 11 May, and the contractual
deadline expired on 15 May. The Club failed to pay within either timeframe. As a result,
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REF. FPSD-19269
on 16 May 2025, the Acceleration Clause was automatically triggered, entitling the Player
to the claimed amounts.
29. Finally, the Player underscored that one of the payments made by the Club was done few
hours after the claim was filed, and the other one was made seven days later. However,
both payments were made after the applicable deadlines and did not include the
interest stipulated in the Termination Agreement. Therefore, such late payments do not
preclude the Club’s contractual obligation to pay both the interest and the full outstanding
amount subject to the acceleration clause.
30. Considering the above, the Player reiterated the requests for relief previously made.
d. Duplica of the Respondent
31. In its duplica submitted on 27 June 2025, the Club preliminarily addressed the Player’s
procedural objection by asserting that its answer was duly submitted via the FIFA Legal
Portal, correctly addressed to the designated case manager, and made fully accessible to
the Claimant. Consequently, the mere reference to the PSC in the heading did not
undermine the submission’s admissibility.
32. With respect to the Notice, the Club reaffirmed its position that the communication was
invalid, arguing that the manner and context of its submission appeared to be a deliberate
tactic aimed at ensuring the Notice would be overlooked.
33. As to the delayed payments, the Club maintained that it had submitted proof of
payment for the March and April 2025 instalments, paid on 16 and 23 May 2025,
respectively. It emphasized that the Player neither disputed receipt of these payments nor
challenged the authenticity of the supporting documentation. Nevertheless, the Claimant
continued to pursue amounts already settled and to invoke the Acceleration Clause, which
the Club argued was indicative of bad faith and amounted to an attempt of unjust
enrichment, particularly in the absence of any contractual or legal basis for such claims.
34. In light of the above, the Club reiterated the requests for relief previously made.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-19269
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
35. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 16 May 2025 and submitted for decision on
14 August 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January 2025
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
36. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (July 2025 edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between an Colombian player and a Brazilian club.
37. At this point, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant challenged the admissibility of
the Respondent’s response as it was misaddressed to wrong chamber of the Football
Tribunal. However, the Chamber considered that such circumstance bears no material
impact on the proceedings, as the Chamber was able to duly access, review, and consider
the submission and its contents, and the Player’s rights were not adversely affected.
Accordingly, the Chamber dismissed the objection and confirmed that the parties’
submissions were all admissible.
38. Subsequently, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber observed that, pursuant to
item (b) of clause 3.1 of the Termination Agreement, a portion of the amounts in dispute
appears to originate from an image rights contract likely entered by the parties. In this
context, the Chamber recalled that, in principle, a dispute between a player and a club
regarding an image rights contract is not related to employment and, consequently, FIFA
does not have jurisdiction to consider it. Nonetheless, since neither party has raised any
objections in this regard and given that these amounts were included in the Termination
Agreement that essentially pertains to the mutual termination of the employment
relationship between the parties, the Chamber considered that it has jurisdiction to hear
the Claimant’s claim on its entirety.
39. Lastly, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance
of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the Regulations
(July 2025 edition), the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-19269
b. Burden of proof
40. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
41. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
42. The Chamber subsequently proceeded to examine the merits of the case, noting that it
concerned a claim for outstanding amounts under a termination agreement executed
between the parties.
43. In particular, the Chamber noted that the parties dispute the validity and legal effect of the
Notice, the applicability and triggering of the Acceleration Clause, as well as the legal
consequences arising therefrom.
44. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to determine:
a. Was the Notice validly submitted, and if so, what are the legal consequences?
b. Was the Acceleration Clause validly triggered, and if so, what are the effects?
c. What amounts, if any, remain payable to the Player?
45. The Chamber then proceeded to address each of these issues in turn.
a.
Was the Notice validly submitted, and if so, what are the legal
consequences?
46. The DRC first noted that the Termination Agreement did not prescribe the use of specific
email addresses for official correspondence.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-19269
47. Notably, the DRC observed that while the Player’s email addresses were expressly stated
in the preamble of the Termination Agreement, the Club failed to designate any email
address—neither within the body of the contract nor on its official letterhead. According to
the Chamber, this omission undermined the Club’s allegation that the Notice was sent to
an “incorrect” address.
48. Furthermore, according to the submissions contained in the case file, the Chamber noticed
that it was undisputed that the address to which the Player sent the Notice
(i.e., [email protected]) constituted an official communication channel of the
Club, and that a representative of the Club did, in fact, receive the Notice.
49. Ultimately, the DRC highlighted that no contractual or legal basis prevented the submission
of the Notice on a holiday.
50. Hence, the Chamber considered that the Notice was validly submitted by the Player on 1
May 2025.
51. For the sake of completeness, the DRC also took note of the parties’ arguments regarding
the validity of the Notice vis-à-vis the requirements of art. 12bis of the Regulations.
However, the DRC confirmed that any determination in this regard was irrelevant to the
existence of the financial claim in itself, as it solely pertained to the sporting consequences,
particularly the potential imposition of sanctions. Consequently, the Chamber stated that
this matter would be addressed separately below.
b.
Was the Acceleration Clause validly triggered, and if so, what are its legal
consequences?
52. The Chamber then noted that the Acceleration Clause did not impose any notification
requirement, as it merely established that default occurs when any instalment is delayed
by more than 10 working days, and that the late payment of two consecutive instalments
automatically triggers the early maturity of the remaining debt.
53. In this vein, the Chamber noted that, in the case at hand, clause 3.5 of the Termination
Agreement established that “the Parties recognise that any default will be considered after any
delay of more than 10 working days in the instalments provided for in the clause” (emphasis
added).
54. Therefore, based on the aforementioned provision, and considering the public holiday in
Brazil on 1 May 2025, the Chamber concluded that the March 2025 instalment entered into
default on 15 April 2025, which corresponds to 11 working days after the due date (i.e., 31
March 2025). Similarly, the April 2025 instalment entered into default on 16 May 2025, also
11 working days after its respective due date (i.e., 30 April 2025).
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-19269
55. Consequently, the DRC concluded that, as of the date of the claim (i.e., 16 May 2025), both
the March and April 2025 instalments were overdue within the meaning of the Acceleration
Clause, thereby triggering the early maturity of the remaining outstanding debt (i.e., the
instalments from May to December 2025).
56. The Chamber then confirmed that the Acceleration Clause was successfully triggered in the
present case.
c.
What amounts, if any, remain payable to the Player?
57. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber concluded that the Player is indeed
entitled to remaining debt under the Termination Agreement.
58. For the sake of calculation, the Chamber preliminarily determined:
(i)
The Acceleration Clause solely provides for the application of interest at a rate of 1%
per month and a 10% penalty in relation to the accelerated amounts. Therefore, the
interest on the past instalments should follow the default rate of 5% per annum.
(ii) It is undisputed that, although late, the Club effected the following two payments: BRL
200,000 on 16 May 2025, corresponding to the March 2025 instalment, and BRL
200,000 on 23 May 2025, corresponding to the April 2025 instalment.
59. Taking the foregoing into consideration, the Chamber decided that the payments made by
the Club should be duly offset against the corresponding obligations, namely, the
instalments for March and April 2025. Nevertheless, the Chamber determined that the Club
remains liable for the payment of the default interest accrued from the due date to the
date of effective payment, in the total sum of BRL 1,068.49, calculated as follows:
March 2025:
Calculation:
April 2025:
Calculation:
BRL 876.71
Principal: BRL 200,000
Applicable interest: 5% p.a. until date of payment
Delay Period: 14 April 2025 to 16 May 2025
Number of Days: 32 days
BRL 191.78
Principal: BRL 200,000
Applicable interest: 5% p.a. until date of payment
Delay Period: 16 May 2025 to 23 May 2025
Number of Days: 7 days
60. The Chamber moreover decided that the Player is entitled to the accelerated amounts—
specifically, BRL 1,600,000 corresponding to the instalments originally due between May
and December 2025 pursuant to clause 3.1(b) of the Termination Agreement.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-19269
61. Additionally, the Chamber determined that interest shall accrue on the principal amount
at a rate of 1% per month (equivalent to 12% per annum), commencing from the date on
which the Acceleration Clause was triggered, namely, 16 May 2025.
62. Finally, the Chamber confirmed that the Player is further entitled to the contractual penalty
amounting to 10% of the accelerated sum, corresponding to BRL 160,000. The DRC
recognised that (i) the penalty amount is also reasonable and proportionate considering its
established jurisprudence; and (ii) no interest applied on the penalty in accordance with
the principle of ne bis in idem.
ii. Art. 12bis of the Regulations
63. Having established the above, the Chamber referred to art. 12bis par. 2 of the Regulations,
which stipulates that any club found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days
without a prima facie contractual basis may be sanctioned in accordance with art. 12bis
par. 4 of the Regulations.
64. The DRC further recalled that “to trigger the applicability of article 12bis, the amount
concerned must have been overdue for at least 30 days. Once this period has elapsed, the
creditor must proceed to provide the debtor club with written notice that it is in default, thereby
granting the debtor club a deadline of ten days to comply with its financial obligations” (cf. FIFA
Commentary on the Regulations – 2023 edition – p. 114) (emphasis added).
65. In this respect and referring to its earlier findings concerning the due dates of the relevant
instalments, the Chamber noted that, as of 1 May 2025—the date on which the Notice was
sent—none of the relevant instalments had been overdue for at least 30 days.
66. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the requirements set forth in art. 12bis of the
Regulations were not met. As a result, no sanction was applicable under this provision in
the present case.
iii. Compliance with monetary decisions
67. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
68. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
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REF. FPSD-19269
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
69. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
70. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
71. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
72. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
73. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
74. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-19269
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Claimant, John Steven
Mendoza Valencia.
2.
The claim of the Claimant, John Steven Mendoza Valencia, is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Santos Futebol Clube, must pay to the Claimant the following amount(s):
- BRL 1,068.51 as accrued interest;
- BRL 1,600,000 as outstanding amount plus 12% interest p.a. as from 16 May 2025 until
the date of effective payment; and
- BRL 160,000 as contractual penalty.
4.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
6.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
7.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-19269
8.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-19269
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 17