Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-19228
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 5 February 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Omar Sabouni
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. HENDEL (USA & France), Deputy Chairperson
Dana MOHAMED AL-NOAIMI (Qatar), Member
Sihon GAUCI (Malta), Member
CLAIMANT:
Omar Sabouni, Morocco
Represented by Iliass Segame
RESPONDENT:
Al Hilal Tobruk, Libya
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-19228
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 2 December 2024, the Moroccan player Omar Sabouni (hereinafter, the Player or the
Claimant) and the Libyan club Al Hilal Tobruk (hereinafter, the Club or the Respondent)
concluded the so-called “Preliminary Player Contract”, which contains the following terms:
“CONTRACT TERMS:
1. [The Player] agrees to play for the First Team of [the Club] for the 2024-2025 sports
season.
2. Contract Value: 8,000 USD (Eight thousand US dollars only).
The payment will be made as follows:
o First payment: 50% of the total contract value.
o The remaining 50% will be divided into two instalments: one between the first and
second leg of the season and the other at the end of the league.
3. This contract becomes official upon the player passing the medical examination.
4. This contract becomes official after the player signs the Libyan Football Federation
Competition Committee documents”.
2.
According to the information retrieved from the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the
2024/2025 season in Libya ran from 20 September 2024 to 30 June 2025.
3.
Also according to the information retrieved from TMS, on 15 December 2024, the Libyan
Football Federation (LFF), acting on behalf of the Club, initiated a transfer instruction for
the Player’s transfer from the Moroccan club Tihad Athletic Club and requested the Player’s
International Transfer Certificate (ITC) from the Moroccan Football Association (FRMF).
4.
On 18 December 2024, the FRMF requested the cancellation of the transfer, stating:
“Cancellation reason: Incorrect counter club.
Remarks: Last club KAC professional 2024.2025”.
5.
On 6 January 2025, the LFF accepted the transfer cancellation request.
6.
On 9 March 2025, the LFF, acting on behalf of the Club, initiated a new transfer instruction
for the Player’s transfer from the Moroccan club KAC (Kenitra Athletic Club).
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-19228
7.
On 10 March 2025, the FRMF delivered the ITC to the LFF.
8.
On 2 April 2025, the Player put the Club in default, granting it a deadline of 15 days to pay
USD 8,000.
9.
On 13 May 2025, the Player lodged the present claim before FIFA.
10. On 1 June 2025, the parties concluded the so-called “Termination of an Amateur Player’s
Contract by Mutual Consent” (hereinafter, the Termination Agreement).
11. The Termination Agreement provides:
“Article (1)
By the will and desire of both parties, and without any pressure or coercion from either
party to the other, it is agreed to terminate the contract concluded between them for the
period starting from 2/12/2024 and ending on 1/6/2025, by mutual consent and acceptance
thereof.
Article (2)
Both parties release each other from all legal effects arising from the termination of the
contract, comprehensively and without exception.
Article (3)
This termination shall take effect from its date”.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
12. On 13 May 2025, the Player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
13. In his claim, the Player asserted that, under the employment contract concluded with the
Club, he was entitled to a fixed remuneration of USD 8,000, structured as follows:
o USD 4,000 as an advance payment, payable upon arrival and signature;
o USD 2,000 at mid-season; and
o USD 2,000 at the end of the season.
pg. 4
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14. The Player stated that he duly fulfilled his obligations and was properly registered by the
Club. However, the Club failed to pay any of the agreed amounts.
15. Invoking art. 14bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter,
the Regulations), the Player argued that “such a total lack of financial performance from the
club constitutes not only just cause, but a particularly serious breach warranting full
compensation and possible sporting sanctions under Article 17”.
16. On this basis, the Player claimed compensation for breach of contract in the amount of
USD 8,000, corresponding to the residual value of the employment contract. Additionally,
the Player sought additional compensation equivalent to six monthly salaries, citing
aggravating circumstances; namely: “(i) The Respondent failed to pay the Claimant a single
instalment of his salary; (ii) It ignored a formal written notice sent on 24 April 2025 granting a
final 15-day period to remedy the breach; and (iii) It has offered no justification or explanation
for its complete non-performance”. The Player acknowledged, however, that the total
compensation awarded should not exceed the residual value of the employment contract.
17. Based on the foregoing, the Player requested the following relief:
“In light of the above, the Claimant respectfully requests the Chamber to grant the following
relief:
o Order the Respondent to pay the Claimant a base compensation in the amount of Eight
Thousand United States Dollars (USD 8,000), representing the entire residual value of the
prematurely terminated contract, pursuant to Article 17(1)(ii) of the FIFA RSTP with
interest at a rate of 5% per annum from May 13th, 2025, until the date of effective
payment;
o Further order the Respondent to pay the Claimant additional compensation, under
Article 17(1)(ii) of the FIFA RSTP, due to the aggravating circumstances of the case —
including the complete non-payment of remuneration, lack of communication, and
disregard of the formal notice — in an amount to be determined by the Chamber, up to
a maximum of six monthly salaries, it being understood that the overall compensation
shall not exceed USD 8,000 with interest at a rate of 5% per annum from May 13th, 2025,
until the date of effective payment.
o Impose sporting sanctions on the Respondent, in accordance with Article 17(4) and Article
24 of the RSTP and the consistent jurisprudence of the DRC, including but not limited to
a ban on registering new players, either nationally or internationally, until the full
payment of the amounts due to the Claimant has been made.
o Order the Respondent to bear all procedural costs associated with these proceedings, if
applicable, pursuant to the FIFA Procedural Rules.
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REF. FPSD-19228
o Grant interest on the amount awarded at the standard rate and from the date of the
breach or such other date as the Chamber may consider fair and appropriate.
o Grant any further or alternative relief the Dispute Resolution Chamber deems just and
equitable under the circumstances”.
b. Reply of the Respondent
18. In its reply, the Club contended that the Preliminary Player Contract does not constitute a
valid and binding employment agreement between the parties. Specifically, the Club
argued that the document expressly states that an official contract would only be signed
upon fulfilment of certain conditions. According to the Club, the Preliminary Player
Contract merely reflects a prior understanding of the contractual terms and does not
qualify as an official contract under FIFA regulations, as it lacks essential elements such as
start and end dates, obligations of the Parties, and a jurisdiction clause. Furthermore, the
Club noted that the Preliminary Player Contract provides for payment of 50% of the agreed
amount without specifying a payment date, asserting that such payment was contingent
upon completion of certain procedures and fulfilment of contractual conditions.
19. The Club further claimed that it complied with its obligations by issuing a flight ticket for
the Player and securing his entry permit to Libya. The Club stated that the Player arrived in
Libya on 28 November 2024, signed the Preliminary Player Contract, but subsequently
refused to undergo a medical examination, provided inaccurate information regarding his
previous club, and failed to submit proof of termination of his prior employment contract.
The Club emphasized that, despite these issues, it acted in good faith and remained
committed to completing the contractual formalities.
20. The Club explained that, during the process of requesting the Player’s ITC, the Player
indicated that his former club was the Moroccan club Al-Qadisiyah. However, the ITC
request was rejected because the Player was actually registered with the Moroccan club AlQunaytirah. Considering that the league was scheduled to commence on 10 April 2025, the
Player was asked to travel to Morocco to resolve his legal status. The Club issued a flight
ticket for the Player to travel on 6 March 2025, granting him leave during this period, which
coincided with the holy month of Ramadan.
21. The Club asserted that it later requested the Player to return, join the team, settle his
financial status, receive the first payment, and finalize the official contract. However, the
Player allegedly refused to respond to these requests.
22. The Club stated that the Player was officially registered after the ITC was obtained and
added to the team roster in April 2025. The Club noted that the ITC was received three
months after the initial request, which, in its view, demonstrates the Player’s bad faith.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-19228
23. The Club claimed that, coinciding with the ITC’s arrival, it received a default notice from the
Player. However, according to the Club, the Player did not take any steps to unilaterally
terminate the contract, as the Club remained responsive during the specified period. The
Club continued to communicate with the Player, urging him to return from Morocco, but
the Player allegedly insisted on not returning and began requesting a mutual termination
of the contract.
24. The Club further alleged that, while registered with the Club, the Player was simultaneously
in contact with the Libyan club Nojoom Ajdabya, which constitutes a violation of FIFA
regulations.
25. Subsequently, and allegedly at the Player’s request, the parties executed the Termination
Agreement on 1 June 2025, releasing each other from all legal consequences arising from
the contract. The Club emphasized that, pursuant to this agreement, it was absolved of any
obligations toward the Player, which he acknowledged on the official form prepared by the
Player Status Committee of the LFF.
26. Finally, the Club noted that the Libyan Premier League commenced on 10 April 2025 and
that the Player did not participate in any matches due to his absence and failure to join the
team during the first half of the season. The Club added that, following the Termination
Agreement, the Player was registered with Nojoom Ajdabya Club.
27. Based on the foregoing, the Club requested that the claim be dismissed.
c. Replica of the Claimant
28. Despite being invited to do so, the Player failed to provide any additional comments to the
Club’s reply.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-19228
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
29. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or the DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 13 May 2025 and submitted for decision on
29 January 2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the January 2026
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter, the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
30. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (July 2025 edition), the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which
concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a
Moroccan player and a Libyan club.
31. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
32. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within TMS.
c. Merits of the dispute
33. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-19228
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
34. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and noted that it concerned a
claim lodged by the Player against the Club for breach of contract and its legal
consequences.
35. After briefly recalling the parties’ position, and in view of their divergent accounts regarding
the existence and validity of an employment contract between them, the members of the
Chamber acknowledged that their task was to address the following questions:
I.
Is the Preliminary Contract a valid and binding employment contract between the
parties?
II.
If yes, did the Player unilaterally terminate the contract?
III. If yes, did the Player have just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract?
***
I.
Is the Preliminary Contract a valid and binding employment contract between the
parties?
36. The Player maintained that the Preliminary Player Contract constitutes a valid and binding
employment agreement between the parties. Conversely, the Club contended that the
document cannot be regarded as such, alleging that it was subject to the fulfilment of
various conditions contained therein. According to the Club, the Preliminary Player
Contract merely represented an initial understanding of the terms and lacked essential
contractual elements, such as start and end dates of the employment relationship, the
specific obligations of the parties, and a jurisdiction clause. The Club further argued that
the obligation to pay 50% of the agreed amount was not accompanied by a precise
payment date and was instead contingent upon the satisfaction of certain internal
procedures and contractual conditions.
37. While taking into account the Club’s arguments, the Chamber found that its own conduct
is fundamentally inconsistent with its arguments. By explicitly requesting that the Player
return to the Club in order to receive the first contractual payment, the Club unequivocally
acknowledged both the existence and enforceability of the Preliminary Player Contract. The
Chamber determined that this constitutes a clear application of the principle of venire
contra factum proprium, which prohibits a party from acting inconsistently with its prior
conduct to the detriment of the other party.
38. This inconsistency is further reinforced by the Club’s submission of the Termination
Agreement. Regardless of the assessment of its validity —which will be addressed in
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continuation— any agreement purporting to terminate a contract necessarily presupposes
the existence of that underlying contract. The Club cannot, on the one hand, seek to rely
on a termination document and, on the other hand, deny that the underlying employment
relationship ever came into force.
39. Moreover, the DRC considered that the Club’s assertions that the Preliminary Player
Contract is non-binding because it lacked certain clauses is not persuasive in this case. As
established by the longstanding jurisprudence of the DRC, in order for an employment
contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the consent of the employer and
the employee (usually manifested by their signature to the relevant employment contract),
it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to
the contract, their role, the duration of the employment contract and the remuneration
payable by the employer to the employee (in this regard, inter alia, DRC Decision of 24 July
2025, Moreira de Miranda).
40. A plain reading of the Preliminary Player Contract shows all the aforementioned essential
elements are present: the parties are clearly identified (Player and Club), the role is
expressly defined (professional footballer), the duration is stipulated (season 2024/2025),
and the fixed remuneration is specified (USD 8,000). Further, the Club undertook formal
steps consistent with the existence of an employment relationship —such as initiating
immigration procedures and requesting the issuance of the ITC— while the Player travelled
from Morocco to Libya to commence his duties. These acts constitute evidence of
contractual implementation.
41. In view of the foregoing considerations, and based on both the objective terms of the
Preliminary Player Contract and the subsequent conduct of the parties, the Chamber
unanimously concluded that the Preliminary Player Contract constitutes a valid and binding
employment agreement between the parties.
II. Did the Player unilaterally terminate the contract?
42. Having established that the Preliminary Player Contract constitutes a valid and binding
employment agreement, the Chamber proceeded to analyse whether the Player
unilaterally terminated said contract.
43. Upon examination of the case file, the Chamber observed that no formal termination
notice was submitted by the Player prior to the initiation of the proceedings before FIFA.
While the Player placed the Club in default on 2 April 2025, requesting the payment of USD
8,000 within 15 days, no explicit termination letter addressed to the Club was filed before
the submission of his claim on 13 May 2025.
44. The Club acknowledged receipt of the default notice but argued that the Player did not
undertake any subsequent actions to unilaterally terminate the contract, asserting that the
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REF. FPSD-19228
Club remained communicative and repeatedly urged the Player to return. However, the
Chamber noted that the Club failed to substantiate these allegations with any documentary
evidence.
45. Nevertheless, the Chamber recalled that under FIFA jurisprudence no specific format is
required for a valid termination, provided the intent is clear, unequivocal, and justified.
Both FIFA and CAS have recognised that a claim lodged before FIFA containing a clear
request for termination may itself constitute a valid act of termination (in this regard, inter
alia, CAS 2021/A/8241 Altay SK v. Andreas Tatos; CAS 2016/A/4408 Raja Club Athletic v.
Baniyas FC & Ismail Benlamalem).
46. In this regard, the Chamber determined that the Player’s claim filed on 13 May 2025
contains a clear and express request regarding the termination of the contract, along with
a request for, inter alia, compensation and sporting sanctions under art. 17 of the
Regulations. The Club was duly notified of the claim and responded accordingly. Therefore,
the Player’s intent to terminate the employment relationship was clearly and effectively
communicated through the initiation of the FIFA proceedings and the explicit relief sought
therein.
47. In light of the above, the Chamber held that the Player unilaterally terminated the contract
on 13 May 2025, the date on which his claim before FIFA was lodged. The filing of the claim,
coupled with the clear and justified request to bring the contractual relationship to an end
before the agreed expiry date of 30 June 2025, constitutes a valid act of termination in line
with established FIFA and CAS jurisprudence.
III. Did the Player have just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract?
48. Having established that the Player unilaterally terminated the contract on 13 May 2025, the
Chamber proceeded to assess whether the Player had just cause to terminate it based on
art. 14bis of the Regulations.
49. In this respect, the DRC referred to art. 14bis par. 1 of the Regulations, in accordance with
which if a club fails to pay at least two monthly salaries on their due dates, the player will
be deemed to have just cause to terminate his contract, provided that he has put the
debtor club in default in writing and has granted a deadline of at least 15 days for the
debtor club to fully comply with its financial obligations.
50. The Chamber observed that, in his default notice dated 2 April 2025, the Player requested
payment of USD 8,000, corresponding to the total remuneration agreed in the Preliminary
Player Contract.
51. The Chamber further noted that, according to the terms of the contract, this amount was
payable in three instalments, none of which were linked to precise payment dates:
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REF. FPSD-19228
o A first payment of 50% (i.e., USD 4,000) as an advance, without a stipulated due
date;
o 25% (i.e., USD 2,000) “between the first and second leg of the season”, again
without a stipulated due date; and
o The remaining 25% (i.e., USD 2,000) “at the end of the league”, likewise without a
stipulated due date.
52. Art. 14bis par. 2 of the Regulations clarifies that for any salaries which are not due on a
monthly basis, the pro rata value corresponding to two months shall be considered. In case
of delay of an amount which is equal to two months shall also be deemed a just cause for
the player to terminate his contract, provided that they comply with the notice of
termination requisite.
53. The Chamber observed that the Player contended that the initial 50% instalment
(USD 4,000) fell due upon his arrival and signature as an advance payment. Significantly,
the Club did not contest this interpretation. On the contrary, the Club expressly stated in
its submissions that, prior to receiving the Player’s default notice, it had instructed the
Player to return to Libya to receive the first instalment. By doing so, the Club implicitly
—and unequivocally— acknowledged that the first payment was already due and payable.
54. Taking into consideration that the Player’s remuneration was not structured on a monthly
basis, the Chamber calculated the pro rata value of the salary corresponding to the
contractual period (i.e., 7 months). Based on this calculation, the amount of USD 4,000 (the
unpaid advance) corresponds to approximately four months of salary, well exceeding the
two-month threshold required under art. 14bis of the Regulations.
55. Additionally, the Chamber noted that the Player provided written evidence of having put
the Club in default on 2 April 2025, i.e., 15 days before unilaterally terminating the contract
on 13 May 2025 by filing the present claim.
56. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber noted that in this case the Club bore the
burden of proving that it indeed complied with the financial terms of the contract
concluded between the parties. Nonetheless, the Club did not dispute that no payments
were ever made to the Player, nor did it submit any proof of compliance with the financial
terms of the contract.
57. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the DRC concluded that the Player had just
cause to unilaterally terminate the contract, in accordance with art. 14bis of the
Regulations.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-19228
58. Having established the existence of a unilateral termination with just cause, the Chamber
turned to the legal consequences arising therefrom. In this regard, the Chamber noted that
the Club, in its reply to the claim, submitted a copy of the Termination Agreement
concluded with the Player on 1 June 2025.
59. Under the terms of the Termination Agreement, the parties declared that they mutually
terminated the contract “without any pressure or coercion” and “release each other from all
legal effects arising from the termination of the contract, comprehensively and without
exception”.
60. The Chamber observed that the Termination Agreement was executed on 1 June 2025, i.e.
after the Player had already filed his claim before FIFA on 13 May 2025. Moreover, despite
being granted an opportunity to comment on the Club’s reply, the Player did not provide
any explanation regarding the circumstances in which he signed the Termination
Agreement or why he elected to do so after already seeking termination before FIFA.
61. In light of this, the Chamber concluded that, through the signature of the Termination
Agreement, the Player effectively rendered his initial request for compensation for breach
of contract devoid of object. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Player’s
claim for compensation.
62. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber recalled that FIFA and CAS jurisprudence
establish that the mere signing of a contract (in casu, a termination agreement) is not
sufficient to ensure the enforceability of its contents.
63. Even though the Termination Agreement states that the Player waived all rights arising
from the contractual termination, the Chamber underlined that the Club did not pay the
Player any amount whatsoever during the validity of the contract. This remained an
undisputed fact.
64. In accordance with constant FIFA and CAS jurisprudence on waivers, a player generally
cannot validly waive remuneration for work already performed, or amounts already
accrued, unless there is an appropriate equivalence between the parties’ reciprocal
concessions.
65. In the present case, the Chamber held that no such reciprocity exists. The Player would be
waiving all his financial entitlements under the contract without receiving any
consideration or compensation in exchange. Such an imbalance renders the waiver clause
materially invalid.
66. On this basis, and taking into account the Club’s own admission in its reply —namely, that
the Player became entitled to the first payment of USD 4,000— the Chamber determined
that this amount is unquestionably owed to the Player.
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67. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the second instalment of USD 2,000 was
contractually due mid-season, a fact not disputed by the Club. Given that the Libyan
2024/2025 season ran from 20 September 2024 to 30 June 2025, the Chamber found that
the mid-season instalment fell due in January 2025, thereby entitling the Player to a further
USD 2,000.
68. However, with respect to the third and final instalment of USD 2,000, payable at the end of
the season, the Chamber determined that the Player was not entitled to this amount. The
Chamber noted that the Player left Libya on 6 March 2025 following the Club’s instructions
and never returned. Although the Club failed to provide evidence that the Player declined
to travel back, it remained undisputed that the Player did not return to complete the
sporting season.
69. Lastly, taking in consideration the Player’s request as well as the constant practice of the
Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided to award the Player interest at the
rate of 5% per annum on the outstanding amounts (i.e., USD 6,000) as from 13 May 2025,
in line with the Player’s request for relief.
ii. Compliance with monetary decisions
70. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
71. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
72. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
73. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
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74. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
75. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
76. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
77. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
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IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Omar Sabouni, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Al Hilal Tobruk, must pay to the Claimant USD 6,000 as outstanding
remuneration plus 5% interest per annum as from 13 May 2025 until the date of effective
payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
5.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
6.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
7.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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