Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-19191
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 19 March 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning
the player Daniel Farias de Oliveira
COMPOSITION:
Lívia SILVA KÄGI (Brazil & Switzerland), Deputy Chairwoman
Vanessa PLAVJANIKOVA (Czech Republic), Member
Johan VAN GAALEN (South Africa), Member
CLAIMANT:
Daniel Farias de Oliveira, Brazil
Represented by Filipe Orsolini Pinto de Souza
RESPONDENT:
Sportivo 2 de Mayo (Amambay), Paraguay
Represented by Gerardo Luis Acosta Pérez
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-19191
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 1 January 2025, the Brazilian player Daniel Farias de Oliveira (hereinafter: the Player or
the Claimant) and the Paraguayan club Sportivo 2 de Mayo (Amambay) (hereinafter: the Club
or the Respondent) entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract A) valid
as from 13 February 2025 to 13 December 2027.
2.
Clause 5 of Contract A established:
“QUINTA: REMUNERACION MENSUAL- EL CLUB se compromete en abonar a EL
FUTBOLISTA la suma única y total de GUARANIES DIEZ MILLONES (10.000.000 Gs.)
mensuales a partir del mes de febrero del año 2025. Suma de dinero que será abonada
durante los primeros 10 días en el mes posterior al servicio prestado, hasta la
finalización del presente contrato. (…)”
Freely translated into English:
“FIFTH: MONTHLY REMUNERATION - THE CLUB agrees to pay THE PLAYER the single and
total sum of TEN MILLION GUARANIES (PYG 10,000,000) per month starting in February
2025. This sum of money shall be paid during the first 10 days of the month following
the service provided, until the end of this contract. (...)"
3.
Clause 7 of Contract A provided as follows:
“SEPTIMA: En caso de rescisión unilateral sin justa causa por parte de EL FUTBOLISTA,
el mismo o en su defecto el nuevo club, deberá pagar a EL CLUB titular del presente,
una indemnización en concepto de Clausula Penal, equivalente a la suma de dólares
estadounidenses un millón (1.000.000 Usd.).”
Freely translated into English:
“SEVENTH: In the event of unilateral termination without just cause by THE PLAYER, the
player or, failing that, the new club, shall pay THE CLUB, the holder of this contract,
compensation in the form of a penalty clause equivalent to the sum of one million US
dollars (USD 1,000,000).”
4.
Also on 1 January 2025, according to the Club, the parties concluded another employment
contract (hereinafter: the Contract B), valid as from 1 February 2025 until 12 December
2025. It must be noted that the Player denied having signed this contract.
5.
Clause 5 of Contract B stipulated:
“QUINTA: REMUNERACION MENSUAL- EL CLUB se compromete en abonar a EL
FUTBOLISTA la suma única y total de GUARANIES DOS MILLONES OCHOCIENTOS MIL
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REF. FPSD-19191
(2.800.000 Gs.) mensuales a partir del mes de febrero del año 2025. Suma de dinero
que será abonada durante los primeros 10 días en el mes posterior al servicio prestado,
hasta la finalización del presente contrato.”
Freely translated into English:
“FIFTH: MONTHLY REMUNERATION—THE CLUB agrees to pay THE PLAYER the single and
total sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND GUARANIES (PYG 2,800,000)
per month starting in February 2025. This sum of money will be paid during the first 10
days of the month following the service provided, until the end of this contract.”
6.
Clause 11 of Contract B included the following:
“DECIMA PRIMERA: En caso de rescisión unilateral sin justa causa por parte de EL
FUTBOLISTA, el mismo o en su defecto el nuevo club, deberá pagar a EL CLUB titular del
presente, una indemnización en concepto de Clausula Penal, equivalente a la suma de
dólares estadounidenses un millón (1.000.000 Usd.).”
Freely translated into English:
“ELEVENTH: In the event of unilateral termination without just cause by THE PLAYER, the
player or, failing that, the new club, shall pay THE CLUB, the holder of this contract,
compensation in the form of a penalty clause equivalent to the sum of one million US
dollars (USD 1,000,000).”
7.
On 11 April 2025, the Player, by means of his legal representative, put the Club in default
and requested payment of PYG 20,000,000, corresponding to the salaries that were due on
10 March and 10 April 2025. The Player granted the Club until 26 April 2025 to pay and
indicated that, otherwise, he would terminate the employment relationship with just cause
based on art. 14bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter:
the Regulations).
8.
According to the Club, on 22 April 2025, the parties concluded a document titled “Acuerdo
de Rescisión de Contrato de Trabajo de Futbolista Profesional”, freely translated into
English as “Agreement for the Termination of a Professional Football Player's Employment
Contract” (hereinafter: the Termination Agreement), which established the following:
“[Las partes]
Convienen en celebrar el presente Acuerdo de Rescisión del Contrato de Trabajo
Deportivo entre EL CLUB y EL JUGADOR, en base a las siguientes:
PRIMERA: Mediante la suscripción del presente acuerdo, EL CLUB y EL JUGADOR,
manifiestan que no tienen nada que reclamarse y que renuncian a todo derecho, acción
o reclamo judicial o extrajudicial emergente directa o indirectamente de la ejecución o
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REF. FPSD-19191
interpretación del mismo, habiéndose liquidado satisfactoriamente, todos los intereses
económicos que pudieren haber surgido durante su vigencia, de manera directa o
indirecta;
SEGUNDA: Las partes acuerdan someter cualquier controversia que surja de la
ejecución de este contrato o tenga relación con el mismo, con su interpretación, validez
o invalidez, a un proceso de arbitraje, ante un tribunal conformado por un árbitro
designado de la lista del Cuerpo Arbitral del Centro de Arbitraje, y aplicará el
reglamento respectivo y demás disposiciones que regulen dicho procedimiento al
momento de ser requerido, declarando las partes conocer y aceptar los vigentes, incluso
en orden a su régimen de gastos y costos, considerándolos parte integrante del presente
contrato.
Previa lectura y ratificación del contenido del presente contrato, suscriben las partes en
prueba de conformidad, en el lugar y fecha señalados más arriba, en doble ejemplar y
bajo los efectos jurídicos acordados en el mismo.”
Freely translated into English:
“[The parties]
Agree to enter into this Agreement to Terminate the Sports Employment Contract
between THE CLUB and THE PLAYER, based on the following:
FIRST: By signing this agreement, THE CLUB and THE PLAYER declare that they have no
claims against each other and waive all rights, actions, or judicial or extrajudicial claims
arising directly or indirectly from the execution or interpretation of this agreement,
having satisfactorily settled all financial interests that may have arisen during its term,
either directly or indirectly.
SECOND: The parties agree to submit any dispute arising from the execution of this
contract or related to it, its interpretation, validity, or invalidity, to arbitration before a
tribunal composed of an arbitrator appointed from the list of the Arbitration Body of
the Arbitration Center, and the respective regulations and other provisions governing
such proceedings shall apply at the time of being required, the parties declaring that
they know and accept those in force, including with regard to their regime of expenses
and costs, considering them an integral part of this contract.
After reading and ratifying the content of this contract, the parties sign in witness
whereof, in the place and on the date indicated above, in duplicate and under the legal
effects agreed therein.”
9.
It must be noted that the Player disputed having signed the Termination Agreement.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-19191
10. On 27 April 2025, the Player, by means of his legal representative, terminated the
employment relationship, citing just cause based on art. 14bis of the Regulations.
11. On 28 April 2025, the Club replied to the Player, arguing that the employment relationship
had already been terminated by mutual consent and attached a copy of the Termination
Agreement.
12. On 5 May 2025, the Player, by means of his legal representative, replied to the Club stating
that he had never signed the Termination Agreement but had instead terminated the
employment relationship with just cause on 27 April 2025. The Player further argued that
the document sent by the Club was fraudulent, as he had never seen it before and his
signature had clearly been forged. The Player asserted that his family’s livelihood depended
on his salaries, and he would therefore never have accepted an agreement on 22 April 2025
waiving all his salaries and compensation. Lastly, he alleged that if the Club insisted on this
position, he would seek criminal measures.
13. On an unspecified date, the Player concluded a new contract with the Albanian club Besa
(hereinafter: Besa), valid as from 13 October 2025 until 30 May 2026. The Player was
entitled to EUR 1,000 per month.
14. Based on the information retrieved from the FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 17
October 2025, after this claim was lodged, Besa uploaded a copy of the Termination
Agreement and used it for the Player’s registration as proof of his “last contract end date”.
15. On 2 January 2026, the Player concluded a new contract with the Brazilian club Andraus
Brasil Ltda/PR, valid as from 26 December 2025 until 26 March 2026. Pursuant to this
contract, the Player is entitled to BRL 1,650 per month.
16. On 17 February 2026, and upon request by the FIFA general secretariat, the Club sent the
original copy of the Termination Agreement to FIFA.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
17. On 10 May 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
18. The Player argued that the parties concluded Contract A, valid as from 13 February 2025
until 13 December 2027, by means of which he was entitled to PYG 10,000,000 to be paid
every 10th day of each subsequent month. The Player argued that, however, the Club failed
to pay him the salaries that were due on 10 March and 10 April 2025. Therefore, the Player
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REF. FPSD-19191
stated that he put the Club in default and granted 15 days to comply with the payments, to
no avail. Consequently, the Player terminated the employment relationship.
19. In this respect, the Player alleged that he is entitled to two salaries as outstanding
remuneration, and to the residual value of Contract A, along with additional compensation.
20. The Claimant’s requests for relief were the following, quoted verbatim:
“1. In view of all above, the Claimant requests:
a. the DRC to send this claim to Sportivo 2 de Mayo (Paraguay) with a time limit for a
statement or a reply, pursuant article 21.1 the FIFA Procedural;
b. the DRC to accept this claim and declare that the Employment Contract signed by and
between the parties was terminated with just cause for outstanding salaries on 27 April
2025, according to article 14bis of the FIFA RSTP;
c. the DRC to accept this claim and order the Respondent Sportivo 2 de Mayo (Paraguay)
to pay to the Claimant the following:
i.
the outstanding salaries in the net amount of PYG 20.000.000 (twenty
million Paraguayan Guaranis), plus interests of 5% p.a. as from the due date
of each payment;
ii.
a compensation equal to the residual value of the contract that was
prematurely terminated in the total net amount of PYG 320.000.000 (three
hundred and twenty million Paraguayan Guaranis), plus interests of 5% p.a.
as from 27 April 2025;
iii. an additional compensation in the total net amount of PYG 30.000.000
(thirty million Paraguayan Guaranis), plus interests of 5% p.a. as from 27 April
2025.
d. the DRC to accept this claim and sanction the Respondent Sportivo 2 De Mayo
(Paraguay) in accordance with article 17.4 of FIFA RSTP.
e. the DRC to accept this claim and include the consequences of the failure to pay the
relevant amounts in due time, pursuant article 24 of the FIFA RSTP.”
b. Reply of the Respondent
21. In its reply, the Club acknowledged that, initially, the parties concluded Contract A, valid as
from 13 February 2025 until 13 December 2027, with a monthly salary of PYG 10,000,000.
According to the Club, this document was sent to the Player via WhatsApp. Nevertheless,
the Club alleged that when the Player arrived at the Club, Contract A was novated by
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-19191
Contract B, which was shorter in duration and provided for a lower salary. The Club
remarked that Contract B was valid from 1 February 2025 until 12 December 2025.
22. The Club asserted that both contracts were dated 1 January 2025, but that the start date
of Contract B was prior to that of Contract A and, therefore, Contract B shall prevail. Hence,
the Club rejected the validity of Contract A.
23. Additionally, the Club indicated that when the Player put it in default based on what it
considered an erroneous salary, the Club contacted the Player and they signed the
Termination Agreement, by means of which the employment was terminated by mutual
consent. The Club asserted that the signature of this document occurred after the payment
of the financial obligations and in accordance with Paraguayan law. Hence, the Club alleged
that the legal principle of venire contra factum proprium should apply.
24. Subsidiarily, the Club argued that national law should apply for the calculation of
compensation and referred to Law no. 5322/14 and, in particular, its art. 25, according to
which compensation should be equal to the residual value of the remaining year.
Therefore, the Club stated that compensation should be limited to the Player’s salary for
2025, and it would be up to the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) to determine which
contract shall be taken into account.
25. The Respondent’s requests for relief were the following:
“Por lo tanto, en atención a lo expuesto, al Tribunal del Fútbol se presentan las
siguientes
PETICIONES
1. Que se tenga por presentado el descargo del Demandado conforme a lo expresado
previamente.
2. Que se rechace este reclamo considerando el Acuerdo de Rescisión suscrito el 22 de
abril de 2025.
3. Que, subsidiariamente, en caso de no considerarse válido el Acuerdo de Rescisión, se
establezca como indemnización reducida, el valor residual del salario hasta el mes de
diciembre de 2025, de conformidad a lo establecido en la legislación nacional vigente
en Paraguay.”
Freely translated into English:
“Therefore, in view of the foregoing, the following PETITIONS are submitted to the
Football Court
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REF. FPSD-19191
1.That the Respondent's defense be deemed to have been presented in accordance with
the foregoing.
2. That this claim be rejected in view of the Termination Agreement signed on April 22,
2025.
3. That, alternatively, if the Termination Agreement is not considered valid, the residual
value of the salary until December 2025 be established as reduced compensation, in
accordance with the provisions of current national legislation in Paraguay."
c. Replica of the Claimant
26. In his replica, the Player pointed out that the Club expressly admitted having signed
Contract A. While the Player admitted having been requested to sign some documents for
his registration before the Paraguayan Football Association (APF), he denied that this was
related to the amendment of any clause of Contract A. The Player asserted that he would
never have accepted a new contract, let alone one with significantly worse conditions.
Specifically, he alleged that he would never have signed another contract that reduced the
length of the contractual relationship from three years to one and reduced his
remuneration to around 25% of the amount initially agreed.
27. In this respect, the Player affirmed that, since the Respondent recognised that Contract A
was effectively signed and was more favourable to the employer (sic), it should be
considered valid and official. Hence, the Player argued that Contract A should be
considered the contract governing the employment relationship.
28. The Player then affirmed that he had never agreed to a mutual termination of the
employment, as he would never have accepted to terminate his contract after having put
the Club in default. The Player indicated that he would not have waived all the outstanding
salaries plus all his rights under a three-year contract. In this respect, he stated that he
could not have opted to waive his rights rather than terminate his contract with just cause
and request all his salaries and compensation.
29. The Player stated that the Termination Agreement was a forged document and that he had
claimed this as soon as the Club shared this document with him. In fact, the Player provided
a written statement alleging that he did not sign the document.
30. In any event, the Player affirmed that, had he signed the Termination Agreement, it should
be set aside according to art. 21 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO). Furthermore, the
Player indicated that it should be disregarded because it was sent on 28 April 2025, the day
after the termination. Therefore, the Player maintained that the employment was
terminated by him with just cause.
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REF. FPSD-19191
31. Moreover, the Player argued that compensation should be determined based on the
Regulations, according to the first clause of Contract A and the jurisprudence of the
Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
32. Lastly, the Player alleged that the Club was acting in bad faith, misrepresenting the truth
and producing a false document. However, he reiterated that the allegations and
documents submitted by the Club clearly brought an unfair advantage to him.
d. Duplica of the Respondent
33. In his duplica, the Club reaffirmed that the parties had concluded the Termination
Agreement and stated that the Player had probably failed to inform his legal representative
of this fact. The Club asserted that it had informed the legal representative once and then
stopped replying because it deemed further communication unnecessary. The Club
remarked that it was the legal representative, and not the Player, who was claiming forgery.
34. In any event, the Club argued that it was for the Player to prove the alleged forgery and
that merely asserting it was insufficient. The Club affirmed that, conversely, it was entitled
to deny what it considered to be unfounded allegations.
35. Based on the above, the Club requested that the proceedings be closed.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
36. First of all, the DRC (hereinafter also referred to as the Chamber) analysed whether it was
competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present
matter was presented to FIFA on 10 May 2025 and submitted for decision on 19 March
2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the January 2026 edition of the
Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the
aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
37. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (July 2025 edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between a Brazilian player and a Paraguayan club.
38. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
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REF. FPSD-19191
b. Burden of proof
39. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the TMS.
c. Merits of the dispute
40. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
41. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerned a claim
brought by a player against a club for outstanding remuneration and compensation.
42. The Chamber recalled that, according to the Player, the parties concluded Contract A and
the Club failed to pay him two salaries, thereby giving him just cause to terminate the
employment in accordance with art. 14bis of the Regulations. Therefore, the Player
requested outstanding remuneration and compensation.
43. The Chamber noted that the Club, conversely, alleged that while the parties concluded
Contract A, they later novated its terms when they signed Contract B, and thus the latter
should prevail. In addition, the Club asserted that, after the Player put the Club in default,
it settled its debts and the parties concluded the Termination Agreement, which implied
that the claim should be rejected.
44. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to determine (i) which contract
was applicable, and (ii) whether the employment relationship was terminated by mutual
consent or unilaterally by the Player. Only if the employment relationship was considered
as terminated by the Player, the Chamber stated that it would need to analyse whether he
had just cause and the ensuing consequences.
45. The Chamber then proceeded to analyse each of these issues in turn.
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REF. FPSD-19191
A. Which was the applicable contract?
46. The Chamber recalled that, according to the Player, Contract A was the valid and binding
contract while, according to the Club, it was Contract B. The Chamber’s conclusions in this
respect were the following.
47. First, the Chamber noted that it was undisputed that the parties concluded Contract A.
While the Club argued that this contract was subsequently novated, it never denied having
signed it.
48. On the contrary, the Chamber observed that the Player alleged that he never signed
Contract B, asserting that he would never have signed a document containing worse
conditions. Despite the Player’s allegations, the Chamber emphasised that - unlike what he
argued regarding the Termination Agreement - the Player did not claim that the Club forged
his signature on Contract B but simply relied on the improbability of him having signed
such a document, or on the irrationality of worsening his labour conditions. In this regard,
without any explanation or evidence provided by the Player to support his allegations, the
Chamber could only conclude that he also signed Contract B.
49. Having established the above, the Chamber then observed that the parties indeed
concluded two contracts with different terms and conditions. In particular, Contract A
provided for a duration from 13 February 2025 to 13 December 2027 and a monthly salary
of PYG 10,000,000, whereas Contract B provided for a duration from 1 February 2025 until
12 December 2025 and a monthly salary of PYG 2,800,000. Furthermore, both contracts
were - according to the documents themselves - signed on 1 January 2025 in Pedro Juan
Caballero (Paraguay). In this respect, the Chamber had to determine which contract should
prevail.
50. At this point, the Chamber noted that the Club argued that Contract A was first signed by
the parties and shared between them via WhatsApp, but then, when the Player arrived in
Paraguay, they signed Contract B and novated the terms of Contract A. However, the
Chamber remarked that the Club failed to prove any of these allegations and, specifically,
failed to prove that Contract B novated Contract A.
51. In the Chamber’s opinion, it would have been relatively easy for the Club to provide
evidence of having sent Contract A to the Player via WhatsApp, or to prove his arrival date
in Paraguay, or to provide any evidence of the date of signature of Contract B, such as a
video or photo. Nevertheless, the Club failed to do so.
52. In addition, the Chamber considered that had Contract B been signed after Contract A and
had the parties really intended to novate its terms, they would have explicitly referred to
the previous contract in the new document to avoid any conflict - for example, by stating
that with the signature of this contract, the other one was rendered without effect -
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REF. FPSD-19191
especially considering that both documents bore the same date and it would otherwise
have been very difficult to determine which one should prevail.
53. While it was true that the Player acknowledged having been requested to sign some
documents for his registration before the APF, he denied that this was related to the
amendment of any clause of Contract A, or that it was Contract B - which he denied having
signed at all. It is in this context that the Chamber stressed that it could not assume, based
solely on the Player’s allegations, that Contract B was signed after Contract A or that it
novated its terms.
54. Moreover, the Chamber noted that the Club did not argue that Contract B novated Contract
A because it was signed after it, since the Club acknowledged that both documents bore
the same date. On the contrary, the Club maintained that Contract B should prevail
because it provided for an earlier start date. However, the Chamber considered that this
allegation also could not be upheld, as the starting date of a contract is irrelevant to
determine whether there was a novation; rather, the only relevant factor is which
document was signed later, modifying the previous agreement between the parties.
55. Based on the above, the Chamber concluded that it was not possible to determine that
Contract B novated Contract A.
56. Since both parties agreed that Contract A was signed and the Club failed to prove that
Contract B novated the terms of the employment relationship, although it bore the burden
of proof as it raised this argument, the Chamber determined that the valid and binding
contract was Contract A.
B. Did the parties mutually terminate the employment
relationship, or did the Player unilaterally terminate it?
57. Having established that Contract A governed the employment relationship between the
parties, the Chamber then proceeded to determine whether the parties mutually
terminated it or whether the Player unilaterally terminated it.
58. The Chamber recalled that on 11 April 2025, the Player put the Club in default, requesting
payment of PYG 20,000,000, corresponding to the salaries that were to be paid on 10 March
and 10 April 2025. In this letter, the Player granted the Club 15 days to comply with the
payments and stated that otherwise he would terminate the employment relationship.
59. The Chamber also observed that, according to the Club, on 22 April 2025 the parties
concluded the Termination Agreement, thereby terminating the employment by mutual
consent; whereas, according to the Player, he unilaterally terminated Contract A on 27 April
2025 with just cause, by means of the letter sent by his legal representative.
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60. Since the Termination Agreement was purportedly signed before the Player’s termination
and was allegedly an act concluded by both parties, the Chamber established that it must
first analyse whether this document was indeed valid and binding. The Chamber
considered that the fact that this document was sent to the legal representative after the
termination was irrelevant, as the date of the signature remained the decisive element.
a) Was the Termination Agreement valid and binding?
61. At this point, the Chamber observed that the Player argued that he never signed the
Termination Agreement and that it was in fact forged by the Club, who fabricated a false
document. However, the Chamber noted that, despite the Player’s allegations, he failed to
provide any evidence of the forgery. The Chamber recalled that, based on art. 13 par. 5 of
the Procedural Rules, a party that asserts a fact bears the burden of proving it. Therefore,
in the Chamber’s view, it was not sufficient to simply claim forgery without providing any
evidence to support such allegations.
62. In fact, the Chamber considered that the Player did not even provide an explanation as to
why the document should be disregarded. For example, he did not claim that his signature
was different from the one appearing on other documents he signed, or that the Club used
his signature from another document and pasted it onto this one or provided any other
valid explanation supporting his position. The Player again simply relied on the argument
that it made no sense for him to have signed a document waving any claims when he
allegedly would have been entitled to further compensation.
63. In addition to the above, the Chamber noted that the Club provided the original copy of
the document, which matched the one digitally submitted before. While the Chamber
recalled that the Football Tribunal is not a criminal instance capable of analysing the
authenticity of signatures, nor can it assume the functions of a court of law within the
ordinary jurisdiction to appoint a handwriting expert, it noted that, after a meticulous
layman’s analysis of this original document, it was not possible to establish that the
document was forged.
64. More importantly, the Chamber found decisive that when the Player was transferred to his
subsequent club, Besa, the latter uploaded a copy of the Termination Agreement as proof
of his last contract end date. The Chamber observed that this copy was uploaded on 17
October 2025, during these proceedings, and, since it was the Player’s new club who
uploaded and used this copy for the Player’s registration, the Chamber interpreted that it
was the Player himself who provided this document, which contradicted his own argument.
65. The Chamber also found contradictory the Player’s argument that, in any event, this
document could not be valid based on art. 21 of the SCO, because this article establishes
that a document may be declared invalid when it was signed as a result of one party’s
exploitation of the other's straitened circumstances, inexperience, or thoughtlessness. The
Chamber considered that it was not consistent to argue that a document was not signed
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REF. FPSD-19191
and then argue, even subsidiarily, that it was signed as a result of the exploitation of certain
circumstances. This was because, in order to sustain this explanation, it was necessary to
analyse the circumstances under which the document was signed, which the Player
explicitly denies. Without prejudice, and in any event, the Chamber underlined that these
alleged straitened circumstances were not proven at all.
66. Lastly, the Chamber emphasised that the Player, in his claim, did not even mention the
existence of this document, although he was clearly aware of it based on the evidence he
himself provided in the replica, which generated doubts about his good faith regarding this
document.
67. Based on all the above, the Chamber was not convinced that the Termination Agreement
had been forged; thus deciding that it should be considered as valid and binding on the
parties.
b) Did the parties mutually terminate the employment through the Termination Agreement?
68. Having established the above, the Chamber then noted that the wording of the
Termination Agreement was not entirely clear. While the title of the document was
“Agreement for the Termination of a Professional Football Player's Employment Contract”
and, in the preamble, the parties stated that they agreed to enter into this “Agreement to
Terminate the Sports Employment Contract”, the clauses did not expressly specify that with
this document the parties were terminating the employment relationship. At the same
time, the Chamber considered that it would be overly formalistic to adopt any other
interpretation than that the parties indeed terminated their employment relationship with
this document, which – again - the Player himself used as proof of the last contract end
date, as the intention of the parties was clear.
69. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that, by signing the Termination Agreement, the parties
terminated Contract A by mutual consent. With this conclusion, the Chamber considered
that it was not necessary to analyse the consequences of the Player’s termination on 27
April 2025, since, at that time, Contract A had already been terminated, and this was an act
performed by both parties.
c) Is all the content of the Termination Agreement enforceable?
70. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber also recalled that the mere signing of a
contract is not sufficient to ensure the enforceability of all its contents. In particular, the
well-established jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal and the CAS on waivers provides
that (i) in general terms, an employee (e.g., a player or a coach) cannot waive remuneration
for work already performed; and (ii) in order to assess whether a transaction is permissible,
the court / deciding-making body is required to conduct a balancing of interests by
considering whether the reciprocal claims waived by each party are of comparable value.
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-19191
Put differently, whether there is an appropriate equivalence between the parties’ reciprocal
concessions.
71. At this point, the Chamber considered that the Termination Agreement appeared to fall
somewhere between an acknowledgment of receipt and a waiver, as it indicated that the
parties waived any possible claim on the basis that all financial obligations (i.e., the salaries
for February, March and the prorated salary for April 2025) had been complied with.
Furthermore, the Chamber stressed that the Club has neither during the pre-litigation
exchanges nor throughout these proceedings provided proof of payment of those financial
obligations, merely relying on the text of the agreement to assert that all payments have
been made.
72. Accordingly, based on the lack of evidence on file, the Chamber considered that although
the Termination Agreement stipulated that the Player was not entitled to claim the salaries
for February, March, and the prorated salary for April 2025 - i.e. the months during which
the Player effectively rendered his services - the Club failed to provide evidence of having
paid these amounts and therefore the Player was entitled to receive these outstanding
salaries for the work he performed.
73. Based on the above, the Chamber held that, notwithstanding the wording of the
Termination Agreement and the fact that it was the document through which the parties
terminated their employment relationship, the Player remained entitled to unpaid
remuneration for work already performed. Therefore, the Chamber decided to award the
Player his outstanding remuneration.
74. Regarding the salary for February 2025, since Contract A started on 13 February 2025, the
Chamber decided to award the prorated remuneration for that month, i.e., PYG
5,714,285.71. Additionally, the Chamber decided to award the full salary for March 2025,
i.e., PYG 10,000,000.
75. Regarding these two salaries, the Chamber decided to award 5% interest p.a. over both
amounts as from the day following each due date, i.e., 11 March and 11 April 2025
respectively, until the date of effective payment.
76. Regarding the salary for April 2025, the Chamber decided to award the prorated amount
of PYG 7,333,333.33 with 5% interest p.a. as from 27 April 2025 - in order not to rule ultra
petita based on the Player’s request for relief, since he requested this salary as part of the
compensation - until the date of effective payment.
77. Lastly, given that the parties mutually terminated the employment relationship, the
Chamber decided that any claim lodged by the Player relating to compensation must be
rejected.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-19191
ii. Compliance with monetary decisions
78. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
79. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
80. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
81. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
82. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
83. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
84. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
85. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-19191
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Daniel Farias de Oliveira, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Sportivo 2 de Mayo (Amambay), must pay to the Claimant the following
amount:
- PYG 23,047,619.04 as outstanding remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as follows:
- 5% interest p.a. over the amount of PYG 5,714,285.71 as from 11 March 2025 until the
date of effective payment;
- 5% interest p.a. over the amount of PYG 10,000,000 as from 11 April 2025 until the date
of effective payment;
- 5% interest p.a. over the amount of PYG 7,333,333.33 as from 27 April 2025 until the
date of effective payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
5.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
6.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
pg. 18
REF. FPSD-19191
7.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 19
REF. FPSD-19191
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 20