Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-19090
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 19 February 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Mayowa
Akinola Olaofe
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Khadija TIMERA (Senegal), Member
Dana MOHAMED AL-NOAIMI (Qatar), Member
CLAIMANT:
Mayowa Akinola Olaofe, Nigeria
Represented by André Oliveira Teodoro Lopes
RESPONDENT:
CFEA Club Football Estrela Sad, Portugal
Represented by 14 Sports Law
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-19090
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 19 June 2024, the Nigerian player Mayowa Akinola Olaofe (hereinafter: the Player or the
Claimant) and the Portuguese club CFEA Club Football Estrela Sad (hereinafter: the Club or
the Respondent) entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract), valid as
from 1 July 2024 until 30 June 2027.
2.
In accordance with the Contract, the Club undertook to pay the Player a monthly
remuneration in the amount of EUR 1,300 net.
3.
Clause 18 of the Contract read as follows (quoted verbatim):
“Clause Eighteen
1. In order to settle all issues related to the interpretation of this contract, its execution,
validity or force, or related to any of its clauses, and for all other issues arising therefrom, the
parties agree to submit their respective assessment to the Arbitration Committee constituted
under the terms of Law 54/2017 of 14 July for Football Professionals.
2. In the event of the absence of a decision under the terms of the previous clause, the parties
agree to submit the respective assessment to the Labour Court of Lisbon, with express waiver
of any other.
3. In the event that any of the provisions or portions of this agreement are void or
unenforceable for any reason under applicable law, the remainder shall continue in full force
and effect, the parties agreeing to use all reasonable efforts to replace the legally void or
unenforceable provision with one that purports the same results as those intended or
contemplated by the original provision.”
4.
According to the Club, on 9 April 2025, it and the Player mutually agreed to terminate the
Contract by means of a termination agreement (hereinafter: the Alleged Termination
Agreement).
5.
Clause 3 of the Alleged Termination Agreement provided as follows (quoted verbatim):
“CLAUSE THREE
1. The PLAYER declares and acknowledges that [the Club] has fully complied with all
obligations arising, directly or indirectly, from the Professional Sports Employment Contract
referred to above.
2. The PLAYER declares and acknowledges that he has no further claims against [the Club],
under any title or of any nature, including, but not limited to, salaries, bonuses, performance
incentives, damages, or any other amounts.”
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-19090
6.
Clause 7, par. 3, of the Alleged Termination Agreement provided the following (quoted
verbatim):
“3. For the purposes of interpreting this Agreement and resolving any disputes arising out of
or in connection with its application or execution, the Parties expressly agree to submit to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Judicial Court of the District of Sintra (Tribunal Judicial da
Comarca de Sintra), with the express waiver of any other jurisdiction.”
7.
On 27 January 2025, the Player placed the Club on default, requesting the payment of EUR
8,932.26 corresponding to the full salaries of July to December 2024 and the partial salary
of January 2025. The Player granted the Club 15 days to remedy the default.
8.
On 2 April 2025, the Player sent a further default notice to the Club, requesting the payment
of EUR 11,700 corresponding to the full salaries of July 2024 to March 2025. The Player
granted the Club 15 days to remedy the default.
9.
On 9 April 2025, the Club issued a document titled “EQUIPMENT RECEIPT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT” to be signed by the Player (hereinafter: the Equipment Receipt),
whereby the Player stated that he had received some equipment and that he was
responsible for taking care of it and return it if the Contract is terminated or in any situation
that require the return of materials in accordance with the Club’s internal policies.
10. On 20 April 2025, the Player sent a third default notice to the Club, granting a final deadline
until 24 April 2025 to make the payment of EUR 11,700.
11. On 25 April 2025, the Player terminated the Contract.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
12. On 29 April 2025, the Player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Player
13. In his claim, the Player submitted that, on 25 April 2025, he prematurely terminated the
Contract with just cause due to outstanding salaries.
14. The Player alleged that, as at the date of the termination the Contract, an amount of EUR
11,700 net remained outstanding corresponding to the full salaries from July 2024 to March
2025.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-19090
15. The Player further claimed that he is entitled to compensation in the amount of EUR 35,100
net, corresponding to the residual value of the Contract.
16. The Player requested the following (quoted verbatim):
“For all the above, the Claimant requests that the DRC:
a) Deems the present claim admissible, and accepts it in full;
b) Acknowledges that the Player had just cause to terminate the Employment Agreement;
c) Orders the Respondent to pay the Player the following amounts:
1. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of July 2024, plus 5% p.a. as interest
as from 06 August 2024;
2. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of August 2024, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 September 2024;
3. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of September 2024, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 October 2024;
4. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of October 2024, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 November 2024;
5. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of November 2024, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 December 2024;
6. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of December 2024, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 January 2025;
7. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of January 2025, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 February 2025;
8. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of February 2025, plus 5% p.a. as
interest as from 06 March 2025;
9. EUR 1,300 (one thousand Euros) as the salary of March 2025, plus 5% p.a. as interest
as from 06 April 2025; and
10. EUR 35,100 (thirty-five thousand and one hundred Euros) as the residual value of
the Employment Agreement as compensation for contractual breach, plus 5% p.a.
interest as from 26 April 2025.”
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-19090
b. Reply of the Club
17. In its reply, the Club contested the jurisdiction of FIFA to hear the present dispute.
18. The Club submitted that clause 18 of the Contract referred to two different judicial
authorities in Portugal, with express waiver of any other jurisdiction, namely, the
Arbitration Committee or, in the absence of a decision of said committee, the Labour
Courts of Lisbon.
19. In addition, the Club asserted that clause 7, par. 3 of the Alleged Termination Agreement
provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Judicial Court of the District of Sintra, with
express waiver to any other jurisdiction.
20. The Club further alleged that there was no evidence of any claim having been filed by the
Player before the dispute resolution bodies elected by the parties under the Contract.
21. In the alternative, and only in the event that the FIFA Football Tribunal declares itself
competent to hear the present dispute, the Club submitted that the Player’s default notices
were received by surprise, as the parties had signed the Alleged Termination Agreement.
22. The Club asserted that the Alleged Termination Agreement established that the Club
complied with all financial obligations and that the Player had no outstanding claims
against the Club.
23. The Club requested the following relief (quoted verbatim):
“In light of all of the above, Estrela SAD respectfully requests the Dispute Resolution Chamber
of the FIFA Football Tribunal to:
(i) Determine that the FIFA Football Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim filed
by Mr. Mayowa Olaofe; or
In the alternative,
(ii) Reject Mr. Mayowa Olaofe’s Requests for Relief in its entirety and determine that Estrela
SAD is not liable for the payment of any amounts.”
c. Replica of the Player
24. In his replica, the Player maintained that FIFA has jurisdiction hear the present dispute.
25. The Player contended that he had no involvement in drafting the Contract and that the
Arbitration Committee referred to in clause 18 of the Contract cannot be considered
competent, since it is not a recognised by FIFA as a National Dispute Resolution Chamber
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-19090
(NDRC).
26. In addition, the Player asserted that he could not have submitted a claim before the Labour
Court of Lisbon, as he had no residency permit and would therefore have risked being
arrested and ultimately deported.
27. For these reasons, the Player asserted that clause 18 of the Contract should be deemed
inapplicable, whilst the remainder of the Contract should remain valid.
28. The Player further submitted that he had never signed any settlement agreement nor any
document waiving any of the claimed amounts and therefore maintained that the Alleged
Termination Agreement was forged.
29. The Player further referred to the inconsistencies in the timeline between his repeated
default notices and the alleged termination date.
30. The Player alleged that the Club had sent the Equipment Receipt to be signed by him with
the intention of subsequently inserting his signature into the Alleged Termination
Agreement, as the last page of both documents was identical.
31. In addition, the Player submitted statements from the players Nádor Milán Balázs and
Alexandre Gordinho Galvanito, whereby they asserted that the Club had not requested
them to sign any document similar to the Equipment Receipt.
32. The Player further submitted that, whilst it was not possible for him to prove negative facts,
such as the non-existence of any settlement between the parties, it would have been
possible for the Club to prove the positive fact of payment to the Player or the existence of
negotiations which had led to the Player waiving his alleged entitlements.
33. In light of all the above, the Player maintained his position.
d. Duplica of the Club
34. In its duplica, the Club maintained that the FIFA Football Tribunal does not have jurisdiction
hear the present dispute.
35. The Club argued that the Contract clearly assigned exclusive jurisdiction to Portuguese
bodies, namely, the Arbitration Committee and, subsidiarily, the Labour Court of Lisbon,
whilst expressly waiving any other forum, including FIFA.
36. The Club asserted that the Player’s claim of a defect in consent was unsupported, as the
use of standard contracts is common practice and no evidence of coercion or
misunderstanding had been provided. The Club further dismissed the Player’s argument
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-19090
that he could not access the Labour Court due to immigration issues, noting the lack of
supporting evidence.
37. The Club submitted that both the Contract and the Alleged Termination Agreement
confirmed the parties’ intention to submit all disputes exclusively to Portuguese courts.
38. As regards the forgery allegations, the Club asserted that FIFA is not empowered to conduct
criminal level investigations and the Player has not met the high burden of proof required
by the applicable jurisprudence.
39. The Club asserted that, by contrast, the certification of the Alleged Termination Agreement
and the Player’s alleged acknowledgments supported its validity. In this respect, the Club
emphasized that the Alleged Termination Agreement does not merely bear a final signature
on its last page but has also been duly initialled on each page.
40. In light of all the above, the Club maintained its position.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
41. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 29 April 2025 and submitted for decision on
19 February 2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the January 2026
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
42. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter
at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension
between a Nigerian player and a Portuguese club.
43. Nonetheless, the Chamber observed that the parties strongly disputed the jurisdiction of
the Football Tribunal in this matter. In this respect, the Chamber noted that, while the
Player averred that the Chamber was competent to decide this dispute, the Club
challenged FIFA’s jurisdiction in view of an alleged clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause
included in the Contract.
44. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber recalled that pursuant to art. 22, par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations, the Football Tribunal has default jurisdiction over employment-related
disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension unless the parties
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-19090
decide to opt out FIFA’s jurisdiction in favour of (i) civil courts (cf., art. 22, par. 1, caput);
and/or (ii) a NDRC that has been officially recognised by FIFA. This choice of forum can be
added to the specific contract and/or to a validly negotiated CBA.
45. The Chamber found furthermore noteworthy that “the FT reviews jurisdiction clauses on a
case-by-case basis and only when one of the parties challenges the competence of the FT,
invoking the relevant clause” (cf., Commentary on the Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players), 2023 edition, p. 446-7).
46. Based on the above, the Chamber proceeded to analyse whether the parties had validly
opted out FIFA’s jurisdiction.
The contract(s) governing the relationship between the parties
47. As a preliminary matter, and in order to identify the relevant jurisdiction clause to be
considered for the purposes of its assessment, the Chamber first found it necessary to
determine the validity of the Alleged Termination Agreement.
48. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Club relied on an Alleged Termination
Agreement dated 9 April 2025 in support of its position that the contractual relationship
between the parties had been amicably brought to an end. Conversely, the Player
contested the authenticity and validity of said document, alleging, inter alia, that the
signature page of an Equipment Receipt he had signed on the same date had been
incorporated into the Alleged Termination Agreement without his knowledge or consent.
49. The Chamber further observed that, although the Club was invited by the FIFA general
secretariat to submit the original version of the Alleged Termination Agreement for
inspection, the Club did not provide said alleged document or any documentary evidence
capable of demonstrating the existence of negotiations between the parties preceding the
alleged execution of said agreement, nor any proof of payment of the outstanding
remuneration or of any settlement amount that would reasonably be expected in the
context of a mutual termination of the Contract.
50. In addition, the Chamber took into account the chronology of events on file, namely that
the Player issued further default notices to the Club following the alleged date of signature
of the Alleged Termination Agreement and ultimately terminated the Contract invoking just
cause on 25 April 2025. In the Chamber’s view, such conduct appeared prima facie
incompatible with the existence of an amicable settlement between the parties.
51. Bearing in mind that it is for the party relying on a given document to establish its
authenticity and legal effects, and considering in particular FIFA’s limited investigatory
powers to determine the genuineness of handwritten elements in the absence of expert
evidence, the Chamber considered that it could not be sufficiently established that a valid
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-19090
mutual termination agreement had been effectively concluded between the parties on 9
April 2025 so as to extinguish or amend the Contract binding them.
The jurisdiction clause
52. The DRC emphasized that the only reasonable conclusion from the above was twofold: (i)
the Contract did contain a jurisdiction clause; and (ii) such clause, which was neither
revoked nor amended by the Alleged Termination Agreement. Consequently, the
jurisdiction clause remained fully valid and governed the present assessment.
53. In view of the above, the Chamber proceeded to examine whether clause 18 of the Contract
constituted a valid agreement capable of derogating from FIFA’s jurisdiction. In this respect,
the Chamber recalled that this provision established as follows (quoted verbatim):
“1. In order to settle all issues related to the interpretation of this contract, its execution,
validity or force, or related to any of its clauses, and for all other issues arising therefrom, the
parties agree to submit their respective assessment to the Arbitration Committee constituted
under the terms of Law 54/2017 of 14 July for Football Professionals.
2. In the event of the absence of a decision under the terms of the previous clause, the parties
agree to submit the respective assessment to the Labour Court of Lisbon, with express waiver
of any other.
[…]”
54. The Chamber observed that this clause provided for a two-tier dispute resolution
mechanism, pursuant to which any disputes arising from the Contract were to be
submitted, in the first instance, to the Arbitration Committee constituted under the terms
of Law 54/2017 of 14 July for Football Professionals and, failing a decision from that body,
to the Labour Court of Lisbon, with express waiver of any other jurisdiction.
55. At the outset, the Chamber concurred with the Player’s argument that the clause does not
designate a single exclusive national body as the sole forum. Nonetheless, the majority of
its members also considered that (i) the competence of the Arbitration Committee to hear
employment-related matters exists without prejudice to the parties’ right to seek redress
before national civil courts; and (ii) in any event, the language of clause 18 is sufficiently
clear to reflect the parties’ intention to submit their disputes to national mechanisms.
56. In the present matter, and irrespective of the initial reference to the Arbitration Committee,
the majority of the Chamber was satisfied that the parties had unequivocally exercised
their right to submit employment-related disputes to national authorities. In fact, the
Chamber emphasized that jurisdiction clauses providing for recourse to ordinary courts
must be examined with particular caution, taking into account the structure and hierarchy
of forums established under art. 22 par. 1 of the Regulations.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-19090
57. Accordingly, the majority of the Chamber held that the wording of clause 18 of the Contract
unmistakably demonstrated the parties’ intention to refer any disputes arising from the
Contract to national deciding bodies in Portugal, thereby excluding FIFA’s jurisdiction.
58. The same majority of the Chamber also stressed that the express waiver of “any other”
jurisdiction, coupled with the subsidiary competence of the Labour Court of Lisbon,
confirmed that the parties agreed to ensure the resolution of any disputes at national level.
In light of such a clear and deliberate choice of forum, the Chamber saw no grounds to
disregard the parties’ agreement.
59. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber, by majority, concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the Player’s claim.
Costs
60. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
61. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
62. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-19090
IV.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Mayowa
Akinola Olaofe.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-19090
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 13