Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-18737
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 19 February 2026
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Brian
Kibambe Cipenga
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Dana MOHAMED AL-NOAIMI (Qatar), Member
Khadija TIMERA (Senegal), Member
CLAIMANT:
Futebol Clube Paços de Ferreira, SDUQ, LDA, Portugal
FIRST RESPONDENT:
Brian Kibambe Cipenga, Congo DR
Represented by João Filipe Lobão
SECOND RESPONDENT:
C.D. Castellón SAD, Spain
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-18737
I. Facts of the case
1.
The parties involved in the dispute are the following:
•
The Portuguese club, Futebol Clube Paços de Ferreira, SDUQ, LDA (hereinafter: the Club
or the Claimant), affiliated to the Portuguese Football Federation (FPF) and competing
in the Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Professional (hereinafter: the Portuguese League);
•
The Congolese player, Brian Kibambe Cipenga (hereinafter: the Player or the First
Respondent); and
•
The Spanish club, C.D. Castellón S.A.D. (hereinafter: the New Club or the Second
Respondent), affiliated to the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF).
2.
The Player and the New Club are hereinafter jointly referred to as the Respondents.
3.
On 20 June 2023, the Club and the Player concluded an employment contract (hereinafter:
the Contract), valid from 1 July 2023 until 30 June 2025.
4.
Under the Contract, the Player was entitled to receive a net annual remuneration of EUR
27,000 for each of the 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 seasons, payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments of EUR 2,250 each, as follows:
“Second - § 1st - The Club undertakes to pay the Player the total net annual remuneration,
including the corresponding holiday and Christmas allowances, during the 2023/2024
sporting season of €27,000.00 (twenty-seven thousand euros), to be paid in 12 equal and
successive monthly instalments of €2,250.00 (two thousand, two hundred and fifty
euros), the first of which is due on 5th August 2023 and the remaining eleven on the same
day of the following months.
§ 2nd - The Club undertakes to pay the Player, in the 2024/2025 sporting season, the
following net annual global remuneration, including the corresponding holiday and
Christmas allowances, depending on the sporting competition in which the Club
participates:
i. Primeira Liga: a total net annual remuneration of €42,000.00 (forty-two thousand
euros), including the corresponding holiday and Christmas allowances, to be paid in 12
(twelve) equal and successive monthly instalments of €3,500.00 (three thousand five
hundred euros), the first of which is due on 5th August 2024 and the remaining eleven
on the same day of the following months.
ii. Segunda Liga: a total net annual remuneration of €27,000.00 (twenty-seven thousand
euros), to be paid in 12 equal and successive monthly instalments of €2,250.00 (two
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-18737
thousand, two hundred and fifty euros), the first of which is due on 5th August 2024 and
the remaining eleven on the same day of the following months.”
5.
Clauses 13 and 14 of the Contract provided as follows:
“Thirteenth - Cases and situations not provided for in this Contract shall be governed by
the CCT signed between the Professional Football Players' Union and the Portuguese
Professional Football League.
Fourteenth - In order to settle disputes arising between them, the parties agree to submit
the respective resolution to the Judicial or Arbitration Court competent for the purpose.”
6.
On 20 January 2024, the Club seemingly received a transfer offer from the Tunisian club
Esperance Sportive de Tunis for the amount of EUR 200,000 for the services of the Player,
which it did not accept.
7.
On 11 March 2024, the Player and the Club signed a “Payment Agreement” (hereinafter: the
Payment Agreement), pursuant to which the payment of the Player’s February 2024 salary,
originally due on 5 March 2024, was postponed until the end of March 2024.
8.
On 10 April 2024, the Club paid the amount of EUR 2,250 to the Player, corresponding to
the salary for February 2024.
9.
On 13 May 2024, the Player sent a letter to the Club unilaterally terminating the Contract
(hereinafter: the Termination Letter), alleging just cause based on the alleged non-payment
of salaries and invoking Portuguese labour law as well as the applicable Portuguese
Collective Labour Agreement (hereinafter: the Portuguese CBA). In this letter, the Player
claimed that the Club had failed to pay the salaries for March, April, and May 2024 and that
such default had persisted for more than 60 days. A copy of the Termination Letter was
sent to the Portuguese League and the FPF; however, the Club asserted that it only received
its copy by post on 20 May 2024.
10. On 14 May 2024, the Club paid the amount of EUR 2,250 to the Player, corresponding to
the salary for March 2024.
11. On 15 May 2024, the Club paid the amount of EUR 2,250 to the Player, corresponding to
the salary for April 2024.
12. On 16 May 2024, the Joint Arbitration Committee of the Portuguese League (“Comissão
Arbitral Paritária”; hereinafter: the CAP) contacted the Club in relation to the Player’s
termination and requested that it submit any opposing position within a period of seven
days.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-18737
13. Also on 16 May 2024, the Club sent an email to the Player informing him that it had been
notified of the termination through the Portuguese League and the CAP. In this
communication, the Club alleged that (i) the Player had provided written consent to defer
the payment of his February 2024 salary until 31 March 2024, which salary had been paid
on 10 April 2024; and (ii) the salaries for March and April 2024 had been paid on 14 and 15
May 2024, respectively. The Club therefore stated that it had not been in default for a
period exceeding 60 days and requested that the Player report to its facilities on the
following day in order to continue performing under the Contract.
14. On 17 May 2024, the Club seemingly informed the Portuguese League that it had not yet
received a copy of the Termination Letter and provided proof of payment of the relevant
salaries.
15. On 17 May 2024 and 7 June 2024, following the termination, the Club issued public
statements on its official pages, contesting the Player’s absence and the existence of just
cause for the termination.
16. On 31 May 2024, the CAP issued its decision in the Player’s case (hereinafter: the CAP
Decision). The CAP, inter alia, acknowledged that it had not received any response from the
Club and confirmed that the Player had followed the termination procedure set out in the
Portuguese CBA. Accordingly, the CAP confirmed that the Player was no longer registered
with the Club.
17. On 5 July 2024, the Player and the New Club entered into a new employment contract, valid
as from 30 June 2024 until the end of the 2024/2025 season. Under this contract, the Player
was entitled to:
•
A signing fee of EUR 80,000, payable in 4 instalments of EUR 20,000 in September,
October, November and December 2024; and
•
A fixed remuneration of EUR 40,000, payable in 12 instalments from July 2024 to June
2025.
18. On 6 July 2024, the New Club publicly announced the Player as a new member of its squad.
19. On 8 July 2024, the Club formally notified the New Club, by registered letter and by email,
of the allegedly unlawful termination of the Contract and warned of impending
proceedings before the Football Tribunal. In this communication, the Club asserted that
the Player had terminated the Contract without just cause and indicated that it would seek
relief before FIFA in the following days.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-18737
II. Proceedings before FIFA
20. On 25 March 2025, the Club filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Club
21. The Club alleged that it had fully complied with all its contractual obligations, including the
payment of the Player’s remuneration, and that no salary remained unpaid at the time the
termination became effective.
22. The Club argued that the Player acted in bad faith by invoking false and misleading
allegations of non-payment in order to force a unilateral termination of the Contract.
23. The Club maintained that the Player did not comply with art. 14bis of the FIFA Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations), as he never put the Club
in default in writing nor granted a minimum 15-day deadline to remedy any alleged delay.
24. The Club submitted that the delays in salary payments were neither excessive nor
persistent, and in any event did not reach the severity required under the jurisprudence of
the Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to justify termination with
just cause.
25. The Club argued that, as a consequence of the breach, it suffered significant financial
damage, including:
•
The remaining value of the Contract allegedly amounting to EUR 31,500;
•
The loss of a concrete transfer opportunity of at least EUR 200,000, and realistically EUR
300,000; and
•
The loss of sporting and economic value associated with the Player.
26. The Club asserted that compensation should be calculated in accordance with art. 17 par.
1 of the Regulations, taking into account the remaining contractual value, the Player’s
market value, and the lost transfer revenues, and should amount to at least EUR 400,000.
27. The Club further alleged that the New Club induced the breach of contract or, at a
minimum, failed to rebut the presumption of inducement under art. 17 par. 4 of the
Regulations, as it signed the Player despite public statements and direct notifications
concerning the unlawful termination.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-18737
28. Consequently, the Club claimed that the Player and the New Club were jointly and severally
liable for the payment of compensation, and that sporting sanctions should be imposed on
both Respondents in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 and 4 of the Regulations.
29. The Club submitted the following relief:
“Accordingly, and taking in consideration the provisions of the FIFA Regulations and
applicable law, this CLAIM must be considered admissible and fully accepted, and
consequently:
1) The Football Tribunal must declare that the PLAYER – FIRST RESPONDENT committed
a breach of the FIFA RSTP the moment he terminated the Contract that will expired on 30
June 2025, without just cause.
2) The PLAYER – FIRST RESPONDENT must pay to the CLAIMANT at least EUR 400.000,00
as compensation for breach of contract without just cause, plus 5% interest p.a. as from
20 May 2024 until the date of effective payment.
3) The NEW CLUB – SECOND RESPONDENT must be ordered to be jointly and severally
liable for the payment of the compensation mentioned under point 2) above.
4) The PLAYER – FIRST RESPONDENT must be sanctioned with a restriction of at least four
months on his eligibility to play in official matches.
5) NEW CLUB – SECOND RESPONDENT shall be banned from registering any new players,
either nationally or internationally, for at least, two entire and consecutive registrations
periods.
6) The total costs of the proceedings must be paid by the RESPONDENTS.”
b. Reply of the Player
30. On 7 May 2025, the Player submitted his reply to the claim.
Jurisdiction
31. The Player contested the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal, arguing that the parties had
expressly agreed, in the Contract, to submit any disputes arising from the contractual
relationship to the Portuguese judicial or arbitration courts.
32. The Player submitted that the Contract contained a clear choice of law clause and a
reference to the Portuguese CBA applicable to professional footballers, thereby excluding
the application of Swiss law and the direct applicability of the Regulations to the merits of
the dispute.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-18737
33. The Player argued that, pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract and art. 41 of the
Portuguese Civil Code, the law chosen by the parties – namely Portuguese law – must
prevail and could not be unilaterally disregarded by the Club.
34. The Player further invoked art. 405 of the Portuguese Civil Code, emphasizing the principle
of contractual freedom and autonomy of will in the choice of applicable law.
35. The Player also referred to art. 14bis par. 3 of the Regulations, asserting that valid collective
bargaining agreements at national level may derogate from FIFA principles and must
prevail.
36. The Player further alleged that the Club engaged in forum shopping by bringing the dispute
before FIFA with the intention of circumventing the limitations imposed by Portuguese
labour law.
37. On this basis, the Player requested that the Football Tribunal declare itself incompetent
and refer the parties to the competent Portuguese courts.
Substance
38. Without prejudice to the jurisdictional objection, the Player maintained that the Club had
persistently failed to pay salaries on time throughout the duration of the employment
relationship.
39. The Player submitted a detailed overview of salary payments to demonstrate that every
monthly salary was paid late, with delays ranging from a few days to more than one month.
In this sense, the Player provided a table of salary payments:
N°
Salary Month
Payment Due
Contractual
Date
Salary - Net
Date Payment and Amount Paid
N° Days
Overdue
Amount Due (€)
1
July 2023
05/08/2023
2250
24/07/2023 (1.000€); 24/07/2023
2
2
August 2023
05/09/2023
2250
06/09/2023 (2.250 €)
1
3
September
05/10/2023
2250
12/10/2023 (2.250 €)
7
(1.000€); 07/08/2023 (250 €)
2023
4
October 2023
05/11/2023
2250
15/11/2023 (2.250 €)
10
5
November
05/12/2023
2250
18/12/2023 (2.250 €)
13
05/01/2024
2250
23/01/2024 (2.250 €)
18
05/02/2024
2250
16/02/2024 (2.250 €)
11
2023
6
December
2023
7
January 2024
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-18737
8
February 2024
05/03/2024
2250
10/04/2024 (2.250 €)
37
9
March 2024
05/04/2024
2250
14/05/2024 (1.500 €)
40
10
April 2024
05/05/2024
2250
15/05/2024 (2.250 €)
10
40. In particular, the Player emphasized that:
•
•
•
The February 2024 salary was paid 37 days late;
The March 2024 salary was paid 40 days late and only partially at first; and
The April 2024 salary was paid 10 days late.
41. The Player contended that the March and April 2024 salaries were only paid after he had
already sent the Termination Letter on 13 May 2024 and therefore could not retroactively
cure the Club’s prior breaches.
42. The Player argued that the Club only proceeded with the outstanding payments after being
notified by the Portuguese League of the termination, which, in his view, confirmed the
Club’s prior default.
43. The Player then submitted that he had just cause to terminate the Contract based on
Portuguese law. In particular, he referred to the following provisions:
•
Under art. 394 of the Portuguese Labour Code, the culpable failure to pay remuneration
on time, particularly when repeated, constitutes just cause for termination by the
employee;
•
The Player further relied on Law no. 54/2017, governing employment contracts of
professional athletes in Portugal, which mandates that remuneration be paid monthly
by the fifth day of the following month and establishes the imperative nature of this
obligation;
•
The Player also cited art. 394 par. 5 of the Portuguese Labour Code, according to which
failure to pay wages persisting for more than 60 days is presumed culpable, and art.
394 par. 3 lit. c), which recognizes non-culpable delay as just cause when it undermines
the employment relationship; and
•
The Player further invoked art. 799 of the Portuguese Civil Code, arguing that the Club
bore the burden of rebutting the presumption of fault, which it allegedly failed to do.
44. In support of his position, the Player referred to Portuguese jurisprudence confirming that
persistent salary delays constitute just cause, including a judgment of the Court of Appeal
of Coimbra.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-18737
45. On this basis, the Player maintained that the repeated and chronic salary delays made it
impossible to maintain the employment relationship, thereby justifying termination with
immediate effect.
46. In parallel, the Player challenged the validity of the alleged Payment Agreement relied upon
by the Club in relation to the February 2024 salary, arguing that:
•
His signature was not notarized in person, as required by the Portuguese League / FPF
regulations;
•
The Payment Agreement was not freely and validly executed; and
•
Any agreement deferring salary payments was incompatible with Portuguese labour
law and the protective nature of salary rights.
47. The Player therefore asserted that the Payment Agreement was null and void and could
not justify delayed payment of remuneration.
48. The Player maintained that, having terminated the Contract with just cause, he was not
liable to pay any compensation to the Club.
49. In the alternative and purely subsidiarily, the Player argued that, even if the termination
were considered without just cause, compensation would be strictly limited under
Portuguese law and the Portuguese CBA to the remaining remuneration until the natural
expiry of the Contract, which he calculated at EUR 29,250 (Portuguese CBA; Law no.
54/2017).
50. The Player contested the Club’s alleged loss of a transfer fee, arguing that:
•
The alleged transfer offer was never finalized or accepted;
•
The Player was never informed or consulted;
•
Any alleged transfer opportunity was speculative and non-binding; and
•
Under Portuguese law, only certain and direct damages may be compensated.
51. The Player concluded that any alleged financial loss claimed by the Club was either
unproven, speculative, or self-inflicted as a consequence of the Club’s own repeated
contractual breaches.
52. The Player submitted the following relief:
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-18737
“I. The Chamber hereby and expressly confirms that the Football Tribunal has no
jurisdiction to decide on the present matter and consequently closes the present
procedure.
Subsidiarily, and without prejudice of the above;
In the unlikely event (which is disputed and would be challenged) that this Chamber
declares that the FIFA Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to solve the present dispute, the
Respondent hereby requests the Dispute Resolution Chamber to recognize that:
II. The Chamber recognizes that the FIFA Regulations are not applicable to the merits of
the case and, consequently, Portuguese law shall govern the present proceedings
III. The Claim presented by the Claimant is unproven, unfounded and therefore shall be
dismissed;
Hence,
IV. The Dispute Resolution Chamber shall declare that the Player had valid reasons to
terminate the contract with just cause due to Claimant’s fault.”
c. Reply of the New Club
53. Also on 7 May 2025, the New Club submitted its reply to the claim.
Jurisdiction
54. The New Club also challenged the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal, arguing that the
underlying dispute stemmed from the termination of the Contract between the Player and
the Club.
55. The New Club submitted that the employment contract between the Club and the Player
expressly referred disputes to the Portuguese CBA, which did not confer jurisdiction on
FIFA bodies.
56. Consequently, the New Club argued that FIFA regulations, including the Regulations, were
not applicable to the merits of the dispute.
57. In the alternative, should the Football Tribunal declare itself competent, the New Club
accepted that FIFA regulations and Swiss law would apply only subsidiarily.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-18737
Substance
58. The New Club categorically denied having induced or encouraged the Player to terminate
his contract with the Club.
59. The New Club submitted that the Club’s allegations of inducement were unsubstantiated,
unsupported by evidence, and failed to meet the burden of proof required under the
Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules).
60. The New Club emphasized that no contact, communication, or negotiation took place
between the New Club and the Player prior to the termination of the Contract (i.e., prior to
20 May 2024).
61. The New Club stressed the importance of the chronological sequence of events, submitting
that negotiations with the Player were initiated only after:
•
The Player had terminated his employment relationship with the Club; and
•
The CAP had issued the CAP Decision confirming the Player’s right to terminate his
contract and declaring him free to sign with other clubs.
62. According to the New Club, this CAP Decision was decisive and certified that the Player was
no longer contractually bound to the Club at the time negotiations commenced.
63. The New Club further alleged that the Club was aware of the CAP Decision but failed to
disclose it in its statement of claim.
64. The New Club submitted that the Player’s employment contract with the New Club was
signed on 5 July 2024, following negotiations conducted in the days immediately prior to
that date.
65. The New Club argued that it would never negotiate with a player under a valid employment
contract, and that negotiations were initiated only after the Player’s agent confirmed, based
on the CAP Decision, that the Player was free to negotiate.
66. The New Club concluded that, in the absence of any evidence of inducement, it could not
be held jointly and severally liable for any compensation allegedly owed by the Player.
67. The New Club further submitted that no sporting sanctions could be imposed on it under
art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, as the legal and factual requirements for such sanctions
were not met.
68. Accordingly, the New Club requested that the claim against it be fully dismissed, both with
respect to financial liability and sporting sanctions.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-18737
d. Replica of the Club
69. On 13 August 2025, the Club submitted its replica.
Jurisdiction
70. The Club reaffirmed that the Football Tribunal, and in particular the Dispute Resolution
Chamber, had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
71. The Club relied on art. 22 and 23 of the Regulations and art. 2 and 23 of the Procedural
Rules, arguing that the dispute was an employment‑related dispute of an international
dimension involving a Portuguese club, a Congolese player, and a Spanish club.
72. The Club contended that the Contract did not contain a clear and specific jurisdiction clause
excluding FIFA’s competence, as the contractual reference to “Judicial or Arbitration Court
competent for the purpose” was generic and did not designate any independent national
arbitration tribunal meeting FIFA requirements.
73. The Club emphasized that the dispute acquired an international dimension upon the
issuance of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) and the Player’s registration with the
New Club, thereby triggering FIFA’s jurisdiction.
74. In support, the Club referred to Football Tribunal and CAS jurisprudence, in which FIFA’s
jurisdiction was confirmed once an ITC was issued and a new club from another association
became involved.
75. The Club rejected the Player’s and the New Club’s argument that Portuguese law and the
Portuguese CBA should prevail over FIFA regulations.
76. The Club argued that, according to well-established Football Tribunal and CAS
jurisprudence, FIFA regulations prevail in disputes brought before FIFA bodies, in order to
ensure uniform criteria for contractual stability and avoid divergent outcomes based on
national laws.
77. The Club maintained that the termination of an employment contract in international
football must be assessed primarily under the Regulations, complemented by general
principles of law and consistent jurisprudence, rather than exclusively under national
labour law.
Substance
78. As to the substance, the Club reiterated that the Player terminated the Contract without
just cause, disputing the Player’s allegations of persistent non-payment of salaries.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-18737
79. The Club reiterated that the Player’s termination did not satisfy the requirements for just
cause under either the Regulations or Portuguese labour law. The Club relied on CAS
jurisprudence applying Swiss law principles, emphasizing that just cause is an exceptional
measure and requires a breach of sufficient severity, which was absent in the present case.
80. The Club further contested the Respondents’ reliance on the CAP Decision. In this respect,
the Club argued that the CAP decision merely validated the Player’s termination for
sporting registration purposes, allowing the Player to be registered with another club, but
did not confirm the existence of just cause for the termination.
81. According to the Club, the CAP explicitly stated that the existence of just cause could still
be discussed, and therefore the decision had no bearing on FIFA’s assessment of
contractual breach and compensation.
82. In continuation, the Club maintained that, pursuant to art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the
New Club’s liability was inseparably linked to the Player’s breach of contract.
83. The Club further recalled Football Tribunal and CAS jurisprudence confirming that the joint
and several liability of the new club is triggered once the Player is found liable to pay
compensation, irrespective of whether inducement is proven. The Club argued that the
New Club was aware, or should have been aware, of the contentious nature of the Player’s
termination, particularly in light of:
•
The Club’s public statements of 17 May and 7 June 2024; and
•
The formal notifications sent to the New Club on 8 July 2024.
84. The Club emphasized that the New Club never responded to these warnings and
nevertheless proceeded with the registration of the Player.
85. In fact, the Club alleged that the Player terminated the contract primarily for financial
reasons, as the remuneration offered by the New Club was significantly higher than that
under the Contract with the Club.
86. The Club submitted that the Player’s new contract provided for a total remuneration of EUR
240,000, including a signing-on fee and substantially higher annual salaries than those
foreseen under the terminated contract.
87. The Club argued that these financial elements confirmed that the termination was
opportunistic and not motivated by any serious contractual breach by the Club.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-18737
88. Finally, the Club maintained that FIFA should order the payment of compensation in
accordance with art. 17 of the Regulations, taking into account the remaining contractual
value and the remuneration earned by the Player under the new contract.
e. Duplica of the Player
89. On 20 August 2025, the Player submitted his duplica in this matter.
Jurisdiction and admissibility
90. The Player reiterated his objection to the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal, maintaining
that the Contract expressly subjected the parties’ relationship to Portuguese law and the
applicable Portuguese CBA. He argued that this choice of law was binding under the
principles of freedom of contract and autonomy of will, as reflected in Portuguese private
international law, and could not be unilaterally displaced by the Club through the initiation
of proceedings before FIFA.
91. The Player further submitted that art. 14bis par. 3 of the Regulations expressly allowed
collective bargaining agreements negotiated at national level to prevail over FIFA principles,
thereby reinforcing the primacy of Portuguese law in the present dispute.
92. According to the Player, by filing the claim before FIFA, the Club engaged in forum
shopping, seeking to circumvent the legal framework freely chosen by the parties and the
limitations imposed by Portuguese labour law. Consequently, the Player maintained that
the Football Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and that the dispute should be adjudicated by the
Portuguese judicial courts, particularly those of the district where the employment
relationship was performed.
Substance
93. Without prejudice to his jurisdictional objection, the Player reaffirmed that the Club had
persistently and systematically failed to pay his salaries on time throughout the entire
duration of the employment relationship. He submitted a detailed overview of payments
demonstrating that every monthly salary was paid late, with delays ranging from a few days
to approximately forty days, including the final months preceding termination.
94. The Player emphasized that the March and April 2024 salaries were paid only on 14 and 15
May 2024, respectively, i.e. after he had sent the Termination Letter on 13 May 2024. He
argued that such post‑termination payments could not retroactively remedy the Club’s
prior breaches or eliminate the just cause that existed at the time of termination. According
to the Player, the Club only proceeded with these payments after being notified by the
Portuguese League of the termination, in an attempt to conceal its non‑compliance.
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-18737
95. The Player maintained that, under art. 394 of the Portuguese Labour Code, Law no.
54/2017 governing professional athletes, and the applicable Portuguese CBA, the repeated
failure to pay remuneration on time constituted a serious and culpable breach of the
employer’s fundamental obligations. He argued that Portuguese jurisprudence
consistently recognized that persistent salary delays, even where individual delays did not
exceed sixty days, undermined the relationship of trust and justified immediate
termination with just cause.
96. The Player further contended that the Club failed to rebut the legal presumption of
culpability associated with late payment of wages and did not provide any objective
justification for the repeated delays. He submitted that the chronic nature of the breaches
rendered it impossible to maintain the employment relationship, thereby entitling him to
terminate the contract with immediate effect and without prior notice.
97. In support of his position, the Player relied on CAS jurisprudence, which confirmed that
material, repetitive and persistent late payment of salaries could amount to just cause for
unilateral termination by a player, and clarified that earlier restrictive approaches had been
superseded.
98. In conclusion, the Player maintained that the termination of the employment contract was
lawful and based on just cause, that no compensation was due to the Club, and that the
claim should therefore be entirely dismissed.
f. Duplica of the New Club
99. On the same day, i.e., 20 August 2025, the New Club also submitted its duplica in this
matter.
Jurisdiction
100. The New Club reiterated all arguments previously raised in its response to the claim and
clarified that its duplica was limited to addressing the Club’s rejoinder. It maintained its
objection to the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal, aligning itself with the Player’s position
and reaffirming that the Contract between the Player and the Club referred disputes to the
Portuguese CBA, which conferred jurisdiction on the CAP.
101. The New Club argued that the contractual framework chosen by the Club and the Player
had already been applied, as the CAP had issued a decision acknowledging the Player’s
termination and sporting disengagement as of 13 May 2024. According to the New Club,
the Club accepted this jurisdiction by incorporating such clauses into the employment
contract and by failing to object in due time before the CAP. Consequently, the New Club
maintained that FIFA lacked competence to adjudicate the dispute.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-18737
Substance
102. On the merits, the New Club firmly denied any inducement of the Player to terminate his
Contract with the Club. It emphasized that it had no contact whatsoever with the Player,
his agent, or any intermediary while the Player was still contractually bound to the Club.
The New Club stressed the clear temporal gap between the Player’s termination notice on
13 May 2024 and the conclusion of the employment contract with the New Club on 5 July
2024, arguing that this chronology excluded any involvement in the termination.
103. The New Club relied heavily on the CAP Decision, asserting that, from the moment of that
decision, the Player was free to sign with any club. It argued that the Club did not challenge
the Player’s sporting disengagement before the CAP and therefore tacitly accepted the
effects of that decision. The New Club further submitted that the CAP Decision cited by the
Club in support of its arguments was outdated and did not reflect the regulatory changes
introduced following the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) “Diarra judgment”,
nor the amendments to art. 17 par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations and FIFA Circular no. 1917
of 23 December 2024.
104. In this regard, the New Club contended that the legal framework governing inducement
and joint liability had fundamentally changed. It argued that the burden of proof now
rested entirely with the Club, who had to demonstrate, based on the individual facts and
circumstances of the case, that the New Club had actively induced the Player to breach his
contract. According to the New Club, the Club failed to discharge this burden.
105. The New Club also dismissed the evidentiary value of the Club’s public statements and
website communications, arguing that they were unilateral, made after the termination
date, and could not establish inducement or liability. It stressed that only a competent
adjudicatory body could determine whether the termination was justified and whether
inducement existed.
106. In conclusion, the New Club maintained that no evidence established any inducement, that
it acted in good faith, and that, under the revised FIFA regulatory framework and applicable
European Union law principles, it could not be held jointly and severally liable for any
compensation, nor be subject to any sporting sanctions. It therefore requested that the
claim against it be dismissed in its entirety.
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-18737
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Jurisdiction and admissibility
107. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 25 March 2025 and submitted for decision on
19 February 2026. Taking into account the wording of arts. 32 and 35 of the January 2026
edition of the Procedural Rules, the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is
applicable to the matter at hand.
108. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) and b) of the
Regulations (July 2025 edition), the Chamber was in principle competent to deal with the
matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between a Congolese player, a Portuguese club, and a Spanish club.
109. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber observed that the Player objected to the
jurisdiction of FIFA, arguing that the Contract expressly subjected the contractual
relationship to Portuguese law and to the Portuguese CBA. According to the Player, the
contractual clauses referring disputes to the competent judicial or arbitration courts,
together with the reference to the Portuguese CBA, excluded FIFA’s jurisdiction and
conferred competence on the Portuguese judicial system and, in particular, on the CAP.
110. The New Club aligned itself with the Player’s position. It submitted that the parties had
contractually agreed to resolve disputes under Portuguese law and within the framework
of the Portuguese CBA, which attributed jurisdiction to the CAP. The New Club further
relied on the CAP Decision, arguing that such decision confirmed the Player’s termination
and sporting disengagement, thereby excluding FIFA’s jurisdiction.
111. Conversely, the Club maintained that the FIFA Football Tribunal, and in particular the DRC,
was competent to adjudicate the present dispute, as it concerned an employment-related
dispute of an international dimension between a Portuguese club, a Congolese player, and
a Spanish club. The Club further argued that the Contract did not contain a clear and
exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a national dispute resolution body and that, once
the Player was registered with a foreign club and an ITC was issued, FIFA’s jurisdiction was
triggered.
112. In this context, the Chamber first recalled that, in accordance with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations, it was competent to hear employment-related disputes between a club and a
player of an international dimension, unless an exception applies.
113. The Chamber further noted that, pursuant to art. 22 para. 1 lit. a) of the Regulations, FIFA
is also competent to hear disputes relating to the maintenance of contractual stability
pg. 18
REF. FPSD-18737
where an ITC has been requested and a claim has been lodged in connection with such
request, including claims for compensation and sporting sanctions.
114. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the present dispute involved:
•
•
a Portuguese club as Claimant;
A player of Congolese nationality as First Respondent; and
•
A Spanish club as Second Respondent, which had registered the Player following the
termination of his employment contract.
115. The Chamber further considered that an ITC was issued in order to allow the Player’s
registration with the New Club. Consequently, the dispute clearly displayed an
international dimension, thereby falling, in principle, within the scope of FIFA’s jurisdiction.
A. THE JURISDICTION CLAUSE
116. The Chamber then turned to the jurisdictional objections raised by the Respondents based
on the wording of the Contract.
117. The Chamber observed that the relevant jurisdiction clause provided, in substance, that
disputes arising between the parties should be submitted to the “competent Judicial or
Arbitration Court competent for the purpose”, while another clause referred to the
applicability of the Portuguese CBA to matters not expressly regulated by the Contract.
118. In the view of the Chamber, such a general reference to competent decision-making bodies
did not suffice to exclude FIFA’s jurisdiction. Rather, the Chamber recalled that a contract
must contain a reasonably clear jurisdiction clause establishing that the parties had
decided to opt-out FIFA’s jurisdiction in favour of another decision-making body.
119. According to the Chamber, in the present case, the contractual wording relied upon by the
Respondents was not sufficiently clear to refer to any alternative jurisdiction – national or
international – nor to exclude the jurisdiction of FIFA. Furthermore, the Chamber
emphasized that the Contract did not refer disputes to the “national” judicial or arbitration
courts either.
120. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the Football Tribunal has jurisdiction over this
matter.
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE CAP DECISION
121. The Chamber then addressed the relevance of the CAP Decision, which had been invoked
by both the Player and the New Club.
pg. 19
REF. FPSD-18737
122. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the CAP Decision acknowledged the Player’s
termination of the Contract and recognized his sporting disengagement, thereby allowing
him to be registered with another club for sporting purposes.
123. However, the CAP Decision expressly limited its assessment to the formal and sporting
effects of the termination, and did not determine whether the termination had occurred
with or without just cause, nor did it rule on any financial consequences arising from the
termination.
124. The Chamber noted that, according to FIFA’s jurisprudence, decisions rendered by national
bodies validating a player’s sporting disengagement do not bind FIFA with respect to the
assessment of contractual breach, just cause, compensation, or sporting sanctions under
the Regulations.
125. Therefore, the CAP Decision did not preclude FIFA’s jurisdiction, nor did it affect the claim’s
admissibility or prevent the Chamber from fully assessing the contractual termination
under the FIFA regulatory framework.
b. Applicable legal framework
126. Having established its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the claim, the Chamber analysed
which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it
confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the
Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
127. The Chamber further noted that, in accordance with art. 3 of the Procedural Rules, whilst
taking into account any relevant national law and CBA, the present dispute must be
assessed primarily under the Regulations. The Chamber further noted that, pursuant to
the DRC’s longstanding practice, FIFA regulations generally prevail over national law chosen
by the parties when deciding disputes brought before FIFA bodies, in order to ensure the
uniform application of the principles of contractual stability within international football.
c. Burden of proof
128. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
d. Merits of the dispute
pg. 20
REF. FPSD-18737
129. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations, it would refer only
to the facts, arguments, and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
130. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerned a claim
for breach of contract brought by a club against a player and his new club.
131. The Club maintained that the Player unilaterally terminated the Contract without just cause
on 13 May 2024. It argued that all salaries due to the Player had been paid and that any
delays were limited, justified, and did not reach the threshold required to justify
termination. The Club further submitted that the Player failed to put the Club in default
and failed to grant a deadline of at least 15 days as required under the Regulations.
Consequently, the Club asserted that the Player breached the contract during the
protected period and was liable to pay compensation.
132. The Player, for his part, argued that he had just cause to terminate the Contract due to the
Club’s persistent and repeated late payment of salaries throughout the entire contractual
relationship. He submitted that all monthly salaries were paid late, including the final
salaries prior to termination, and that such repeated delays undermined the relationship
of trust. The Player relied primarily on Portuguese labour law and, subsidiarily, on FIFA and
CAS jurisprudence, arguing that post termination payments could not cure prior breaches.
133. The New Club denied any responsibility for the termination and submitted that the Player
had terminated his Contract with just cause. In any event, it argued that its liability could
only arise if the Player were found to have terminated the contract without just cause.
134. In this context, the Chamber recognised that its task was to decide on the just cause for
the termination by the Player, as well as the consequences thereof.
135. With the above in mind and as a starting point, the Chamber observed that the following
facts were relevant and remained undisputed between the parties:
•
The Club and the Player concluded the Contract valid from 1 July 2023 until 30
June 2025.
•
Under the Contract, the Player was entitled to receive a net monthly salary of EUR
2,250, payable by the 5th day of the following month.
pg. 21
REF. FPSD-18737
•
In relation to the February 2024 salary, the parties concluded a specific payment
agreement whereby the due date of that salary was deferred to 31 March 2024
(i.e., the Payment Agreement).
•
The Player terminated the Contract by letter dated 13 May 2024, which was
received by the Club on 20 May 2024.
•
The salaries for February, March and April 2024 were paid on 10 April 2024, 14
May 2024, and 15 May 2024, respectively.
•
Throughout the contractual relationship, the Player’s salaries were systematically
paid after their contractual due dates, with delays ranging from a few days to
several weeks.
•
Prior to terminating the Contract, the Player did not send a written notice putting
the Club in default, nor did he grant a specific deadline to remedy the alleged
breaches.
136. The Chamber then recalled that pursuant to art. 14 of the Regulations, a contract may be
terminated by either party without consequences only where there is just cause.
Furthermore, just cause must be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis, and termination of an
employment contract is an exceptional measure, only admissible where the breach is of
such severity that the injured party cannot reasonably be expected to continue the
employment relationship.
137. Similarly, art. 14bis of the Regulations establishes specific requirements in cases of alleged
non‑payment of salaries, namely that a player must put the club in default in writing and
grant a deadline of at least 15 days to comply with its financial obligations, unless
alternative provisions apply.
138. In the present case, the Chamber established that the Player did not comply with the formal
requirements set out in art. 14bis of the Regulations, as he did not grant the Club a written
deadline prior to terminating the Contract.
139. However, the DRC pointed out that the absence of a formal default notice did not
automatically exclude the existence of just cause, particularly where the contractual
breaches invoked were of a repetitive and systematic nature.
140. In this respect, the Chamber observed that it was undisputed that the Club paid the Player’s
salary late on every single occasion during the contractual relationship. In the Chamber’s
view, such conduct went beyond isolated or minor delays and instead constituted a pattern
of recurrent late payments.
pg. 22
REF. FPSD-18737
141. The Chamber further observed that, at the time the Player sent the Termination Letter, the
March and April 2024 salaries had not yet been paid and were only settled after the
Termination Letter had been dispatched – even if the Club had not yet received its physical
copy. Accordingly, the Chamber underscored those post-termination payments could not
retroactively cure a breach that already existed at the time of termination.
142. The Chamber also took into account that the obligation to pay salaries in due time
constituted one of the Club’s most fundamental obligations under the Contract. As such,
the DRC considered that the repeated failure to comply with this obligation was indeed
capable of undermining the mutual trust necessary for the continuation of the
employment relationship.
143. Even if unimpressed by the Player’s decision not to send a further default notice, the
Chamber was still convinced that the cumulative effect of the repeated salary delays was
sufficiently serious to justify the Player’s loss of trust in the Club. In other words, the
Chamber concluded that the systematic nature of the late payments could reasonably
justify the termination, in that the Club had persistently failed to comply with its contractual
obligations over a prolonged period of time and therefore could not benefit from its own
shortcomings.
144. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the Player terminated the Contract on 13 May
2024 with just cause (cf., art. 14 of the Regulations). As a result, the Chamber concluded
that the Club’s claim was to be rejected.
e. Costs
145. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
146. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
147. Lastly, the Chamber concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief
made by any of the parties.
pg. 23
REF. FPSD-18737
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Futebol Clube Paços
de Ferreira, SDUQ, LDA.
2.
The claim of the Claimant, Futebol Clube Paços de Ferreira, SDUQ, LDA, is rejected.
3.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 24
REF. FPSD-18737
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 25