Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-18397
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 6 November 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
Frank William Ken Matam
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. HENDEL (USA), Deputy Chairperson
Calum BEATTIE (Scotland), Member
Johan VAN GAALEN (South Africa), Member
CLAIMANT:
Frank William Ken Matam, Cameroon
Represented by Gauthier Bouchat
RESPONDENT:
Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh, Vietnam
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-18397
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 15 January 2024, the Vietnamese club, Ho Chi Minh City FC (hereinafter: the Club or the
Respondent) through its purported assistant sporting director allegedly contacted the
Cameroonian player, Frank William Ken Matam (hereinafter: the Player or the Claimant),
enquiring about his interest in joining the club.
2.
On 17 October 2024, the Player signed a representation agreement with two
intermediaries for the purposes of concluding an employment contract in Vietnam.
3.
On 12 December 2024, the a person presenting herself Club’s assistant sporting director
allegedly informed the Player that the Club was prepared to offer him a contract with a
monthly salary of USD 10,000, for a duration of one year and a half.
4.
On 16 December 2024, the Club purportedly made a first offer to the Player, which the
latter declined.
5.
On 17 December 2024, the alleged sporting director sent a further offer (hereinafter: the
Offer) to the Claimant which included inter alia, a salary of USD 10,000 per month, a
provision for accommodation, a round-trip flight ticket and a match win bonus of “around
USD 1,000”, according to club regulations. The Offer was drafted on the Club`s letterhead
and was stamped.
6.
On 18 December 2024, the Player allegedly signed and returned the Offer to the
Respondent.
7.
On 8 January 2025, the Player sent a letter to the Club, informing the latter that the contract
deriving from the Offer was supposed to enter into force on 10 January 2025 – per the
terms of the Offer – and invited the Club to provide him with flight tickets in order to travel
to Vietnam.
8.
On 9 January 2025, the Club replied, stating that it had never issued any offer to the Player
and that the Offer he referred to was “fake”.
9.
On the same day, the Player purportedly contacted the alleged assistant sporting director,
informing the latter that the Club renegued on the Offer. The latter replied, making
reference to the email the Player had sent to the Club the day prior, stating that the Club
would not “succumb to pressure” and that an “offer is not a contract”.
10. As per the terms of the Offer, the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant inter alia
a monthly salary of USD 10,000 and a match win bonus of “around USD 1,000” pursuant to
the Club’s regulations, as well as to provide him accommodation and a one round trip flight
ticket.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-18397
11. On the same day, the Player sent the Club an email, stating that a valid binding contract
existed between the parties pursuant to the Offer. The Player emphasized that the Club,
through its alleged assistant sporting director, had validly remitted the Offer, which the
Player had signed and returned. Furthermore, the Player pointed out that the alleged
assistant sporting director had access to the Club’s rejection email, which was only remitted
to the Club’s representatives (and not to her), thus proving her involvement and access to
the Club’s files. The Player requested the Club to confirm within 72 hours whether or not it
was at all interested in pursuing with the employment relationship following the Offer,
failing which he would lodge a claim before FIFA.
12. On 12 January 2025, the Player notified the Club of his intention to terminate the
employment relationship with just cause, as the former failed to communicate any
intention to honour the terms of the Offer.
13. On 13 January 2025, the Club replied to the Player, stating that the Offer to which the Player
referred was forged with the use of a graphic design software. Furthermore, the Club
pointed out that the Player had been communicating with someone who was not
authorized by the Club, and that the individuals negotiating the Offer with the Player were
“not the people of Ho Chi Minh City Football Club”.
14. On 27 January 2025, the Player signed an employment contract with the Algerian club
USMK, valid as from the date of signature until 30 January 2027 and with a monthly salary
of DZD 1,300,000.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
15. On 28 February 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
16. In his claim, the Player argued that the Club failed to comply with the terms of the alleged
contract, given rise to by the Offer, and requested compensation for termination of
contract without just cause.
17. The Player emphasised that the Club had made the Offer validly through the assistant
sporting director, and that her involvement in the negotiations as a representative of the
Club was corroborated by the fact that she was in possession of the Player’s letter sent to
the Club on 9 January 2025. Said letter was, in fact, only communicated to the Club via its
official email addresses.
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-18397
18. Having set out that the Offer was validly communicated, the Player argued that it contained
all essentialia negotii, thus giving rise to a valid and binding employment contract. In
particular, the Player asserted that the Offer indicated the parties’ respective roles, the
duration, the remuneration and the nature of the contract as an employment relationship.
19. The Player also emphasised that he communicated the agreement to the proposed terms
on 18 December 2024, to the Club’s assistant sporting director, thus affirming his intention
to be legally bound to the Club.
20. All in all, the Player argued that a valid and binding contract was in place, which the Club
renegued on without a valid justification.
21. As a result, the Player argued that the Club’s rejection of the contract’s existence
constitutes a breach of contract without just cause, giving rise to liability for compensation.
22. The Player thus formulated the following request for relief, quoted verbatim:
“A titre principal
1.Déclarer que le Joueur et le Club ont valablement conclu le Contrat;
2.Déclarer que le Club a résilié le Contrat sans juste cause et pendant la période protégée;
3.Condamner le Club à payer au Joueur la somme nette de 120.000 USD à titre d’indemnité de
rupture sans juste cause, plus un intérêt de 5% par an à compter de la date de rupture jusqu’à
la date de paiement effectif;
A titre subsidiaire
4.Condamner le Club à payer au Joueur la somme nette de 20.000 USD, plus un intérêt de 5%
par an à compter de la date de faute jusqu’à la date de paiement effectif, sur base du principe
de la culpa in contrahendo;
En tout état de cause
5.Condamner le Club à une interdiction d’enregistrer de nouveaux joueurs jusqu’à paiement
complet des sommes susmentionnées. ”
Freely translated into English
"Principal
1. Declare that the player and the club have validly entered into the contract;
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-18397
2. Declare that the Club terminated the contract without good cause and during the protected
period;
3. Order the club to pay the player the net sum of USD 120,000 as a termination fee without just
cause, plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of termination until the date of
effective payment;
Subsidiarily
4. Order the Club to pay the player the net sum of USD 20,000, plus interest at the rate of 5%
per annum from the date of the misconduct until the date of actual payment, based on the
principle of culpa in contrahendo;
In any case
5. Condemn the Club to a ban on registering new players until the above sums have been paid
in full. "
b. Position of the Respondent
23. In its reply, the Club acknowledged that it was contacted by the agents of the Player which
were mandated by the latter on 17 October 2024.
24. The Club outlined that, after discussing with the representatives of the Player, it had
informed them that it was not interested in the Player’s services and broke off contact with
the agents thereon after. The Club wished to stress that it did not acknowledge that the
individual described as the Club’s assistant sporting director was in any way affiliated to
the Club and only pretended to hold an official position.
25. The Club further denied having ever sent any proposal to the Player, and indicated that the
Offer on file was forged, containing many visible elements that corroborate such assertion.
In particular, the Club’s seal and stamp, as well as its president’s signature, were copypasted using a file editing software.
26. What is more, the Club asserted that the validity of the contract, per the Offer, was subject
to a medical examination, meaning that the Offer – if valid (quod non) was still subject to a
formal employment contract thereafter.
27. Additionally, the Club wished to point out that the alleged acceptance of the Offer was
made also to the purported assistant sporting director, and never to the Club directly,
further supporting its line of argument that there was never a “meeting of the minds”
between the Player and the Club.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-18397
28. As to the obtention of the Player’s letter dated 8 January 2025 by the alleged assistant
sporting director, the Club highlighted that it had, upon receipt thereof, forwarded the
email to the intermediary of the Player, stating that the Offer was fake. The Club mentioned
that it was possible that this was forwarded to the alleged assistant sporting director by
the intermediary, however, in any event, her possession of the Player’s email did not
demonstrate sufficiently that she was an employee of the Club authorised to issue offers
on its behalf.
29. Moreover, the Club asserted that in the WhatsApp conversations with the alleged assistant
sporting director, her name was saved as “Selma Agent” – pointing towards the likely
conclusion that, rather than being a Club employee, she was an independent agent.
Equally, the Club asserted that the Player failed to conduct any due diligence when being
contacted by the alleged assistant sporting director, to verify her identity. Thus, the Club
firmly maintained that this individual was not affiliated to the Club whatsoever.
30. Lastly, the Club stated that it consistently denied having made the Offer to the Player, even
in the correspondence following the alleged conclusion of a contract, i.e from January 2025
onwards.
31. Consequently, the Club denied that there was a valid and binding contract in place and
requested for the claim to be rejected.
c. Replica of the Claimant
32. In his replica, the Player sustained that the Club’s allegation that the Offer was forged
constituted bad faith. In particular, the Player denied that the logo and stamp were
inconsistent and edited, and that, as the falsification of documents was a strong accusation,
the Club should be held accountable for making such an assertion.
33. As for the involvement of the alleged assistant sporting director, the Player emphasised
that she not only had presented herself within that capacity, but further, had conducted a
video-call with the Player to discuss the terms of a potential employment relationship –
materialising in the Offer – and thereafter (whether directly or through third parties)
communicated the Player’s letter dated 8 January 2025 to such assistant. Therefore, the
Player opined that he met the burden of proving that the individual allegedly acting as the
assistant sporting director was actively involved in the submission of the Offer, thus binding
the Club.
34. Moreover, the Player argued that the conclusion of an ulterior, formal employment
contract was not necessary, and that the passing of a medical examination would in any
event not be prejudicial to the validity of a contract. The Player emphasised that this
position was underscored by the jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal.
35. Ultimately, the Player concluded its submissions by recalling its initial request for relief.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-18397
d. Duplica of the Respondent
36. In its duplica, the Club first argued that the Player failed to substantially challenge the
assertion that the Offer was forged and not issued by the Club. In particular, whilst the Club
highlighted specific inconsistencies and visual defects with the Club’s logo and stamp in the
Offer, the Claimant has not addressed any of these aspects in detail and plainly reiterated
his position that the logo and stamp contained on the document corroborate the Club as
the source of the Offer.
37. Furthermore, the Club pointed out that the evidence submitted by the Player, even in his
replica, is not sufficient to establish that the individual posing as the assistant sporting
director was indeed carrying out this role. The Club emphasised that such individual was
not linked to it at all, and that she appeared to have claimed being associated to the Club.
Moreover, it pointed out that the Player did not adduce any evidence whatsoever of her
being linked to the Club, such as an official mandate, power of attorney, or proof of
employment. The Club once again emphasised the Player’s duty to undertake due diligence
in order to verify if the individual was at all employed by the club or not – quod non.
38. Thus, the Club requested once again that the claim be rejected in its entirety.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-18397
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
39. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 28 February 2025 and submitted for decision
on 6 November 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
40. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake,
which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between
a Cameroonian player and a Vietnamese club.
41. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
42. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
43. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-18397
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
44. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter and took note of the fact that the
parties strongly dispute whether they entered into an employment relationship. On one
hand, the Player asserted that the Offer he received constituted an employment contract,
whereas the Club rejected this position raising that it never extended an offer to the Player
and that the Offer was sent to the Player by a person fraudulently pretending that she was
acting as assistant sporting director of the Club, and that it never contemplated engaging
the Player’s services.
45. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its primary task was to first determine
whether the parties had entered into an employment relationship. If such a relationship
was established, it then had to assess whether the termination occurred with or without
just cause and determine the consequences thereof.
46. In respect of the above, the Chamber recalled the jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal,
which dictates whether or not a purported employment contract (e.g. an offer or precontract) contains the required elements that would create a mutual, legitimate
expectation for the parties to the extent of being equivalent to an employment
relationship.
47. Hereby, the doctrine of essentialia negotii lays down that the four following cumulative and
necessary requirements must be met in order for a contractual instrument to be deemed
an employment contract: (i) Salary, (ii) Duration, (iii) Employment nature – i.e.,
subordination of employer and employee for the rendition of professional football
services -, and (iv) Mutual intention to be legally bound.
48. With this in mind, the Chamber observed that the Offer contained the first three
requirements, but that the fourth remained contested. It then proceeded to analysing the
final element, which is whether the parties exhibited a mutual intention to be legally bound.
49. The Chamber recalled that the jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal typically considers
this to be complied with if both parties’ signatures are on the document at the centre of
the dispute, however, where there is a dispute as to either the legitimacy or provenance of
the signatures, or the communication of the acceptance of the relevant offer to the
counterparty, further evidence must be taken into account in order to determine whether
or not there was consent between the parties.
50. In other words, the Chamber considered that it must establish whether (i) the Offer was
validly remitted by the Club, so as to indicate that the latter extended its interest formally
to the Claimant, knowing that, if the Offer was to be accepted, it would be legally bound by
its terms; and (ii) the Offer was, upon such receipt from the Player, signed and validly
returned to the Club to indicate his acceptance of the proposed terms, consummating the
employment relationship as a result.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-18397
51. The Chamber deemed both elements cumulatively necessary to indicate that the parties
wished mutually to be legally bound and enter an employment relationship.
52. In this regard, the Chamber deemed moot the issue of whether the Offer was validly
communicated to the Player, as it considered that the Player has failed to meet the burden
of proving that he had formally accepted the Offer and notified the Club thereof through
verifiable channels of communication.
53. In particular, the Chamber noted that the Player argued that he accepted the Offer by
sending a WhatsApp message to the Club’s alleged assistant sporting director; however,
there is no evidence thereof on file. The Chamber observed that transcript of the WhatsApp
conversation with the latter individual is provided entirely out of context and without any
corroboration of such conversation having taken place at the relevant time, nor is there
any proof corroborating the contact details of the Player’s counterparty in the alleged
negotiation (i.e., identifying the alleged assistant sporting director of the Club).
54. Moreover, the Chamber highlighted that no email confirmation or any other
communication informing the Club of the Player’s consent to the purportedly proposed
terms was filed in support of the claim.
55. Indeed, the Chamber observed, that the earliest point at which the Club became aware of
the alleged acceptance of the Offer appeared to be on 8 January 2025 – three weeks after
the supposed remittance of the Offer – when the Player formally warned the Club that he
had not received any information or flight tickets regarding the beginning of the contractual
activity. The Chamber found particularly compelling that immediately thereafter, the Club
denied its involvement in any proposal or negotiation with the Player.
56. On the hypothesis that the Player’s email dated 8 January 2025 would constitute a
notification by the Player of the acceptance of the Offer (quod non), the delay from the first
alleged remittance of the Offer undermined the notion that the Player had indeed formally
accepted the Offer.
57. The Chamber, therefore, deemed that the evidence on file did not suggest the timely
acceptance of the Offer, through valid means of communication, by the Player.
58. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber continued its analysis the remaining elements
that are relevant for establishing a mutual intention to be legally bound.
59. In this respect, the Chamber turned to the communication of the Offer to the Player. The
latter argued that the individual supposedly acting as the assistant sporting director of the
Club had apparent authority for binding the Club with the issuance of the Offer.
60. The Chamber acknowledged the longstanding jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal
according to which players are not expected to be aware of the internal authority
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-18397
distribution of the club they are negotiating with, to the extent that an actual representative
of the club making an offer is capable of binding said club. Nonetheless, the Chamber
recalled that the above-referenced jurisprudence does not exempt a player from
demonstrating that an individual making a proposal on behalf of a club is at least employed
by said club or authorised to negotiate on its behalf. In other words, a mere assertion that
an individual is negotiating in an official capacity on behalf of a club, without any
corroborating evidence – such as an email address associated to the club, a written
mandate, a power of attorney, or correspondence proving that the club had hired the
services of such individual, does not automatically mean that said individual is linked to the
club at all, let alone in a position to extend contractual offers.
61. The Chamber observed that in the present case, the Club consistently held its line of
reasoning that it was entirely unrelated, and not aware of, the individual alleging that she
was assistant sporting director. In other words, the Club has denied any link whatsoever to
this individual, whether in relation to the present negotiation or otherwise.
62. Based on the above, the Chamber deemed that the Player bore the burden of proving
otherwise – namely that the individual in question was indeed employed by, or at all linked
to the club.
63. In this respect, the Chamber highlighted that the only link the Player had invoked regarding
this alleged relationship was that the supposed assistant sporting director was in
possession of the email sent by the Player to the Club on 8 January 2025.
64. However, the Chamber determined that this element alone did not lead to the conclusion
that the supposed assistant sporting director was indeed authorized to act on behalf of the
Club.
65. Indeed, even disregarding the lack of any identifying elements in the correspondence
exchanged – which already undermines the credibility of any argument that she was indeed
the assistant sporting director –, the Chamber highlighted that the way in which the
individual became in possession of the Player’s email is uncertain. The Chamber noted that
in light of the Club’s argument that it had forwarded this email to the authorised
intermediaries of the Player – for which a formal mandate is on file – the chain of
possession of said email remained uncertain, which further undermined the probative
value of the evidence submitted in this regard by the Player.
66. After careful consideration of the documents and submissions on file, the Chamber
concluded that it could not establish to its comfortable satisfaction that the Player both
validly received, and accepted the Offer, and that both parties had a mutual intention to
be legally bound by the parties by virtue of the issuance and acceptance of the Offer.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-18397
67. Considering the above, the Chamber determined that the Offer did not contain the
essentialia negotii in the case at hand, and that no valid and binding employment contract
was concluded between the parties.
68. Consequently, in absence of a valid and binding employment contract between the parties,
the Chamber decided to reject entirely the claim of the Player.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-18397
d. Costs
69. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
70. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
71. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-18397
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Frank William Ken Matam, is rejected
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-18397
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 16