Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-18153
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 6 November 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Matehus
Izidorio Leoni
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. HENDEL (USA & France), Deputy Chairperson
Calum BEATTIE (Scotland), Member
Johan VAN GAALEN (South Africa), Member
CLAIMANT:
Matehus Izidorio Leoni, Brazil
Represented by Pedro Macieirinha
RESPONDENT:
Nyiregyhaza Spartacus Football Club Szolgaltato KFT., Hungary
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-18153
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 29 July 2024, the Brazilian player Matheus Izidorio Leon (hereinafter: Claimant or player)
and the Hungarian club Nyiregyhaza Spartacus Football Club Szolgaltato KFT (hereinafter:
Respondent or club) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: contract) valid as from
30 July 2024 until 30 June 2025.
2.
According to the section “Personal Conditions” of the Contract, the Respondent undertook
to pay the Claimant a net remuneration of “HUF 2,730,000 / EUR 7,000” per month, on the
10th day of each respective month.
3.
Pursuant to Section II of the Contract, (“General Conditions, Methods and Rules of Work
and Rights and Obligations of the Parties”) the following was stipulated (quoted verbatim):
“[…] [the Claimant] will make all efforts to keep and improve the professional level of
himself/herself and of the football teams managed by the employer, as well as to keep and
improve the recognition of the employer by the professional sports public, by the fans and by
the press.[…]
The employee’s obligations are the following:
a) to take part in team or individual trainings, preparations, training camps, matches organised
by the employer and assigned for him/her, as well as to participate in other events, programs
determined by the employer, to subject himself/herself to trainings and other occupations,
individual or group physical fitness programs defined by the professional staff of the Employer,
to execute the instructions of the professional management relating to his/her sports activities
with the condition that ordering of individual trainings are only allowed in cases and to the extent
which are justified from sports professional and/or from medical point of view. […]
In order to be included in the first team of the Employer, or to remain in it, to always perform to
the best of his/her abilities at trainings and matches in any teams determined by the professional
management of the employer or individually and also at the mandatory trainings determined
for him/her, to maintain himself/herself in the best condition and to have a healthy and other
lifestyle which contributes to giving the best performance according to his/her abilities at the
trainings and matches. […]
The professional management or the management of the Employer may determine in his/her
sole discretion what team – or in line with the content of [abovementioned] point – individually,
or otherwise shall the Employee perform his/her training work, or in matches of what team
he/she is obliged to participate.”
4.
Furthermore, the Contract foresaw, under its clause 47, the following clause with respect
to jurisdiction over disputes (quoted verbatim):
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REF. FPSD-18153
“The Parties agree that they shall make efforts to settle their dispute in amicable way by
negotiations. If these efforts fail – in cases determined by the rules of MLSZ and FIFA – the Parties
may turn to the organisational units with MLSZ or FIFA scope of authority, in case of labour
dispute to the Administrative and Labour Court having competence and scope of authority, and
in all other disputes arising out of their legal relationship the parties stipulate the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sports Standing Arbitration Court based on the Article 47 of the Sports Law.
[…]”
5.
At an unspecified date in December 2024, the Respondent allegedly called the Claimant via
telephone, proposing a premature termination of the Contract in exchange for two
monthly salaries as compensation.
6.
On 19 December 2024, the Claimant sent an email to the Respondent, stating that he was
not prepared to accept the Respondent’s “offer” to prematurely terminate the Contract in
exchange for two monthly salaries. Instead, the Claimant offered as a solution for a
potential mutual termination agreement the following terms (quoted verbatim):
-
“13 months salary (6 months from season 2024/2025 (January /June) + 7 months
season 2025/2026)
If club stays in NB+ club can save 5 months salary from my contract (35k euros)
40% of previously bonuses won at league til now”.
7.
At an unspecified date, the Respondent allegedly declined the Claimant’s offer for
premature mutual termination.
8.
As from 3 January 2025, the Claimant was allegedly excluded from the Respondent’s
collective training sessions.
9.
At unspecified dates, the Claimant allegedly reached out to the Respondent’s staff
regarding his involvement in the training sessions via the messaging application,
WhatsApp. In reply thereto, the Respondent’s staff allegedly informed him that he would
be training alone with the club’s fitness coach.
10. At another unspecified date, the Claimant allegedly was informed that he would be
receiving another car than previously provided.
11. On 5 January 2025, the Claimant sent the Respondent a letter, stating he wished to be
reintegrated into the squad, as he had been forced to train alone. The Claimant requested
to be reintegrated into training and official matches, alongside the rest of the team, within
15 days, failing which, he would terminate the Contract unilaterally and lodge a claim
before FIFA.
12. On 10 January 2025, the Respondent replied to the Claimant, stating that the player would
be training and playing with the club’s second team indefinitely, and that he would be
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REF. FPSD-18153
included in the first team trainings and matches as deemed appropriate at the head coach’s
discretion, pursuant to the rights outlined in the Contract. As the second team was only
commencing training on 13 January 2025, the Respondent was unable to integrate him into
their collective training sessions.
13. On 11 January 2025, the Claimant replied to the Respondent’s latest correspondence,
reiterating his previous request and stating that the Respondent, by demoting the Claimant
to the second team, is unilaterally and substantially altering the terms of the Contract and
thereby forcing him to terminate the Contract prematurely, in contravention of art. 14 of
the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. Therefore, the Claimant
requested to be reintegrated into the squad within 9 days, failing which he would
unilaterally terminate the Contract and lodge a claim before FIFA.
14. On 24 January 2025, the Claimant unilaterally terminated the Contract.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
15. On 7 February 2025, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
16. The Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA and requested
compensation for breach of contract.
17. In his claim, the player argued that the Respondent breached the terms of the Contract by
forcing him to train alone, and by demoting him to the second squad, although he had been
initially hired to perform professional football services for the first team.
18. The Claimant argued that he consistently carried out his obligations in good faith and
continued to fully comply with the individual training plan provided for him, whilst seeking
an amicable resolution of the situation.
19. The Claimant emphasised that he had repeatedly voiced his discontent with the
Respondent’s approach and with his exclusion from the squad to no avail, as the
Respondent had confirmed in writing that it was within its rights to demote the player to
the second squad at the head coach’s discretion.
20. Basing himself on the jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal and CAS, the Claimant
affirmed that the exclusion from training and demotion (until further notice) from the first
team to the second team, constituted a breach of contract capable of giving rise to liability
for compensation.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-18153
21. As a result, the Claimant asserted that he had a just cause to terminate the Contract
prematurely, with the threshold of ultima ratio having been met.
22. As for the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal, the Claimant pre-emptively addressed the
fact that the clause contained in art. 47 of the Contract has been the subject of debate in
the jurisprudence and, relying upon an award rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(hereinafter: “CAS”), affirmed that the jurisdiction clause under art. 47 of the Contract was
not sufficiently clear in order to deviate from FIFA’s competence.
23. Lastly, as for the compensation for breach of contract, the Claimant emphasised that, as the
Claimant was unlikely, at the time of termination, to be relegated, pursuant to the
Respondent’s standing in the first division at the time.
24. Therefore, the Claimant’s requests for relief were the following (quoted verbatim):
“The Claim shall be accepted
The Dispute Resolution Chamber shall declare that the Claimant had terminated the
employment contract with the Respondent with just cause pursuant to the article 14bis of the
FIFA RSTP.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber shall declare that FIFA has jurisdiction to settle the present
dispute.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber shall condemn the Respondent to pay the Claimant:
•
•
•
5.600,00 EUR regarding 24 days of work in January 2025 as remuneration;
36.400,00 EUR as compensation for the termination of the employment contract with
just cause regarding the Sporting season of 2024/2025;
84.000,00 EUR as compensation for the termination of the employment contract with
just cause regarding the Sporting season of 2025/2026;
TOTAL DUE = 126.000,00 EUR plus interest at 5% rate since 24/01/2025 until effective payment.
All according to the employment contract signed by the parties, the FIFA Statues and regulations,
as well as the specificity of sport, and the Swiss Law under penalty of imposition of disciplinary
measures to the Respondent if the above obligation is not observed.”
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-18153
b. Position of the Respondent
25. The Respondent failed to provide its submission within the time limit granted by the FIFA
administration; whereas the deadline to submit its reply was set on 3 March 2025, the
Respondent only replied to the claim on 2 April 2025.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-18153
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
26. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 7 February 2025 and submitted for decision
on 6 November 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
27. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is – in principle – competent to deal with the
matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between a Brazilian player and a Hungarian club.
28. Nevertheless, the Chamber noted, as raised by the Claimant himself, that art. 47 of the
Contract has indeed been the subject of discussion in several decisions rendered by this
Chamber, CAS, and the Swiss Federal Tribunal (hereinafter: the “SFT”). Thus, the Chamber
began by recalling the wording of art. 47 of the Contract (quoted verbatim):
“The Parties agree that they shall make efforts to settle their dispute in amicable way by
negotiations. If these efforts fail – in cases determined by the rules of MLSZ and FIFA – the Parties
may turn to the organisational units with MLSZ or FIFA scope of authority, in case of labour
dispute to the Administrative and Labour Court having competence and scope of authority, and
in all other disputes arising out of their legal relationship the parties stipulate the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sports Standing Arbitration Court based on the Article 47 of the Sports Law.
[…]”
29. Subsequently, the Chamber acknowledged that the SFT recently reviewed the precise
wording of art. 47 of the Contract (then art. 49 of the relevant employment agreement), in
the context of an appeal against the same CAS award that the Claimant relied upon in his
claim, CAS 2023/A/9363. 1
30. Following 4 previous decisions in which the SFT also analysed the very contractual clause
before this Chamber, the SFT’s most recent decision held that the above-cited clause
1 4A_92/2025 of 4 July 2025.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-18153
established an exclusive, and not merely alternative, jurisdiction of the Hungarian state
courts for labour disputes, thus excluding FIFA and CAS jurisdiction.2
31. As such, the majority of Chamber emphasised that, irrespective of the arguments raised
by the Claimant in this regard, the interpretation of the relevant clause – art. 47 of the
Contract – has already been repeatedly and conclusively addressed by the SFT. Considering
the position occupied by the SFT within the governing legal hierarchy, and the apparent
absence of any materially different circumstances in this case, the majority of the Chamber
determined it was not at liberty to adopt a divergent approach in this matter.
32. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber, by majority, concluded that it did not
have jurisdiction over the player’s claim.
b. Costs
33. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
34. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
35. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
2 4A_64/2025 of 16 June 2025, 4A_460/2024 of 10 March 2025, 4A_430/2023 of 23 February 2024, 4A_2/2023 of 6
October 2023.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-18153
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Matehus
Izidorio Leoni.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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REF. FPSD-18153
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
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396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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