Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-16183
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 10 September 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Kevin
Gnonher Boli
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Alexandra GOMEZ BRUINEWOUD (Uruguay & the Netherlands), Member
Iñigo RIESTRA (Mexico), Member
CLAIMANT:
Esteghlal Khozestan FC, Iran
Represented by Alejandro Pascual Madrid
FIRST RESPONDENT:
Kevin Gnonher Boli, France
SECOND RESPONDENT:
Kheybar Sports Club, Iran
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-16183
I. Facts of the case
1.
The parties to this dispute are:
•
•
•
the Iranian club Esteghlal Khozestan FC (hereinafter: the Claimant);
the French player Kevin Gnonher Boli (hereinafter: the Player or the First
Respondent);
the Iranian club Kheybar Sports Club (hereinafter: the Second Respondent).
2.
Between 16 July 2024 and 19 July 2024, the Claimant and the Player held conversations
through WhatsApp towards obtaining the Player’s personal information and a signed
mandate for the Claimant to issue a Letter of Interest (hereinafter: the Letter of Interest) to
the Player and process his visa.
3.
On 19 July 2024, the Claimant sent the Letter of Interest to the Player through WhatsApp.
4.
The Letter of Interest letterheaded with the name of the Club was drafted as follows
(quoted verbatim):
“LETTER OF INTEREST
Esteghlal Khuzestan FC (club) from the Iran premier league is interested in having
negotiations with Mr Boli Kevn Gnonher with passport number 21AD814.
1. Duration of the contract :lr. Iran football season 2024.2025
2. Total contract fee: 235/000 USD Net.
3. 20% of the contract amount will be paid before the start of the competition and the
rest will be paid to him in 5 equal installments.
4. The club will provide a full furnished apartment for the player.
5. Two round trip tickets for boli and one ticket for his wife.
This offer is only valid if the player passes the medical tests taken by IFMARK in Iran.
This offer is valid until 21 july 2024
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-16183
Finally please note that this offer does not intend to be considered as an employment
contract.”
5.
Also, on 19 July 2024, the Player signed the Letter of Interest and sent it back to the
Claimant through WhatsApp.
6.
On 23 July 2024, the Claimant applied for a visa on behalf of the Player that was granted on
24 July 2024.
7.
On an unspecified date, which according to the Claimant was on 24 July 2024, it announced
the Player on Instagram.
8.
According to the information retrieved from TMS, on 28 July 2024, the Player signed an
employment contract with the Second Respondent.
9.
On 1 August 2024, the Claimant, through its legal representative, sent a warning letter to
the Player (hereinafter: the First Warning Letter). The said letter reads as follows (quoted
verbatim):
“Re: Breach of Employment Contract
Dear Mr. Gnonher,
On behalf of my client, Esteghlal Khuzestan FC (“Club”) (see POA attached) I refer to the
employment agreement signed and between you and the Club dated 19 July 2024
(“Contract”).
In this regard, we found out that you recently arrived at Iran (using the visa issued by the
Club) and you signed another contract with the Iranian club Kheybar Khorramabad FC.
As you may understand, this is a material breach of contract without just cause leading
to the pertinent compensation in favor of the Club.
Thus, we urge you to state your position in this matter urgently and immediately and in
any case within the next 24 hours at the latest. In the contrary, we will take the
appropriate legal measures.”
10. On 4 August 2024, the Claimant, through its legal representative, sent a second warning
letter to the Player (hereinafter: the Second Warning Letter). The said letter reads as follows
(quoted verbatim):
“Re: Breach of Employment Contract
Dear Mr. Gnonher,
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-16183
I refer to my letter of 1 August 2024 which remains unanswered.
In this sense, I insist on the breach of contract you have committed without just cause.
The sports websites1 already indicate that you entered into another agreement with
Kheybar Khorramabad FC, so the breach seems irrefutable.
In any case, we give you a last opportunity to contact us and state your position in this
matter
urgently and immediately and in any case within the next 24 hours, at the latest. In the
contrary, we will take the appropriate legal measures.”
11. On 6 August 2024, the Claimant, through its legal representative, sent a third default notice
to the Player (hereinafter: the Third Warning Letter), this time including the Second
Respondent stating (quoted verbatim):
“Re: Breach of Employment Contract
Dear Sirs,
On behalf of my client, Esteghlal Khuzestan FC (“Esteghlal FC”) (see POA attached) I refer
to the employment agreement signed and between Mr. Boli (“Player”) and Esteghlal FC
dated 19 July 2024 (“Contract”).
In this regard, we noticed that Kheybar Khorramabad FC (“Kheybar FC”) signed another
contract with the Player which clearly constitutes a clear breach of the Contract without
just cause by the Player and Kheybar FC.
In this sense, Kheybar FC clearly induced the Player to such breach as Kheybar FC was
not only perfectly aware of the Player's contractual situation with Esteghlal Khuzestan FC
as Kheybar FC even used the visa issued by Esteghlal FC in order for the Player to enter
Iran but, more importantly, such inducement is considered automatic by FIFA. Thus,
Kheybar FC will be solidarity responsible for any compensation to be paid by the Player
in favor of Esteghlal Khuzestan FC. Additionally, please note that we will also request FIFA
to impose the relevant sporting sanctions over the Player and Kheybar FC
In light of the above, we grant the Player and Kheybar FC a deadline of 2 (two) days in
order to reach a friendly agreement with us and solve this matter amicably. In the
contrary, we will submit this matter to FIFA.”
12. On 12 August 2024, the Claimant, through its legal representative, sent a last warning letter
to the Player (hereinafter: the Fourth Warning Letter) and the Second Respondent stating
(quoted verbatim):
“Re: Breach of Employment Contract
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-16183
Dear Sirs,
I refer to all my previous letters which remain unanswered.
As I mentioned in the said communications, Mr. Boli (“Player”) and Esteghlal Khuzestan
FC (“Club”) signed an employment agreement dated 19 July 2024 (“Contract”), which has
been materially breached by the Player and Kheybar FC.
We already warned the Player and Kheybar FC of the consequences of such breach, where
we will initiate the pertinent legal procedure in FIFA and the Player and Kheybar FC, as
solidarity responsible, will be condemned to pay the relevant compensation in favor of
the Club, plus the relevant sporting sanctions that will be imposed over the Player and
Kheybar FC.
Please note that this is the last warning and if we don’t reach a friendly agreement to
settle this case within the following 2 (two) days, we will submit this matter to FIFA without
further notice.”
13. On 16 August 2024, the Player played 90 minutes with the Second Respondent in a match
against the club Havadar SC.
14. On 23 August 2024, the Player played 90 minutes with the Second Respondent in a match
against the club Sepahan.
15. On 29 August 2024, the Player played 90 minutes with the Second Respondent in a match
against the club Zob Ahan.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
16. On 23 September 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
17. In its claim, the Claimant argued that based on the Letter of Interest, it had a valid and
binding contract which the Player breached when he signed a new contract with the Second
Respondent.
18. The Claimant argued that based on FIFA’s well-established jurisprudence, the Letter of
Interest contains all the essential elements (essentialia negotii) to be considered a valid and
binding contract between the Claimant and the Player.
19. In this particular, the Claimant outlined that the Letter of Interest stipulated:
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-16183
- The duration of the contract for the 2024/2025 season;
- The role of the player;
- The salary of the Player amounting to USD 235,000 net.
- The signature of both parties.
20. According to the Claimant, by complaining about whether the deal was done or not and
signing the Letter of Interest, the Player acknowledged that the deal was concluded.
21. The Claimant argued that the condition regarding the deadline provided in the Letter of
Interest establishing that the offer was valid until 21 July 2024 was fully met when the Player
countersigned the Letter of Interest on 19 July 2024. Furthermore, the Claimant argued
that it even announced the Player on social media.
22. In this regard, the Claimant argued that based on FIFA’s jurisprudence, an agreement
produces all its effects when signed by the parties involved and must be interpreted in
good faith. Therefore, the Claimant argued that the Player cannot depart from his consent
and join the Second Respondent just because he thought it was a better option for him.
23. In light of the above, the Claimant considered that the condition regarding the abovementioned deadline was met.
24. In regard to the condition of the Player passing the medical test that was also included in
the Letter of Interest, the Claimant first argued that according to the league’s regulations
all players signing with any Iranian club have to pass a medical test conducted by the Iran
Football Medical Assessment and Rehabilitation Centre (IFMARK) in Tehran and that
therefore it shall be considered that the Player passed the medical. However, the Claimant
also mentioned that the Player refused to pass the said medical examination.
25. To this point, the Claimant sustained that even if it is considered that the Player passed the
test, the well-established jurisprudence of the Football Tribunal clearly establishes that the
fact that a contract refers to a medical examination prior to the signing of the employment
contract does not prevent that the contract come into effect.
26. The Claimant argued that FIFA shall declare the clause that linked the validity of the Letter
of Interest to signing an employment contract as invalid without prejudice of the validity of
the Letter of Interest.
27. In this sense, the Claimant argued that the constant and solid jurisprudence of the DRC has
confirmed that whenever a club had refused to sign an employment contract after a valid
and binding agreement between the parties, the Player shall be entitled to receive a
compensation. In this sense, the Claimant argued that this situation applies by analogy to
the present dispute as it was the Player who, after signing the Letter of Interest, refused to
conclude an employment contract.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-16183
28. Moreover, the Claimant argued that the Player was even congratulated as a new player of
the Claimant after he signed the Letter of Interest. Consequently, the Claimant argued that
the Player breached the legal general principle of pacta sunt servanda.
29. In regard to the compensation, the Claimant argued that, as it was stipulated in the Letter
of Interest, the amount shall be considered as net.
30. Also, the Claimant argued that the Second Respondent shall be considered jointly and
severally liable based on art. 17 par.2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) as well as the established jurisprudence of FIFA. In this
respect, the Claimant argued that it expressly notified the Second Respondent through the
Third and Fourth Warning Letters. Therefore, the Claimant contended that the Second
Respondent was aware of the breach.
31. Consequently, the Claimant requested (quoted verbatim):
“86. As per all the above, the Player requests the FIFA PSC:
a. To accept this claim against the Player and the Second Respondent
b. To condemn the Player to pay the Club USD 235,000 (two hundred and thirty-five
thousand US Dollars) net as compensation for breach of the Agreement, plus interests on
a 5% annual rate starting from 23 September 2024, moment in which this claim was
submitted, until its effective payment.
c. To determine that the Second Respondent shall be jointly and severally liable for the
aforementioned compensation/amounts.
d. To confirm any amount granted as “net”;
e. To order the Second Respondent to provide the relevant tax
certificates.
f. To impose the Player a restriction on playing in official matches up until the due
amounts are paid, as per Art. 24 of the FIFA RSTP;
g. To impose the Second Respondent ban from registering any new players, either
nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid, as per Art. 24 of the FIFA
RSTP”;
32. On 23 December 2024, the Bureau of the FIFA Council adopted a new interim regulatory
framework (hereinafter: the IRF), which entered into force on 1 January 2025.
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REF. FPSD-16183
33. On 3 March 2025, the FIFA general secretariat invited the Claimant to amend its claim
exclusively in relation to the possible consequences of the IRF to the present case.
34. On 6 March 2025, the Claimant amended its claim.
35. Regarding the IRF and its possible consequences to the present case, the Claimant argued
that based on art. 13 par. 6 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal
(hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the Second Respondent had the obligation to cooperate
in establishing the facts of the case as it would be almost impossible for the Claimant to
prove its inducement in the breach of the employment relationship. The Claimant stated
that this was the reason why FIFA introduced the evidentiary requests.
36. Nonetheless, the Claimant argued that it was able to prove, at least to FIFA’s comfortable
satisfaction, that the Second Respondent was perfectly aware of the alleged breach
because the Claimant announced the Player on its social media accounts. Therefore, it was
public and notorious that the Player was under an employment contract with the Claimant.
37. The Claimant argued that the Second Respondent took advantage of the Claimant
processing the visa for the Player. In this sense, the Claimant argued that because of this
the Second Respondent had to be aware that another club already had initiated the visa
procedure because any foreign person needs a visa to enter Iran.
38. The Claimant argued that the Second Respondent’s attitude - not answering the Third and
Fourth Warning Letters - demonstrate its involvement in the inducement to the Player to
breach the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Player.
39. In light of the above, the Claimant made the following requests (quoted verbatim):
“IX PROCEDURAL REQUETS
We hereby request FIFA to order the Secon Respondent to produce all documents related
to the negotiations between the Player and the Second Respondent itself, including
without limitation the proof of exchange of the countersigned copy of all the contracts
signed by and between them, as well as any other evidence that FIFA may be consider
relevant.
X REQUEST FOR RELIEF:
94. As per all the above, the Player requests the FIFA PSC:
a. To accept this claim against the Player and the Second Respondent
b. To condemn the Player to pay the Club USD 235,000 (two hundred and thirty-five
thousand US Dollars) net as compensation for breach of the Agreement, plus interests on
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REF. FPSD-16183
a 5% annual rate starting from 23 September 2024, moment in which this claim was
firstly submitted, until its effective payment.
c. To order the Second Respondent to produce all documents related to the negotiations
and signature of the relevant contracts between them as well as the proof of the
exchange date of the countersigned documents.
d. To determine that the Second Respondent shall be jointly and severally liable for the
aforementioned compensation/amounts.
e. To confirm any amount granted as “net”;
f. To order the Second Respondent to provide the relevant tax certificates.
g. To impose the Player a restriction on playing in official matches up until the due
amounts are paid, as per Art. 24 of the FIFA RSTP;
h. To impose the Second Respondent ban from registering any new players, either
nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid, as per Art. 24 of the FIFA
RSTP;”
b. Position of the First Respondent
40. Despite being invited to do so, the First Respondent did not provide his reply to the claim.
c. Position of the Second Respondent
41. Despite being invited to do so, the Second Respondent did not provide its reply to the claim.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-16183
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
42. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 23 September 2024 and submitted for
decision on 10 September 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the
January 2025 edition of the Procedural Rules, the aforementioned edition of the Procedural
Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
43. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (July 2025 edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between an Iranian club and a French Player, with the involvement of another
Iranian Club.
44. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
45. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
46. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-16183
47. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerned a claim
of a club against a player and his new club for breach of contract.
48. The Chamber took note that the Claimant argued that the Letter of Interest was a valid and
binding contract between the Claimant and the Player, which was subsequently breached
by the latter when he signed for the Second Respondent.
49. Since no reply was provided by the Player nor by the Second Respondent, the DRC
considered that its analysis shall be based on the evidence provided by the Claimant (cf.
art. 21, par. 1 of the Procedural Rules).
50. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to determine first whether the
Letter of Interest was a valid and binding contract and, if so, whether the Player breached
this contract and its consequences.
51. Firstly, the Chamber noted that the Claimant argued that based on FIFA’s well-established
jurisprudence, the Letter of Interest contains all the essential elements (essentialia negotii)
to be considered a valid and binding contract between the Claimant and the Player.
52. In this particular, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant outlined that the Letter of Interest
stipulated (i) the duration, (ii) the roles of the parties, (iii) the remuneration and (iv) included
both signatures.
53. The Chamber underscored that according to the long-standing jurisprudence, for an
employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of
both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an
employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the
employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee.
54. In this sense, the Chamber analysed the wording of the Letter of Interest and was
observant that it (i) had the signature of both Parties; (ii) had the word “player” in reference
of the Player in points 4 and 5 as well as in the following paragraph, and also referred to
the Claimant as “club”; (iii) although it did not provide the specific start date, it mentioned
that the contract would be valid for the 2024/2025 Iran football season and (iv) provided
the remuneration payable to the Player amounting to USD 235,000 net. Therefore, the
Chamber stressed that all the essential elements of a contract appeared to be present in
the Letter of Interest.
55. Notwithstanding the above, the DRC highlighted that the Letter of Interest included the
following statement:
“(…) Finally please note that this offer does not intend to be considered as an employment
contract.”
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-16183
56. In this respect, in the Chamber’s point of view, it was crystal clear that, although it contained
the essentialia negotii, the Letter of Interest drafted by the Claimant was not intended to be
an employment contract but only a “declaration of interest” that was part of the
negotiations between the parties. Specifically, the disclaimer stated that the Player’s
acceptance of the offer included in the Letter of Interest did not constitute in any way an
employment contract.
57. The DRC remarked that it was undisputed that the Letter of Interest was drafted by the
Claimant. From the wording, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant’s intention was to
include this specific disclaimer to ensure the non-binding effect of the Letter of Interest. In
this sense, the Claimant clearly clarified that the Letter of Interest did not intend to be
considered an employment contract. The Chamber underscored that, if the Claimant’s
intention had been to be bound by the said letter, this disclaimer would not have been
included.
58. In this regard, the Chamber considered that arguing now that the Letter of Interest was
valid and binding when the Claimant itself was the one that included this disclaimer to
ensure that the said letter was non-binding violates the legal principles of venire contra
factum propium and nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans. Therefore, the DRC was
of the opinion that the Claimant’s reasoning could not be accepted.
59. Furthermore, and also expressly stated in the Letter of Interest, the Chamber observed
that with said letter the Claimant was only expressing its interest in “having negotiations”
with the Player. In this respect, the Letter of Interest clearly stipulated:
“Esteghlal Khuzestan FC (club) from the Iran premier league Is interested in having
negotiations with Mr Boli Kevn Gnonher (…)”
60. The Chamber also noted that the Player accepted the offer included in the Letter of Interest
on the basis that this specific wording was included. It was therefore not possible to know
whether the Player would have accepted the offer included in the Letter of Interest without
this wording or whether he would have acted differently in the absence of it.
61. Additionally, the DRC recalled that according to the well-established jurisprudence, the
jurisprudence according to which offers are usually considered as valid and binding
employment contracts – provided that they contain all the essentialia negotii – was
developed in order to protect players from unemployment, in line with the legal principles
of in dubio pro operario and in dubio contra stipulatorum. Therefore, the Chamber
considered that all the jurisprudence to that effect does not apply to this case, where the
Claimant itself drafted the Letter of Interest and was now using this document to try to
establish that it had a valid and binding contract with the Player.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-16183
62. In this line, and taking into account the disclaimer included in the Letter of Interest, the
Chamber considered that it was not relevant to analyse whether all the conditions included
there in were met in order for the Letter of Interest to be considered a valid and binding
contract.
63. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the Letter of Interest signed between the Claimant
and the Player was not a valid and binding contract and, consequently, the Player did not
breach such contract.
64. In light of the above, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim.
d. Costs
65. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
66. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
67. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-16183
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Esteghlal Khozestan FC, is rejected.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-16183
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 16