Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-15999
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 8 August 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Giovanni De
la Vega
COMPOSITION:
Martín AULETTA (Argentina), Deputy Chairperson
Oleg ZADUBROVSKIY (Russia), Member
Peter LUKASEK (Slovakia), Member
CLAIMANT:
Giovanni De la Vega, The Netherlands
Represented by Zoe Jaarsma
RESPONDENT:
C.D. Llosetense, Spain
Represented by Toni Roca Alomar
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REF. FPSD-15999
I. Facts of the case
1.
On an unspecified date, the Dutch player Giovanni De la Vega (hereinafter: the Player or the
Claimant) and the Spanish club C.D. Llosetense (hereinafter: the Club or the Respondent),
entered into a Private Agreement (hereinafter: First Employment Agreement) valid as from
1 August 2022 until 30 June 2023.
2.
According to the Third Clause of the First Employment Agreement, the Respondent
undertook to provide the Claimant with the following benefits:
- EUR 500 monthly during the 2022/2023 season;
- Shared house during the competition;
- Bonus package for 5 goals or assistance in official matches amounting EUR 250;
- Bonus for promotion to 2ª RFEF (i.e., 4th Spanish Division) amounting to EUR 750.
3.
The Eight Clause of the First Employment Agreement stipulated (quoted verbatim):
“OCTAVA: En todo lo no previsto en el presente contrato, será de aplicación el Real Decreto
1006/1985 del 16 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas
profesionales, y las demás normas laborales en cuanto no sean incompatibles con la naturaleza
especial de la relación laboral de los deportistas profesionales.”
The above freely translated into English as follows:
"EIGHTH: For all matters not expressly regulated in this contract, Royal Decree 1006/1985 of 16
June, which governs the special employment relationship of professional athletes, shall apply,
as well as any other labour regulations insofar as they are not incompatible with the special
nature of the employment relationship of professional athletes."
4.
On 4 July 2023, the parties concluded a second private agreement (hereinafter: the Second
Employment Agreement) valid as from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024.
5.
According to the Third Clause of the Second Employment Agreement, the Respondent
undertook to pay the Claimant EUR 700 net monthly.
6.
In accordance with the Fourth Clause of the Second Employment Agreement, the parties
agreed upon the following bonuses:
- 2023/2024 season: EUR 50 per goal;
- 2023/2024 season: EUR 25 per goal assistance;
- Bonus of EUR 1,500 payable within 6 months of achieving the promotion to 2 RFEF.
7.
The Fifth Clause of the Second Employment Agreement provided (quoted verbatim):
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REF. FPSD-15999
“QUINTA.- Como retribución en especies por los servicios prestados por el Jugador durante toda
la duración de este acuerdo, el Club se compromete a facilitarle los servicios que a continuación
se especifican.
-Alojamiento en casa compartida con agua y luz pagada en Lloseta;
- Servicio de comida; menu del mediodía.”
The above freely translates to English as follows:
“FIFTH.- As payment in kind for the services provided by the Player throughout the duration of
this agreement, the Club undertakes to provide the services specified below:
- Accommodation in a shared house with water and electricity paid for in Lloseta.
- Meal service; midday menu.”
8.
The Sixth Clause of the Second Employment Agreement provided (quoted verbatim):
“SEXTA.- Como retribución complementaria por los servicios prestados en función de
DERECHOS DE
IMAGEN A BENEFICIOS DEL CLUB.
Esta clausula tendrá vigencia desde el momento de la firma de este acuerdo Y SERÁ
PAGADAÍNTEGRAMENTE POR LA SOCIEDAD; PRO EXPERIENCE SL.
- DERECHOS DE IMAGEN A BENEFICIOS DEL CLUB 23/24: 300,00 euros.”
The above freely translates to English as follows:
"SIXTH.- As additional compensation for the services provided in accordance with IMAGE RIGHTS
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CLUB.
This clause shall be valid from the moment this agreement is signed AND SHALL BE PAID IN FULL
BY THE COMPANY; PRO EXPERIENCE SL.”
9.
The Tenth Clause of the Second Employment Agreement stipulated (quoted verbatim):
“DECIMA: En todo lo no previsto en el presente contrato, será de aplicación el Real Decreto
1006/1985 del 16 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas
profesionales, y las demás normas laborales en cuanto no sean incompatibles con la naturaleza
especial de la relación laboral de los deportistas profesionales.”
The above freely translates to English as follows:
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TENTH: For all matters not expressly regulated in this contract, Royal Decree 1006/1985 of 16
June, which governs the special employment relationship of professional athletes, shall apply,
as well as any other labour regulations insofar as they are not incompatible with the special
nature of the employment relationship of professional athletes."
10. On 1 October 2022, the Respondent won a match against Collerense 1-3 where the
Claimant scored one goal.
11. On 29 October 2022, Respondent won a match against Mercadal 0-2 where the Claimant
scored one goal.
12. On 19 November 2022, the Respondent won a match against CE Sant Jordi 3-1 where the
Claimant scored one goal.
13. On 17 December 2022, the Respondent won a match against Poblense 2-0 where the
Claimant scored one goal.
14. On 8 January 2022, the Respondent and the club Binissalem tied 2-2 and the Claimant
scored a goal.
15. On 29 January 2023, the Respondent and the club Penya Independent tied 2-2 and the
Claimant scored a goal.
16. On 16 April 2023, the Respondent lost 5-1 against the club Poblense. The Claimant scored
the only goal of the Respondent.
17. On 23 April 2023, the Respondent won a match 3-0 against the club Binissalem and the
Claimant scored a goal.
18. On 22 October 2023, the Respondent and the club Manacor tied 1-1 and the Claimant
scored a goal.
19. Between November 2023 and May 2024, a WhatsApp conversation between the parties
took place between regarding the Claimant’s remuneration and his injury, as well as the
possibility of undergoing treatment in the Netherlands.
20. On 1 June 2024, the Claimant sent an email to the Respondent stating that he would not
return because the Club failed to comply with what was promised to him. The Claimant
also mentioned that the Club did not provide him with what he needed for his recovery
and requested to be paid the outstanding salary corresponding to June 2023.
21. On 19 June 2024, a person named Johan Wins, allegedly the Claimant’s agent, sent an email
to inform the Respondent that his contract would be terminated as of 1 July 2024. In the
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REF. FPSD-15999
same email, the pending payments for his salaries and bonuses for the 2022/2023 and
2023/2024 were requested setting a deadline expiring on 1 July 2024.
22. On 2 August 2024, the Claimant put the Respondent in default and requested the amount
of EUR 16,425 net plus 21% VAT granting the Respondent 10 days to comply with this
financial obligation.
23. Allegedly, on 2 August 2024, the Respondent sent an email to the Claimant stating (quoted
verbatim):
“En referencia a los pagos descritos de la temporada 22/23 el jugador si que ha competido
correctamente y cumplió con el régimen interno.
Pero en referencia a los pagos de la temporada 24/25, hemos comprobado y el jugador no tiene
el contrato firmado por nuestra parte además no cumplió con las normas internas del club al
volverse a su país y no entrenar ni competir con nosotros, obviamente todo es demostrable que
por parte del jugador no ha competido la temporada 24/25 correctamente con nosotros ni tiene
contrató firmado con nosotros.
Igualmente estaría dispuesto a hablar con usted para llegar a un acuerdo.”
The above freely translates to English as follows:
“With regard to the payments described for the 2022–23 season, the player did compete
correctly and complied with internal regulations.
However, with regard to the payments for the 2024/25 season, we have verified that the player
does not have a contract signed by us and that he did not comply with the club's internal rules
by returning to his country and not training or competing with us. It is clear that the player did
not compete correctly with us during the 2024/25 season and does not have a contract signed
with us. I would also be willing to talk with you to reach an agreement.”
24. On 14 August 2024, the Claimant sent an email to the Respondent referring to a meeting
held between the parties the day before and summarizing a proposal for an agreement.
The email reads, inter alia, as follows:
“(…) During the meeting it was mentioned that the club is willing to reach a settlement. But that
the settlement is subject to the following conditions:
1. During the meeting, it was confirmed that the monthly fee amounted to € 1.000,-. It was
further indicated that the club is willing to pay the fee for the months July 2023 to October 2023.
Because the fee for September has already been paid, the total amount the club is willing to pay
under the second agreement amounts to € 3.000,-;
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REF. FPSD-15999
2. The club is willing to pay a compensation for lunch costs incurred by Giovanni in the amount
of € 5,- per day for the months July to October. This amounts to a compensation of € 615,-;
3. The payment obligation under the first employment agreement in the amount of € 1.500,- for
the months of April, May and June will be verified by you. We agreed that you will let me know
whether the club is prepared to pay this compensation of € 1.500,- under the first contract to
Giovanni;
4. Reimbursement of the legal costs incurred by Giovanni in the amount of €1.500,- excluding
VAT would also be consulted internally. We agreed that you will let me know whether the club is
prepared to reimburse (part of) these costs (…)”
25. On 21 August 2024, the Claimant sent a follow up email to the Respondent asking for an
answer regarding the proposal.
26. On 23 August 2024, the Respondent replied to the Claimant’s email dated 21 August 2024,
stating that they were consulting with their lawyer about the proposal.
27. With his claim, the Claimant provided evidence of a bank transaction dated 29 September
2023 for the amount of EUR 1,000 which according to the Claimant was made by the
Respondent.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
28. On 11 September 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
29. In his claim, the Player argued that the Club failed to comply with his obligations.
30. In this sense, the Player argued that based on the First Employment Agreement, he was
entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 500 and according to the Second Employment
Agreement, he was entitled to receive EUR 700 to be increased by EUR 300, totalling EUR
1,000.
31. Regarding the Second Employment Agreement, the Player argued that despite not being
signed by the Club, it shall remain valid as he was registered and played matches for the
Club.
32. Additionally, based on the First and the Second Employment Agreements, the Player
argued that he is entitled to EUR 50 per goal scored and he scored 8 goals in total.
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33. The Player claimed that in accordance with Clause 5 of the Second Employment Agreement,
he was entitled to a daily lunch menu, which the Club failed to provide. In this sense, the
Player provided evidence of bank transactions in relation to the purchase of food during
the period between 1 February 2023 and 6 November 2024.
34. Also, the Player argued that he was entitled to an accommodation suitable to live and the
Club’s failure to provide it made him incurred in costs for a mattress, a table and a chair. In
this regard, the Claimant provided evidence of bank transactions and pictures of furniture
of the store IKEA.
35. The Player stated that on 11 November 2023 he got injured while playing a match for the
Club and had to travel to the Netherlands for his treatment. Then on 1 February 2024, he
came back but because the injury persisted, he had to go back to the Netherlands on 7
March 2024.
36. The Player argued that only after multiple notices, the Club accepted to have a meeting
with his representatives via Teams, where the Club showed a willingness to settle.
37. Despite the above, the Player argued that the Club never presented an offer.
38. The Player established the amount in dispute as EUR 15,125 and broke it down as follows:
a. The salary of EUR 500 from April 2023 through June 2023 based on the First Employment
Agreement (i.e. EUR 1,500) and EUR 1,000 based on the Second Employment Agreement
for the months of July, August and October 2023 to June 2024 (i.e. EUR 11,500) totalling EUR
12,500.
b. EUR 50 corresponding to the goal bonus of the 2023/2024 season.
c. The Player estimated a EUR 5 per day for lunch allowance totalling EUR 1,825
d. The amount of EUR 750 for not providing a suitable accommodation.
39. Consequently, the Player requested (quoted verbatim):
“Due to the fact that the Club does not fulfil its payment obligations arising out of the First
Employment Contract and Second Employment Contract, De la Vega requests for the
intervention of the FIFA DRC. On behalf of De la Vega, I request the FIFA DRC the following:
1. To determine that the Club is in breach of the provisions of the First Employment Contract
and/or the Second Employment Contract;
2. To order the Club to pay to De la Vega (i) the (overdue) salary of EUR 12,500.- (twelve thousand
five hundred euros) net, and/or (ii) the overdue bonus in the amount of EUR 50.- (one hundred
eu-ros), and/or (in) damages in the amount of EUR 1,825.- (one thousand eight hundred twenty-
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REF. FPSD-15999
five euros) for failure to comply with the Club's contractual obligation to provide daily lunch
and/or (iv) damages in the amount of EUR 750.- (seven hundred fifty euros) for failure to comply
with the Club's contractual obligation to provide proper accommodation, all the
aforementioned amounts to be increased by 5% interest p.a. as per the date on which the
respective amounts should have been paid, within 7 days after your decision;
3. To intervene as soon as possible on the basis of Article 12bis FIFA RSTP, and as such to impose
the sanctions mentioned in Paragraph
4, under a. through d. of said Article; 4. To order the Club to pay the costs of the current
proceedings; and 5. To submit the present matter to FIFA's Disciplinary Committee who will
impose the necessary sanctions if the Club fails to comply with your decision.
b. Position of the Respondent
40. In its reply, the Respondent challenged FIFA’s jurisdiction.
41. In this respect, the Respondent asserted that the Second Employment Agreement included
a clause that referred to the Spanish Royal Decree 1006 /1985 of 26 June which in its article
19 stipulates that all disputes between professional athletes and sporting entities shall be
submitted to the jurisdiction of labour tribunals. The Club also provided the link to the full
text of the Royal Decree in his claim.
42. In this sense, to supports its argument, the Respondent provided a decision of the FIFA
Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: DRC) dated 25 September 2014, where the
Chamber decided to decline competence based on a clause with the same wording.
43. In this line, the Respondent also relied on and provided a copy of the award of the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter: CAS) rendered in CAS 2015/A/3896.
44. As to the merits, the Respondent argued that it complied with all payments owed to the
Player for the 2023/2024 season which the Respondent said it would provide as evidence
in ordinary courts.
45. The Respondent described as false that the salary for the 2023/2024 season was EUR 1,000.
Moreover, the Respondent explained that payment of September 2023 corresponds to EUR
700 as salary and EUR 300 as payment for image rights.
46. The Respondent argued that the Player did not provide any proof that the Respondent did
not provide lunch for him. The Respondent argued the same regarding the fact that the
Player failed to prove that the Respondent did not provide a suitable to live
accommodation.
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47. The Respondent argued that the Player travelled to the Netherlands without its permission.
In this sense, the Respondent provided a screenshot of a WhatsApp conversation with the
Player which is attached in his claim.
48. In light of the above, the Respondent requested FIFA to declare the Player’s claim
inadmissible as the Spanish courts have exclusive competence to decide this matter.
c. Replica of the Claimant
49. In his replica the Player argued that FIFA shall retain jurisdiction because this is a dispute
with an international dimension.
50. Moreover, the Player explained that the parties did not agree on a clear and exclusive
jurisdiction clause in favour of civil courts or independent arbitral tribunals.
51. The Player also argued that the Second Employment Agreement was not signed by the Club
and the Club recognized in the meeting held via Teams that it never signed it.
52. Therefore, the Player requested that FIFA retains jurisdiction.
53. As to the merits, the Player insisted in the arguments and requests made in his claim.
d. Final comments of the Respondent
54. In its final comments, the Respondent insisted that FIFA must declare the Player’s claim
inadmissible as the Spanish courts have exclusive competence to decide this matter. The
Respondent also provided another decision related to this issue from the DRC dated 16
October 2014.
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III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
55. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 11 September 2024 and submitted for
decision on 8 August 2025. Taking into account the wording of art. 31 and 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
56. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (July 2025
edition), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is - in principle - competent to deal with the
matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international
dimension between a Dutch player and a Spanish club.
57. At this point, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the
Football Tribunal to deal with the present claim. In particular, the Respondent contended
that that FIFA shall decline competence because based on clause Tenth of the Second
Employment Agreement, in accordance with Art. 19 of the Spanish Royal Decree 1006/1985
of 26 June which in its article 19 stipulates that all disputes between professional athletes
and sporting entities shall be submitted to the jurisdiction of labour tribunals.
58. The Chamber noted that, conversely, the Claimant argued that FIFA must retain
competence because this dispute has an international dimension and a clear and exclusive
clause was not agreed between the parties. In this sense, the Claimant also argued that the
Club acknowledged that it never signed the Second Employment Agreement.
59. Moreover, the Chamber observed that the Claimant aimed to enforce the validity of the
Second Employment Agreement in order to claim his alleged outstanding remuneration
although it was not signed by the Club.
60. As a preliminary observation, the Chamber was of the opinion that the Claimant cannot,
on one hand, seek to enforce the terms of the Second Employment Agreement to claim his
alleged outstanding remuneration, and on the other hand, question the validity of said
agreement in order to prove that FIFA shall retain competence. Therefore, the Claimant’s
contentions in this respect were disregarded.
61. In this context, the Chamber observed that the Respondent did not explicitly contest the
validity of the Second Employment Agreement. However, it relied on the jurisdiction clause
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REF. FPSD-15999
contained in Clause Tenth of said agreement to argue that FIFA lacks competence to
adjudicate this matter.
62. The Chamber highlighted that although the Respondent remained silent on the validity of
the Second Employment Agreement, its reliance on the jurisdiction clause presupposed
the enforceability of that agreement. In any event, regardless of whether the matter was
assessed under the First or the Second Employment Agreement—or both—there was a
threshold issue concerning the jurisdiction clause that had to be addressed before
proceeding to analyse the merits of the decision.
63. Taking into account the above, the Chamber recalled that both the First and the Second
Employment Agreement included the same clause whose content read as follows:
“En todo lo no previsto en el presente contrato, será de aplicación el Real Decreto 1006/1985
del 16 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas profesionales,
y las demás normas laborales en cuanto no sean incompatibles con la naturaleza especial de
la relación laboral de los deportistas profesionales.”
The above is freely translated into English as follows:
“In all matters not covered by this contract, Royal Decree 1006/1985 of June 26, regulating the
special employment relationship of professional athletes, shall apply, as well as other labour
regulations insofar as they are not incompatible with the special nature of the employment
relationship of professional athletes.”
64. The Chamber further observed that art. 19 of the Royal Decree 1006/1985 of June 26,
regulating the special employment relationship of professional athletes, stipulates (quoted
verbatim):
"los conflictos que surjan entre los deportistas profesionales y sus clubes o entidades deportivas,
como consecuencia del contrato de trabajo, serán competencia de la jurisdicción laboral."
The above freely translates to English as follows:
“Any conflicts arising between a professional athlete and a club or sports entity, as a
consequence of their employment relationship, will fall under the jurisdiction of the labour
justice.”
65. In light of the above, the Chamber was of the opinion that, in accordance with the right
reserved for the Parties under art. 22 of the Regulations to submit any employment-related
dispute to a civil court, both the First and Second Employment Agreement by expressly
referring to the Spanish Royal Decree 1006/1985, contains the Parties' exclusive choice of
forum in favour of the Spanish Labour Courts.
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66. In this sense, the Chamber considered that by signing the Second Employment Agreement,
the Player accepted the jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts as an exception of FIFA’s
jurisdiction over any dispute possibly arising from his employment relationship with the
Club.
67. The Chamber highlighted that it is not the Tribunal’s first time dealing with identical or
nearly identical clauses as the ones at issue here, and that this approach regarding the
choice of forum in favour of the Spanish Labour Courts by express reference to the Spanish
Royal Decree 1006/1985 has been confirmed on several occasions by the DRC and PSC. In
this respect, the Chamber recalled inter alia the arbitral award rendered in CAS
2019/A/6621 Club Atlético Osasuna v. Álvaro Fernández Llorente and AS Monaco FC, which
confirmed the DRC’s decision declining jurisdiction and where the panel stated that:
“(…) 117. In the present case, the Panel does not find any reason to deviate from the above
finding, and considers that, by reference to the Royal Decree 1006/1985, the Ninth and Sixth
clauses of the Employment Contract and of the Disputed Contract contained an indirect choice
of forum by means of which the Appellant and the First Respondent agreed to submit their
disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Spanish labour courts (…)”
68. Consequently, based on the clear jurisprudence of both FIFA and CAS on this specific issue,
the Chamber determined that the Football Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the
claim of the Claimant.
b. Costs
69. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
70. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
71. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
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IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Claimant, Giovanni
De la Vega.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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