Acórdão do FIFA
Processo FPSD-15930 VIUNNYK_2025-11-13

REF. FPSD-15930

Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 13 November 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Bohdan
Viunnyk

COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Jorge GUTIÉRREZ (Costa Rica), Member
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member

CLAIMANT:
FC Shakhtar Donetsk, Ukraine
Represented by Uno-One Legal Partners

FIRST RESPONDENT:
Bohdan Viunnyk, Ukraine
Represented by Maciej Balazinski

SECOND RESPONDENT:
Lechia Gdansk S.A., Poland
Represented by Maciej Balazinski

pg. 2

REF. FPSD-15930

I. Facts of the case
1.

This is a claim involving the Ukrainian club, FC Shakhtar Donetsk (hereinafter: the Club or
the Claimant), the Ukrainian player, Bohdan Viunnyk (hereinafter: the Player or First
Respondent) and the Polish club, Lechia Gdansk S.A. (hereinafter: Lechia or Second
Respondent).

2.

On 2 June 2020, the Club and the Player entered into an employment contract valid as from
1 July 2020 until 30 June 2025.

3.

According to Appendix no. 1 of the Contract, the parties agreed on the following
remuneration:
“The Player’s salary is 99,950 (ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and fifty) hryvnias
per month gross, which is equivalent to 3,000 (three thousand) USD dollars after
deduction of Ukranian taxes and other mandatory payments as well as:
If the Player participates in one official match for the [Club] first team during one (any)
full season of this Contract (2020/2021, 2021/2022, 2022/2023, 2023/2024), then
starting from the next season (i.e. from July 1 of the corresponding year) his salary will
be increased by the Club to 166,584 (one hundred sixty-six thousand five hundred and
eighty-fou) hryvnias per month gross, which is equivalent to 5,000 (five thousand)
US dollars after deduction of Ukrainian taxes and other mandatory payments.”

4.

According to clause 7 of the Contract, the parties agreed that “If the Football Player is the
party guilty of terminating the Contract without good reason, the Football Player shall
fully compensate the Club for the damages caused in accordance with the principle of restitutio
in integrum (positive interest), but in any case the amount of damages shall not be less than
60,000,000 (sixty million) Euros.
The Parties have carefully assessed the damages that may be caused to them, thus, the above
amount is considered by the Parties as a real preliminary estimate of such damages and it is
high, excessive or onerous. Thus, the Parties accept and agree that the above amount of
damages is reasonable and fair, as a result, the Parties hereby waive their right to challenge the
validity of this Contract condition.” (emphasis added)

5.

Finally, according to clause 8 of the Contract, the parties agreed as follows:
“8. APPLICABLE LAW AND PLACE OF DISPUTES RESOLUTION
8.1. This Contract is governed and interpreted in accordance with the Articles of
Association and regulations/rules of the UAF, as well as with the legislation of Ukraine.
The Swiss law can also be applied.

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REF. FPSD-15930

8.2. All disputes arising out of or associated with this Contract shall be submitted for
resolution at the option of the claimant to:
1. the relevant authority of the Ukrainian Association of Football; or
2. the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne (Switzerland), where the dispute will
be settled in strict accordance with the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The language
of proceedings will be English.
Due to the fact that none of the parties to this Contract has a location, place of
permanent residence or place of business in Switzerland, both Parties to this Contract,
based on Article 192 of Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law, waive their
right to appeal on any grounds decision by Court Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne in
any competent court, including Swiss Federal Court.”
6.

During the duration of the Contract, the Player was transferred on loan to the following
clubs:
-

In April 2022, the Player transferred to the Swiss club, FC Zurich;

-

In February 2023, the Player transferred to the Austrian club, OFB;

7.

In December 2023, the Club was scheduled to play a match in Tokyo, Japan. Due to the
martial law that was imposed in Ukraine, the Player was obliged to sign a document
declaring that he would return to Ukraine after the match.

8.

On 10 January 2024, the Club received an offer from Lechia for the Player’s transfer on loan
free of payments until 30 June 2024.

9.

On 13 January 2024, Lechia followed up with the Club requesting whether it would be
interested in a loan. On 16 January 2024, the Club sent a formal notice to the Player asking
him to return to the trainings. The Club stated that the Player did not return to the Club
after the match in Japan which took place on 18 December 2023 and has not been in
contact with the Club’s management ever since. The Club also informed the Player that the
trainings were resumed on 14 January 2024 after the winter break and the Club required
his presence at the training camp. In addition, the Club stated the following:
“Considering the specified responsibilities of a football player, your actual refusal to
return to the team’s location and absence from the training camp is a gross violation
of the terms of the Contract.

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REF. FPSD-15930

Taking into account the above, I require you to arrive at the location of the team […]
by 20.01.2024 and continue the performance of your employment duties under the
Contract. […]”
10. On 24 January 2024, Lechia sent another email to the Club asking about the loan. In
particular, the email stated as follows:
“Are you prepared to consider the loan of this player or has the player already signed
with another club?
In case your answer is positive, do you want to prepare a draft agreement or do you
prefer that we will do it on your own?
Finally, again assuming that you are ok with the loan, can we start discussing the
terms of the contract with the player?”
11. On 25 January 2024, the Club offered the Player to extend his Contract until 31 December
2026.
12. Due to the Player’s absence, on 28 January 2024, the Club issued a decision against the
Player in which they imposed a sanction for his continued absence from 14 January 2024.
In particular, the Club decided to reduce the Player’s salary for January by 50%.
13. On the same date, the Club sent a new notice to the Player asking him to resume trainings
by 2 February 2024.
14. On 5 February 2024, the Player sent a letter to the Club stating the following:
“I had to take legal advice in order to be able to properly understand my situation and
my rights, which I did. I have signed a contract with [the Club] on the second of June
2020, for five years. Due to lack of proper legal advice on my side and dominant
position of your club, I signed the contract without any discussion.
It is stipulated that in case of a breach of contract, the party in breach shall
compensate the other party with:
-

In case the Club is in breach- with the amount of Player’s salary due from the
Club lowered by his salary earned in the new club of Player’s employment;

-

In case the Player is in breach- at least 60,000,000 EUR (60 million euros).

I have been informed that such a clause disproportionate and unjustified is not
admissible, neither under FIFA regulations, nor under Swiss law, taking into
consideration that my salary amounts to 5000 USD (five thousand dollars).

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REF. FPSD-15930

I believe that there is a good and just cause to lawfully terminate my
employment contract since the fundamental terms and conditions of the
contractual arrangement we signed are no longer respected by [the Club].
Indeed, with 18 months left on my contract, after half of a season where I had
practically no opportunity to play, you are willing to force me to extend my contract
with your club because you know that we are out of the FIFA contractual protected
period since the second of June 2023.
[The Club]’s attitude is abusive because you are aware that I have an opportunity to
player for a second division club in Poland, you agree orally with a free loan to this
club, but at the same time you have decided to put a precondition to this loan by
requesting me to extend my contract with your club.
As a matter of fact, the sport director Dario Srna first told by voicemail my father (who
solely represents my interests) about it and that he wanted that I sign a new contract
with [the Club] for 4 years.
I refused.
Having in mind that for the past 3 ½ years I almost never played the club first team of
[the Club], I cannot accept the idea of contract extension which your club sets as a
condition to my loan.
The Dario Srna said to my father on the phone that he would at least ask for a year
extension and finally I received by email a draft contract extension of my current
contract for an additional period of 18 months.
Since I am currently with my family (who are refugees) in Switzerland, Dario Srna
asked me to go first to sign the extension contract in some offices in Zurich before [the
Club] will approve the loan to Poland.
I refused.
This email is done with the purpose to warn [the Club] that I will have no other
choice but to terminate my agreement with your club if you continue to refuse
to let me player in Poland on loan for the next 6 months to come without
requesting me to previously extend my contract with your club.
[…]
To summarize, I consider that there are objective circumstances that make
unreasonable to expect our employment relationship to continue, because of a
very serious breach of trust on your side.

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REF. FPSD-15930

I understand that my termination of the contract is a toll of ultima ration- meaning a
last resort if there are no other means. […]
I have been informed that due to the fact that termination will take place
outside of the FIFA protected period, no sporting sanctions shall apply on me.”
(emphasis added)
15. On 7 February 2024, the Club replied to the Player’s letter objecting the allegations and
argued that the Club has not stated any “specific fact of violation by the Club of contractual
obligations that could serve as a basis for termination of the Contract”. The Club requested the
Player to resume training by 11 February 2024 and informed him that any negotiations
regarding his loan will be suspended.
16. On 10 February 2024, Lechia contacted the Club via WhatsApp asking whether they could
contact the Player “to discuss matters we have talked about”. On the same day, the Club,
answered giving permission to Lechia to contact the Player and his father.
17. The Player did not resume training.
18. On 15 February 2024, the Player sent a letter to the Club stating that “I have to warn you one
more time that if you are not going to accept to let me go on loan to the club that is prepared
to give me the opportunity to exercise my profession to the best of my interests, I will have no
other option but to terminate my contract. […]”
19. On 17 February 2024, the Club sent a letter to the Player denying all the allegations against
it and requesting the Player for the fourth time to return to the Club by 19 February 2024.
20. On 20 February 2024, the Club registered the Player to participate in the UEFA Europa
League.
21. On 22 February 2024, the Player sent a termination letter to the Club. The Player alleged
having just cause to terminate his Contract due to (i) the “limited opportunities to play in
senior football”, (ii) that Club’s denial to transfer him on loan abroad, (iii) the lack of trust
towards the Club and (iv) the alleged abusive clause of EUR 60,000,000 that was intended
to keep the Player to the Club and limit his opportunities abroad.
22. Specifically, the Player stated the following;
“By the letter herein, I terminate my contract signed with FC Shakhtar Donetsk on
2.6.2020 (hereafter the “Contract”) with immediate effect for just cause.

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REF. FPSD-15930

Firstly, it must be underlined that there is a clear double language with regard to the
current situation. The Club presents one standpoint in the official correspondence and
a different one in straight communications with me and my father.
Secondly, there are several reasons why the continuance of our contractual
relationship is no longer possible. I do not agree that after being a member of the
Club for over three and a half years I did receive enough opportunities to play
in senior football. As a professional Player my main concern is to develop my football
skills. For that purpose I need to participate in senior competitions of a certain level.
Not only has this not been provided by the Club but, what is far worse, I was
never given proper chances to prove I could play for the club’s first team.
I know that the Club is travelling a lot and playing games in different countries but my
chances to participate as an active Player were always limited while the other options
I offered the Club have been disregarded. It is neither the Club’s nor my fault that
normal training and league practice is no longer possible in Ukraine. However, I was
hoping on a cooperation between me and the Club to give me best training and
playing possibilities in some other club. It has occurred to be completely
otherwise – the Club is trying to limit my possibilities even if I have offers to
practice my profession abroad, options that I personally found and proposed to
the Club.
Having this in mind, the pressure the Club has been exercising on me for the extension
of my contract and putting this extension as a pre-condition for me to go for loan to
a second division Polish club has definitely broken my trust in the Club. As a matter
of fact, the Club did not allow me to join another club on loan basis during the
winter transfer window January–February 2024 – exactly as the sport director
threatened would happen in case I would not accept to renew/extend the
contract with the Club.
It is not true that the Club forgot about this condition as Mr. Palkin wrote in his last
letter to me, and it is not true also that I wasn’t authorized to negotiate the terms of
my engagement with the second division club in Poland, and I can prove it. On the
opposite, the Club just executed the threat by refusing to let me go on loan to
any third club without me accepting to extend my contract.
Finally, from the beginning the relationship has been unequal between me and the
Club. I understand this now. As I already mentioned in my letter, I have signed a
Contract with Shakhtar Donetsk for five years. Due to the lack of proper legal advice
on my side and the dominant position of the Club, there is an abusive clause in the
Contract stipulating that in case of breach of the Contract, the penalty for me to pay
would be amounting to 60 million euros, when today my transfermarkt value is less
than 800,000 euros. That clause is clearly abusive and illegal. It shows, however,

pg. 8

REF. FPSD-15930

how the Club wanted to put me in a vulnerable position and “keep me in a cage” from
the very beginning.
That is why trust has gone progressively and finally was completely broken
when I was given the opportunity to play anew at a level appropriate for me and
the Club decided to blackmail my father that I should extend the contract first,
otherwise they wouldn’t let me go.
To sum up, there is just cause to terminate with immediate effect because of very
serious breach of trust on your side as well as obvious abusive limitation of my
development and possibility to participate in competitions, while at the same
time trying to force me to extend.” (emphasis added)
23. On 22 February 2024, Lechia asked the Club by WhatsApp message whether they could
negotiate a permanent transfer. The individual replied stating that the Player terminated
the Contract and that the Club would initiate legal proceedings. In the following days Lechia
sent follow ups and called the Club.
24. On 22 and 23 February 2024, the Club responded to the Player’s termination letter
dismissing all his allegations and requesting him to reconsider his position within 48 hours,
otherwise the Club would take legal actions.
25. On 5 March 2024, Lechia and the Club signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the
New Contract) valid as from the date of the signature until 30 June 2028. The Player’s
monthly salary is USD 5,000.
26. According to TMS, on 1 July 2024, Lechia entered a transfer instruction to permanently
transfer the Player from the Club.
27. On 5 July 2024, the Ukrainian Football Federation (hereinafter: the UAF) rejected the
issuance of the ITC by stating that “there has been no mutual agreement regarding early
termination of the employment contract between the former club and the professional player.”
28. On 15 July 2024, the Polish Football Federation (hereinafter: the PZPN) disputed UAF’s ITC
rejection and requested FIFA’s intervention.
29. On 18 July 2024, the Player registered with the PZPN for Lechia.

pg. 9

REF. FPSD-15930

II. Proceedings before FIFA
30. On 5 September 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ respective positions is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Claimant
31. The Club lodged the claim with FIFA for breach of contract alleging that the Player did not
have just cause to terminate the Contract.
The termination without just cause
32. The Club stated that it had sent 4 different requests to the Player asking him to return to
the trainings and all of them were ignored as the Player did not resume his contractual
obligations after the winter break.
33. According to the Club, it appeared that, as of January 2024, the Player had reached an
agreement to transfer to Lechia. However, the Club maintained that it neither intended to
transfer the Player on loan nor was under any legal obligation to do so.
34. In addition, the Club claimed that the abandoned his contractual obligations in January
2024 and only answered to the Club’s notices in February 2024 with baseless allegations
indicating that the latter has breach the Contract without pointing out any contractual
provisions that were allegedly violated.
35. Furthermore, the Club alleged that the Player’s complaints in his letter of 5 February 2024
regarding not having been fielded enough by the Club are baseless, since the Player was
on loan in the football seasons 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 and had not challenged or
disputed such decisions.
36. The Club denied the allegations regarding the extension of the Contract stating that they
only made one attempt to extend the Contract which was denied. In this regard, the Club
denied having put the extension of the Contract as a pre-condition for the loan of the player
to Lechia.
37. According to the Club, from the Player’s correspondence of 15 February 2024, it is evident
that the Player was negotiating with Lechia while being under Contract with the Club, in
breach of art. 18.3 of the Regulations.
38. To summarize, according to the Club, the Player terminated the Contract without just cause
for the following reasons:

pg. 10

REF. FPSD-15930

-

“Player abandoned the Contract from January 2024 and failed to report to first team
training despite four (4) official requests from Shakhtar;

-

Shakhtar was under no obligation to accept Lechia’s free loan offer;

-

Player and Lechia possibly colluded and planned Player’s termination as he was out
of the protected period, which is evident from the correspondence of the Respondents;

-

None of the allegations made by the Player were backed by any evidence nor he could
point out any clause in the Contract which was allegedly violated by Shakhtar;

-

Shakhtar’s coaching staff has the right to manage the first team and decide the
starting eleven. Absence of Player’s presence in each match of the first team7 until
December 2023 cannot and does not give him right to terminate the Contract;

-

Player did not have sporting just cause to terminate the Contract as wrongfully alleged
by him as the conditions required by Article 15 of the FIFA RSTP are not met.

-

Player did not have just cause to terminate the Contract under Articles 14 and 14bis
of the FIFA RSTP.

-

Thus, the Player violated his obligations towards Shakhtar under Article 13 of the FIFA
RSTP.

-

Lechia and the Player violated its obligations under article 18.3 of the FIFA RSTP by
entering into negotiations with each other absent any prior information given to
Shakhtar to that end and without having received Shakhtar’s consent.”

The compensation
39. Regarding the consequences of terminating the Contract, the Club invoked clause 7.3.2 of
the Contract according to which the Player was liable to pay an amount of EUR 60,000,000
net in case the Player is the party in breach. The Club pointed out the lack of reciprocity in
the above-mentioned clause and requested the DRC not to disregard it but rather adjust it
if deemed excessive.
40. In case the DRC deems that the clause 7.3.2 shall be reduced, the Club, as an alternative,
suggests that the Player shall be liable to pay the pro-rata amount of the liquidated
damages clause which would equal to EUR 16,000,000 net considering that almost sixteen
months of the Contract were left at the time of the termination.
41. As a second alternative, the Club suggested that “the FIFA DRC has a margin of discretion to
reduce it taking into account the circumstances of the case and to the extent that it is no longer
excessive.”

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REF. FPSD-15930

42. As a third alternative, the Club proposed that the amount that could serve as basis for the
determination of the compensation is EUR 700,000, i.e. the Player’s value at the time of the
termination according to Transfermarkt.
43. In case the DRC decided to disregard completely clause 7.3.2 of the Contract, the Club
proposed the following criteria to be taken into account for the determination of the
compensation:
“Pursuant to this criteria, [the Club] contends that the amount due to it should be the
average of what it would have paid the Player for the period 23 February 2024 to 30
June 2025 and the amount that Lechia are paying the Player for the same period. As
per Article 1.1 of the Appendix No. 1 of the Contract, at the time of termination, the
Player’s monthly salary was USD 5.000 NET (five thousand US dollars) […]. Accordingly,
[the Club] was scheduled to pay the Player an amount of USD 81.207 NET (eighty one
thousand two hundred seven US dollars) for the period 23 February 2024 to 30 June
2025.
On 6 March 2024, Lechia announced the signing of the Player […]. However, the
contractual information concerning the amounts that the Player is earning at Lechia
for the period March 2024 to 30 June 2025 is not in public domain.
Accordingly, to calculate the average amount due to [the Club] between the Player’s
Contract and his contract with Lechia, [the Club] respectfully requests the FIFA DRC to
share the financial information so as to calculate the exact amount due to it.
Alternatively, the FIFA DRC can make the said calculation and award the amount to
[the Club] under this head as the value of the same will fall below the amount that
[the Club] seeks pursuant to the liquidated damages clause and hence, it will fall
within the power of FIFA DRC and in the scope of [the Club]’s request for relief.”
44. In addition, the Club requested the amount of USD 30,000 net for the specificity of sport.

The Second Respondent’s role
45. Furthermore, the Club alleged that Lechia “has engaged in abusive conduct along with the
Player, inducing him to terminate the Contract presuming there would be no sporting
consequences either for the Player or for Lechia”.
46. According to the Club, the following events illustrated Lechia’s abusive conduct:
“Lechia sent a free loan offer to [the Club] on 10 January 2024 which is around the time the
Player was required to resume training with [the Club] and he failed to do so;

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REF. FPSD-15930

Despite [the Club] not accepting the offer of Lechia, it kept pressurizing [the Club] and
negotiating with the Player without informing the latter, and in the meantime, the Player
continued to be absent from training by not resuming his contractual obligations with [the
Club];
In his communications of 5 & 15 February 2024, the Player indicated that he has an agreement
with Lechia on his contractual terms meaning thereby that Lechia negotiated with the Player
without [the Club’s] consent being fully aware that the Player has a valid and binding
contractual relationship with the latter until 30 June 2025. Moreover, the Player threatened to
terminate his Contract if he is not allowed to go on free loan to Lechia;
The fact that the Player already started commenting on issues such as protected period and
termination clause, it appears that the Player in cahoot with Lechia had already made up his
mind to terminate the Contract as there were no sporting consequences in the Respondents
opinion. In reality, it appears that Lechia was involved from the very beginning and played a key
role in Player’s termination which is evident from the fact that he immediately signed a contract
with Lechia days after the unjust termination of the Contract with [the Club].”
The request for relief
47. In view of all the above, the Club requested the following relief:
“On these grounds, FC SHAKHTAR DONETSK hereby respectfully requests the FIFA
Dispute Resolution Chamber to rule that:
The claim of FC Shakhtar Donetsk against the Respondents is admitted/accepted.
Lechia made an ITC request under the wrong TMS instruction violating Article 10 of
the Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP.
The Player terminated his Contract without just cause on 22 February 2024.
The Player is liable to pay FC Shakhtar Donetsk the following amounts
An amount of EUR 60.000.000 NET (sixty million euros) as foreseen in clause 7.3.2 of
the Contract between the Player and Shakhtar along with an interest of 5% p.a. as
from 22 February 2024 until the date of effective payment;
As an alternative to point i above, an amount of EUR 16.000.000 NET (sixteen million
euros) representing the pro-rata value of clause 7.3.2 of the Contract between the
Player and Shakhtar along with an interest of 5% p.a. as from 22 February 2024 until
the date of effective payment or to reduce it to an amount which is no longer excessive
as indicated by the doctrine cited in the claim;

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REF. FPSD-15930

As an alternative to points i and ii above, an amount of EUR 700.000 NET (seven
hundred thousand euros) which was the transfer market value of the Player at the
time of termination along with an interest of 5% p.a. as from 22 February 2024 until
the date of effective payment;
As an alternative to points i-iii above, to award Shakhtar the average amount of
salaries of the Player under Article 17.1 of the FIFA RSTP which is to be calculated by
FIFA DRC as Shakhtar does not have a copy of the employment contract of the Player
with Lechia. Such an amount is payable along with an interest of 5% p.a. as from 22
February 2024 until the date of effective payment; OR To grant the request for
production of documents of Shakhtar and allow it a short period of time to calculate
the exact amount due to it under Article 17.1 of the FIFA RSTP;
Additionally, if FIFA disregards clause 7.3.2 and follows the non-exhaustive criteria
under Article 17.1 of the FIFA RSTP, then to award Shakhtar an amount of USD 30.000
NET (thirty-thousand US dollars) under the head of specificity of sport along with an
interest of 5% p.a. as from 22 February 2024 until the date of effective payment in
addition to the amount in point iv above.
Lechia Gdansk SA is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned
compensation.
To impose disciplinary measures and/or sanctions on the Player and Lechia Gdansk
for violation of Articles 17.3 and 17.5 of the FIFA RSTP which is to be determined by
the DRC at its discretion.
To impose appropriate disciplinary measures and/or sanctions on the Player and
Lechia Gdansk for violation of Article 18.3 of the FIFA RSTP which is to be determined
by the DRC at its discretion.”
b. Reply of the First Respondent
48. In its reply and as a preliminary remark, the Player requested the following:
“1. To dismiss the claim on the grounds that the FIFA Football Tribunal is not
competent to resolve the present dispute based on article 186 (2) of PILA (Private
International Law Act adopted by Switzerland);
Alternatively, should the FIFA Football Tribunal decide that it is competent to resolve
the present dispute:
2. to refer the present case to FIFA Mediation;

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REF. FPSD-15930

Alternatively, to reject or dismiss the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and find that the
Respondent 1 terminated his contract with the Claimant with just cause;
Alternatively, should the claim of the Claimant be accepted:
4. To determine that the compensation due for the Claimant shall be limited to 3
monthly salaries of the Respondent 1, i.e. 15,000 USD (say: fifteen thousand US
dollars.”
49. In addition, the Player pointed out that he does not “raise the counterclaim against the Club.
The reason for that related not to lack of grounds, as the Player has terminated his contract due
to just cause, but to the fact that his salary in Lechia Gdansk (present club of employment) is
similar to his salary at the Claimant (former club of employment).” In other words, the Player
did not lodge a counterclaim due to the fact that he has already mitigated his damages.
The facts of the case
50. According to the Player, he had “very limited possibilities to perform for [the Club] and was
always treated as a redundant burden, not a possible prospect”.
51. Allegedly, the Player was approached by the sporting director of the Club and informed
about the possibility to be loaned to Lechia until the end of 2023/2024 season. According
to the Player, the negotiations lasted several weeks and reportedly, the Club gave
permission to Lechia to negotiate the conditions of the loan directly with the Player.
52. The Player alleged that the “core of the dispute is that for several years, [the Club] was not
interested in the professional football services of the Player. The Claimant did not provide the
Player with adequate development conditions, at the same time making it difficult for the Player
to pursue his career in any other football club”.
53. The Player argued that he was sent on loan to FK Mariupol where he suffered both
psychological and physical abuse. He also alleged that his agent informed the Club about
the situation and requested them to return him from loan, however, the Club did not
provide him with any assistance or support.
54. The Player further alleged that the Club undermined his sporting development by refusing
to transfer him permanently to the Swiss club, FC Zurich. The Player argued that the denial
to be permanently transferred to FC Zurich and his non-integration to the Club’s senior
team, constituted an abusive behaviour.
55. In addition, the Player alleged that, on 19 October 2023, he was asked to extend his
Contract for another 4 years in order to receive a salary raise and he was only given one
day to decide.

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REF. FPSD-15930

56. The Player eventually refused the extension of the Contract and claimed that due to his
refusal, he was excluded from the Club’s first team. He further argued that until the
termination of the Contract (i.e., on 22 February 2024), the Club did not field the Player in
any match.
57. Regarding the Club’s allegations about the Europa League game (i.e., that the Player was
registered to play at that game), the Player alleged that he was not aware of this
information and the document provided by the Club is not signed nor dated and
questioned its validity.
58. Regarding the transfer to Lechia, the Player argued that he was approached by the Club
and informed that the Club was considering transferring him to Lechia. According to the
Player, it was the Club’s initiative to transfer him.
59. The Player also argued that the Player’s loan to Lechia was subject to the Player’s consent
to extend the Contract.
60. Furthermore, the Player alleged that he was threatened that if he did not sign the
extension, he would be excluded by the Ukrainian national team. The Player claimed that
the Club’s letter from 7 February 2024 which stated that “your unilateral refusal of the
Contract and actual escape from the Club will be impossible to keep quiet, which in turn will
have a negative impact on your further professional career, both at the European level and at
the level of the U-21 national team” demonstrated that the Club was threatening the Player
with exclusion from the national team.
61. According to the Player, he was not called up to the national team after 22 March 2024,
which was the date of the first match following his unilateral termination.
62. The Player also argued that the Club gave its permission to Lechia to negotiate with the
Player about his transfer.
63. However, as argued by the Player, the Club refused to approve his transfer to Lechia
because he declined to extend his Contract, which, according to the Player, constituted bad
faith and abusive conduct
64. Furthermore, the Player alleged that the Club misinterpreted his letters, claiming that he
did not threat the Club to terminate the Contract, but rather that the letters “constitute a
constructive position of the Player, who seeks his fundamental contractual rights to be respected
and the development of his career as a professional football player to be existent and effective.”
In addition, he claimed that he “warned [the Club] in writing twice that he would have no other
choice but to terminate the Contract, giving the club due time to rectify its breaches and to find
in good faith an amicable solution. [The Club] did not reply with any constructive reply to
Player’s position”.

pg. 16

REF. FPSD-15930

65. Finally, the Player contended that he was left with no other option but to terminate the
Contract.
FIFA’s lack of jurisdiction
66. The Player alleged that the FIFA DRC does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim based
on the facts of the case. According to the Player, art. 22 par. 1 (a) of the Regulations does
not apply to the present case.
67. In particular, the Player alleged that “there is a clear core issue of the dispute arising from the
facts of the case- an ongoing contractual dispute between the Player and [the Club] which with
different intensity lasted since the beginning of the Contract’s term, with culmination in the
2023/2024 football season. The consequence of this dispute was the Player’s termination of the
Contract. Only after this dispute arose, Lechia engaged the Player as a free agent on 5 March
2024. Lechia immediately proceeded with registration of the Player in FIFA TMS. [The Club] was
well aware of this fact (and submits several documents in this regard), however refrained from
raising any claims against the Player and Lechia regarding this ITC request”.
68. The Player argued that the ITC request was not “the cause and the trigger of the present
dispute” as argued by the Club. He further alleged that Lechia did not induce the Player to
terminate the Contract and therefore, the dispute “is of purely contractual nature (Art. 14 of
the FIFA RSTP/ art. 17 of the FIFA RSTP) and is a contractual dispute- not as suggested by the
[Club] dispute concerning the issue of the ITC (Art. 9, Annex 3 to the RSTP)”.
69. In this regard, the Player claimed that the dispute with the Club started 3 years before the
Contract’s termination, “long before Lechia was interested in the free loan of the Player”.
Therefore, Lechia’s ITC request “cannot be recognized as linked to the contractual dispute that
has been ongoing since 2021 and concerns only the Player and [the Club]”.
70. Consequently, according to the Player the claim lacks international dimension. However,
due to the jurisdiction clause the Player is of the opinion that the matter shall be heard by
CAS as per clause 8.2 of the Contract.
71. Finally, the Player claimed that the Club “artificially created a link between its claim for
compensation resulting from the contractual dispute that arose between the club and the Player
with the ITC request filed by Lechia in order to escape the jurisdiction clause which [the Club]
offered to the Player itself”.
The merits of the case
72. According to the Player, he terminated his Contract with just cause for the following
reasons:

pg. 17

REF. FPSD-15930

-

Clear lack of interest in the Player’s services. The Player was never fully integrated
in the team and the Club’s behaviour suggested that they did not intend to integrate
him.

-

He had not played any games since 30 September 2023.

-

The Club made it difficult for the Player to transfer to another club on loan.

-

The Club would offer the Player a salary increase only if he agreed in extending his
Contract.

-

The Club would agree on the Player’s loan to Lechia only if he agreed in extending
his Contract. In addition, the Club threatened the Player with exclusion from the
Ukrainian national team.

-

His career was put at stake due to the Club’s abusive behaviour and lack of support.

-

By including in the Contract a non-reciprocal and extremely disproportionate
damages clause in favour of the Club of a minimum of EUR 60,000,000, the Club
created an unbalanced leverage against the Player in order to put pressure on him
and discourage him from terminating the Contract even in the case where there
was just cause.

-

By their conduct, the Club broke the Player’s trust entirely.

73. The Player also stated that he “duly warned [the Club] of his intent to terminate the Contract
should [the Club] not change its behaviour and attitude towards the Player […].”
74. In view of the above, the Player alleged that the Club’s breaches were serious enough to
justify the termination of the Contract and that the Player could not have reasonably
expected the continuation of the employment relationship.
The financial consequences of the termination
75. Concerning the compensation, the Player alleged that the compensation clause that
established the payment of EUR 60,000,000 net in case of termination by the Player is
utterly disproportionate, non-reciprocal, and shall be disregarded.
76. The Player pointed out that his yearly salary corresponded to USD 60,000 and the
maximum amount to be paid by the Player as compensation would be USD 80,000, i.e. the
residual value of the Contract that corresponds to 1/750 of the amount of USD 60,000,000.
77. In addition, the Player claimed that the Club “did not make any attempt to prove the actual
damage alleged incurred as a result of termination of the Contract by the Player, limiting its

pg. 18

REF. FPSD-15930

argumentation to invoking the minimum amount of compensation provided in Art. 7.3.2 of the
Contract. This, in the Player’s view, is insufficient to establish the club’s damage in the
circumstances of the present case”.
78. In view of the above, the amount of USD 60,000,000 requested as compensation shall be
disregarded.
79. Regarding the alternative amounts given by the Club as compensation, the Player argued
the following:
-

Concerning the amount of EUR 16,000,000 net, the Player alleged that (i) the amount
of USD 60,000,000 shall be disregarded and not reduced, (ii) that the Club failed to
provide any evidence why the indicated amount should be considered as
proportionate and duly reflecting the damage effectively incurred by the Club and
(iii) this amount of compensation corresponds to the amount of EUR 1,000,000 net
for each month of the residual term of the Contract.

-

Concerning the second alternative, the Player alleged that the Club’s request of “an
amount which is no longer excessive as indicated by the doctrine cited in the claim”, is
contrary to the well-established jurisprudence on the burden of proof in
compensation related cases as the amount shall be quantified and justified.

-

Concerning the third alternative of a compensation amounting to EUR 700,000, the
Player strongly objected this request. In particular, the Player alleged that a breach
of contract has as its aim putting the injured party in the position it would have
been, should the breach not occur. The value of the Player’s services as one of the
factors influencing the calculation of damages incurred should be the value at the
time of the breach (i.e. 22 February 2024). The simple screenshot from
Transfermarkt without any further evidence cannot serve as a reliable indicator of
the Player’s value at the time of termination of the Contract. The Player strongly
objected the calculation of his value based on Transfermarkt.

-

Concerning the last alternative, the Club argued that the compensation of USD
30,000 net for the specificity of sport is an unquantifiable factor, and it is not
possible to derive an amount of due compensation solely from this element.

80. In view of the above, the Club argued that even if the Chamber concluded that the
termination was without just cause, the Club shall not be entitled to compensation as they
did not have a real interest in the Player’s services.
81. Furthermore, the Player argued that in case the Chamber takes into consideration the
Ukrainian national law, it shall be noted that “the maximum compensation due from the
employee who gave a proper notice amounts to direct damages only (however not more than

pg. 19

REF. FPSD-15930

one-month salary).” In this regard, the Player made reference to arts. 130 and 132 of the
Labor Code of Ukraine and provided a translation of the above articles.
82. Finally, the Player stated that as the protected period elapsed, “applying sporting sanctions
on the Player or Lechia would be illegitimate.”
c. Reply of the Second Respondent
FIFA’s lack of jurisdiction
83. Lechia disputed the jurisdiction of the FIFA DRC alleging that the dispute at hand is of a
pure contractual, employment-related nature and therefore has a national dimension.
Lechia further claimed that the Contract contained a jurisdiction clause according to which
the competent bodies to entertain the claim would be UAF or CAS.
84. Lechia claimed that the dispute between the parties arose long before the Player signed
the employment contract with them and for reasons not attributable to Lechia.
85. Furthermore, Lechia asserted that the Club voluntarily initiated negotiations regarding the
Player’s loan. On 10 February 2024, the Club granted Lechia permission to engage directly
with the Player to discuss employment terms.
86. Therefore, Lechia argued that ”the sole fact that Lechia in good faith negotiated loan
conditions with [the Club] and negotiated- upon [the Club’s] approval- employment terms with
the Player, does not shift the burden of the dispute to Lechia and does not prove any inducement
on the side of this club. In negotiating these terms, Lechia acted in compliance with the
applicable laws and regulations and in good faith”.
87. In addition, Lechia claimed that the present dispute cannot be linked to the ITC request
made to register the Player. Lechia argued that “unlike it is argued by [the Club], the first
transfer instruction was entered into the TMS by Lechia on 6 March 2024, i.e. on the day after
conclusion with the Player. What was omitted by [the Club] in its claim, ITC request was made
on 7 March 2024 at 15:55:29 (Polish time)”.
88. In this regard, Lechia argued that “Should [the Club] truly derive any claims against Lechia
and the Player in relation to an ITC request, it should have claimed so within a reasonable time
after such ITC request was made. However, being fully aware that Lechia and the Player
concluded a contract and despite the transfer instruction and the ITC request being made
immediately after its conclusion, [the Club] did not raise any claim against the Player and Lechia
on the procedural basis of Art. 22 para. 1 a) of the RSTP”.
89. For that reason, Lechia provided the timeline of the event arguing that the present dispute
cannot be linked to the ITC request:

pg. 20

REF. FPSD-15930

-

“22 February 2024 – Termination of the Shakhtar Contract

-

22 February 2024 – Information from Shakhtar that the Player terminated the Shakhtar
Contract and that Shakhtar intends to pursue legal action against the Player

-

5 March 2024 – Conclusion of the contract between Lechia and the Player

-

6 March 2024 – Registration of a transfer instruction in the TMS

-

7 March 2024 – First ITC request

-

21 March 2024 – Intervention of the PZPN in the TMS

-

1 July 2024 – Second ITC request

-

18 July 2024 – Registration of the Player with Lechia

-

5 September 2024 – Claim of Shakhtar against the Player and Lechia for compensation
for breach of contract.”

90. According to Lechia, the present dispute is of a clear contractual nature, as its essence
revolves solely around the termination of the Contract by the Player and the financial/
sporting consequences thereof. In addition, Lechia argued that the reference to the ITC
request was only secondary and artificial, and made only to find the Player jointly and
severally liable.
91. In view of the above, Lechia asserted that as the Club and the Player are both of Ukrainian
nationality, the dispute lacks international dimension and therefore, FIFA would not be
competent to entertain the claim.
92. In addition, Lechia invoked clause 8.2 of the Contract (jurisdiction clause) and alleged that
the dispute at hand should be referred to the UAF or to CAS directly. According to Lechia,
irrespective of the fact whether this dispute should be considered national or international,
the parties clearly excluded FIFA’s jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of or associated
with the Contract.
The termination of the Contract
93. Regarding the just cause for the termination of the Contract, Lechia argued that “the Player
was subject to an abusive behaviour from the side of [the Club]”.
94. Lechia alleged that it got interested in the Player’s services in the middle of the 2023/2024
season and on 10 January 2024, Lechia sent an official offer to loan the Player free of

pg. 21

REF. FPSD-15930

payments. In addition, according to Lechia, the Club gave its consent for Lechia to negotiate
directly with the Player.
95. Moreover, Lechia contended that negotiations with the Player only commenced after
receiving the Club’s written consent.
96. Lechia further asserted that it contacted the Club on 22 February 2024 and was informed
that the Player had terminated his Contract. Lechia claimed this was the first time it became
aware of the termination.
97. In light of the foregoing, Lechia maintained that it was unaware of the Player’s termination
and did not, in any way, induce or contribute to it.
98. Lechia also reiterated that it got into negotiations with the Player only after having received
the Club’s written consent, and therefore Lechia was in compliance with the FIFA
Regulations.
99. Regarding the employment contract that was signed between Lechia and the Player, the
former argued the following:
“[…] Lechia shall not be regarded as the club inducing the Player to terminate the
contract.
This is not altered by the fact that Lechia eventually concluded the employment
contract with the Player. Faced with lack of employment, his willingness to continue
his professional football career and no other offer, the Player was still interested to
join Lechia. It was indeed the [Club]’s Sporting Director Darijo Srna that recommended
the Player to join Lechia on a loan. Since Lechia was interested in engaging the Player
in his team (hence the loan negotiations and the proposal to transfer the Player
permanently), it eventually agreed to conclude an employment contract with the
Player on the same financial conditions as agreed for the loan (and as previously
agreed by the Player in the [Club’s] Contract) but on a permanent basis.
However, any contact between the Player and Lechia with regard to permanent
employment had taken place after Lechia was informed by [Lechia] of termination of
the Shakhtar Contract. No employment conditions were amended (let alone improved)
in the signed contract with respect to the conditions agreed for the term of the loan.
Therefore, no inducement shall be attributed to Lechia.”
The compensation
100. Regarding the financial consequences of the termination, Lechia argued that the Club
should not have been entitled to receive any compensation, as the Contract was

pg. 22

REF. FPSD-15930

terminated with just cause and it was not interested in effectively and fully continuing the
employment relationship with the Player.
101. However, Lechia contended that, should the DRC decide to award compensation to the
Club, it should not be held jointly and severally liable for such payment, citing the Diarra
judgment in support of its position.
102. In addition, Lechia alleged that irrespective of the fact that they shall not be held jointly and
severally liable, it had to briefly refer to the amounts requested by the Club.
103. In particular, Lechia argued that the amount of EUR 60,000,000 net was grossly
disproportionate and non-reciprocal and should be disregarded.
104. Furthermore, Lechia alleged that the Club failed to make any attempt to prove the actual
damage reportedly incurred as a result of the termination of the Contract in line with the
principle of “positive interest.”
105. Regarding the sporting sanctions, Lechia claimed that the Contract was terminated outside
of the protected period and therefore no sporting sanctions shall be imposed to the Player
or to Lechia.
106. Finally, Lechia stated the following:
“In conclusion, Lechia is of the position that the claim of Shakhtar should be rejected
on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction.
Should the Tribunal decide to resolve the present dispute, Shakhtar's claims should be
rejected on the merits in their entirety. The Player shall not be liable to pay any
compensation to Shakhtar (or, as a matter of utmost precaution, a reduced
compensation based on the objective and duly substantiated criteria, in particular the
salary of the Player or possibly the difference between his salary at his previous club
and the new club).
In any case, Lechia shall not be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to
Shakhtar and no sporting sanctions and/or disciplinary measures shall be imposed
on Lechia and the Player on the basis of relevant provisions of RSTP.”
d. Claimant’s comments regarding the Interim Regulatory Framework
107. light of the interim regulatory framework (hereinafter: the IRF) adopted by the Bureau of
FIFA Council for the Regulations and the Procedural Rules, FIFA general secretariat invited
the Claimant to amend its claim, should it wished so, exclusively in relation to the possible
consequences of the application of the interim regulatory framework to this matter.

pg. 23

REF. FPSD-15930

108. The Claimant argued that the June 2024 edition of the Regulations along with Swiss law
shall be the applicable law to the present dispute and not the January 2025 edition. In
addition, according to the Claimant, the Diarra judgement cannot have effect on the
pending cases.
109. However, and in case that FIFA decided to apply the January 2025 edition of the Regulations
to the present case, the Claimant did not wish to amend its claim or its requests and fully
endorsed the requests for relief mentioned in the claim.
e. Player’s comments regarding the IRF
110. The Player upheld his position outlined in his reply to the claim. Regarding the IRF, he
outlined the following argumentation.
111. Regarding the definition of just cause added in art. 14 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Player
stated that his position regarding the just cause remained unchanged.
112. Concerning the compensation, the Player upheld that no compensation should be due to
the Club since the termination was justified. In addition, the Player stated that the Club
failed to prove that it indeed suffered a damage and also to quantify the damage suffered.
Therefore, it could not be concluded that the Claimant suffered any financial damage as a
result of the termination of the Contract.
113. In addition, the Player alleged that the several and joint liability does no longer apply and
argued that the Club failed to prove any inducement on the side of Lechia.
f. Lechia’s comments regarding the IRF
114. Lechia argued that the IRF is applicable to the present case, despite what the Club asserted
in their comments.
115. According to Lechia, the Club did not quantify, substantiate and prove the damage suffered
in accordance with the “positive interest” principle. The Club entirely failed to discharge its
burden of proof in this respect. In this regard, Lechia analysed each alternative
compensation requested by the Club (par. 14 of the comments) and concluded that the
Club’s request for compensation shall be rejected as unfounded, due to the Claimant’s
failure to duly quantify, substantiate and prove the damage suffered.
116. Finally, Lechia argued that the Club failed to prove that Lechia induced the Player to
terminate the Contract and reiterated that any negotiations between the Club and the
Player were authorized by the Club.
g. Replica of the Claimant

pg. 24

REF. FPSD-15930

Reply on the Player’s position
117. Firstly, the Club rejected the Player’s factual allegations.
118. The Club denied having received any complaints from the Player about his loans during the
Contract and underlined that the Player was loaned only so that he could “grow and develop
so as to be ready for the Claimant’s first team”.
119. The Club also alleged that, as a third party, had no involvement or authority to comment
on any disputes between the Player and the club to which he was loaned. During the loan
periods, the contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Player was suspended,
and the Player was employed by another club.
120. Regarding the Player’s allegations about the Club not being interested in his services as he
did not participate as a starting 11 player in some games in October and November 2023.
The Club disputed the above allegations stating that no professional football player has an
automatic right to start all football games. Football clubs usually have a squad of 25
professional players and only 11 of them are allowed to start each game. However, this
does not imply that for the other 14 players who do not start the game that the Club is not
interested in their services. In addition, the Club contended that a football coach has a
margin of discretion to decide his starting 11 for each game and the club officials or the
players shall not intervene in this decision. Moreover, the Club argued that there is no
clause in the agreement granting the Player the right to start each match.
121. Concerning the loan negotiations with Lechia, the Club alleged that it did not have any
obligation to accept a loan free of payments.
122. The Club acknowledged that, on 10 February 2024, it gave its consent to Lechia to speak
directly with the Player as (i) Lechia and the Player had already agreed on employment
terms as per the Player’s letter of 5 February 2024 and (ii) the Club and Lechia would have
to agree on the loan terms.
123. According to the Club, despite the fact that the Player and Lechia agreed on their
employment terms, the negotiations between the Club and Lechia failed as the latter would
only accept a loan free of payments whereas the Club wanted to receive compensation for
loaning the Player.
124. Moreover, the Club alleged that the Player and Lechia orchestrated the Player’s termination
being aware of the fact that the Player was out of the protected period and no sporting
sanctions would apply to neither of them.
125. Secondly, the Club rejected the allegations about FIFA not having jurisdiction to entertain
the present case as the national body would not have jurisdiction over Lechia.

pg. 25

REF. FPSD-15930

126. Thirdly, and regarding the just cause to terminate his Contract, the Club argued that the
Player did not have the right to start each match, and the termination does not meet the
criteria of article 15 of the Regulations.
127. The Club argued that from the 3 letters sent by the Player, it was clear that he was looking
for a reason to terminate his Contract since he stated that he was out of the protected
period.
128. The Club further contended that on 5 February 2024, the Player was already indicating his
intention to transfer to Lechia and directly addressed the legal consequences of a potential
termination. Therefore, according to the Club it was clear that the Player intended to
terminate his Contract and transfer to Lechia, with or without the Club’s consent.
129. To sum up, the Club reiterated that the Player did not have just cause to terminate the
Contract for the following reasons:
“If a player does not start football matched for sporting reasons for 2 months, it does
not mean he has the right to terminate the Contract or the Claimant is not interested
in his services (only 11 players out of 25 start every match);
The Player does not have a contractual right to start every match and as per CAS
jurisprudence coaches have the freedom to decide their starting XI without players
and third clubs interfering;
The Player cannot complain about being sent on loan earlier in his career as it was
for his development and such a complaint is time-barred;
Claimant “offered” a salary increase and contract extension which was rejected by the
Player as Lechia asked him to do so, there is no bad faith from the Claimant and on
the contrary it is abusive behaviour of Lechia to induce the Player;
Claimant is free to decide on its transfer-related matters and has no legal obligation
to follow the advice of Lechia to accept a free loan;
The existence of the liquidated damages clause in a contract cannot be the reason for
termination of the Contract.”
130. Regarding the consequences of such unlawful termination, the Club alleged that it incurred
damages and shall be compensated for the Player’s replacement costs and the sporting
damage.
131. The Club alleged that given the Player’s young age and his position, it took the Claimant a
period of one year to replace him.

pg. 26

REF. FPSD-15930

132. In this regard, the Club alleged that the demand for Ukrainian players has been high
amongst all Ukrainian clubs due to the enactment of Annex 7 of the Regulations.
Additionally, replacing the Player with a foreign one has been equally challenging as FIFA
extended the application of Annex 7 until 30 June 2025. Therefore, the war created a
significant barrier for foreign players to come to Ukraine to play football.
133. In view of the above, the Club alleged that despite having the obligation to mitigate its
damages, it was not possible to do so due to the circumstances explained above until
February 2025 when the Club transferred the Brazilian player Kaua Elias Nogueira
(hereinafter: the New Player) with a fixed transfer fee of EUR 17,000,000. In addition, the
Club argued that it also incurred the cost of EUR 2,000,000 in the form of agent fees.
134. According to the Club, the New Player plays exactly in the same position as the Player and
the Club obtained him as a result of the Player’s termination without just cause.
135. The Club further alleged that despite having paid EUR 17,000,000 to obtain the New Player,
he is not always in the starting 11, which further demonstrates that not having the Player
in the starting 11 does not mean that the Club is not interested in the Player’s services.
136. Based on the above, the Club requested the amount of EUR 19,000,000 net as replacement
costs of the Player. According to the Club, this amount shall be paid by the Player and
Lechia as it is jointly and severally liable for the payment of this amount.
137. However, the Club argued that the amount of USD 81,207 net or EUR 71,500 net shall be
deducted from the amount of EUR 19,000,000 as it represents the salary that the Player
would have earned at the Club should the Contract not be terminated.
138. Consequently, the Club requested the amount of EUR 18,928,500 net as replacements
costs of the Player.
139. In addition, the Club alleged that the Player’s termination also caused sporting damage to
the Player as it had less players in the forward position. This allegedly impacted the Club in
all competitions that it was participating in during that period, i.e. the leagues, the cup and
the UEFA club competition.
140. The Club also requested the amount of USD 81,207 net as the average of the Player’s
remuneration between the two contracts, i.e. the Contract and the New Contract.
Reply on Lechia’s position
141. The Club stated that Lechia induced the Player to terminate the Contract for the following
reasons:

pg. 27

REF. FPSD-15930

-

“The Player was outside the protected period and hence there would be, in principle, no
sporting sanctions for either the Player and/or Lechia;

-

Lechia offered free loan which was rejected by the Claimant. Hence, Lechia induced the
Player by possibly offering him a starting XI position seeing that he was not starting all
matches for the Claimant;

-

The Player in his first communication dated 5 February 2024 to the Claimant already
started addressing the consequences of the termination and legal issued which had no
link to Claimant’s request that he should resume training which he voluntarily and for no
reason skipped for 3 weeks up until that moment. The letter was drafted by the legal
counsel of Player who is also the legal counsel of Lechia;

-

As from 5 February 2024 the Player started blackmailing the Claimant to accept Lechia’s
offer of free loan which is an indication that he agreed the employment conditions with
Lechia without the consent of the Claimant;

-

The Player abandoned the Contract since the time Lechia made the free loan offer;

-

The Player threatened to terminate the Contract, which he ended up doing, if not allowed
to go on a free loan to Lechia.”

142. In addition, the Club made the following evidentiary request:
“The Claimant respectfully requests FIFA to order the Respondents to produce a copy
of the side agreements/addendum/annex etc to the employment contract between the
Player and Lechia.
Further, the Claimant respectfully requests FIFA to order the Player to produce a copy
of his bank statements from 1 March 2024 until 30 June 2025 which will evidence the
salary he is receiving at Lechia.
Such documents exist and are in the possession of the Respondents. These documents
will help demonstrate the Player's actual salary at Lechia. The Claimant will not be
surprised if the Respondents acted in cahoot to hide a portion of his salary in a
different document not uploaded in FIFA TMS so as to limit Claimant's financial
compensation in case the FIFA DRC applies the criteria of average salary of Player in
old and new contract.
Pursuant to Article 13 para. 6 of FIFA Procedural Rules, Respondents have a duty in
fact finding and adverse inference should be drawn from their refusal to submit
requested documents.”
143. Finally, the Club modified its request for relief as follows (point iv.):

pg. 28

REF. FPSD-15930

“On these grounds, FC SHAKHTAR DONETSK hereby respectfully requests the FIFA Dispute
Resolution Chamber to rule that:
1. FIFA Football Tribunal is competent and has jurisdiction to decide on the dispute.
2. The claim of FC Shakhtar Donetsk against the Respondents is admitted/accepted.
3. Lechia made an ITC request under the wrong TMS instruction violating Article 10 of
the Annexe 3 of the FIFA RSTP June 2024 edition.
4. The Player terminated his Contract without just cause on 22 February 2024.
5. The Player is liable to pay FC Shakhtar Donetsk the following amounts:
i.

EUR 60,000,000 NET as foreseen in clause 7.3.2 of the Contract between
the Player and Shakhtar, with 5% interest p.a. from 22 February 2024
until effective payment.

ii.

Alternatively, EUR 16,000,000 NET representing the pro-rata value of
clause 7.3.2, with 5% interest p.a. from 22 February 2024 until effective
payment, or subject to reduction if deemed no longer excessive.

iii.

Alternatively, EUR 700,000 NET, the transfer market value at the time
of termination, with interest from the date of effective payment.

iv.

Alternatively, if liquidated damages are not applied, EUR 18,928,500
NET as replacement costs.

v.

Alternatively, USD 81,207 NET as salary.

vi.

Additionally, USD 30,000 NET disregarding Article 17 RSTP criteria.

6. Lechia Gdansk is jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned compensation.
7. Impose disciplinary measures/sanctions on the Player and Lechia Gdansk under
Articles 17(13), 17(5).
8. Impose appropriate disciplinary measures/sanctions on the Player and Lechia Gdansk
under Article 18(3).”

pg. 29

REF. FPSD-15930

h. Duplica of the Player
144. The Player disputed most of the Club’s allegations and argued that he was systematically
marginalized and neglected regarding his development. He also alleged that the Club was
“ultimately not interested in the direct football services of the Player aiming only to keep his
economical rights just in case he managed to gain value during the loans”.
145. The Player further argued that after refusing to extend his Contract in October 2023, the
Player was excluded from matches without valid sporting or medical reason. He also
denied the Club’s allegations that he was integrated into the first team and provided
statistics showing his exclusion from competitions.
146. He also clarified that his warning letters were meant to protect his rights and were not
evidence of blackmail or pre-agreed terms with Lechia.
147. Regarding FIFA’s competence, the Player reiterated his objection, alleging that the dispute
is of a domestic nature and invoking the jurisdiction clause of the Contract.
148. He argued that the dispute arose before his international transfer to Lechia but the Club is
trying to link the case to an ITC request to give it an international dimension.
149. Concerning the termination, the Player asserted that he had just cause to terminate the
Contract due to the Club’s conduct. He cited exclusion from matches, bad faith
negotiations, threats and psychological hardship as the main reasons of the termination.
150. The Player further argued that the Club shall not be entitled to compensation, as his
termination was justified and the Club had no real interest in his services.
151. He also challenged the request regarding replacement costs, stating that the hiring of the
New Player was not linked to his departure and was also raised belatedly. According to the
Player, the New Player played a different position, and the time gap between transfers
further demonstrates that there is not any direct connection between the two.
152. The Player also rejected any claims of sporting damage, invoking his exclusion from
matches and the unreliability of the Player’s Transfermarkt value.
153. Finally, the Player requested that the Club’s amended request for relief to be declared as
inadmissible as he was invited to amend its request for relied, on 30 March 2025, and in its
submission of 17 April 2025 the Club explicitly gave up this possibility.

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REF. FPSD-15930

i.

Duplica of Lechia

154. Despite being invited to do so, Lechia did not provide its final comments.

pg. 31

REF. FPSD-15930

III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
155. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 5 September 2024 and submitted for decision
on 13 November 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
156. Furthermore, the Chamber observed that it is undisputed that both the Club and the Player
share the Ukrainian nationality. In this regard, the Chamber determined that art. 22 par. 1
lit. b) of the Regulations cannot be applied to the present case, as FIFA’s jurisdiction is
contingent on the employment-related dispute having an international dimension.
157. Nonetheless, the Chamber recalled that art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the Regulations establishes
that FIFA is competent to hear “disputes between clubs and players in relation to the
maintenance of contractual stability (articles 13-18) where there has been an ITC request and a
claim from an interested party in relation to said ITC request, in particular regarding the issue
of the ITC, sporting sanctions or compensation for breach of contract.”
158. The Chamber also recalled that, in the present case, the UFA rejected the issuance of the
ITC by stating that “there has been no mutual agreement regarding early termination of the
employment contract between the former club and the professional player.” Additionally, the
Players’ Status Chamber passed a decision on 18 July 2024 granting the ITC request, without
prejudice to any possible decision from the DRC and/or the competent decision-making
body on the substance of the potential or existing contractual dispute between the player
and his former club (as well as his new club).
159. In this respect, the Chamber concluded that, based on the above provision, the Football
Tribunal has in principle jurisdiction to hear the Club’s claim.
160. Notwithstanding the above, the DRC observed that both respondents have disputed its
jurisdiction on the following two grounds that will be analysed one by one below:
The international dimension
161. Regarding the international dimension, the Chamber recalled that art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the
Regulations as introduced in the January 2025 editions, reads as follows:

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REF. FPSD-15930

“Without prejudice to the right of any player, coach, association or club to seek redress
before a civil court for employment-related disputes, FIFA is competent to hear:
a) Disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of
contractual stability (articles 13-18) where there has been an ITC request and
a claim from an interested party in relation to said ITC request, in particular
regarding the issue of the ITC, sporting sanctions or compensation for breach
of contract.”
162. In light of the above wording and considering the evolution of the Football Tribunal’s
jurisdiction and the regulatory framework, the factor in determining whether FIFA has
jurisdiction - and specifically whether the dispute has an international dimension - is the
involvement of a new club affiliated to a different member association.
163. In other words, the existence of and connection to an ITC request (or a dispute related
thereto) must be interpreted broadly, particularly since the current Regulations no longer
allow a party or federation to reject the delivery of an ITC, in order to safeguard the player’s
contractual freedom (cf., art. 11 par. 3 of Annexe 3 to the FIFA RSTP).
164. This interpretation has already been supported by CAS, in CAS 2023/A/9955, where it
established the following:
“70. The need for a club to oppose the issue of the ITC is not a decisive element in the
context of the jurisdictional question at stake here and does not necessarily follow
from the interpretation of Article 22(1) (a) RSTP. Any dispute in which a club requests
the payment of compensation for a player's alleged breach of contract, extending that
liability, by virtue of Article 17 (2) RSTP, to the new club, is normally implicitly related
to the issue of that player's ITС.
[...]
75. In relation with the jurisdictional issue, the Panel is satisfied that in the
present case, the jurisdiction of the FIFA DRC should only have been excluded (i) if
the filing of the Claim against the New Club was an obvious "abuse of rights"; or
(ii) if the period of time between the termination of the Employment Contract
and the signature of the New Employment Contract was so totally, manifestly long
as to reveal that the relation between those events is without any doubt inherently
“segmented” (see, among others, CAS 2009/A/1996, para. 38, in which the Panel
decided that thirteen months constituted a sufficiently long period to conclude no
foreign club had been involved in the controversy; on the other hand, see CAS
2020/A/7054, para. 203, in which that Panel concluded that Article 22(1)(a) RSTP
might be subject to an exception in case where a lot of time passes between the
termination of the old contract and the international move to a new club).”

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REF. FPSD-15930

165. Notwithstanding the above, in the present case, there has been an ITC dispute as the
relevant transfer took place before the entry into force of the January 2025 edition of the
Regulations.
166. Taking into account all the above, as well as the involvement of Lechia, a foreign club, the
Chamber concluded that the present dispute is of an international dimension.
The jurisdiction clause
167. In continuation, the Chamber noted that regarding the jurisdiction clause, both
respondents contested the DRC’s competence in favour of the NDRC of Ukraine or the CAS.
168. In the present matter, the Chamber noted that the jurisdiction clause of the Contract
stipulates that any dispute arising from the Contract shall be “submitted for resolution at the
option of the claimant to:
the relevant authority of the Ukrainian Association of Football; or
the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne (Switzerland), where the dispute will be settled in
strict accordance with the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The language of proceedings will be
English”.
169. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that art. 22 par. 1 states as follows:
“Without prejudice to the right of any player, coach, association, or club to seek redress before
a civil court for employment-related disputes, FIFA is competent to hear:
a) disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability
(articles 13-18) where there has been an ITC request and a claim from an interested party in
relation to said ITC request, in particular regarding the issue of the ITC, sporting sanctions or
compensation for breach of contract.”
170. In this context, the Chamber emphasised that disputes falling within the scope of art. 22
par. 1 lit. a) of the RSTP are subject to the jurisdiction of FIFA and cannot be validly
derogated from by means of a contractual jurisdiction clause in favour of other arbitral
bodies, except for the possibility of recourse to ordinary civil courts.
171. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the respondents’ objections to the
competence of the DRC to deal with the present matter and held that the DRC is
competent, on the basis of art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the Regulations, to consider the present
matter as to the substance.

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REF. FPSD-15930

172. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
173. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the Transfer Matching System (TMS).
c. Merits of the dispute
174. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
175. Moving to the substance of the matter, the Chamber took note of the fact that the Claimant
alleged that the Player breached the Contract and transferred to Lechia, which would have
induced the Player to terminate his Contract.
176. Therefore, the Chamber had to decide (i) whether the Player had just cause to terminate
the Contract; (ii) in such case, determine the consequences therein and (iii) subsequently,
whether Lechia should be held jointly liable to pay compensation for having induced the
player to breach his Contract.
177. Before proceeding with the analysis of the case, the Chamber wished to reiterate that the
following facts must be taken into consideration:
-

On 10 January 2024, Lechia sent to the Club an offer to engage the Player on loan;

-

On 5 February 2024, the Player sent a letter to the Club stating that “I will have no
other choice but to terminate my agreement with your club if you continue to refuse
to let me play in Poland on loan for the next 6 months to come without requesting me
to previously extend my contract with your club”.

pg. 35

REF. FPSD-15930

-

On 10 February 2024, the Club gave Lechia its permission to negotiate with the
Player directly;

-

On 15 February 2024: The Player sent a new letter to the Club stating that “I have
to warn you one more time that if you are not going to accept to let me go on loan to
the club that is prepared to give me the opportunity to exercise my profession to the
best of my interests, I will have no other option but to terminate my contract”.;

-

On 22 February 2024, the Player terminated his Contract with the Club by sending
a termination letter invoking (i) the “limited opportunities to play in senior football”,
(ii) the Club’s denial to transfer him on loan abroad, (iii) the lack of trust towards
the Club and (iv) the alleged abusive clause of EUR 60,000,000 that was intended
to keep him to the Club and limit his opportunities abroad.;

-

On 5 March 2024, the Player signed a new employment contract with Lechia;

-

On 5 July 2024, the UAF rejected the issuance of the Player’s ITC to the PFF.

178. The Chamber took note of the fact that the Player argued that he had just cause to
terminate his Contract as the Club “broke entirely the trust the Player had in it as his employer
and a contractual party".
179. In particular, the Chamber recalled that the Player invoked the following reasons:
-

The Club never fully integrated him in the team “as provided in the Contract”;

-

His only possibility to participate in organized football was to be loaned to another
football club;

-

The Club’s attitude in the negotiations of the loan with Lechia resulted in him being
deprived of participating in organized club football for half of the 2023/2-24 football
season;

-

The Club negotiated his loan to Lechia in bad faith making its consent to the loan
conditional to him accepting to extend his Contract with the Club;

-

The Club was threatening him to sign the extension and had a hostile, abusive
behaviour towards him. In addition, the Club did not support him in his sporting
development and put his career at stake;

-

The compensation clause of EUR 60,000,000 was unilateral, non-reciprocal,
extremely disproportionate and created an unbalanced leverage to put pressure on

pg. 36

REF. FPSD-15930

him and discouraging him from terminating his Contract.
180. In addition, the Chamber observed that in both his letters sent to the Club, the Player stated
that if the Club did not loan him to Lechia, he would have no other option but to terminate
his Contract.
181. In this regard, the Chamber underlined that according to art. 14 of the Regulations, “a
contract may be terminated by either party without consequences of any kind (either payment
of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions) where there is just cause. In general, just
cause shall exist in any circumstance in which a party can no longer reasonably and in good
faith be expected to continue a contractual relationship”.
182. Hence, the Chamber had to analyse whether the arguments brought forward by the Player
could amount to just cause for terminating his Contract.
183. In this respect, the Chamber considered that it was clear that the Player wanted to transfer
to Lechia, having reiterated multiple times in his letters to the Club that, if it did not consent
to his transfer, he would have no other option but to terminate the Contract.
184. The Chamber also noted that the Club on the other hand, argued that it was not interested
in transferring the Player on loan free of payments and the negotiations between the two
clubs failed.
185. To conclude, the Chamber observed that, (i) the Player plainly demonstrated his willingness
to early terminate the Contract solely as a consequence of the Club’s reticence to allow his
loan; (ii) there is no indication on file of unpaid salaries, nor abusive behaviour of any kind
from the side of the Club, notwithstanding the Player’s claims in this regard.
186. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber determined that the Player lacked any just cause to
prematurely terminate the Contract with the Club. As a closing note, the Chamber recalled
that terminating a contract prior to its mutually agreed expiry is an ultima ratio measure,
to be taken only when the employment relationship can no longer be expected to continue
in good faith. The DRC notes that a unilateral premature termination of an employment
contract can only be an ultima ratio measure according to the merits of each case. The
circumstances of the case show that that the unilateral termination in the case at hand
cannot be considered as an ultima ratio measure.
ii. Consequences
187. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of such unjustified breach of contract committed by the Respondent.
188. First, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount
of compensation shall be calculated, in particular, and unless otherwise provided for in the

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REF. FPSD-15930

contract at the basis of the dispute, taking into account the damage suffered, according to
the positive interest principle, having regard for the individual facts and circumstances of
each case, and with due consideration for the law of the country concerned. According to
the principle of positive interest, the claiming party must be put in the position it would
find itself, had the breach of the contract not occurred and had the contract been duly
performed.
189. Before addressing how the principle of positive interest would apply to this case, the
Chamber first had to assess whether the Contract contained a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of a breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber
observed that the parties did agree on a compensation clause.
190. According to clause 7 of the Contract, “If the Football Player is the party guilty of terminating
the Contract without good reason, the Football Player shall fully compensate the Club for the
damages caused in accordance with the principle of restitutio in integrum (positive interest), but
in any case the amount of damages shall not be less than 60,000,000 (sixty million) Euros”.
191. The Chamber reminded that the parties are free to agree on the consequences of early
termination of the Contract, provided that they are proportionate and reciprocal in
accordance with the jurisprudence of the DRC.
192. In this regard, the Chamber noted that clause 7 of the Contract imposes an amount of
compensation to be paid only in case the Player breaches the Contract. Therefore, and
without even entering into the analysis of the proportionality, the Chamber decided that
such clause shall be disregarded as it is non-reciprocal.
193. Having established the above, the Chamber held that the compensation payable by the
Player to the Club has to be assessed in application of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations,
beginning with the consideration for the damage suffered by the club, guided by the
positive interest principle.
194. Bearing in mind the above principle and art. 13 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, the Club
shall quantify, substantiate and prove the damage that it claimed having suffered as a
result of a breach of a contract.
195. In view of the above, the Chamber analysed below each of the amounts claimed as damage
and recalled that the Club requested the following relief:
-

“EUR 60,000,000 NET as foreseen in clause 7.3.2 of the Contract between the Player
and Shakhtar, with 5% interest p.a. from 22 February 2024 until effective payment.

pg. 38

REF. FPSD-15930

-

Alternatively, EUR 16,000,000 NET representing the pro-rata value of clause 7.3.2,
with 5% interest p.a. from 22 February 2024 until effective payment, or subject to
reduction if deemed no longer excessive.

-

Alternatively, EUR 700,000 NET, the transfer market value at the time of
termination, with interest from the date of effective payment.

-

Alternatively, if liquidated damages are not applied, EUR 18,928,500 NET as
replacement costs.

-

Alternatively, USD 81,207 NET as salary.

-

Additionally, USD 30,000 NET disregarding Article 17 RSTP criteria.”

The pro rata value of the compensation clause
196. The Club alternatively requested the DRC to reduce the compensation clause to the extent
that it is no longer excessive. In particular, the Club deemed an amount of EUR 16,000,000
net to be fair and proportionate considering the Player’s attitude, the severity of the breach
of contract, and the fact that almost 16 months of the Contract were left at the time of the
termination without just cause.
197. However, the Chamber considered these arguments not to be sufficiently specific and
substantiated to justify setting the compensation clause at the (arbitrary value of) EUR
16,000,000.
198. Thus, and as already concluded in par. 191 above, the Chamber reiterated that clause 7 of
the Contract should be disregarded in its entirety, rather than reduced, as it does not meet
the requirement of reciprocity.
The Player’s Transfermarkt value
199. The Chamber noted that the Club requested as a second alternative, the value of the Player
at the time of the termination according to Transfermarkt, corresponding to EUR 700,000
net.
200. According to the Club, the Player’s market value remained the same during the months of
January and February 2024.
201. However, the Chamber deemed that the Player’s value on Transfermarkt cannot serve as
the basis of the calculation of the compensation as it is not based on an objective or
verifiable methodology.
202. In light of the above, the Chamber decided to reject such request.

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REF. FPSD-15930

The replacement costs
203. The Club further alleged that it replaced the Player in February 2025, with the New Player
paying a transfer fee of EUR 17,000,000 and EUR 2,000,000 as agent fees. In this regard,
the Club provided the relevant agreements.
204. The Club alleged that the New Player plays exactly in the same position as the Player and
was transferred as a result of the Player’s termination.
205. In view of the above, the Club requested EUR 19,000,000 as compensation corresponding
to the replacement costs that the Club incurred to replace the Player.
206. According to the Football Tribunal’s jurisprudence, for compensation to be due in such
instances, there must be a logical nexus between the breach and the replacement costs
claimed. In other words, a club claiming replacement costs as head of damage needs to
prove an actual loss flowing naturally from the unjustified termination of the contract. This
also entails that the replacement player’s profile must be similar to that of the replaced
player, that the club decided to hire the player because of the termination of the other
player, and that the costs arising therefrom are reasonable and foreseeable. Whether the
replacement costs claimed are reasonable and foreseeable depends on the circumstances
of each case, for instance and without limitation, on the time of the unjustified termination
(e.g. during the last days of a registration period), the difficulty of finding a replacement
player, the replaced player’s importance on the team, analysed on an objective basis (e.g.
goals scored) and the salaries paid to each the replaces and the replacement player.
207. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the Club hired the New Player in February 2025
(i.e., a year after the Player’s termination). The Club argued that it took a year to replace
the Player due to several challenges, including the ongoing war in Ukraine and FIFA’s Annex
7 of the Regulations. Although conditions improved during the 2024/2025 season, the Club
alleged that it still faced limitations in mitigating its damaged quickly, especially compared
to top European club. Eventually, in February 2025, the Club replaced the player by signing
the New Player.
208. In this regard, the Club invoked the CAS jurisprudence and in particular the following two
decisions:
CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A.
“26. Whilst there is an obligation on the old club to mitigate its position, how this is done in
practice will vary from case to case. In some instances the breach is not in accordance with the
notice “window” detailed in Art. 17.3 of the Regulations and the old club may find it impossible
to mitigate immediately, as they are outside a transfer window; in other cases clubs may do
nothing, when they could have or may seek to bring in a replacement player of greater value
than the player in breach – in all instances it is the judging authorities’ role to review the

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REF. FPSD-15930

particular facts of the case concerned, with the benefit of being able to look back at what actually
was done and how that worked out in the specific case.”
CAS 2018/A/5607 RSCA v. Matías Ezequiel Suárez & CA Belgrano
“124. In order for RSCA to successfully claim replacement costs, RSCA must substantiate that Mr
[M] was hired to replace the Player. Only then can Mr [M]’s acquisition costs be claimed as
compensation under Article 17, para. 1 RSTP. Following Matuzalem, this requires the RSCA to
prove (i) that the players played in more or less the same position on the field, and (ii) that there
is a link between the Player’s premature termination of the Employment Contract and the hiring
of the new player (CAS 2008/A/1519 & 1520, at para. 136). The Panel finds that RSCA satisfied
both requisites.”
209. The Club alleged that the abovementioned requirements laid down by CAS have been met
as the Player and the New Player play exactly in the same position and the latter was
recruited as a result of the former’s termination without just cause.
210. In addition, the Club contended having adopted a similar methodology with the New Player
as the one adopted with the Player (i.e., slowly integrating him into the team and not
regularly fielding him in the starting eleven, despite the EUR 17,000,000 transfer fee paid
to acquire him).
211. The Chamber found that the logical nexus and the replacement costs cannot be
established in casu due to the following reasons:
- the New Player was engaged by the Club a year after the termination, i.e. in the second
registration period after the Player’s termination;
- the Player’s Contract would expire 4 months after the signature of the New Player’s
contract and the payment of the transfer fee of EUR 17,000,000.
212. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber considered that the Club failed to discharge its
burden of proof in demonstrating that the New Player was in fact hired in order to replace
the First Respondent. Therefore, the Chamber held that the Claimant’s contentions in this
respect must be rejected.
The average salary of the Player under the Contract and the New Contract
213. Alternatively, the Club requested the amount of USD 81,207 net corresponding to the
salaries that the Club would have paid for the period between 23 February 2024 until 30
June 2025.

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REF. FPSD-15930

214. The Club argued that the Player’s salary under the New Contract corresponded to USD
5,000 net, i.e. the same as under the Contract and therefore, the amount requested
corresponds to the residual value of the Contract.
215. The Player, for his part, requested the application of the Ukrainian law and in particular the
labour code according to which “the maximum compensation due from the employee who
gave a proper notice amounts to direct damages only (however not more than one-month
salary)”.
216. The Chamber firstly assessed the Player’s request for the ease of methodology.
217. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that art. 17 of the Regulations read as follows:
“In all cases, the party that has suffered as a result of a breach of contract by the
counterparty shall be entitled to receive compensation. Subject to the provisions of
article 20 and Annexe 4 in relation to training compensation, and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract, compensation for the breach shall be calculated taking
into account the damage suffered, according to the ‘positive interest’ principle, having
regard to the individual facts and circumstances of each case, and with due
consideration for the law of the country concerned.”
218. In this regard, the Chamber made reference to the explanatory notes regarding the IRF and
pointed out that if a party wishes FIFA to treat the law of the country concerned as one of
the factors to be considered within the overall calculation as per the “positive interest”
principle, that party shall have the burden of demonstrating the relevance of a particular
national law, its exact content and to what precise effect it should be considered by the
Football Tribunal.
219. The Chamber explained that the reasoning of this requirement is as follows: in its
jurisprudence, the DRC needs to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, a
uniform case law and application of FIFA regulations in order to set uniform standards for
the industry, which provides transparent and predictable criteria, inter alia, for the
calculation of compensation for breach of contract, and, on the other hand, giving due
consideration for the law of the country concerned when calculating compensation under
art. 17 of the Regulations. The burden to demonstrate (1) the relevance (applicability) of a
particular national law, (2) its exact content, and (3) to what precise effect it should be
considered by the Football Tribunal, lies on the party invoking a national law.
220. In the present case, the Chamber noted that the Player requested the DRC to take into
consideration the national law of Ukraine when determining the compensation that shall
be paid to the Club and merely made reference to arts. 130 and 132 of the Labor Code of
Ukraine and provided a translation of these articles.

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REF. FPSD-15930

221. However, the Chamber considered that the Player failed to discharge its burden to
demonstrate, in particular, why and how these two provisions would be applicable to the
present case and, more specifically, to the calculation of the compensation.
222. Turning to the Club’s position concerning the value of compensation to be awarded, the
Chamber noted that art. 17 par. 1 does not establish the residual value of the contract as
the primary or automatic basis for calculating compensation. Rather, the residual value
may serve as a reference point, but only insofar as it is supported by evidence of actual
harm.
223. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that an amount corresponding to the amount payable
to a player for rendering his services as football player under an employment contract,
could be – and in certain specific cases, has been considered – appropriate to establish the
damage suffered by the claimant club. It could be considered reasonable to have as
departure point the fact that, under a fixed-term employment contract both parties (player
and club) have a similar and mutual interest and expectation that the term of the
employment contract will be respected, subject to termination by mutual consent or the
existence of just cause.
224. The Chamber also referenced the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means
that agreements must be respected by parties in good faith and is a fundamental principle
of contractual stability and contract law. Indeed, when a player and a club sign an
employment contract, both parties are fully entitled to assume that both parties will comply
with their contractual obligations towards each other; if a different approach was adopted,
this could mean disregarding such an essential principle (FPSD-13969, FPSD-16859, FPSD16957).
225. In view of all the above and based on the individual facts and circumstances of the case at
hand, the Chamber considered that the Player’s remuneration as foreseen in the Contract
could a priori be awarded as it constitutes a reliable basis on which to establish the
economic value that the Player’s services represented for the Club and this remuneration
bears correlation to his value as player, which the Club lost (and which caused damage to
the Club) in light of the Player’s breach of contract.
226. Taking into account that the Contract was terminated on 22 February 2024 and would
expire on 30 June 2025, the residual value of the Contract that could serve as the basis to
calculate the compensation is USD 81,071 (USD 5,000 net per month for 6 days and 16
months).
227. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the basis for the calculation of the compensation is
the amount of USD 81,071, i.e. the residual value of the Contract.
228. In line with the request for relief, and taking into consideration the Claimant’s request as
well as the constant practice of the Football Tribunal in this regard, the Chamber decided

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REF. FPSD-15930

to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the compensation as from 22
February 2024 until the date of effective payment.
iii. Joint liability
229. Before entering into the question of Lechia’s alleged inducement, the Chamber wished to
recall the following undisputed facts:
-

Lechia had made an offer and sent multiple follow ups to the Club asking to transfer
the Player on loan.

-

The Club gave written permission to Lechia to directly negotiate the employment
terms for the loan with the Player.

-

The Player had sent letters to the Club stating that if the Club does not transfer the
Player on loan to Lechia, he will terminate the Contract.

-

11 days after terminating the Contract with the Club, the Player signed the New
Contract with Lechia.

230. The Chamber also recalled that art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, provide as follows:
“[…] A player’s new club shall be held jointly liable to pay compensation if, having regard to the
individual facts and circumstances of each case, it can be established that the new club induced
the player to breach their contract.”
231. In addition, the Chamber reiterated that the definition no. 4 of the Regulations defines “new
club” as the club that the player is joining. Moreover, the latest edition of the Commentary
of the Regulations (p.205) stated in relation to art. 17 par. 2: that “When determining which
club is to be regarded as the player’s new club for these purposes, the approach has consistently
been to identify the club with which the player was first registered following the breach of
contract […]”.
232. In view of the above and the amendments in the January 2025 edition of the Regulations,
the Chamber noted that the definition of “new club” remained unchanged. Therefore, in the
present case, the “new club” is Lechia.
233. Having established the above, the Chamber entered into the analysis of art. 17 par. 2 of
the Regulations.
234. As explained in the explanatory notes of the IRF, the Chamber noted that the rationale for,
and the purpose of, this rule is to ensure that all decisions on joint and several liability can
be rendered with full regard to the individual facts and circumstances of each case, and

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REF. FPSD-15930

that joint and several liability will only apply if it can be established that a player’s new club
induced the player to breach their contract.
235. Therefore, the burden of proof has been reversed as the new club will be held liable to pay
compensation only if the claiming club can prove that the new club induced a player to
breach their contract.
236. The Chamber also reminded that despite the fact that the Claimant was given the
opportunity to amend its claim after the entry into force of the IRF, the latter insisted that
the IRF is not applicable to the present case and Lechia shall be held jointly and severally
liable for the payment of the compensation.
237. The Chamber took note of the facts of the case which demonstrate that Lechia was indeed
interested in the Player’s services since at least 10 January 2024, (i.e., the day it presented
the offer to the Club and 4 months before signing the New Contract). The Chamber also
considered that Lechia was in negotiations with the Player, with the Club’s express
permission, to discuss his employment conditions for the potential loan.
238. Therefore, the Chamber considered that it has been established that (i) Lechia was in direct
contact with the Player, (ii) did not reach an agreement for the Player’s loan from the Club
and (iii) signed the New Contract 11 days after the Player terminated his Contract.
239. Lechia has denied having induced the Player stating that the “any contact between the Player
and Lechia with regard to permanent employment had taken place after Lechia was informed
by [the Club] of termination of the Contract. No employment conditions were amended (let alone
improved) in the signed contract with respect to the conditions agreed for the term of the loan.
Therefore, no inducement shall be attributed to Lechia”.
240. In light of the foregoing, the majority of the Chamber considered that, even though the
elements on file point to the existence of prior contacts and a certain degree of interest
from Lechia in the Player, such circumstances are not, per se, sufficient to meet the
evidentiary threshold required under art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations. In particular, the
Chamber emphasised that the mere fact that a club engages in discussions with a player—
especially where such discussions initially occurred with the express knowledge and
authorization of the player’s current club in the context of a potential loan — cannot
automatically be construed as inducement to breach a contract. Furthermore, the
temporal proximity between the termination of the Contract and the conclusion of the New
Contract, while potentially indicative of continuity in the parties’ relationship, does not in
itself demonstrate that the termination was prompted, encouraged, or orchestrated by the
new club.
241. The majority of the Chamber further noted that no documentary evidence,
correspondence, or other objective elements were submitted by the Claimant that would
substantiate allegations of active encouragement, undue influence, or contractual offers

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REF. FPSD-15930

made by Lechia prior to the termination that could have reasonably induced the Player to
prematurely end his contractual relationship. In the absence of such concrete and specific
evidence, and bearing in mind that the burden of proof lies with the Claimant, the majority
Chamber found that the existence of inducement cannot be presumed or inferred solely
from circumstantial factors. Consequently, the majority of the Chamber held that the
evidentiary standard required to establish inducement within the meaning of art. 17 par. 2
has not been satisfied in the present case.
242. In view of the foregoing, the majority of the Chamber concluded that Lechia shall not be
held jointly liable, and the Player is the only party responsible for the payment of the
amount of compensation due to the Claimant.

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REF. FPSD-15930

iv. Sporting sanctions
243. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach of
contract in question and, in this respect, it addressed the question of sporting sanctions
against the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision
stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall
be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period.
244. In this respect, the Chamber referred to item 7 of the “Definitions” section of the
Regulations, which establishes, inter alia, that the protected period shall last “for three entire
seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where
such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons
or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such
contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”.
245. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the player was born on 21 May 2002 and the
relevant contract with the club was concluded on 2 June 2020. Furthermore, the Chamber
noted that the player terminated the contract without just cause on 22 February 2024. The
breach of contract by the Player did not occur within the protected period. Consequently,
the Chamber decided that, in line with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, not to impose
sporting sanctions to the Player.
246. For the same reasons, the majority of the Chamber held that no sporting sanctions shall
be imposed on Lechia.
v. Compliance with monetary decisions
247. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
248. In this regard, the Chamber highlighted that, against players, the consequence of the
failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a restriction on playing in
official matches up until the due amounts are paid. The overall maximum duration of the
restriction shall be of up to six months.
249. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Chamber decided that the Player must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the club within 45 days of notification
of the decision, failing which, at the request of the creditor, a restriction on playing in official
matches for the maximum duration of six months shall become immediately effective on
the player in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.

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REF. FPSD-15930

250. The Player shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank account
provided by the club in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached to the
present decision.
251. The Chamber recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior
to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par.
8 of the Regulations.
d. Costs
252. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
253. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
254. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.

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REF. FPSD-15930

IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.

The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Claimant, FC Shakhtar
Donetsk.

2.

The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3.

The First Respondent, Bohdan Viunnyk, must pay the Claimant the following amount:
- USD 81,071 as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22
February 2024 until the date of effective payment.

4.

Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.

5.

Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.

6.

Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The First Respondent shall be restricted on any football-related activity up until the due
amounts are paid. The overall maximum duration of the restriction shall be of up to six
months.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the six months.

7.

The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

8.

This decision is rendered without costs.

For the Football Tribunal:

Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer

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REF. FPSD-15930

NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777

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