Acórdão do FIFA
Processo FPSD-15270 DIAS COELHO_2025-10-15

Data
15/10/2025

Labour Disputes


Texto da decisão

REF. FPSD-15270

Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 15 October 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Bruno
Alexandre Dias Coelho

BY:
Frans de Weger, the Netherlands

CLAIMANT:
ASD Napoli Futsal, Italy
Represented by Elite Law Sa

FIRST RESPONDENT:
Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho, Portugal

SECOND RESPONDENT:
SL Benfica, Portugal

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REF. FPSD-15270

I. Facts of the case
1.

The parties involved in this dispute are:

The Italian futsal club, ASD Napoli Futsal (hereinafter: Napoli or the Claimant),
affiliated to the Italian Football Association (FIGC);

The Portuguese player, Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho (hereinafter: the Player or the
First Respondent);

The Portuguese futsal club, SL Benfica (hereinafter: Benfica or the Second
Respondent), affiliated with the Portuguese Football Federation (FPF).

2.

On 20 October 2021, Napoli and the Player signed a contract entitled “NATIONAL DIVISION
CHAMPIONSHIPS, FIVE-A-SIDE FOOTBALL-ECONOMIC AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO ART 94ter
NOIF” (hereinafter: the Napoli Contract), valid from 1 July 2021 until 30 June 2023.

3.

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Napoli Contract, Napoli undertook to remunerate the Player as
follows:

4.

Season 2021/2022: EUR 28,000
Season 2022/2023: EUR 30,000

Article 3 to 5 of the Napoli Contract provided the following, quoted verbatim:
“Art. 3 – In the event of an annual sum being foreseen, the Club undertakes to pay it in
ten monthly installments of the same amount, within the relevant sports season, in
compliance with the tax provisions of the Law. In the event of alternatively agreed sums
being foreseen as travel allowances, lump-sum reimbursement of expenses and bonus
items for each match, the Club undertakes to disburse the relevant amounts according
to the terms of the month of accrual. For tax purposes, the sums covered by this
agreement can be classified among the various incomes referred to in article 67
paragraph 1 letter. m) Presidential Decree 917/66, and subsequent amendments.
Art. 4 – In the event of an annual gross sum being foreseen, if the Athlete has not provided
the expected sporting services or has provided them in a reduced way without justified
reasons or as a consequence of illness or injury independent of the sporting activity, the
Club will have the right to reduce the amount proportionally in relation to periods of
absence or reduced activity. In the event of illness or injury depending on the sporting
activity which continues for another six months, the Club will have the right to terminate
this economic agreement in any case, paying the Athlete only the sums accrued up to
then. In the event of the athlete's pregnancy, this agreement cannot be terminated.

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REF. FPSD-15270

Art. 5 – In the event of non-fulfilment by the Club, the Athlete may refer the matter to the
competent Economic Agreements Commission of the LND, in accordance with the federal
regulations, also for the purpose of declaring the release of the Athlete due to
delinquency within the limits and in the manner established by the federal and
regulatory rules. Should the Athlete, in contrast with the terms of his registration with
the Club, request and obtain registration as a player, professional or non-professional,
with a club of a foreign federation, he shall be obliged -also in accordance with the
provisions of Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players -to
pay, in favour of the Club, a penalty equal to double/triple (select one of the options:
triple shall automatically apply in the event of non-selection) of the total amounts agreed
in favour of the Athlete under this Agreement (whether or not the same are accrued
and/or paid). Without prejudice to any greater damages and applicable sporting
sanctions.”
5.

On 6 August 2022, Napoli sent a written notice to Benfica, informing Benfica of the
existence of the Napoli Contract and asserting that any concurrent employment with
another club would constitute a breach of sporting regulations.

6.

Also on 6 August 2022, the Napoli sent an email to the FIGC acknowledging that it had come
to its attention that the Player had been training with Benfica and asking that the FIGC take
the appropriate measures to protect its rights.

7.

On 10 August 2022, Benfica responded to Napoli’s notice, denying the existence of any
employment relationship between the Player and Napoli, as the Player had been registered
as an amateur. Benfica maintained that it had lawfully engaged the Player and acted in
good faith.

8.

On 18 August 2022, the media reported that the Player had signed a contract with Benfica
after his time in Italy.

9.

By letter dated 19 August 2022, Napoli placed both the Player and Benfica in default for
breach of contract. Napoli claimed that the Player and Benfica were jointly and severally
liable for compensation in the amount of EUR 174,000, demanding payment within 20 days.

10. On 30 August 2022, the FIGC informed Napoli that the FPF had requested to release the
Player’s International Transfer Certificate (ITC) and that the FIFA Players’ Status Chamber
had provisionally authorized his registration with Benfica – without prejudice to a future
contractual dispute.
11. On 13 September 2022, Benfica reiterated its good faith while handling its business and
stated that there was no breach of contract.

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REF. FPSD-15270

12. On 13 January 2023, Napoli apparently lodged a formal claim against the Player before the
LND Financial Commission of FIGC (hereinafter: the FIGC Financial Commission), seeking
compensation for breach of contract.
13. On 21 December 2023, the FIGC Financial Commission rendered its decision, ordering, inter
alia, that the Player pay Napoli the amount of EUR 30,000 as compensation for breach of
contract, in accordance with clause 5 of the Napoli Contract.
14. On 13 March 2024, following an appeal filed by Napoli, the National Federal Tribunal –
Economic Disputes Section (hereinafter: the FIGC National Tribunal) set aside the decision of
the FIGC Financial Commission and increased the compensation payable by the Player to
Napoli to a total of EUR 174,000.
15. On 9 May 2024, Napoli issued a notice addressed to, among others, the Player, Benfica,
and the FPF, referring to the findings of the FIGC National Tribunal and demanding
payment of EUR 174,000.

II. Proceedings before FIFA
16. On 17 July 2024, Napoli submitted this claim against the Player and Benfica, alleging breach
of contract.
a. Napoli’s claim
17. Napoli recalled the prior correspondence exchanged between the parties and the
procedural steps undertaken before the FIGC decision-making bodies. It acknowledged
that the FIGC National Tribunal had already issued a final decision, but asserted that no res
judicata existed, citing the following grounds:
• The parties to the proceedings are not identical: the FIGC proceedings involved only
the Player and Napoli, whereas the present matter includes Benfica as a second
respondent;
• The object differs: the FIGC proceedings were directed solely against the Player and
adjudicated under FIGC regulations, whereas the present claim is based on FIFA
regulations and additionally concerns the imposition of sporting sanctions; and
• The FIGC decision-making bodies lack jurisdiction to impose sporting sanctions on
the Player or to adjudicate on the joint liability of Benfica.
18. In support of its position, Napoli invoked the precedent established in the Award issued by
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in CAS 2020/A/7054 Sporting Clube de Portugal v.
Rafael Alexandre de Coinceicao & LOSC Lille & FIFA (hereinafter: the Leao Case) to demonstrate

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REF. FPSD-15270

that the claims brought against the respondents were autonomous and did not constitute
a duplication of proceedings.
19. Napoli further argued that the triggering event for the dispute was the termination of the
Napoli Contract on 5 August 2022. Accordingly, it contended that the claim was not timebarred.
20. On the merits, Napoli’s position can be summarized as follows.
A.

The Player was a professional

21. Napoli first asserted that the Player qualified as a professional at the time of entering into
the Napoli Contract. In particular, Napoli referred to the definition of a professional player
under art. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the
Regulations), emphasizing that: (i) the Player had entered into a written agreement; and (ii)
he was entitled to a monthly remuneration of no less than EUR 2,333.33, which exceeded
the expenses incurred in connection with his footballing activities.
22. Napoli maintained that the Player’s professional status was unaffected by the classification
used in the Napoli Contract or his registration with FIGC. It further noted that the Player
subsequently signed a professional contract with Benfica, albeit for a lower remuneration
than that provided under the Napoli Contract.
23. Consequently, Napoli concluded that the Player must be regarded as a professional.
B.

The Player terminated the Napoli Contract without just cause

24. Napoli submitted that, as confirmed in the FIGC proceedings, the Player unilaterally
abandoned Napoli to sign with Benfica, relying on the purported status of being an
amateur as justification.
25. Napoli argued that the termination occurred without just cause and that both the Player
and Benfica should be held liable for their “reckless attitude.”
26. Napoli further contended that, notwithstanding FIFA’s inability to assess the quantum of
compensation due to the FIGC proceedings, it should nonetheless order Benfica to pay
compensation and impose sporting sanctions on both respondents.
C.

The joint liability of Benfica

27. Napoli relied on CAS jurisprudence to assert that the joint liability of the Player’s new club
arises automatically in cases of breach.

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REF. FPSD-15270

28. Napoli emphasized that Benfica acquired the Player without paying a transfer fee and
directly benefitted from the Player’s contractual breach.
29. Accordingly, Napoli alleged that Benfica should be held jointly and severally liable for the
payment of compensation.
D.

The amount of compensation

30. As its main argument, Napoli submitted that the Player and Benfica should be ordered to
pay compensation in accordance with clause 5 of the Napoli Contract, namely EUR 174,000,
representing the residual value of the contract multiplied by three.
31. Napoli argued that this amount was stipulated in the FIGC standard contract and was not
excessive. It therefore asserted that there was no basis to deviate from the parties’ agreed
terms.
32. In the alternative, Napoli requested that compensation be determined pursuant to art. 17
of the Regulations and submitted a copy of the contract entered into with the Player’s
alleged replacement.
33. On that basis, Napoli claimed EUR 31,380 as replacement costs, namely EUR 18,000 for the
salaries and EUR 13,380 for his rental his June 2023.
E.

The sporting sanctions

34. Napoli submitted that the breach occurred during the protected period and that Benfica
actively induced the Player to breach his contract. Accordingly, it requested that sporting
sanctions be imposed on both respondents.
F.

Requests for relief

35. Napoli submitted the following requests for relief:
“In view of the foregoing, ASD Napoli Futsal respectfully requests FIFA to rule as follows:
ON A PRIMARY BASIS
I.

The claim filed by ASD Napoli Futsal before the FIFA DRC against Mr Bruno
Alexandre Dias Coelho and Sport Lisboa E Benfica is upheld;

II.

The NF Contract was terminated by Mr Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho without just
cause;

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REF. FPSD-15270

a. Regarding the Player Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho
III. The Player is condemned to pay EUR 174,000 (one hundred seventy-four
thousand Euros) as per the penalty agreed in article 5 of the NF Contract or any
other amount that the FIFA DRC deems appropriate as compensation for breach
of contract without just cause in line with article 17 FIFA RSTP, in any case plus
interests at a rate of 5% per year to be accrued on said sum as from 5 August
2022 until the date of its effective payment;
IV. Mr Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho is imposed sporting sanctions as per article 17(3)
of the FIFA RSTP at the discretion of the FIFA DRC;
b. Regarding the Sport Lisboa E Benfica
V.

Sport Lisboa E Benfica is jointly and severally liable for the payment of
EUR271,500.00 (two hundred seventy-one thousand five hundred Euros) as per
the penalty agreed in article 5 of the NF Contractor any other amount that the
FIFA DRC deems appropriate as compensation for breach of contract without just
cause in line with article 17 FIFA RSTP, in any case plus interests at a rate of 5%
per year to be accrued on said sum as from 1 July 2022 until the date of its
effective payment;

VI. Sport Lisboa E Benfica is imposed sporting sanctions as per article17(4) of the
FIFA RSTP consisting in a ban from registering any new players, either nationally
or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods;
ON A SUBSIDIARY BASIS, should FIFA DRC deem itself not competent or inadmissible the
prayer sub. III. against the Player,
VII. The claim filed by ASD Napoli Futsal before the FIFA DRC against Mr Bruno
Alexandre Dias Coelho and Sport Lisboa E Benfica is upheld;
VIII. The NF Contract was terminated by Mr Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho without just
cause;
a. Regarding the Player Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho
IX. Mr Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho is imposed sporting sanctions as per article 17(3)
of the FIFA RSTP at the discretion of the FIFA DRC;
b. Regarding the Sport Lisboa E Benfica

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REF. FPSD-15270

X.

Sport Lisboa E Benfica is condemned to pay EUR 174,000 (one hundred seventyfour Euros) as per the penalty agreed in article 5 of the NF Contract or any other
amount that the FIFA DRC deems appropriate as compensation for breach of
contract without just cause in line with article 17 FIFA RSTP, in any case plus
interests at a rate of 5% per year to be accrued on said sum as from 1 July 2022
until the date of its effective payment;

XI. Sport Lisboa E Benfica is imposed sporting sanctions as per article17(4) of the
FIFA RSTP consisting in a ban from registering any new players, either nationally
or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods;
IN ANY CASE
XII. Mr Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho and Bruno Alexandre Dias Coelho shall bear any
and all the possible costs of this procedure.”
b. Napoli’s additional comments
36. On 23 December 2024, the Bureau of the FIFA Council adopted a new interim regulatory
framework (hereinafter: the IRF), which entered into force on 1 January 2025.
37. On 28 May 2025, the FIFA General Secretariat invited Napoli to submit its observations on
the IRF and to indicate whether it wished to amend its original claim.
38. On 5 June 2025, Napoli submitted its comments and, inter alia, formally objected to the
application of the IRF to the present matter, arguing that such retroactive application would
contravene the legal principle of tempus regit actum.
39. In the alternative, should FIFA decide to apply the January 2025 edition of the IRF
retroactively, Napoli maintained that its claim should nonetheless be upheld, on the basis
that Benfica had induced the Player to breach his contract and should therefore: (i) be held
jointly liable for the payment of compensation; and (ii) be subject to sporting sanctions.
40. Napoli further requested that FIFA order the Player and/or Benfica to disclose any contract
signed between these parties, as well as: “Any and all emails, chats, SMS, offers of any kind
exchanged between them or with any agent/intermediary related to the negotiations of the
Benfica Contract signed on or around 5 August 2022”.
41. Napoli confirmed its requests for relief per its statement of claim.
42. On 25 August 2025, the FIFA General Secretariat informed Napoli that the matter in
question raised a preliminary procedural issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Football
Tribunal and would therefore be submitted for an expedited decision in accordance with

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REF. FPSD-15270

art. 19 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules).

III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
43. First, the Chairperson of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chairperson)
analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand.
44. In doing so, he noted that this matter had been presented to FIFA on 17 July 2024 and
submitted for a preliminary decision on 15 October 2025. Taking into account the wording
of art. 34 of the January 2025 edition of the Procedural Rules, the Chairperson determined
that this edition of the Procedural Rules was applicable to this matter.
45. Furthermore, in accordance with art. 19 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules, the
Chairperson confirmed his competence to decide, in an expedited manner, whether this
case is affected by any preliminary procedural matter. Likewise, the Chairperson
highlighted that if the claim is not affected by any preliminary procedural matters, the FIFA
general secretariat would be ordered to continue the procedure (cf., art. 19 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules).
46. Having established the above, the Chairperson acknowledged that this case concerned a
claim from Napoli against the Player and Benfica, alleging breach of contract and seeking
joint liability and sporting sanctions.
47. The Chairperson further noted that prior to initiating proceedings before FIFA, Napoli had
already accessed the Italian dispute resolution system. Napoli initiated proceedings before
the FIGC Financial Commission seemingly on 13 January 2023, which culminated in two
different decisions, including:

FIGC Financial Commission decision (21 December 2023)
FIGC National Tribunal decision (13 March 2024)

48. The Chairperson observed that these decisions addressed the core issue of the Player’s
alleged breach of the employment contract with Napoli. Notably, Benfica was not a party
to any of these proceedings.
49. In light of the above, the FIFA General Secretariat identified, and the Chairperson
confirmed, that this case raises a preliminary procedural matter that must be examined ex
officio concerning the admissibility of Napoli’s claim vis-à-vis the national proceedings.
50. In particular, the Chairperson recalled that within its decisions, the Football Tribunal is
required to examine procedural impediments ex officio, including the applicability of the
general legal principle of res judicata. This doctrine operates to prevent the re-litigation of

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REF. FPSD-15270

disputes that have already been adjudicated by a competent authority. For this general
legal principle to apply, the following cumulative conditions must be met: (i) identity of
parties, (ii) identity of object (petitum), and (iii) identity of legal grounds (causa petendi).
51. In the present case, Napoli appeared to anticipate this procedural challenge and argued
that the present claim was distinguishable from the national proceedings on two grounds:
first, the inclusion of Benfica as an additional respondent, thereby altering the composition
of the parties; and second, the nature of the relief sought, which includes joint liability and
sporting sanctions – remedies that fall outside the jurisdiction of national bodies.
52. However, the Chairperson did not find Napoli’s argumentation to be persuasive.
53. While the present claim introduced Benfica and expanded the scope of relief sought, the
Chairperson considered that these distinctions were not sufficient to overcome the
procedural bar. First, the identity of parties’ requirement was satisfied with respect to
Napoli and the Player, who were parties to both the national and FIFA proceedings. The
addition of Benfica did not alter the essential and initial nature of the dispute, particularly
given the accessory nature of claims for inducement and joint liability under FIFA
jurisprudence.
54. Moreover, the object and legal grounds of the dispute – namely, the alleged breach of
contract by the Player and its consequences – remained unchanged. According to the
Chairperson, the request for sanctions and joint liability did not constitute a new cause of
action but rather an extension of the relief sought in connection with the same underlying
contractual breach.
55. Irrespective of recent and still pending regulatory developments, the Chairperson recalled
that established jurisprudence of the FIFA Football Tribunal has consistently affirmed that
claims for inducement and joint liability are accessory in nature and intrinsically linked to
the principal claim for breach of contract. Contrary to the position advanced by Napoli, this
conclusion was reaffirmed following CAS 2020/A/7054 (i.e., the Leao Case).
56. The Chairperson recalled that in the Leao Case, after the CAS Panel issued its findings and
remanded the matter to the Football Tribunal, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC)
clarified the scope of its mandate and reiterated that arguments concerning joint liability
do not constitute independent claims but rather ancillary components of the underlying
contractual dispute. In the Chairperson’s view, the DRC’s reasoning in the Leao Case applies
to the present matter, as it underscored the procedural inadmissibility of reintroducing
accessory claims that stem from a dispute already adjudicated by a competent national
authority:
“The consistent and well-established jurisprudence of the DRC states that the joint liability
of a player’s new club is accessory to the principal relationship between the player and
the club. The FIFA Commentary describes the player’s liability as follows: “the primary

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REF. FPSD-15270

debtor for the payment of the compensation due because of the breach of contract is,
and remains, the professional player” 1 (emphasis added). A CAS decision has
described this liability mechanism as follows: “It follows that Al Shorta is not the principal
obligor but rather a subsidiary obligor, with Al Shorta merely being jointly and severally
liable”2 (emphasis added). Finally, in another CAS award, the Panel held that “[…] art. 17.2
RSTP provides that if a professional is required to pay compensation, his new club shall
be jointly and severally liable to pay that compensation. The basis of the new club's
liability, however, is the player’s liability. As a consequence, the new club (in this case
Boca Juniors) cannot be held liable for amounts that exceed those for which the player
himself is liable. 3
Notwithstanding the various specific terms used to describe the mechanism set out in
art. 17 par. 2 of the RSTP, it is therefore clear in the eyes of this Chamber that they all
effectively acknowledge that the liability of the new club is “inseparably tied to that of the
player”4 and “its extent necessarily depends on the amount to be owed (or not owed) by
the player to his former club”.5 The joint and several liability of the new club can only be
triggered upon the player having been ordered to pay compensation for breach of
contract to their former club.
[…]
Given the link between the player and the new club’s liabilities as described above
(i.e., the liability of the new club can only be triggered upon the player having been
ordered to pay compensation for breach of contract), claims against new clubs
pursuant to art. 17 par. 2 of the RSTP are necessarily deemed to be employmentrelated claims.
This means that FIFA’s jurisdiction to hear claims regarding the joint and several liability
of the new club must be based on art. 22 par.1 lit. a) or art. 22 par.1 lit. b) of the RSTP,
which are the provisions specifically enabling FIFA to decide upon labour-related disputes
between clubs and players.
[…]
The aforementioned provisions make it clear in this regard that FIFA’s jurisdiction is to
hear disputes between clubs and players and the Chamber noted that nowhere in those
cf., FIFA Commentary on the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Commentary) –
Edition 2023, page 173.
1

2

CAS 2019/A/6233 Al Shorta Sports Club v. FIFA & Dalian Yifang FC, para. 143.

3

CAS 2015/A/4111 & CAS 2015/A/4116, para. 113.

4

CAS 2013/A/3365 Juventus FC v. Chelsea FC / CAS 2013/A/3366 A.S. Livorno Calcio S.p.A. v. Chelsea FC, para. 133.

5

CAS 2019/A/6233 Al Shorta Sports Club v. FIFA & Dalian Yifang FC, para. 141.

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REF. FPSD-15270

articles is there a reference to a dispute only between clubs or any suggestion that there
would be a – separate – possibility for FIFA to hear claims between a former club and a
new club independently of the labour dispute between a club and a player. In other
words, these provisions confer that the FIFA’s jurisdiction to assess a claim for liability of
the new club under art. 17 par. 2 of the RSTP would require that FIFA has been called
upon to decide on the contractual dispute between the player and their former club.
In the Chamber’s opinion, these considerations further reinforce the DRC’s general view
that the potential liabilities of the player and the new club pursuant to art. 17 par. 2 of
the RSTP are inextricably linked.
For the sake of completeness, the Chamber also wished to note that the only provision in
art. 22 of the RSTP (which governs FIFA’s competence) that specifically confers the
jurisdiction on FIFA to decide upon a contractual dispute between two clubs (i.e., disputes
not related to training compensation and the solidarity mechanism) is par. 1 lit. g) which
is a sort of “catch all” provision granting FIFA the competence to decide on disputes
between clubs based in different countries that are not covered by the remaining
provisions of the article. Pursuant to art. 23 par. 2 of the RSTP, these disputes are under
the jurisdiction of the Players’ Status Chamber of the Football Tribunal. It is clear to this
Chamber that art. 22 par. 1 lit. g) would not enable FIFA to adjudicate on a claim under
art. 17 par. 2 of the RSTP, because, as stated above, claims for the joint liability of the
new club can only be made in the context of a employment-related disputes which are
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DRC pursuant to articles 22 par. 1 lit. a) and lit. b) and
art. 23 par. 1 of the RSTP.
Finally, the Chamber wished to conclude these general preliminary remarks by
suggesting that, pursuant to art. 54 par. 4 of the FIFA Statutes, an assessment should be
made by the FIFA Football Tribunal as to whether any amendments to the RSTP could be
useful, or indeed required, in order to ensure that the principles and the objectives of art.
17 par. 2 of the RSTP are adequately protected and implemented in the context of the
FIFA dispute resolution system.” (emphasis added by the Chairperson)
57. Furthermore, the Chairperson deemed that the factual matrix in the Leao Case differed
materially from the present matter. In that case, the allegations of inducement and joint
liability emerged organically during the course of arbitral proceedings in Portugal. By
contrast, to which the Chairperson attaches much value, in the present case Napoli was
already aware of the alleged inducement at the time it elected to pursue the matter before
the national forum, which now led to a final and binding decision. According to the
Chairperson, this strategic decision to omit accessory claims at the national level and
subsequently reintroduce them before FIFA undermined the procedural integrity of the
system.
58. According to the Chairperson, the DRC’s post-remand clarification in the Leao Case further
emphasized that its mandate does not extend to re-adjudicating matters already resolved

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REF. FPSD-15270

by competent national authorities, particularly where the core contractual dispute has
been conclusively addressed. The reason for this is that the Football Tribunal’s role is not
to serve as a forum for expanding the scope of previously litigated claims through the
belated introduction of accessory arguments.
59. Contrary to Napoli’s allegations, the Chairperson emphasized that the Leao Case should
not be interpreted as a precedent permitting parties to circumvent the finality of national
decisions by merely adding a new respondent or expanding the relief sought. While the
Chairperson acknowledged that CAS had indeed scrutinized the res judicata effect of
decisions rendered by administrative bodies, he confirmed that allowing Napoli to relitigate the matter before FIFA would call into question the authority of the Italian decisions
and compromise the coherence of the dispute resolution framework. In the Chairperson’s
view, this was precisely what the principles of res judicata are designed to prevent.
60. Moreover, the Chairperson recalled that the purpose of the FIFA dispute resolution system
is not to serve as an enforcement mechanism for decisions rendered by other adjudicating
bodies, particularly where those bodies operate under different procedural rules and
substantive standards. Accordingly, the integrity of the system is jeopardized when parties
attempt to leverage FIFA proceedings to obtain relief that was either unavailable or
unsuccessful in another jurisdiction.
61. The Chairperson found that this concern was particularly acute in the present case, where
a prima facie review of the contract and the national decisions revealed significant
divergence between the legal standards applied by the Italian authorities and those
recognized under FIFA regulations. This includes, for instance, the parameters for
calculating compensation for breach of contract and the assessment of just cause for
termination. He emphasized that such discrepancies further underscore the inadmissibility
of the claim and the need to preserve the procedural boundaries between national and
international adjudication.
62. Even assuming, arguendo, that the claim could overcome the preliminary procedural bar
under a formalistic interpretation of the principles of res judicata, the Chairperson added
that a second layer of admissibility must be assessed – namely, the consistency of Napoli’s
procedural conduct and the legitimacy of its forum selection.
63. The Chairperson then recalled that according to the Commentary (p. 456 and 457):
“(…) if both parties recognise the jurisdiction of the national body by failing to contest it,
the DRC will recognise any decision passed by the national body, even if that body does
not comply with the procedural standards. In other words, a party that has recognised
(or failed to contest) a national body’s competence to hear a specific case – either by
lodging its claim with the national body or merely by submitting a response to the
substance of the claim without contesting the national body’s jurisdiction – will not be
allowed to claim that the national body concerned does not meet the minimum

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REF. FPSD-15270

standards provided for by article 22 paragraph 1b) (and FIFA circular no. 1010), or to
ask the DRC to reconsider the case on that basis.
For the sake of completeness, the DRC will not serve as a body of appeal in respect
of any decision made by a national body, nor will it enforce any decision made by
a national dispute resolution body.
The final considerations concern the practice known as “forum shopping” – a party taking
the same matter to multiple fora in the hope of obtaining the result that suits its
purposes. The relevant jurisprudence is designed to prevent such behaviour, which
is viewed as illegitimate. A party should not be able to game the system by having
the same argument heard in multiple fora in the hope one of them will hand down
the judgment it wants. For example, a party should not be allowed to ask a national
body to confirm that a contract has been breached without just cause, and then, having
obtained a favourable decision at national level, ask the DRC to set the compensation
payable in the case. The principle against “forum shopping”, namely that a party that
has chosen to have a case heard under one competent jurisdiction cannot then have
recourse to another, is consistently applied.” (emphasis added by the Chairperson)
64. As established above, the Chairperson recalled that the Football Tribunal has consistently
held that parties must demonstrate procedural consistency in their choice of legal
remedies. In particular, a party that elects to pursue a claim in one forum cannot
subsequently shift to another jurisdiction merely because the outcome was unsatisfactory.
Such conduct diverts resources and undermines the credibility of the sporting dispute
resolution framework.
65. While interpretations of the principle electa una via, non datur recursus ad alteram may vary
between the Football Tribunal and CAS, the Chairperson considered that the Football
Tribunal bears a critical responsibility in safeguarding the system from procedural misuse.
The Football Tribunal must ensure that its resources are not exploited by parties seeking
to relitigate matters already adjudicated elsewhere.
66. The Chairperson recalled that this concern had already been addressed in CAS
2022/A/9248, which defined unlawful forum shopping as conduct characterized by
procedural bad faith – where a party deliberately attempts to “game the system” to the
detriment of the opposing party, in verbis:
“Taking the above into account, the Panel is of the view that the unlawful forum shopping
practice is characterized by the intent of the claimant and his/her purposeful conduct
aimed at “gaming the system” to the detriment of the opponent. Its inherent element is
therefore bad faith of the party initiating the dispute.”
67. In the Chairperson’s view, this element of bad faith was present in the current case.

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REF. FPSD-15270

68. The Chairperson found it decisive that: (i) Napoli initiated the proceedings before the Italian
courts, (ii) obtained a decision that did not fully grant its claims, (iii) appealed internally and
secured a more favourable outcome, and (iv) the FIGC National Tribunal reassessed the
merits and issued a final and binding ruling, which significantly increased the
compensation initially awarded.
69. Most importantly, the Chairperson emphasized that Napoli was aware of the alleged
inducement at the outset of this procedural sequence and nonetheless chose to pursue
the matter nationally, for reasons that cannot be precised. Even after initiating proceedings
before FIFA, the Chairperson noted that Napoli remained active in the national forum and
submitted a final and binding ruling obtained after the FIFA claim had already been lodged.
70. In fact, the Chairperson considered that Napoli has relied on the national decisions to
support its arguments regarding the Player’s professionalism and termination without just
cause, thereby placing the DRC in an untenable position: either to act as an enforcement
body extending the effects of a decision rendered under a different legal framework, or as
an appellate body reviewing four prior decisions de novo. Both scenarios, in the
Chairperson’s view, are incompatible with the foundational principles and purpose of the
FIFA dispute resolution system.
71. As a professional club operating within the Italian legal framework, the Chairperson
considered that Napoli was presumed to possess adequate knowledge of its domestic
system. Therefore, Napoli’s decision to pursue a new ruling before FIFA – after having
already litigated the matter nationally – constituted an impermissible attempt to expand
the effects of a prior decision and benefit from a procedural shift. According to the
Chairperson, this conduct fell squarely within the definition of forum shopping and must be
rejected.
72. In conclusion, from every angle of legal and procedural analysis, the Chairperson decided
that this claim must be deemed inadmissible.
a. Costs
73. Having established the above, the Chairperson referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules, according to which “Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a
player, coach, football agent, or match agent”.

74. The Chairperson therefore decided that no procedural costs were to be imposed on the
Claimant. He also denied any further requests for relief.

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REF. FPSD-15270

IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.

The claim of the Claimant, ASD Napoli Futsal, is inadmissible.

2. This decision is rendered without costs.

For the Football Tribunal:

Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer

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REF. FPSD-15270

NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777

pg. 18