Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-14413
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 18 September 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Alejandro
Sebastian Romero Gamarra
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. HENDEL (USA & France), Deputy Chairperson
Andre DOS SANTOS MEGALE (Brazil), Member
Stella MARIS JUNCOS (Argentina), Member
CLAIMANT:
New York Red Bulls, USA
Represented by Litigation Centrefield Llp
RESPONDENT:
Al-Taawoun FC, Saudi Arabia
Represented by Global Sport Consulting
RESPONDENT:
Alejandro Sebastian Romero Gamarra, Argentina
Represented by Ariel Reck
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-14413
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 16 February 2018, the US professional soccer league, Major League Soccer (hereinafter:
MLS), and the Argentinean player Alejandro Sebastian Romero Gamarra (hereinafter: the
Player) entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the Contract) valid as from 9
February 2018 until 31 December 2020.
2.
After signing with MLS, the Player was assigned to New York Red Bulls (hereinafter: RBNY
or the Claimant).
3.
Art. 9 of the Contract stipulated, in relevant part, as follows:
“(b) The Player and MLS agree that it is the specific intent of both parties that this Player
Agreement remains valid and enforceable during the entire Term of this Agreement (including
any extensions thereto set forth in this Schedule). The Player further agrees that he hereby
waives any right he may otherwise have had pursuant to the FIFA Regulations Governing the
Status and Transfer of Football Players (including without limitation the Application Regulations
referenced therein) to unilaterally breach or terminate this Agreement pursuant to such
Regulations (including without limitation any right he may have to so breach or terminate this
Agreement for sporting just cause or otherwise) prior to the end of the Term of this Agreement,
including options periods, if any.
(c) Expedited Arbitration
i. Expedited arbitration hearings under this Paragraph shall be held within fortyeight (48) hours of the filing of a demand for such arbitration. No prior
grievance steps shall be required.
ii. The arbitration shall take place in New York. Each party shall bear its own
costs.
iii. MLS shall notify the Impartial Arbitrator, the Union and the Player and/or his
agent, if any, in writing of the demand for an expedited arbitration as well as
of the time and place for the hearing as soon as practicable.
iv. The failure of any party to attend the hearing as scheduled shall not delay the
hearing, and the Impartial Arbitrator shall proceed to take evidence and issue
an award as though such party were present.
v. The Impartial Arbitrator shall issue a decision as soon as possible, but in no
event more than twelve (12) hours after the hearing has been completed.
vi. If the Impartial Arbitrator finds that the Player has breached this Agreement,
the Impartial Arbitrator shall order that the Player not play, attempt to play
or threaten to play soccer for any team other than a Team in the League.
vii. The decision of the Impartial Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the
parties and may be immediately entered as a judgement in any court of
competent jurisdiction and/or communicated to FIFA.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-14413
viii. The Player and MLS understand and agree that once a judgement has been
entered pursuant to this Paragraph 9(c), such judgement may be immediately
taken by either party to the relevant FIFA body or tribunal to be entered and
enforced. It is further agreed that such a judgement may be submitted to any
court having jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining such equitable relief as
may be appropriate, including but not limited to a decree enjoining the Player
from any further breach of this Agreement and from playing soccer for any
other person, firm, corporation or organization during the Term of this
Agreement, without MLS posting a bond or other security or proving actual
damages.
(d) All disputes arising under this Agreement are disputes under the CBA. Except for a proceeding
pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph 9, the parties agree that all disputes relating to or
arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the grievance procedures set forth in Article 21
of the CBA.
(e) The Player and MLS hereby expressly waive all rights to bring forth resolution on the merits
of any claim, action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal, including any right(s)
either may have pursuant to the FIFA Regulations Governing the Status and Transfer of Players
(including without limitation the Application Regulations referenced therein and the dispute
resolution, disciplinary and arbitration system set forth in Chapter XIV). The Player and MLS
agree that once a judgement has been rendered pursuant to this Paragraph 9, either party may
immediately take such judgement to the relevant FIFA body or tribunal to be entered and
enforced.”
4.
Art. 10 of the Contract further stated as follows:
“10. Non-Applicability of FIFA Regulations:
(a) The Player hereby agrees that the following provisions in the FIFA Regulations Governing the
Status and Transfer of Football Players (including the Application Regulations referenced
therein) shall not apply to this Agreement:
[…]
ii. Chapter VII. Maintenance of Contractual Stability, Article 21, Paragraphs 1 and 2.
The Player agrees that he hereby waives any rights he may have pursuant to Chapter
VIII, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Regulations Governing the Status and Transfer of
Football Players to terminate this Agreement prior to the conclusion of the Term of
this Agreement (as defined in Paragraph 1, above).
[…]
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-14413
v. Chapter XIV. Dispute resolution, disciplinary and arbitration system, Article 42. The
Player agrees that the sole and exclusive dispute resolution procedures available for
resolving any dispute between himself and MLS are as set forth in this Agreement. The
Player therefore hereby waives any right to bring for resolution on the merits any
claim, action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal, including any rights(s)
he may have pursuant to Chapter XIV, Article 42 of the FIFA Regulations Governing the
Status and Transfer of Football Players. As set forth above, the Player understands
and agrees that once a judgement has been rendered pursuant to the mechanism and
appeals process provided for above, either MLS or the Player may immediately take
such judgement to the relevant FIFA body or tribunal or any court having jurisdiction
to be entered and enforced.”
5.
As to the duration of the employment relationship, art. 2 of the Schedule to the Contract
provided for the following:
“2. Extensions
a. Option through 2021. We may, by giving you written notice on or before December 1, 2020,
extend your employment with us for an additional twelve months (i.e. until December 31,
2021) for a base salary of Ninety-One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Six and 66/100 Dollars
(U.S.$ 91,666.66) per month, gross of taxes;
b. Option through 2022. We may, by giving you written notice on or before December 1, 2021,
extend your employment with us for an additional twelve months (i.e. until December 31,
2022) for a base salary of One Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars (U.S.$ 100,000) per
month, gross of taxes;
c. Consideration Acknowledgement. You hereby acknowledge and agree that the benefits set
forth in this Agreement (which include this Schedule and the MLS Standard Player Agreement),
including, but not limited to, a base salary during the initial term that reflects additional value
to you in return for our receiving Two (2) extension option(s), the increase in base salary
during the extension(s), and the performance bonuses set forth below in Section 3 are,
collectively, adequate and sufficient consideration for the Extension(s) provided for in this
Section 2.”
6.
As such, pursuant to art. 2(a) of the Schedule to the Contract, RBNY (or, more precisely,
MLS at RBNY’s behest) was afforded the right to exercise an option (hereinafter: the Option)
to extend the contract with the Player for an additional 12 months, until 31 December 2021.
7.
Accordingly, RBNY alleged that it exercised the Option on 3 March 2020 by hand-delivering
the Player an Option Letter in person, which was purportedly accepted by the Player at the
time. This Option Letter was dated 19 February 2020.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-14413
8.
The Player’s agent sent a message on 29 December 2020 to RBNY stating that it was “very
unlikely you will see Kaku for preseason as he is a free agent January 1st due to your club’s failure
to notify the player correctly of the option”.
9.
On 15 January 2021, the Player signed an employment contract with the Saudi Arabian club
Al-Taawoun (hereinafter: Al-Taawoun or the Respondent), valid as from 15 January 2021 until
30 December 2021 (hereinafter: the Al-Taawoun Contract).
10. On 20 and 22 January 2021, MLS sent correspondence to the Player and Al-Taawoun
regarding the Player’s alleged breach of the Contract and Al-Taawoun’s purported
inducement of the Player’s breach of the Contract.
11. On 28 January 2021, MLS sent correspondence to the Player, Al-Taawoun, and the Saudi
Arabian Football Federation, inter alia warning Al-Taawoun not to proceed with any further
interest in the Player, or it would be liable for inducing a breach of Contract.
12. On 5 February 2021, Al-Taawoun requested the Player’s International Transfer Certificate
(ITC) via the Transfer Matching System. As the United States Soccer Federation rejected
such request, the Saudi Arabian Football Federation requested the FIFA Players’ Status
Chamber’s intervention shortly thereafter.
13. On 18 February 2021, the FIFA Players’ Status Chamber authorized the Player’s registration.
a. Procedure before the MLS Independent Arbitrator
14. Allegedly on 15 February 2021, RBNY referred “the issue of whether the Claimant’s option had
been validly exercised […] to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Player Contract and
the collective bargaining agreement agreed between MLS and the MLS Players’ Association
(‘MLSPA’).” to an Independent Arbitrator, in line with the Contract.
15. This resulted in a decision rendered on 2 April 2021 by an Independent Arbitrator, Mr.
Shyam Das (hereinafter: the DAS Decision), which held the following:
“AWARD
Alejandro Romero Gamarra (a/k/a “Kaku”) breached his Player Agreement with Major
League Soccer as set forth in the above Findings. The Player is ordered to not play,
attempt to play or threaten to play soccer for any team other than a Team in Major
League Soccer, as provided in Paragraph 9(c)(vi) of his Player Agreement”.
16. Al-Taawoun was notified of the DAS Decision by MLS on 13 April 2021.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-14413
17. On 14 April 2021, Al-Taawoun replied indicating that it had signed the Player as a free agent
and RBNY had not provided proof that the Contract was still valid.
b. Prior procedure before FIFA – case ref. FPSD-4283
18. On 12 November 2021, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA (hereinafter: the FIFA Claim)
requesting the following:
“(a)
The claim is admissible
(b)The player unilaterally terminated the contract without just cause by not complying with the
Arbitrator’s Award and failing to remedy his breach; and must pay compensation to the
Claimant based on its primary case in the sum of USD 4,347,730.06 or USD3,845,544.02; or
Alternatively, the player must pay compensation to the Claimant based on its alternative case in
the sum of USD 6,840,369.06 or USD5,288,210.12; or
Alternatively, the player must pay to the Claimant such other compensation amount that the
DRC deems appropriate; and
Interest is payable on the compensation award at a rate of 9% per annum or, alternatively, at a
rate of 5% per annum from 1 January 2021 (i.e. the date that the First Respondent’s breach);
and
(c) The new club is jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation awarded to the Claimant;
(d)Sporting sanctions are to be imposed on the player, namely a six-month restriction on playing
in official matches on account of the aggravating circumstances of the case, or alternatively a
four-month restriction on playing in official matches;
(e) Sporting sanctions are to be imposed on the new club, namely a ban on registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods;
(f) In the event that any compensation (plus interest) due in accordance with this paragraph 146
is not paid to the Claimant within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant
bank details to the players: (i) in respect of the First Respondent, he shall not be permitted to
pay in any official matches until payment has been made in full or the expiry of six months,
whichever the earlier; and (ii) in respect of the Second Respondent, it shall be banned from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid
or for the duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods, whichever the earlier;
and
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-14413
(g) The player and new club are jointly and severally liable to pay the procedural costs in relation
to these proceedings; or in the alternative, a contribution towards the Claimant’s costs and
expenses pertaining to these proceedings.”
As to the DAS Decision and the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber’s competence
19. In its claim, RBNY submitted that the issue of whether the Player acted in breach of the
Contract had already been finally and definitively determined by an independent
arbitration tribunal established at national level within the framework of the collective
bargaining agreement that operated in MLS. It was only once this decision was rendered
that RBNY could take such decision to FIFA, in accordance with art. 9 of the Contract.
20. In any case, RBNY highlighted that the Player had failed to respect the DAS Decision and,
even though RBNY contacted the Saudi Arabian Football Federation in order to request its
assistance with enforcing the decision, RBNY received no reply and the Player continued to
play for Al-Taawoun.
21. The Impartial Arbitrator was not asked, nor was he empowered, to deal with the
consequences of the Player’s failure to comply with the DAS Decision and his subsequent
termination of the Contract without just cause. Nor did the Impartial Arbitrator have
jurisdiction over Al-Taawoun and he was not competent to determine the consequences of
Al-Taawoun’s inducement of the Player’s breach. Hence, RBNY brought its claim to
determine these consequences under art. 22 par. 1 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players and in consideration of art. 9 of the Contract.
22. RBNY cited the Mutu award rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport for the
proposition that a national dispute resolution chamber can deal with the triggering
elements or liability stage and thereafter the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the
Chamber or DRC) can deal with the remedies or quantum stage. While art. 22 par. 1 lit. a)
and b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players do not expressly state as
much, and RBNY submitted that a national dispute resolution chamber (hereinafter: NDRC)
could deal with all aspects of a dispute if the national collective bargaining agreement was
drafted in those terms, the mentioned articles do not exclude the possibility of a division
of role and responsibility in the area between the NDRC and the DRC, particularly in
circumstances where parties have expressly agreed that this should be the case and/or
where there the dispute concerns an international element.
As to the facts
23. RBNY contended that it duly exercised the Option when, on 3 March 2020, at approximately
11h, its Sporting Director, Mr. Denis Hamlett, hand delivered the Option Letter to the Player
in the RBNY training facility. Prior to that, RBNY had communicated the Option Letter to
Mr. Scott Pearson, the Player’s agent, via email and requested that he share the letter with
the Player and confirm that he had received it.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-14413
24. In mid-December 2020, Club Tijuana made an offer for the Player and, on 14 December
2020, RBNY and Club Tijuana had reached an agreement regarding transfer terms. In
parallel, there were ongoing labour negotiations between Mr. Pearson and Club Tijuana.
25. On 15 December 2020, Mr. Pearson sent RBNY a message inquiring about the Option
exercise, claiming neither he nor the Player had any proof that it had been exercised.
As to the merits
26. According to RBNY, the Player terminated the Contract without just cause. The Player’s
breach of the Contract was determined in a final and binding manner in the DAS Decision.
The Player failed to remedy this breach and, by virtue of his conduct, unilaterally
terminated the Contract.
27. RBNY further alleged that it suffered significant losses and therefore the Player is liable to
pay RBNY compensation arising from his unlawful termination of the contract and his new
club should be held jointly and severally liable for such compensation pursuant to art. 17
par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations, in addition to receiving sporting sanctions.
28. RBNY claimed several heads of damage, including the loss of transfer fee, loss of the
Player’s services and replacement costs, salaries paid out in 2021. Furthermore, it
requested that specificity of sport be applied as a correcting factor:
Primary case A
Primary case B
Alternative case A
Alternative case B
“Compensation
Salary Refund
$3,200,000
$3,150,000
$5,692,666
$4,692,666.10
$145,544.06
$145,544.06
$145,544.06
$145,544.06
Specificity
Sport
$1,002,186
$549,999.96
$1,002,186
$549,999.96
of Total
$4,347,730.06
$3,845,544.02
$6,840,369.06
$5,288,210.12”
29. On 1 December 2021, the FIFA general secretariat informed RBNY that it appeared the
dispute was affected by res judicata and FIFA did not appear to be competent.
30. On 16 December 2021, in reply to FIFA’s letter, RBNY sent further correspondence
mentioning, inter alia, the following:
No ‘res judicata’ – different issues under consideration
31. The issue determined by the Independent Arbitrator in the DAS Decision was narrowly
limited and he solely decided “whether [the player] remained under contract with MLS beyond
December 31, 2020, which depends on whether MLS effectively exercised its option to extend his
contract through December 31, 2021. The dispute between the parties at that time was,
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-14413
therefore, whether MLS had effectively exercised an option to extend the Playing Contract. This
is a separate and distinct issue as to whether the player thereafter unilaterally terminated the
Playing Contract without just cause, and whether the new club induced him to do so.”
32. According to RBNY, the Independent Arbitrator – “decided – with res judicata effect – that a
binding contract existed, but he did not decide on issues such as unilateral termination without
just cause or the consequences that follow from such termination.”
Claimant did not bring any claim against Second Respondent outside of FIFA
33. RBNY indicated that the new club has “not yet been called to account in any fora for its
inducement of the player to ignore the Arbitrator’s Award and unilaterally terminate the Playing
Contract without just cause.
34. In this regard RBNY mentioned that,” if the new club induced the player to terminate the
Playing Contract without just cause, FIFA must be able to make Second Respondent answer for
its wrongful actions. If FIFA were to hold otherwise, it would effectively permit ‘foreign’ clubs to
act with impunity where a club and a player have sought to have any aspect of their dispute
determined at a national level – and this would represent a ‘lacuna’ in FIFA’s international
dispute resolution system that would undermine FIFA’s rules and its powers.”
FIFA already deemed itself ‘competent’ in this matter and took steps to allow the
Player to register for Al-Taawoun
35. According to RBNY:
“The PSC already confirmed FIFA’s competence in respect of this matter. As noted in the
Statement of Claim, in accordance with Article 15(6) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, and following
the issuance of the Arbitrator’s Award, Claimant requested the assistance of the SAFF to ensure
that First Respondent respected the Impartial Arbitrator’s order. Such request, however, was
completely ignored by the SAFF. Instead, the SAFF made a request of the PSC to provisionally
register First Respondent for Second Respondent, despite the USSF having rejected the ITC
request (which it did on account of the fact that the employment relationship between Claimant
and First Respondent had not expired). The PSC granted the SAFF’s request. As such, despite
Claimant following the dispute resolution process provided under the terms of the Playing
Contract and the CBA, the PSC nevertheless intervened to allow First Respondent’s provisional
registration with Second Respondent.
The issuance of the ITC and the fact that the new club is affiliated to a different member
association creates the international dimension. Under such circumstances, FIFA becomes
competent to deal with the relevant contractual dispute, regardless of whether there is a
recognised independent arbitration tribunal in the country concerned.”
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-14413
36. In conclusion, RBNY requested that the procedure before the DRC continue, and should
FIFA maintain the position that it was not competent to hear this case, “we respectfully
request you to issue an appealable decision.”
37. On 28 March 2022, the Chairperson of the DRC passed a preliminary decision (hereinafter:
the Preliminary Decision), finding that RBNY’s claim was inadmissible on the basis of res
judicata. The Chairperson held that there was identity of object and cause between the DAS
Decision and the claim before FIFA, with a final and binding decision having been rendered
by the Independent Arbitrator.
38. Furthermore, the Chairperson noted that “a club who decides to bring forward a dispute
before a local deciding body, rather than making use of the alternative dispute resolution
process proposed within the legal framework of FIFA, must demonstrate consistency in relation
to the choice of the course of action” and relied on the principle of electa una via, non datur
recursus ad alteram.
39. In addition, the Chairperson noted that, in accordance with art. 9(e) of the Contract, there
was a clear waiver by the parties to bring “for resolution on the merits any claim, action,
dispute or grievance” before the FIFA Football Tribunal.
c. Appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS 2022/A/8967
40. On 17 June 2022, RBNY filed an appeal against the Preliminary Decision before the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), naming the Player, Al-Taawoun, and FIFA as respondents.
41. On 5 April 2024, CAS rendered its decision (hereinafter: the CAS Award), finding inter alia
that:
“1. The appeal filed … by Red Bull New York, Inc. against the decision rendered by the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal on 28 March 2022 is dismissed with regard to
the claim against Alejandro Sebastian Romero Gamarra.
2. The appeal filed … by Red Bull New York, Inc. against the decision rendered by the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal on 28 March 2022 is partially upheld with
regard to the claim against Al-Taawoun Football Club, and the matter between these two parties
is referred back to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal for a decision.”
42. Citing articles 9 and 10 of the Contract and referring to the DAS Decision, the CAS Panel
reasoned that the DRC did not have jurisdiction over the contractual dispute between RBNY
and the Player, as follows:
“136. There is no valid reasons to find that said provisions intend to provide two different fora
(national arbitral bodies and the judicial bodies of FIFA) for resolving disputes. If this was in fact
the intention of the contractual parties as submitted by the Appellant, the Contract should have
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-14413
been drafted in a totally different way. There is not a single provision reserving the right to bring
specific disputes before the FIFA bodies.
[…]
137. On the contrary, it seems clear to the Panel that the real intention, as very specifically described in the Contract, was to “waive all rights to bring for resolution on the merits any claim,
action, dispute or grievance to any FIFA body or tribunal, including any right(s) either may have
pursuant to the [FIFA RSTP]”. In accordance with its wording, such a waiver, which apparently
covers all kinds of disputes, is supposed to be mutually binding on the contractual parties,
meaning, inter alia, that the Player would also be excluded from filing any claim at all against
the Club before any, otherwise, competent judicial body of FIFA.
[…]
143. Moreover, the Panel notes that the fact that the Independent Arbitrator – pursuant to the
Contract and the provisions of the CBA – does not have the power to condemn a party to pay
any compensation or to impose a sanction on a party in case of breach of contract does not
alter the legal consequences of a waiver of rights of pursuing such reliefs before an otherwise
competent judicial body. If the intention of MLS and the MLSPA in fact is that such consequences
are to be imposed on a player or club breaching an employment contract, depending on the
circumstances, the Panel finds that the wording of the CBA and/or the standard contract should
be amended accordingly in order to create a sufficient legal basis for imposing such
consequences.
[…]
145. Based, inter alia, on the above, the Panel finds that the Appellant´s claim against the Player
filed with the FIFA is in fact inadmissible due to lack of jurisdiction since the Appellant and the
Player have submitted themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national, decision-making
arbitrational body as set out in the Contract and in the CBA and have waived any and all rights
to bring any claim before FIFA. Whether or not the claim before FIFA is identical with the claim
dealt with by the Independent Arbitrator is not decisive in this regard as the waiver is considered
to cover all disputes between the Appellant and the Player in relation to the Player´s employment
relationship.”
43. Conversely, the Panel held that RBNY’s claim against Al-Taawoun must be remanded to the
DRC in order to hear the case and decide de novo:
“148. Even if the Player is not a direct party to the dispute before FIFA between the Appellant and
the Second Respondent, the Panel finds that the Appellant´s claim against the Second
Respondent originates from the dispute between the Appellant and the Player since the claim is
based on Article 17(2) and (4) of the FIFA RSTP in connection with the Player´s alleged breach of
the Contract.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-14413
[…]
150. A player´s new club cannot be considered automatically bound by any agreement entered
into between a player and the player´s former club. This is also true for the dispute resolution
clause contained therein. The latter cannot be extended to the new club. Consequently, the Panel
finds that the dispute resolution clause binding the Appellant and the Player (and included in
the Contract), does not automatically deprive FIFA from the competence to hear any claim of the
Appellant against the Second Respondent as the Player´s new club, referring also to the
considerations set out in paras 87-91 above.
151. As such, and with specific reference to the fact that the Appellant´s claim against the Second
Respondent is based on Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP and the fact that the latter is the Player´s new
club, the Panel finds that the claim is in fact to be considered as an employment-related dispute
between a club and a player of an international dimension, based on which FIFA is competent
to hear and decide the claim against the Second Respondent in accordance with Article 22 (1)(b)
of the FIFA RSTP.
152. As a result, the Panel rules that the FIFA DRC was wrong in declaring the Appellant´s claim
against the Second Respondent inadmissible based on, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction to solve the
dispute between the Appellant and the First Respondent.
[…]
153. However, based on the circumstances of this particular case, including the fact that the
Second Appellant was never called as a party before the Independent Arbitrator and was never
heard by the Chairman, the Panel finds that the Second Respondent should be given the
opportunity to have the case heard before the FIFA DRC. Moreover, the Panel finds it
appropriate, based, inter alia, on the nature of the claim, that the FIFA DRC is given an
opportunity to deal with the dispute in the first instance based on submissions from both the
Appellant and the Second Respondent.”
44. The CAS Award was not appealed and therefore became final and binding.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
45. On 18 April 2024, the FIFA general secretariat acknowledged the contents of the CAS Award
and informed the parties that these proceedings would take place as instructed therein.
Contextually, the matter was reopened before the Football Tribunal with case reference
FPSD-14413 and pursuant to the claim filed by RBNY on 12 November 2021.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-14413
46. On 19 April 2024, Al-Taawoun was invited to provide its position on RBNY’s claim. Similarly,
the Player was invited to provide his position on the claim, which the FIFA general
secretariat later clarified was in the context of the Player as an intervening party.
47. A summary of the parties’ respective positions is detailed in continuation.
a. Claim of the Claimant
48. RBNY’s position has been summarized paragraphs 17-27 ut supra.
b. Reply of the Respondent
49. In its reply submitted on 8 June 2024, Al-Taawoun requested that the claim be rejected.
50. As a first point, Al-Taawoun stressed that RBNY’s choice of forum with regard to the dispute
between it and the Player was dispositive, and that RBNY was fully aware of the
consequences of filing its claim before the Independent Arbitrator instead of FIFA, and with
knowledge that the Player had already signed a contract with Al-Taawoun – thus placing
the dispute within the scope of disputes that may be heard before FIFA.
51. While the CAS Award stated that, from a procedural point of view, the claim against the
Player and the claim against Al-Taawoun were two different matters in dispute, concerning
the substance and the merits, Al-Taawoun’s joint liability was not independent from the
Player in case of breach of contract and compensation. Al-Taawoun was only liable in case
the DRC considered the Player terminated his contract without just cause.
52. For those reasons, Al-Taawoun submitted that it could only be liable when the DRC has
heard the principal matter of the termination and examined whether the contract at issue
was terminated by the player without just cause or not.
53. Furthermore, Al-Taawoun argued that FIFA could only examine the question of
compensation after it examined, based on the FIFA regulations and jurisprudence, whether
the Contract was terminated without just cause or not by the Player.
54. In this case, FIFA and CAS rejected RBNY’s claim against the Player. Accordingly, the claim
against Al-Taawoun should also be rejected because it is only when FIFA condemns the
Player as responsible for the breach that it imposes an obligation to pay compensation,
and at that moment the new club will be considered as jointly responsible to pay the
compensation. Thus, FIFA cannot decide against the new club where it was prevented from
hearing the claim against the player in question.
55. Alternatively, the Player’s Contract ended on 31 December 2020.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-14413
56. First, the Contract contained 2 unilateral extension options operating in RBNY’s benefit.
These are considered excessive and contrary to FIFA and CAS jurisprudence, and leave the
Player at the mercy of RBNY for each season, affecting his freedom of movement and
contravening general principles of labour law. Citing the Portmann criteria and alleging that
the Option failed to meet them, Al-Taawoun submitted that the extension options in the
Contract were invalid, possessive, and affected the Player’s right of movement. Moreover,
Al-Taawoun maintained that RBNY was aware of the invalidity of such extension options,
and it was for this reason that it did not initially submit a claim before FIFA and instead
sought a favourable decision regarding the validity of the clause first before going to FIFA
to request compensation.
57. Secondly, Al-Taawoun submitted that RBNY failed to exercise the Option within the
established deadline, highlighting the total lack of evidence and RBNY’s failure to meet its
burden of proof in this regard. Al-Taawoun averred that it was illogical that RBNY would
present such an important document by hand, without at least requesting that the Player
sign any sort of acknowledgement of receipt or sending it via email. Moreover, RBNY never
announced that it had extended the Player’s Contract for an additional season and, once
the Contract ended on 31 December 2020, the Player never returned and was never
summoned to return, and the MLS Players’ Association issued a letter confirming that, in
its view, the Player was out of contract for 2021 and that MLS should withhold all payments
to the Player for 2021.
c. Reply of the Intervening Party
58. In its reply submitted on 10 June 2024, the Player requested that RBNY’s claim be rejected.
59. As a preliminary point, the Player reiterated that the DRC did not have jurisdiction to render
a decision against the Player.
60. The Player first argued that RBNY had not properly exercised the Option. More specifically,
that there was not enough proof that the Option was exercised as alleged by RBNY:
according to the testimony provided by its Sporting Director, Mr. Dennis Hamlett, in the
scope of the procedure before the Independent Arbitrator, it was given by Mr. Hamlett to
the Player in Mr. Hamlett’s office on 3 March 2020. There is no other contemporaneous
evidence and the DAS Decision has lent more credibility to Mr. Hamlett’s testimony than
the Player’s.
61. Secondly, the Player submitted that, in any case, the Option was invalid for the following
reasons:
-
-
There is no particular consideration in exchange for the unilateral option. The
amounts to be paid to the Player are already fixed as salary, and represent barely
a 10% increase in salary year-on-year.
There were 2 option years established, meaning his 3-year contract could be
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-14413
-
-
extended for up to 2 more years.
There was no compensation for the Player in case the options are not exercised.
Thus, the Player was at the Club’s mercy, revealing an imbalance between the
parties.
RBNY’s only objective upon exercising the Option was to later transfer the Player
for a fee, as it provided evidence of negotiations with Club Tijuana. Therefore,
RBNY had no sporting interest in the Player, but an economic one.
62. Subsidiarily, in case the DRC considered the Player terminated without just cause, the
Player alleged that the amount requested by RBNY was unfounded.
63. As to the request for the loss of transfer fees, the Player submitted that the evidence
provided by RBNY shows that the transfer negotiations were not finalized and only prove
that the Player was not happy with his salary and that RBNY’s intentions were to exercise
the Option in order to transfer him for a fee.
64. As to the request for replacement costs, the Player argued there was no evidence that the
player identified by RBNY, Patryk Klimala, was hired to replace the Player, as he did not
even play in the same position as the Player. Moreover, the replacement costs requested
were hypothetical, as RBNY alleged the market value of the replacement player was
between USD 3-5,000,000, salary stood at USD 1,000,000, and commissions at USD
400,000. However, there was no proof provided of any payments made in this respect or
at these figures.
65. As to the non-amortized acquisition costs, the Player contended those were already
amortized over the original term of the Contract (citing CAS jurisprudence).
66. As to the residual value of the Contract, the Player first highlighted that this should be offset
by the salaries saved pursuant to the Player’s departure. The Player also noted that RBNY
used the 2021 salary and the full sign-on fee of USD 1,400,000 under the Al-Taawoun
Contract when it should have split the sign-on fee across the 4 years, meaning USD 350,000
per year. Thus, taking into account the Player’s monthly salary under the Option for 2021
of USD 91,666.66 per month or USD 1,099,999 for the year, as well as the foregoing figures,
the calculation to apply would be an average between his remuneration with RBNY and AlTaawoun ((USD 1,440,000 + USD 1,099,999)/2, which equals USD 1,269,999.50), less saved
salaries of USD 1,099,000.
67. Hence, the maximum compensation that could be awarded to RBNY pursuant to the
principle of positive interest is USD 170,000.50, if any.
68. Finally, the Player argued that no damages for specificity of sport should be awarded.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-14413
d. Claimant’s Additional Comments on the Interim Regulatory Framework
69. In light of the Interim Regulatory Framework’s (IRF) entry into force on 1 January 2025, the
parties were invited to provide their comments on its application to this matter and, in
addition, RBNY was invited to amend its claim, if it so wished.
70. In its comments filed on 20 February 2025, RBNY submitted, first and foremost, that it
would be inappropriate for FIFA to apply the IRF to a case which had been ongoing for 3
years.
71. The applicable regulations should be applied pursuant to art. 26 par. 1 of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players, given that the present matter does not fall within the
scope of art. 29 as enacted in the IRF. As such, the DRC is required to apply the August 2021
edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, given that this was the
version in force when the FIFA Claim was filed.
72. Arts. 26 par. 1 and art. 29 of the IRF are in direct contradiction, and art. 26 par. 1 shall
prevail, as applying the IRF at this late stage would cause significant prejudice and
uncertainty for RBNY.
73. In any case, the aforementioned art. 29 is contrary to the prohibition of retroactive
application of substantive rules pursuant to Swiss law, which has also been upheld in FIFA
and CAS jurisprudence.
74. Moreover, the DRC was estopped from applying the IRF given that the parties had acted
for some years in this matter on the understanding and in the expectation that the matter
was governed by the August 2021 version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players. Had RBNY known that under the new art. 17 par. 2 it would face a brand-new
evidentiary burden, it would have made the relevant disclosure requests at an early stage
in the proceedings. The later such disclosure requests are made, the less likely they are to
provide a true picture of the facts and the easier it is for a reluctant party to manufacture
excuses for non-disclosure.
75. Nonetheless, in the event that the IRF were applicable, RBNY’s claim would succeed given
that it has already been established in the DAS Decision that the Player unilaterally
terminated the Contract without just cause, there is clear and indisputable circumstantial
evidence to confirm that Al-Taawoun knowingly induced the Player to terminate, and AlTaawoun has not denied that its actions interfered with the Player’s contractual
relationship with RBNY and his terminating the Contract without just cause.
76. RBNY insisted that it has an independent claim for compensation against Al-Taawoun,
irrespective of whether it has obtained or will obtain an order for damages against the
Player. Under the IRF, Al-Taawoun can still be ordered to pay damages to RBNY in its own
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-14413
right, for any losses arising from its inducement of the Player to breach the Contract,
without a requirement for RBNY to establish a right to damages from the Player.
77. From the evidence on file, it was clear that Al-Taawoun induced the Player to terminate the
Contract by making an offer of employment and subsequently signing with him while on
notice (at least constructive, if not actual) that the Contract remained in force. The Contract
extension was in fact exercised in February 2020 and, in any case, announced by MLS on
its website on 30 November 2020.
78. The Player’s Agent’s message on 29 December 2020 stating that it was “very unlikely you will
see Kaku for preseason as he is a free agent January 1st due to your club’s failure to notify the
player correctly of the option” evidenced a third party’s involvement in the Player’s sudden
decision to challenge the validity of the exercise of the Option 10 months after it had
occurred. It could easily be inferred that the Player was in negotiations with Al-Taawoun at
that time (especially considering that he signed 2 weeks later, on 15 January 2021).
79. Al-Taawoun persisted in its course of action and attempted to register the Player in early
February 2021, even after being notified in writing on 20, 22 and 28 January 2021 that the
Option had been validly exercised and the Player was under Contract with RBNY.
80. RBNY also submitted an evidentiary request concerning correspondence between the
Player and Al-Taawoun concerning the Player’s contractual status with MLS and the terms
of the contract with Al-Taawoun, and requested that art. 13 par. 6 of the Procedural Rules
Governing the Football Tribunal apply.
81. Further, RBNY argued that if the IRF were to apply, its claim for damages was already based
on the principle of positive interest, and it submitted that Al-Taawoun should be liable to
pay either (i) the value of the agreed transfer terms with Club Tijuana, or (ii) the value of
the loss of the Player’s services, and in either case plus the salary paid to the Player between
1 January and 15 February 2021.
82. Thus, RBNY submitted the following request for relief:
“For the reasons set out herein, and as further particularised in its Statement of Claim, the
Claimant requests that the DRC concludes and/or orders as follows:
The Claim shall be determined in accordance with the Contemporaneous FIFA Regulations; or
In the event that the Claim is determined in accordance with the Interim Regulations, the
Respondent shall be ordered to provide the evidence set out at paragraphs 51 to 52 above; and
The Claim is admissible and well-founded; and
pg. 18
REF. FPSD-14413
The Respondent must pay compensation to the Claimant based on its primary case in the sum
of USD $4,297,730.06 or $3,845,544.02, or (if compensation on the specificity of sport basis is
not deemed to be recoverable) USD $3,295,544.06; or
Alternatively, the Respondent must pay compensation to the Claimant based on its alternative
case in the sum of USD $6,840,369.06 or $5,288,210.12, or (if compensation on the specificity of
sport basis is not deemed to be recoverable) USD $5,838,210.06, or USD $4,738,210.16; or
Alternatively, the Respondent must pay to the Claimant such other compensation amount that
the DRC deems appropriate; and
Interest is payable on the compensation award at a rate of 9% per annum or, alternatively, at a
rate of 5% per annum from 1 January 2021 (i.e. the date of the Unlawful Termination); and
Sporting sanctions are to be imposed on the Respondent, namely a ban on registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods;
and
The Respondent is liable to pay the procedural costs in relation to these proceedings; and
The Respondent is liable to pay in full, or in the alternative, a contribution towards the Claimant’s
costs and expenses pertaining to these proceedings.“
e. Additional Comments on the Interim Regulatory Framework from the
Respondent and Intervening Party
83. In its comments submitted on 15 March 2025, Al-Taawoun considered that the IRF shall
apply to this matter. Furthermore, with regard to the reversal of the burden of proof for
joint liability, Al-Taawoun denied any contact with the Player before the end of his Contract
on 31 December 2020 and recalled RBNY’s lack of proof in relation to any inducement.
84. The Player did not submit any comments in this respect.
pg. 19
REF. FPSD-14413
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Preliminary remarks
i. Nature of the liability under art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players
85. Having carefully examined the CAS Award, and in light of the particular nature of this
dispute, the DRC concluded that the decision touches upon certain fundamental elements
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players concerning joint liability under art.
17 par. 2. The DRC therefore felt compelled, on an exceptional basis, to make some general
preliminary remarks (i.e., remarks that are generally relevant to the application of the
Regulation on the Status and Transfer of Players, as opposed to being limited to the specific
dispute) concerning these fundamental elements of the FIFA regulatory framework.
86. To that end, the Chamber recalled that art. 17 par. 2 plays an essential role in the
architecture of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and its objectives are
well-known and accepted. It is predominantly aimed at reinforcing the principle of
contractual stability and providing the player’s former club with an additional guarantee
that the compensation for breach of contract owed by the player will in fact be paid.1
87. Prior to the IRF’s entry into force, art. 17 par. 2 provided that “If a professional is required
to pay compensation, the professional and his new club shall be jointly and severally liable for
its payment” (emphasis added). The wording of the provision (and, therefore, its literal
interpretation) established that the liability of the new club is the liability for the payment
that the player has been ordered to pay. In other words, it is the player’s breach, and
consequent liability to pay, that triggers the new club’s liability.
88. The literal interpretation of that provision has been further confirmed by its teleological
and historical interpretation, as established, for example, by the following elements:
a. the FIFA Commentary on the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(hereinafter: the FIFA Commentary), which provides as follows: “Equally, this
provision gives the player’s former club that was damaged because of the breach of
contract, a stronger additional guarantee that the compensation the player is
required to pay will in fact be paid.”2 (emphasis added);
b. the well-established jurisprudence of this Chamber;3 and
cf. FIFA Commentary, page 171.
cf. FIFA Commentary, page 173.
3
cf. for instance, DRC decision of 18 June 2020, Cinari; DRC decision of 21 February 2020, Malango; DRC decision of 20 May 2020,
Diaz; DRC decision of 17 January 2020, Ayala; DRC decision of 18 June 2020, da Silva Barbosa; DRC decision of 25 March 2021,
Khacef; DRC decision of 28 April 2021, Henriquez; DRC Decision of 21 June 2022, Pantilimon; DRC decision of 2 June 2022, Ivakhnov.
1
2
pg. 20
REF. FPSD-14413
c. previous iterations of art. 17 par. 2: “If a player is registered for a new club and has
not paid a sum of compensation within the one month time limit referred to above,
the new club shall be deemed jointly responsible for payment of the amount of
compensation”4 (emphasis added).
89. In addition, the consistent and well-established jurisprudence of the DRC up to now has
stated time and again that the joint liability of a player’s new club is accessory to the
principal relationship between the player and the club. The FIFA Commentary describes
the player’s liability as follows: “the primary debtor for the payment of the compensation due
because of the breach of contract is, and remains, the professional player” 5 (emphasis
added). A CAS decision has described this liability mechanism as follows: “It follows that Al
Shorta is not the principal obligor but rather a subsidiary obligor, with Al Shorta merely being
jointly and severally liable”6 (emphasis added). Finally, in another CAS award, the Panel held
that “[…] art. 17.2 RSTP provides that if a professional is required to pay compensation, his new
club shall be jointly and severally liable to pay that compensation. The basis of the new club's
liability, however, is the player’s liability. As a consequence, the new club (in this case Boca
Juniors) cannot be held liable for amounts that exceed those for which the player himself is
liable.”7
90. Notwithstanding the various specific terms used to describe the mechanism set out in art.
17 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it was clear to the
Chamber that they all effectively acknowledged that the liability of the new club is
“inseparably tied to that of the player”8 and “its extent necessarily depends on the amount to be
owed (or not owed) by the player to his former club”.9 The joint liability of the new club can
only be triggered upon the player having been ordered to pay compensation for breach of
contract to their former club.
91. Indeed, in the decision rendered by the Chamber in FPSD-5438, where, in a similar vein, the
dispute between a club and a player and his new club was affected by a decision from a
national tribunal and the Chamber was ultimately tasked with deciding upon the dispute
between the player’s old club and new club only, the immediately preceding CAS decision
referring the matter back to the DRC accepted that the player being ordered to pay
compensation was a condition with respect to the new club’s liability.10
92. Now, with the IRF’s entry into force, the wording of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players was modified to state as follows:
See art. 14 par. 3 of the Regulations Governing the Application of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (2001).
cf. FIFA Commentary, page 173.
6
CAS 2019/A/6233 Al Shorta Sports Club v. FIFA & Dalian Yifang FC, para. 143.
7
CAS 2015/A/4111 & CAS 2015/A/4116, para. 113.
8
CAS 2013/A/3365 Juventus FC v. Chelsea FC / CAS 2013/A/3366 A.S. Livorno Calcio S.p.A. v. Chelsea FC, para. 133.
9
CAS 2019/A/6233 Al Shorta Sports Club v. FIFA & Dalian Yifang FC, para. 141.
10
Cf. para. 216 of the award rendered in CAS 2023/A/9670 LOSC Lille v. Sporting Club de Portugal & FIFA & CAS 2023/A/9671
Sporting Clube de Portugal v. LOSC Lille.
4
5
pg. 21
REF. FPSD-14413
“Entitlement to compensation cannot be assigned to a third party. A player’s new club shall be
held jointly liable to pay compensation if, having regard to the individual facts and
circumstances of each case, it can be established that the new club induced the player to breach
their contract.”
93. In this sense, the Explanatory Notes which accompany the IRF establish that the
modification to art. 17 par. 2 was meant to ensure that (1) all decisions on joint and several
liability could be rendered with full regard to the individual facts and circumstances of each
case, and (2) it would only apply if inducement could be established, thus reversing the
burden of proof and imposing it on the claiming club.11
94. However, the Chamber opined that the foregoing modifications do not imply a complete
departure from the above-described approach and the established understanding of joint
liability under the previous iterations of art. 17 par. 2 as developed in this Chamber’s
jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to the interdependency between the player’s liability
and the new club’s liability.
ii. FIFA’s jurisdiction to hear claims under art. 17 par. 2 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
95. Given the link between the player and the new club’s liabilities as described above (i.e., the
new club’s liability can only be triggered upon the player having been ordered to pay
compensation for breach of contract), claims against new clubs pursuant to art. 17 par. 2
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players are necessarily deemed to be
employment-related claims.
96. This means that FIFA’s jurisdiction to hear claims regarding the joint and several liability of
the new club must be based on art. 22 par.1 lit. a) or art. 22 par.1 lit. b) of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players, which are the provisions specifically enabling FIFA to
decide upon labour-related disputes between clubs and players.
97. These two articles provide as follows:
“Without prejudice to the right of any player, coach, association, or club to seek redress before
a civil court for employment-related disputes, FIFA is competent to hear:
a) disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of contractual
stability (articles 13-18) where there has been an ITC request and a claim from an interested
party in relation to said ITC request, in particular regarding the issue of the ITC, sporting
sanctions or compensation for breach of contract; […]
11
cf. Explanatory Notes, par. 38-41.
pg. 22
REF. FPSD-14413
b) employment-related disputes between a club and a player of an international
dimension; […]” (emphasis added).
98. The aforementioned provisions make it clear in this regard that FIFA’s jurisdiction is to hear
disputes between clubs and players and the Chamber noted that nowhere in those articles
is there a reference to a dispute only between clubs or any suggestion that there would be
a – separate – possibility for FIFA to hear claims between a former club and a new club
independently of the labour dispute between a club and a player. In other words, these
provisions which confer FIFA’s jurisdiction to assess a claim for liability of the new club
under art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players would in
principle require that FIFA has been called upon to decide on the contractual dispute
between the player and their former club.
99. Thus, the DRC has consistently held in the past that these considerations further reinforce
its general view that the potential liabilities of the player and the new club pursuant to art.
17 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players are inextricably linked.
100. For the sake of completeness, and to conclude these general remarks, the Chamber also
wished to note that the only provision in art. 22 of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (which governs FIFA’s competence) that specifically confers the
jurisdiction on FIFA to decide upon a contractual dispute between two clubs (i.e.,
disputes not related to training compensation and the solidarity mechanism) is par.1 lit. g),
which is a sort of “catch all” provision granting FIFA the competence to decide on disputes
between clubs based in different countries that are not covered by the remaining
provisions of the article. Pursuant to art. 23 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, these disputes are under the jurisdiction of the Players’ Status
Chamber of the Football Tribunal.
101. It is thus clear to this Chamber that art. 22 par.1 lit. g) would not enable FIFA to adjudicate
a claim under art. 17 par. 2 because, as stated above, claims for the joint liability of the
new club can only be made in the context of employment-related disputes, which are
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DRC pursuant to articles 22 par.1 lit. a) and lit. b) and
art. 23 par.1of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
b. The DRC’s mandate
102. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber wished to clarify that, even though it may
have its own views as to the general application of certain provisions of the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players as set out in the preceding paragraphs, it is in any case
bound to abide by the conclusions and orders of CAS regarding the present dispute, as
established in the CAS Award.
pg. 23
REF. FPSD-14413
103. In this sense, the DRC noted that its mandate pursuant to the CAS Award was to “deal with
the dispute in the first instance based on submissions from both the Appellant and the Second
Respondent” and “hear and decide the case de novo.” (cf. par. 155-156 of the CAS Award)
104. The Chamber therefore considered that it would be useful at this stage to clarify the
boundaries of its mandate by recalling the matters which were finally decided by CAS and
which therefore cannot be revisited by this Chamber:
a. In the DAS Decision, the Independent Arbitrator was requested to, and actually
did, decide on (i) whether the Option was effectively exercised, (ii) whether the
Player breached his contractual relationship and (iii) on the consequences of such
breach in respect of the scope of such consequences as set out in the Contract.
(cf. par. 91 of the CAS Award)
b. However, the Independent Arbitrator never dealt with any claim for damages
against either the Player or Al-Taawoun, since such a claim was never lodged
before the Independent Arbitrator. (cf. par. 92 of the CAS Award)
c. The DAS Decision was not vested with res judicata vis-à-vis the FIFA Claim because
they did not share the same subject matter, and, thus, the DRC erred in declaring
RBNY’s claim inadmissible due to res judicata in the Preliminary Decision. (cf. par.
93-99 of the CAS Award)
d. The DRC did not have jurisdiction to hear RBNY’s claim against the Player, as both
parties had submitted themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
arbitration body, and waived any and all rights to bring a claim before FIFA. (cf.
par. 145 of the CAS Award)
e. Such waiver was considered to cover all disputes between RBNY and the Player
in relation to the Player’s employment relationship. (cf. par. 145 of the CAS Award)
105. In the Chamber’s view, the present case and the mandate that has been given to it are
admittedly infrequent and, therefore, it must rule on the basis of somewhat limited
precedents and guidance, making the best possible use and interpretation of the
applicable rules within its mandate.
106. The Chamber also noted that the stated reason for why the CAS Panel decided to refer the
case back to FIFA appeared to be because Al-Taawoun had not been afforded an
opportunity to present its position before the Independent Arbitrator or FIFA and should
be given the opportunity to have the case heard before the DRC. (cf. par. 155 of the CAS
Award) The Chamber further recalled that Al-Taawoun also made submissions before CAS
that its right to defend itself was violated due to never having been called before the
Independent Arbitrator. (par. 117 of the CAS Award)
pg. 24
REF. FPSD-14413
c. Jurisdiction, admissibility, and applicable legal framework
107. First of all, the Chamber noted that the present matter was remanded to FIFA by means of
the CAS Award, dated 5 April 2024. It equally underlined that the matter was submitted for
a decision before the DRC on 18 September 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts.
31 and 34 of the January 2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural
Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
108. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 and art. 24 par. 1 lit. b) of the Procedural
Rules and observed that, in accordance with paras. 148-151 of the CAS Award ex positis and
with reference to art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (July 2025 edition; hereinafter: the Regulations), the
DRC shall deal with the matter at stake.
109. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations, the July 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as
to the substance.
a. Burden of proof
110. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within TMS.
b. Merits of the dispute
111. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by noting, once again,
that the scope of its competence within the present proceedings cannot exceed the
boundaries established by the CAS Award and, in doing so, acknowledged all the abovementioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file. However, the
Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts,
arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for assessing the
matter at hand, particularly in light of the scope of its mandate.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
pg. 25
REF. FPSD-14413
112. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, and once again stressed that
there were two key considerations in this respect:
a. the CAS Award declared that the DRC did not have jurisdiction to hear any
disputes between RBNY and the Player in relation to their employment
relationship. This, in the DRC’s view, necessarily extends to any considerations as
to whether, under art. 17 par. 1 RSTP, the Player terminated the Contract without
just cause and the consequences (economic and sporting) deriving therefrom.
b. the Player has never been ordered to compensate RBNY for a breach of contract
without just cause by a competent court or arbitration tribunal.
113. Here, the DRC considered that it was bound to accept the CAS Panel’s findings that, from a
procedural point of view, RBNY’s compensation claims against the Player and Al-Taawoun
were “two different matters in dispute.” However, the Chamber also recalled that this finding
was expressed within the scope of the Panel’s analysis of res judicata and in order to sustain
the conclusion that the possible res judicata effects of the DAS Decision had to be examined
separately for each of the respondents before CAS. (cf. par. 75-76 of the CAS Award).
114. Equally, the DRC noted that it was bound to accept the CAS Panel’s finding that the DAS
Decision would not affect Al-Taawoun’s liability as it was never called as a party before the
Independent Arbitrator and no claim for compensation against Al-Taawoun was brought
forth in that instance. At the same time, the Chamber reflected that, even though the CAS
Panel stated that the Regulations do not specifically describe a claim based on art. 17 par.
2 against a “new club” as being purely accessory or ancillary to the one of art. 17 par. 1, it
also did not hold that the two claims were entirely unrelated to each other.
115. Indeed, the Chamber understood that RBNY’s claim against Al-Taawoun was premised, first
and foremost, on art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, which, as highlighted above, cannot be
divorced from the threshold findings that a player has terminated his contract without just
cause and must pay compensation to his former club in a certain amount. Indeed, per the
terms of art. 17, “The following provisions apply if a contract is terminated without just cause:
[…].”
116. As has been previously confirmed by this Chamber, the basis of the new club’s liability is
the player’s liability. (cf. FPSD-5438 and the relevant CAS decision) However, the DRC could
not help but observe that the CAS Award has effectively confirmed, in a final and binding
manner, that this Chamber had no possibility of evaluating the question of the Player’s
liability for paying compensation for the damages RBNY may have suffered in this instance.
117. Hence, in the absence of any determination from any competent court concerning the
Player’s (primary) liability to pay RBNY compensation for breach of contract, the Chamber
concluded that there was simply no legal foundation upon which to issue a finding of joint
pg. 26
REF. FPSD-14413
(or accessory) liability against Al-Taawoun ordering payment of compensation under art.
17 par. 2 of the Regulations.
118. Similarly, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber further concluded there was no
legal foundation pursuant to which the Chamber may apply sporting sanctions under art.
17 par. 4 of the Regulations.
119. For these reasons, the Chamber determined that RBNY’s claim must be rejected.
c. Costs
120. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
121. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
122. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 27
REF. FPSD-14413
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, New York Red Bulls, is rejected.
2.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 28
REF. FPSD-14413
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to art. 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf., art. 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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