Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-13969
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 27 March 2025
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Musa Esenu
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Mario FLORES CHEMOR (Mexico), Member
Michele COLUCCI (Italy), Member
CLAIMANT:
Massafi Al-Jonob, Iraq
Represented by Islam Hisham & Shimaa El-Daly
FIRST RESPONDENT:
Musa Esenu, Uganda
SECOND RESPONDENT:
Bul Football Club, Uganda
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-13969
I. Facts of the case
1.
The parties to the present dispute are:
-
The Iraqi club, Massafi Al-Jonob Sports Club (hereinafter: the Claimant)
-
The Ugandan player, Musa Esenu, born on 18 December 1995 (hereinafter: the
Player or the First Respondent)
-
The Ugandan club, Bul Football Club (hereinafter: the Second Respondent)
-
The First Respondent and the Second Respondent are jointly referred to as the
Respondents
-
The Claimant and the Respondents are jointly referred to as the Parties.
2.
On 1 January 2024, the First Respondent sent a letter to his former club, Rayon Sport FC
from Rwanda, informing it of his intention to not renew his contract.
3.
Reportedly, on 11 January 2024, the Claimant and the First Respondent concluded an
employment contract (hereinafter: the Club’s Contract) valid as from 15 January 2024 until
31 May 2024. The Player contests his signature on the Club’s contract.
4.
Also on 11 January 2024, the Claimant and the First Respondent concluded an employment
contract (hereinafter: the Player’s Contract, and together with the Club’s Contract, the
Contracts) valid as from 15 January 2024 until 31 May 2024.
5.
The Contracts reads inter alia as follows:
Club’s Contract
Clause 2.4 reads as follows:
Player’s Contract
n/a
“Player's Duties and Obligations
[…] The two parties agreed to agree to
pay a fee of 3% of the general value of
the contract to be paid upon
ratification of the contract to the IFA
and it shall be divided equally
between the two parties to the
contract or as agreed upon by the two
parties".
Clauses 3.8 and 3.9 read as follows:
n/a
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-13969
“Utilization and commercialization of
Personal rights in Employment
Television[…]
8. The Player shall as well place his
autograph signature in its original
handwriting, as email, or in printed
form at the Club's and/or IFA/ disposal
or purposes of publicity and for
reproduction on souvenirs and sales
articles produced by the Club and/or
IFA/, should the occasion arise in
connection with the advertising of
third parties.
9. The Club shall be to that extent of
concession entitled to unlimitedly use
and exploit the portrait, name
(including nickname and stage name).
distinguishing features of the Player's
personality. With this contract the
Club shall be obliged to grant these
particular rights to the IFA in order for
them to perform their contractual
obligations towards third parties
without
any
further
written
confirmation
and
financial
compensation.
Clause 14 reads as follows:
“Applicable Law and Jurisdiction
1. This Contract is governed firstly
by the IFA regulations and
subsidiary by the Laws of the State
of IRAQ as well as AFC and FIFA
Regulations.
Clause 8 reads as follows:
“8- The second party has to bound by the
laws and regulations in the in the Republic
of lraq.”
2. Any dispute between the club
and the player in respect of this
contract shall be subject to
amicable solutions, in the absence
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-13969
of an amicable solution which shall
be settled by the following means:
A-Review of the Iraqi Football
Federation's
Players
Affairs
Committee to take action and resolve
the conflict
B-Review of the civil courts in Iraq to
resolve the dispute between the
parties in accordance with Iraq’s legal
methods
C-International Football Federation
Dispute Resolution Commission to
resolve dispute between parties
3. Decisions of the Player’s Affairs
Committee or the International
Federation are binding and not
subject to appeal. It is only appealed
to the Court of Arbitration for Sport,
which
is
based
in
Lausanne/Switzerland.”
Clause 10 reads as follows:
Clauses 11 to 14 read as follows:
“1. IFA regulations governing this
matter and, where applicable, FIFA
regulations in force from time to time
apply.
2. This Contract may be terminated
before its expiry by mutual
agreement.
3. This Contract may be terminated by
either party, without consequences
for the terminating party, where there
exists just cause at the time of the
contract termination.
4. If the Club terminates the Contract
without having just cause, the Club
“11. In the event of breach of the
contract by the second party of any
paragraph of the contract, the
administration shall have the right
to cancel the contract, terminate
his its services, return all of his
salaries dues and he undertakes
not to claim them in the future.
12- In case that the player (the
second party) is absent from the
official matches without an
acceptable excuse, the (first party)
can terminate this contract and
return all financial dues to the first
party.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-13969
shall pay to the Player compensation
equal to the total amount of
5. If the Player terminates the
Contract without having just cause,
the Player shall pay to the Club
compensation equal to the total
amount of: Ten million dinars
6. The Parties expressly agree that the
compensation amounts stipulated
under the provisions of paragraphs 4
and 5 of this Article X above, are fair
and respect the principles of parity
and reciprocity of the Parties in light
of the overall circumstances related to
the Contract's conclusion and
execution […]”
13- E-signature via e-mail for
signing the contract is considered
valid
and
official
also
correspondence via e-mail Is
considered valid and official
14- The two parties have the right
to terminate this contract at any
time without paying any financial
dues after notifying the other party
in written letter.
The contract stipulated the following The contract stipulated the following
salary:
salary:
“1. The Contract has a total value of
13,500 US dollars in words: Thirteen
thousand five hundred US dollars and
nothing else).
4. The second party receives a
monthly salary of (3000) dollars
only (three thousand dollars only
and no other).
2. Concerning the season 2423/2A24,
the Player shall receive from the Club
the total amounts as follow:
[…]
6- The second party receives two (1)
roundtrip tickets.
a. Signing-on fee:
Nothing […]
b. Monthly salary:
Three thousand dollars to be paid at
the end of each Gregorian month for
the period from 15 / 01/2024 until 31
/ 05 / 2024.”
6.
On 12 January 2024, the Claimant requested the Iraqi Football Federation to contact the
“Ministry of Youth and Sports / Department of International Relations and Cooperation” to
issue a visa for the Player.
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-13969
7.
On 15 January 2024, the First Respondent and the Second Respondent signed an
employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2026 with an annual
salary of UGX 16,668,000 (hereinafter: the Bul Contract).
8.
On 17 January 2024, the Claimant received the Player’s International Transfer Certificate
(hereinafter: ITC).
9.
On 18 January 2024, following the Second Respondent’s social media, the Player was
presented as a player for the Second Respondent.
10. On 4 February 2024, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondents indicating that:
-
the Respondents breached FIFA regulations, as players cannot sign 2 contracts at the
same time;
-
as a result, such serious breach constituted a termination without just cause;
-
therefore, the Respondents shall pay compensation to the Claimant for the damages
incurred; and
-
The Claimant granted the Respondents 10 days to resolve the matter amicably.
11. By letter dated 14 February 2024, a law firm called Novus Advocates and Solicitors claiming
to be the Player's representative replied to the Claimant, mentioning that the Player had
decided to terminate the contract due to personal reasons and that he was committed to
finding an amicable solution. The aforementioned law firm also posited to the Claimant
how to resolve the case.
12. On 26 February 2024, the Claimant sent a letter in response to the letter from Novus
Advocates and Solicitors, accepting their request to hold a meeting to resolve the matter
amicably.
13. By letter dated 10 March 2024, Novus Advocates and Solicitors requested the Claimant to
provide evidence as to the expenses incurred. The letter reads as follows (quoted verbatim):
“Refer to the above captioned subject matter wherein we act for and on behalf of Mr.
Esenu Musa, Our Client on whose behest we address you as hereunder;
1. We acknowledge receipt of your response in your letter dated 26th February, 2024
and the contents of which a noted in which you communicated the willingness of your
client to reach an amicable settlement with our client
2. However, in light of having these proposed settlement meetings, we request that
you avail our client or us with the specific amounts your client claims a damages for
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-13969
compensation from our client as well as avail us with copies of the following
documents within 7 days from the date of receipt of this letter;
a. Proof that your client incurred losses resulting from the breach of contract,
b. Proof of registration of our client and fees paid to the Iraqi Football Federation as
player registration fees, and:
c. Proof of payment of Agent commissions in regards to our player's contract with your
client.
d. Proof of any addition losses incurred as a result of the breach of contract on the
side of our client.
The purpose for this request, is enable us to be able to discuss the terms of your
proposal for a settlement with our client, in order for us to diligently advice our client
before we can commence the negotiations.
3. We propose a date for the negotiation to happen soon after you have availed us
with the documents requested above
4. In specific response to a request for a Powers of Attorney authorizing us to represent
our client/ player in this matter, subject to Ugandan Law, specifically The Advocates
Act CAP 267 and its amendments, a power of attorney is not a requirement for
provision of legal counsel to our clients.
5. In the premises whereof, we can only provide you with a Notice of Instructions/
Attorney-Client Engagement Letter to represent our client which will be made
immediately available to you upon providing us with a copy of Notice of Instructions/
Attorney-Client Engagement Letter from your clients authorizing you to represent
them. We noticed in your warning letter that you did not provide us with a Copy of
your Powers of Attorney you referenced as "(Exhibit No. 1)". For purpose of record, we
request you provide us with a copy of the same for our file. […]”
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-13969
II. Proceedings before FIFA
14. On 8 March 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
Parties’ positions is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
15. In its claim, the Claimant contended that there was a valid contract between itself and the
Player, i.e., the Club’s Contract. By signing another contract on 18 January 2024 for the
same period with the Second Respondent, the Player committed a serious breach, thereby
terminating the Club’s Contract without just cause.
16. In view of the above, the Claimant was of the opinion that the Respondents were jointly
liable to compensate the Claimant.
17. The Claimant further added that the compensation shall be calculated in accordance with
art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and it shall be calculated as
follows:
- Residual value: USD 13,500
- Fees and expenses incurred:
Flight ticket: USD 700.
Registration fee: USD 405: the Claimant added that “according to Article 3 para 14
of the Contract the First Respondent shall bear the amount of 3% of the total value of
the Contract to be paid to the Iraq Federation for registering the Contract”.
Specificity of sport: USD 21,000 corresponding to 6 monthly salaries.
Replacement cost: USD 15,000 as salary of the new player, for which the Claimant
argued that it was forced to replace with another player who was playing in the
same position. In support of this the Claimant provided a copy of a new contract
with a third player concluded for the period 3 February 2024 until 30 July 2024
with a total salary of USD 15,000 (USD 2,500 per month).
Compensation for losing the amount of utilizing the personal rights. The Claimant
referred to clause 3. 9 of the Club’s Contract and mentioned that on 25 January
2024, “the Claimant received an offer from company named “Rise to Fame Sports
Company” requesting to use the image of the First Respondent in return for an
amount USD 2,000. The Claimant stated that: “[a]s a result of breaching the
contract from the First Respondent side by terminating it prior to its expiry date
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-13969
without just cause and during the protected period, the Claimant has lost the amount
of 2,000-/ USD as revenue from using the Player’s personal right”.
18. Moreover, it requested that sanctions shall be imposed to the Respondents in accordance
with art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, as the Club’s
Contract was terminated during the protected period.
19. The Claimant requested the following relief:
“1) To accept this claim against both Respondents “the Player and his New Club.
2) To consider the First Respondent liable for the breach Contract without just cause
of the Employment Contract under article 14 of FIFA-RSTP during the protected period.
3) To consider the Second Respondent induced the First Respondent to terminate the
Contract with the Claimant.
4) To condemn both Respondents jointly and severally to pay compensation to the
Claimant according to articles 17 of FIFA-RSTP, as follows:
a) The residual value of the existing contract: an amount of USD 13,500-/ “thirteen
thousand and five hundred dollars” plus 5% interest should be calculated as of 18
January 2024.
b) Specificity of Sports: an amount of USD 21,000-/ “twenty-one thousand dollars” plus
5% interest should be calculated as of 18 January 2024 the date of terminating the
contract.
c) Replacement Cost: an amount of USD 15,000-/ “fifteen thousand dollars” plus 5%
interest to be calculated as of 03 February 2024.
d) Compensation for losing the amount of utilizing the personal rights: an amount of
USD 2,000-/ “two thousand dollars” plus 5% interest to be calculated as from 25
January 2024.
e) Flight ticket: an amount of USD 700-/ “seven hundred dollars” plus 5% interest as
from 29 January 2024.
f) Registration fees: an amount of USD 405-/ “four hundred and five dollars” plus 5%
interest as from 20 January 2024.
5) To condemn the Respondent to pay interests at a rate of five percent (5%) per
annum over entire amounts requested from the due date of each payment until the
date of the effective payment.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-13969
6) To Ban the First Respondent from participating in any national or international
match for six months.
7) To ban the Respondent from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, for two registration periods under article 17, paragraph 4 of the FIFA
RSTP; AND
8) To fix a sum of USD (2,000-/) “two thousand dollars”, to be paid by both
Respondents, to help the payment of its legal fees and costs.
9) All amounts mentioned in the present claim shall be paid in dollars at the price of
the time of signing the Contract.
10) As a consequence of the above, to condemn the Respondent to pay all expenses
and costs of the present proceedings, if any.”
20. In support of the above requests, the Claimant provided inter alia the following documents:
-
A flight ticket reservation on behalf of the Player from Entebbe, Uganda to Basra,
Iraq on 29 January 2024 returning on 24 April 2024;
-
An invoice dated 20 January 2024 of USD 400 to the Iraqi Football Federation as
registration fee for the employment contract with the Player;
-
A copy of a new contract with a third player concluded for the period 3 February 2024
until 30 July 2024 with a total salary of USD 15,000 (USD 2,500 per month);
-
A “proposal for Image Rights Agreement with Musa Esenu” dated 25 January 2024 from
a company named Rise to Fame Sports. The document only contained telephone
contacts from the UK, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire; and
-
The communications with the law firm (i.e., Novus Advocates and Solicitors) (points
11-13 above).
b. Position of the First Respondent
21. In his reply, the First Respondent indicated the following:
-
After the end of the employment contract with the club Rayon Sports FC, the First
Respondent was approached for a football opportunity in Iraq. According to the
Player, he was in communication with Mr. Moyassar - understood by the Player to be
a Club representative - via WhatsApp and agreed to enter into an employment
contract with the Claimant for the period between 15 January 2024 and 31 May 2024,
with a promised monthly salary of USD 3,000. The Player provided a release letter
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-13969
from his former club and signed the Player’s Contract. In this respect, the First
Respondent mentioned that he was not able to retrieve the WhatsApp
communications as he changed his phone.
-
The First Respondent argued that the contract presented by the Club (i.e., the Club’s
Contract) is forged and invalid. He claimed to have never signed this document and
asserted that the Claimant cannot derive benefits from an invalid contract. However,
the First Respondent admitted signing a different contract (i.e., the Player’s Contract)
sent by Mr. Moyassar, which he believed should be the only valid contract to be
considered by the FIFA Football Tribunal. In particular, he mentioned that he “signed
the hard copy of the contract, scanned it and sent it back to Mr. Moyassar. All these
correspondances [sic] were exchanged via WhatsApp”.
-
The First Respondent claimed to have terminated the contract on 15 January 2024
because of family issues and exercising his right under clause 14 of the Player’s
Contract, which allows termination without financial dues after notifying the other
party. The First Respondent argued that notifying Mr. Moyassar, who acted on behalf
of the Club, was sufficient to terminate the contract.
-
The First Respondent stated that he never exchanged any correspondence with the
Claimant directly and only dealt with Mr. Moyassar.
22. Alternatively, in the event FIFA considered that the First Respondent did not terminate the
contract with just cause, he argued having valid reasons to terminate the contract. The First
Respondent highlighted the absence of a visa as a significant issue, stating that the delay
in obtaining it would have prejudiced his football career by preventing him from training
and playing.
23. The First Respondent emphasized that the Claimant did not suffer financial loss as it never
paid any salary, and the First Respondent did not receive any money from the Claimant.
24. As to the communications with the law firm (i.e., Novus Advocates and Solicitors) presented
by the Claimant, the First Respondent argued that he sought some advice as to the case,
but that he did not authorise it to represent him in any negotiations with the Claimant.
25. In view of all of the above, the First Respondent stated that the Claimant was not entitled
to compensation. Also alternatively, he mentioned that the Claimant acted in bad faith to
unjustly enrich itself, since it did not suffer any financial loss.
26. Moreover, he mentioned that if the Claimant already fabricated some documents, it is
possible that it did the same for other documents. In particular, the First Respondent
disputed the allegations of liability for a flight ticket, questioning its authenticity and
arguing that the Club purchased it despite being notified of the contract termination.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-13969
27. The First Respondent also argued against the imposition of sporting sanctions, citing the
inability to play football for five months due to the ongoing case and the transfer of his ITC
to the Claimant.
28. To conclude, the First Respondent requested that the entire claim of the Claimant is
dismissed.
c. Position of the Second Respondent
29. It is to be noted that the FIFA General Secretariat granted a deadline until 2 June 2024 to
the Respondents to provide their positions to the claim. However, as the deadline fell on a
Saturday, the time limit for the Respondents to provide their respective positions was
extended until 3 June 2024.
30. On 31 May 2024, the Second Respondent created a support ticket in the FIFA Legal Portal
indicating that it encountered difficulties upon attempting to open its account. On 11 June
2024, the FIFA Legal Portal support team replied to the ticket requesting additional
information from the Second Respondent. The ticket was subsequently closed as no
further information was provided.
31. On 1 June 2024, the Second Respondent provided its position to the claim via email and
mentioned that it had problems accessing the FIFA Legal Portal.
32. On 3 June 2024, the FIFA general secretariat informed the Second Respondent that its reply
would be disregarded since, as of 1 May 2023, the email service was no longer used for
official communications, and that its submission must have been filed via the FIFA Legal
Portal.
33. On 4 June 2024, the FIFA General Secretariat closed the investigation phase.
34. On 6 June 2024, the Second Respondent provided its position. The Second Respondent
requested to resubmit its defence as it had technical difficulties and provided evidence of
having sent emails to FIFA.
35. The Second Respondent mentioned in its reply that it was not aware that, at the moment
of the conclusion of the Bul Contract, the First Respondent had a contract with the
Claimant, and that they became aware of the existence of an employment relationship,
upon the communication provided by the Claimant on 4 February 2024. The Second
Respondent also mentioned that it had started the relevant legal actions before the
Federation of Uganda Football Associations.
d. Rejoinder of the Claimant
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-13969
36. On 13 August 2024, the FIFA general secretariat informed the Parties that (i) after reviewing
the case, a second round of submissions was necessary and invited the Claimant to provide
its comments on the latest correspondence of the Player; and (ii) “acknowledge that Bul
Football Club faced technical issues with the FIFA Legal Portal when uploading its position to the
claim, resulting in late reply of the latter. In this respect, we inform the parties that the relevant
deciding body will take a decision on the admissibility of the latest documentation filed by the
Bul Football Club, taking into account the technical issues mentioned above, as well as the
evidence thereto provided”.
37. In its rejoinder, the Claimant mentioned that the Player acknowledged that he signed the
Club’s Contract, and therefore this was a clear admission of acceptance and agreement to
the terms of the contract. This admission substantiated the existence of a mutual
agreement and reinforced the contractual obligations between the Claimant and the
Player.
38. Moreover, it mentioned that the necessary constitutive elements - acceptance, reciprocity
and concordance - were met. In particular, it mentioned that the Player’s Contract is
consistent with the terms of the Club’s Contract: “The provisions outlined in the Agreement
reflect the same obligations and expectations as stipulated in the Employment Contract, thereby
ensuring that both documents are harmoniously integrated. This alignment confirms that the
Employment Contract accurately mirrors the terms agreed upon in the Agreement, reinforcing
the mutual understanding and intent of the parties. The concordance between the Agreement
and the Employment Contract establishes that the Employment Contract is a valid extension of
the Agreement, thereby affirming the coherence and consistency of the contractual
relationship”.
39. Therefore, even if the Club’s Contract was forged - which according to the Claimant was not
the case - the First Respondent was bound by the terms of the signed Player’s Contract.
Consequently, the First Respondent is required to honour and perform under the
agreement as signed, regardless of any claims concerning the authenticity of the Club’s
Contract.
40. As to the termination pursuant to clause 14 of the Player’s Contract, the Claimant contested
such argument, mentioning that “[h]e has not terminated the contract, and the Claimant was
never formally notified by the First Respondent of any intent to terminate the Agreement nor the
Employment Contract. This assertion is further undermined by the fact that the First Respondent
has provided no evidence to support these claims”.
41. The Claimant also mentioned that the First Respondent via his attorney admitted that he
was in breach of the Club’s Contract and therefore, he was acting in a contradictory manner
by simultaneously admitting to the breach of the contract and claiming, on the other hand,
that he was unaware of the contract and that it was forged.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-13969
42. Finally, the Claimant argued that all of the First Respondent's allegations have proven to be
unfounded, as he has failed to provide any substantive evidence to support his arguments.
43. As to the Second Respondent's position, the Claimant rejected the argument that it had
been filed on time and argued that it should be disregarded. However, in case the position
was considered as admissible, it mentioned that the Second Respondent has not
substantiated its argument of not having induced the First Respondent to terminate his
contract with the Claimant. The lack of concrete evidence from the Second Respondent
regarding its procedures and actions, together with the chronology of the contractual dates
and the admissions made by the First Respondent, prove a coordinated effort or at least a
substantial influence on the First Respondent's decision.
44. The Claimant asserted that the Second Respondent induced the Player to breach the
contract and should be considered jointly liable.
e. Final comments of the First Respondent
45. The First Respondent reaffirmed that he did not sign the Club’s Contract and that it was
forged. Moreover, he mentioned that the Player’s Contract was the “contract” and not an
offer and that FIFA should not allow the Claimant to sustain its claim on the “Agreement”
(i.e., the Club’s Contract) since despite having it in its possession, it deliberately decided to
ignore it.
46. The First Respondent also contested that the Player’s Contract and the Club’s Contract were
consistent. In particular, the Club’s Contract imposed more obligations on the Player, such
as the commercialization of his image, payment of a fee of 3% of the contractual value to
the Iraqi Football Association, none of which can be assumed to have been accepted by the
Player without disclosing the same.
47. The First Respondent also mentioned that the Claimant did not prove having sent the Club’s
Contract for signature and that he cannot be bound by its terms.
48. In the alternative, he should not pay compensation due to the Club’s bad faith.
49. Finally, the Player reiterated his submissions presented in his reply and requested FIFA to
reject the claim.
f. Original documents
50. In light of the Player’s allegations and the fact he did not recognise the terms of the Club’s
Contract, and at the request of the FIFA General Secretariat, the Claimant provided a copy
of such document (a printed copy) via courier.
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-13969
g. Additional comments of the Claimant regarding the Interim Regulatory
Framework
51. On 4 February 2025, the FIFA general secretariat invited the Claimant to amend its claim, if
it so wished, exclusively in relation to the possible consequences of the application of the
new interim regulatory framework adopted by the Bureau of the FIFA Council on 23
December 2024 (hereinafter: the Interim Regulatory Framework). The FIFA general
secretariat also highlighted that any submission that went beyond the scope of the
mentioned request would be disregarded.
52. The Claimant reiterated its position that the Second Respondent induced the Player to
terminate his contract without just cause and that the Second Respondent has failed to
provide any evidence showing that it took the necessary steps to verify the Player’s
employment situation before signing the new contract. This was also substantiated in the
default notice sent on 4 February 2024. The Claimant mentioned that despite
acknowledging receipt of the notice, the Second Respondent failed to take any meaningful
steps or actions to resolve the matter amicably with the Claimant.
53. The Claimant confirmed its request for relief mentioned in the claim and requested that
the “the Chamber consider the player liable for breaching the contract without just cause and
recognize that the club (Bul Club) induced the player to terminate the contract with the Claimant.
Additionally, we request that both the player and the club be condemned jointly and severally
to pay compensation to the Claimant, as outlined in the Claimant’s statement of claim”.
h. Additional comments of the First Respondent regarding the Interim
Regulatory Framework
54. On 21 February 2025, the FIFA general secretariat invited the Respondents to provide any
additional comments they may have exclusively in relation to the application of the Interim
Regulatory Framework.
55. The Player mentioned that he terminated his contract on the basis of the termination
clause and, in the event the Football Tribunal found that he did not terminate the contract
by triggering its termination clause, he submitted again that he had just cause to terminate
it. Moreover, he mentioned that the absence of a visa and an inability to play football for
an extended period of time, as well as a lack of timely payment of the salaries, were valid
justifications for the Player to terminate the employment agreement.
56. As to the consequences under art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players, the Player argued that the Claimant was not entitled to compensation. Moreover,
he stated that “in light of the new regulatory framework, I submit that these claims for expenses
such as reimbursement of flight tickets, replacement costs and an additional compensation
claim of USD 21,000 for specificity of sport under paragraphs 40-42 of the claim all lack
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-13969
regulatory basis as they fall outside the considerations to be taken into account when calculating
compensation under Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP January 2025 edition”.
i.
Additional comments of the Second Respondent regarding the Interim
Regulatory Framework
57. The Second Respondent stated that it cannot be held jointly liable for the payment of
compensation as it did not induce the Player to breach the contract.
58. The Second Respondent stated that it did not have knowledge of the existence of a contract
between the Claimant and the Player. In particular, it mentioned that on 6 January 2024,
the Player informed the Second Respondent that he was a free agent, and in the Transfer
Matching System (hereinafter: TMS) on the same date he was still registered with Rayon
Sports FC. The Player and the Second Respondent concluded the Bul Contract on 15
January 2025 i.e., prior to when the Claimant obtained the Player’s ITC, which occurred on
17 January 2024.
59. The Second Respondent mentioned that, as of the entry into force of the Interim Regulatory
Framework, joint liability was no longer presumed, and the burden was on the Claimant to
prove that the Second Respondent induced the Player to breach the contract; however,
according to the Second Respondent, the Claimant did not provide any evidence.
60. Therefore, in case the Player is found liable to pay compensation, the Second Respondent
should not be considered as liable.
61. As to the sporting sanctions, it should not be sanctioned as it did not induce the Player. The
Second Respondent “did not obtain the ITC of the Player and never registered him with the
Club. The Player never rendered any services to the Club. The ITC at times remained with the
Claimant. [the Respondent] therefore never enjoyed any sporting advantage from the alleged
breach committed by the player”.
j.
Information retrieved from TMS
62. On 12 January 2024, the Claimant started an instruction in TMS, in order for the Player to
be transferred to the Claimant from his former club, however this instruction was cancelled
on 13 January 2024 (cf. Transfer n°: 783267).
63. On 13 January 2024, the Claimant started an instruction in TMS, in order for the Player to
be transferred to the Claimant from his former club, however this instruction was cancelled
on 13 January 2024 (cf. Transfer n°: 783648).
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-13969
64. On 13 January 2024, the Claimant started an instruction in TMS, in order for the Player to
be transferred to the Claimant. The Claimant received the Player’s ITC (cf. Transfer n°:
783654).
65. The Player was not registered in TMS with the Second Respondent following the above
transfer (cf. Transfer n°: 783654).
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
66. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed
whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that
the present matter was presented to FIFA on 8 March 2024 and submitted for decision on
27 March 2025. Taking into account the wording of arts. 31 and 34 of the January 2025
edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at
hand.
67. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (January 2025 edition), the Dispute
Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an
employment-related dispute with an international dimension between an Ugandan player
and an Iraqi club with the involvement of an Ugandan club.
68. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 29 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (January 2025 edition), the January 2025
edition (hereinafter: the Regulations) of said regulations is applicable to the matter at hand
as to the substance.
b. Admissibility
69. The Chamber observed that the Second Respondent provided its position on the claim in
the FIFA Legal Portal on 6 June 2024, i.e., after the deadline granted by the FIFA general
secretariat. Specifically, the Second Respondent argued that it had problems accessing the
FIFA Legal Portal and provided its position via email within the deadline, and then via the
Legal Portal on 6 June 2024.
70. As to the position provided via email, the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with art. 10
par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, all communications must be undertaken via the FIFA Legal
Portal. Therefore, the Chamber confirmed that the correspondence provided by email was
pg. 18
REF. FPSD-13969
to be disregarded. However, as to the reply in the FIFA Legal Portal, the Chamber was aware
that the Second Respondent submitted a support ticket mentioning that it could not access
the Legal Portal within the deadline to present its position, and a reply from the Legal
Portal’s support team was provided but only after the deadline had passed.
71. In light of the foregoing and based on the particular circumstances surrounding the Second
Respondent's technical difficulties and their resolution, the Chamber decided to
exceptionally accept the Second Respondent's reply filed via the FIFA Legal Portal once it
regained access.
72. With regard to the additional comments concerning the Interim Regulatory Framework
requested from the Parties, the Chamber confirmed that any additional comments
submitted by the Parties which were unrelated to the Interim Regulatory Framework would
be disregarded, considering that the submission phase was already closed and the FIFA
general secretariat’s letters clearly stated that the Claimant and the Respondents were
invited to provide their comments exclusively on the Interim Regulatory Framework.
c. Burden of proof
73. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the Parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the TMS.
d. Merits of the dispute
74. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
75. The Chamber then moved to the substance of the matter, acknowledging the significant
disagreement between the Claimant and the First Respondent regarding which contract
(Player’s Contract or Club’s Contract) constitutes the employment agreement between
them, the manner in which the contract was terminated, and the consequences of such
termination.
pg. 19
REF. FPSD-13969
76. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that it was its task to determine: (i) the
employment contract binding on the Claimant and the Player; (ii) whether the employment
contract was terminated with just cause; and (iii) the consequences thereof, if any.
Which employment contract is binding on the Claimant and the Player?
77. The Chamber noted that, while the Claimant and the First Respondent agreed on the
existence of an employment contract, they disagreed on which specific contract was valid.
78. The Chamber also observed that neither party provided any evidence regarding how the
contractual relationship was formalised between the Claimant and the Player. The
Claimant stated that it signed the Club’s Contract, but no evidence of communications
between the Player and the Claimant was provided. It was also unclear to the Chamber the
circumstances under which this contract was signed. Additionally, and pursuant to the
request from the FIFA general secretariat to receive the original contract, the Chamber was
only presented with a printout of the contract in question.
79. The Chamber further observed that the Player, on the other hand, mentioned that the
Claimant and the Player concluded the Player’s Contract but failed to provide any evidence,
solely mentioning that he lost all the WhatsApp communications. From the Player’s answer,
the Chamber understood that the signature of said contract had also not taken place in
person and that it was handled through messages.
80. Additionally, the Chamber observed that while the Claimant mentioned that the Player’s
Contract was “the offer” or the first document signed and that it contained the same or
similar elements as the Club’s Contract, the Player mentioned that it was the only
employment contract. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Player’s Contract had all
the essentialia negotii and therefore, it cannot be considered a mere offer.
81. Upon examining both contracts, it can be established that they had similar content,
particularly regarding the duration and the salary. However, they had different wording
concerning the Club/Player obligations and the termination clause. Therefore, the
Chamber could not conclude that both contracts were the same.
82. Considering all of the above, the Chamber determined that the Claimant and the Player
both acknowledged that they have entered into an employment relationship. However,
without entering into the allegations of forgery, and considering that (i) the Claimant and
the Player both acknowledged that they have an employment relationship; (ii) the Claimant
and the Player both agreed that the Player’s Contract was signed at some point; (iii) the
Player denied having signed the Club’s Contract and no evidence was provided by the
Claimant regarding the signature of the Club’s Contract, nor has the Chamber been
provided with any further elements to analyse; the Chamber concluded that the Player’s
Contract was the valid contract between the Claimant and the Player (hereinafter: the
Employment Contract).
pg. 20
REF. FPSD-13969
Was the Employment Contract terminated with just cause?
83. To begin, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations and its
longstanding jurisprudence to this effect, noting that a party cannot have signed two
contracts covering the same period.
84. The Chamber also noted that, while the Player argued that he terminated the Employment
Contract on the basis of clause 14 of the Employment Contract, there was no evidence as
to the communication of such termination. Therefore, the Chamber stated that the
Employment Contract, even if terminated for the reasons provided by the Player, was in
fact terminated on 15 January 2024, i.e., when the Player signed the Bul Contract.
85. In continuation, the Chamber observed that clause 14 of the Employment Contract reads
as follows: “[t]he two parties have the right to terminate this contract at any time without paying
any financial dues after notifying the other party in written letter”.
86. In that respect, the Chamber could not consider that this clause was ever exercised as there
was no proof of any written notice (a requirement explicitly set forth in the clause).
Therefore, the Chamber held that said clause is not applicable.
87. Having concluded the above, the Chamber turned its attention to art. 14 of the
Regulations, according to which, "[a] contract may be terminated by either party without
consequences of any kind (either payment of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions)
where there is just cause. In general, just cause shall exist in any circumstance in which it can
no longer be reasonably expected in good faith from a party to continue a contractual
relationship".
88. Generally, as stated in art. 14 of the Regulations, a premature termination may be issued
only in circumstances in which it can no longer, reasonably and in good faith, be expected
from the party issuing the termination to continue the respective contractual relationship.
In line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber, the termination of a
contract should always be an action of last resort, having regard to the individual facts and
circumstances of each case. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken
in order for an employee to assure the employer’s fulfilment of its contractual duties, such
measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. In other words, as
consistently held by this Chamber, a premature termination of an employment contract
can only be an ultima ratio measure.
89. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the Player mentioned in his claim that the
Claimant did not provide him with a work visa, nor did it contact him. The Chamber also
noted that the Player did not send any warning or notification as to this matter. What is
more, the Player immediately signed the Bul Contract on the same date the Employment
Contract would have started (i.e., 15 January 2024), and thus the Player had two contracts
pg. 21
REF. FPSD-13969
in force simultaneously, contrary to art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations. In light of the above
circumstances, the Chamber concluded that the Player terminated the Employment
Contract without just cause.
ii. Consequences
90. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of
compensation payable to the Claimant by the First Respondent in the case at stake.
91. As a preliminary point, the Chamber recalled that this matter is governed by the Interim
Regulatory Framework as reflected in the January 2025 edition of the Regulations,
applicable in casu. By way of context, the Chamber underlined that said framework
impacted the following rules:
•
the calculation of compensation payable in the event of a breach of contract by a
player or coach;
•
the burden of proof in relation to joint and several liability for compensation
payable for a breach of contract;
•
the burden of proof in relation to an inducement to breach a contract (and the
related sporting sanction against the new club of a player); and
•
the procedure regarding the issuance of an ITC.
92. With the above in mind, the Chamber noted that, for the present purposes, the relevant
rules are those related to (i) the calculation payable by a player in case of a breach of
contract; (ii) the question of the joint and several liability of the new club; and (iii) the
burden of proof in relation to an inducement to breach a contract.
93. Having established the above, the Chamber recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17
par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and
unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, taking into account
the damage suffered, according to the positive interest principle, having regard for the
individual facts and circumstances of each case, and with due consideration for the law of
the country concerned. In this respect, the Chamber emphasized that, according to the
principle of positive interest, the claiming party must be put in the position it would find
itself in, had the breach of the contract not occurred and had the contract been duly
performed.
94. Therefore, before even addressing how the principle of positive interest would apply to this
case, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the Employment
Contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon
an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of
pg. 22
REF. FPSD-13969
contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was
included in the Employment Contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
95. Consequently, the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the
First Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of art. 17 par. 1 of the
Regulations, beginning with the consideration for the damage suffered by the club, guided
by the positive interest principle.
96. Bearing in mind the above principles, the Chamber recalled that per art. 13 par. 5 of the
Procedural Rules, the onus is on the Club to quantify, substantiate and prove the damage
that it allegedly suffered as a result of a breach of a contract.
97. In view of the above, the Chamber analysed each of the amounts claimed as damage by
the Claimant.
98. First, the Claimant requested the payment of USD 13,500 which corresponded to the
amount payable to Player for rendering his services as football player under the
Employment Contract.
99. In this respect, the majority of the Chamber stressed that an amount corresponding to the
amount payable to a player for rendering his services as football player under an
employment contract, is an appropriate starting point in order to establish the damage
suffered by the Claimant. In fact, the majority of the Chamber finds it reasonable to depart
from the fact that under a fixed-term employment contract both parties (player and club)
have a similar and mutual interest and expectation that the term will be respected, subject
to termination by mutual consent or the existence of just cause. In this respect, further
reference is made to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that
agreements must be respected by parties in good faith and is a fundamental principle of
contractual stability and contract law. When a player and a club sign an employment
contract both parties are fully entitled to assume that both parties will comply with their
contractual obligations towards each other. If a different approach was adopted, this would
mean disregarding such an essential principle.
100. In view of the above, the majority of the Chamber considered that, having regard of the
circumstances of this individual case, the Player’s remuneration as foreseen in the
breached Employment Contract can be awarded as it constitutes a reliable basis on which
to establish the economic value that the Player’s services represented for the Club and this
remuneration bears correlation to his value as player, which the Club lost (and which thus
caused damage to the Club) in light of the Player’s breach of contract. Consequently, the
majority of the Chamber concluded that the Claimant sufficiently substantiated and proved
that it suffered a damage of USD 13,500.
101. Second, the Claimant requested reimbursement for the flight tickets. The Chamber
considered this request as potentially constituting a compensable element of damage,
pg. 23
REF. FPSD-13969
contingent on the Claimant having paid for the tickets. However, the Chamber noted that
no evidence was provided regarding the price paid or proof of payment. Additionally, it was
unclear when the payment occurred (whether before or after the termination), as the flight
reservation was dated 29 January 2024. Therefore, the Chamber held that the Claimant’s
contentions in this respect must be rejected.
102. Third, the Claimant requested reimbursement of USD 405 as a registration fee. The
Chamber observed that the Claimant provided an invoice dated 20 January 2024 for USD
400. However, the Chamber also noted no proof of payment was provided. Therefore, the
Chamber held that the Claimant’s contentions in this respect must be rejected.
103. Fourth, the Claimant requested USD 21,000 pursuant to considerations of specificity of
sport. The Chamber referred to the Interim Regulatory Framework and confirmed that this
criterion was no longer one of the criteria used to determine compensation under art. 17
of the Regulations. Therefore, the Chamber held that the Claimant’s contentions in this
respect must be rejected. In any event, the Chamber emphasised that the specificity of
sport was never intended to constitute as standalone head of damage; it was only a
correcting factor to either increase or decrease the payable compensation in a given set of
circumstances. Be it as it may, the Chamber underlined again that such correcting factor is
no longer foreseen in the Regulations, and it is therefore not applicable.
104. Fifth, the Claimant requested replacement costs of USD 15,000 deriving from the salary of
a new player it had hired to allegedly replace the First Respondent. In this respect, the
Chamber emphasised that, for compensation to be due in such instances, there must be a
logical nexus between the breach and the replacement costs claimed. Put differently, a club
claiming replacement costs as head of damage needs to prove an actual loss flowing
naturally from the unjustified termination of contract. This, in turn, entails that the
replacement player’s profile must be similar to that of the replaced player, that the club
decided to hire the player because of the termination of the other player, and that the costs
arising therefrom are reasonable and foreseeable. Whether the replacement costs claimed
are reasonable and foreseeable depends on the circumstances of each case, for instance
and without limitation, on the time of the unjustified termination (e.g. during the last days
of a registration period), the difficulty in finding a replacement player (e.g. a goalkeeper),
the replaced player’s importance on the team, analysed on an objective basis (e.g. goals
scored) and the salaries paid to each the replaced and the replacement player.
105. In that respect, the Chamber observed that the Claimant provided a copy of a new contract
with the alleged replacement player concluded for the period from 3 February 2024 until
30 July 2024 with a total salary of USD 15,000 (USD 2,500 per month). However, the
Claimant failed to prove that the replacement player had a sufficiently similar profile as the
First Respondent to be considered as a true replacement. Therefore, the Chamber
considered that there were no sufficient elements to establish - to the requisite degree of
certainty - that this new player was indeed hired as a replacement for the First Respondent.
pg. 24
REF. FPSD-13969
The Chamber was comforted with its conclusion by the fact that the salary paid to the
alleged replacement player was lower than that supposedly due to the First Respondent.
106. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber was not able to conclude that the new player was in
fact hired in order replace the First Respondent. Therefore, the Chamber held that the
Claimant’s contentions in this respect must be rejected.
107. Sixth, the Claimant requested compensation for loss of income derived from its inability to
commercialize the Player´s image rights in the amount USD 2,000. In this respect, the
Chamber observed that the Claimant provided a proposal for commercializing the Player´s
image rights dated 25 January 2024 for the amount of USD 2,000. However, while noting
again the need for a logical nexus, the Chamber noted there was no evidence that the
Claimant ever accepted such proposal, let alone that the loss of said (potential) commercial
opportunity flowed naturally from the breach of contract. Therefore, the Chamber held
that the Claimant’s contentions in this respect must be rejected.
108. Having established all the above, the majority of the Chamber concluded that the Claimant
is entitled to USD 13,500 as compensation for breach of contract which corresponded to
the damage the Claimant suffered from such breach and was the only element in the
majority of the Chamber’s view that was proven.
109. Moreover, and taking into consideration the Claimant’s request as well as the constant
practice of the Football Tribunal in this regard, the majority of the Chamber decided to
award the Claimant interest on said compensation at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 18 January
2025 until the date of effective payment.
110. Lastly, considering the particularities of the case at hand, the majority of the Chamber
decided not to impose sporting sanctions on the Player.
iii. Joint liability
111. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, which stipulates
that a player’s new club shall be held jointly liable to pay compensation if, having regard to
the individual facts and circumstances of each case, it can be established that the new club
induced the Player to breach their contract.
112. Similarly, art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations states that a sporting sanction shall be imposed
on a player’s new club if, having regard to the individual facts and circumstances of each
case, it can be established that the new club induced the Player to breach the contract
during the protected period.
113. Therefore, the Chamber turned to the consideration of the designation of “new club” and
the matter of inducement, as both are key for determining any consequences that may
apply to the Second Respondent.
pg. 25
REF. FPSD-13969
114. In this sense, the Chamber recalled the definitions of the Regulations define “new club” as
the club that the player is joining. Moreover, the latest edition of the Commentary of the
Regulations (p. 205) stated in relation to art. 17 par. 2:
“[…]
When determining which club is to be regarded as the player’s new club for these
purposes, the approach has consistently been to identify the club with which the
player was first registered following the breach of contract […]”
115. In light of the above and the amendments in the January 2025 edition of the Regulations,
the Chamber noted that the definition of "new club" remained unchanged.
116. In this context, the Chamber observed that the Player was not registered with the Second
Respondent, raising questions about whether the Second Respondent could be considered
a "new club".
117. Furthermore, even if the Second Respondent was considered the "new club", the Chamber
highlighted that the Claimant had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the new club
induced the player to breach the contract. Considering the individual facts and
circumstances of the present matter, the Chamber concluded that there was no evidence
to indicate that the new club induced the Player to breach his contract with the Claimant.
118. Additionally, the Chamber noted that the Player and the Second Respondent signed an
employment contract on 15 January 2024, four days after the Employment Contract was
signed and two days before the Player's ITC was confirmed in TMS on 17 January 2024. The
Chamber also observed that the registration process was only completed (confirmation
receipt of the ITC) on 17 January 2024. Therefore, at the moment of the signature of the
Bul Contract, there was not a definitive transfer to the Claimant. As a consequence, the
DRC considered that the Second Respondent could not have known, on 15 January 2024
that the Player had an employment relationship with the Claimant.
119. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the Second Respondent shall not be
held jointly liable, and the Player is the only party responsible for the payment of the
amount of compensation due to the Claimant. For the same reasons, the Chamber held
that no sanction shall be imposed on the Second Respondent.
iv. Compliance with monetary decisions
120. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
pg. 26
REF. FPSD-13969
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
121. In this regard, the Chamber highlighted that, against players, the consequence of the
failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a restriction on playing in
official matches up until the due amounts are paid. The overall maximum duration of the
restriction shall be of up to six months.
122. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Chamber decided that the Player must pay the
full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the club within 45 days of notification
of the decision, failing which, at the request of the creditor, a restriction on playing in official
matches for the maximum duration of six months shall become immediately effective on
the player in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
123. The Player shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank account
provided by the club in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached to the
present decision.
124. The Chamber recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior
to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par.
8 of the Regulations.
e. Costs
125. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the parties.
126. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
127. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the parties.
pg. 27
REF. FPSD-13969
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Massafi Al-Jonob, is partially accepted.
2.
The First Respondent, Musa Esenu, must pay to the Claimant USD 13,500 as compensation
for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as from 18 January 2024 until the date of
effective payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
5.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The First Respondent shall be restricted on any football-related activity up until the due
amounts are paid. The overall maximum duration of the restriction shall be of up to six
months.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the six months.
6.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
7.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 28
REF. FPSD-13969
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 50 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 29