Dispute Resolution Chamber
Texto da decisão
REF 20-01343
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(DRC) Judge
passed on 16 June 2021
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Leonardo Carboni
BY:
Alexandra Gómez Bruinewoud (Uruguay & Netherlands), DRC Judge
CLAIMANT:
Leonardo Carboni, Argentina
Represented by Mr. Esteban Carlos Rodriguez
RESPONDENT:
Mons Calpe SC, Gibraltar
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I.
FACTS OF THE CASE
1.
On 21 June 2018, the Argentinean player, Mr. Leonardo Carboni (hereinafter: the player or
the Claimant) and the Gibraltarian club, Mons Calpe SC (hereinafter: the club or the
Respondent), signed an employment contract valid as from 15 July 2018 until 31 May 2019
(hereinafter: the first employment contract).
2.
Clause 2.1 of the first employment contract reads, inter alia, as follows: “In consideration
for his services, the club shall pay the player the compensation and other benefits set forth
in exhibit B herein. All such compensation shall be paid gross and subject to all applicable
taxes and contributions”.
3.
Additionally, clauses 7.1, 7.2 and 7.4 of the first employment contract established the
following:
“7.1. The parties agree that this contract is subject only to the laws of Gibraltar. Only in
the event that Gibraltar Law is unable to resolve any such controversy, then and only then
the GFA, UEFA and FIFA regulations shall apply. Player herein expressly renounce and waive
any such FA, UEFA and/or FIFA regulations that may be applicable unless and until Gibraltar
law decides on the merits of any claim under this contract.
7.2. The parties agree in the case of any dispute between the parties arises out of this
contract, the parties shall first try to settle the dispute in an amicable manner. If such
amicable solution is nor found, then the aggrieved party shall file a complaint with the
competent board of the GFA to decide on such dispute, which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. Player herein expressly renounce and waive any such GFA,
UEFA and/or FIFA regulations that be applicable unless and until Gibraltar law decides on
the merits of any claim under this contract.
7.4. This contract is being initiated in each page and signed by all signatories as an
attestation that the parties have read and understood the contents of this contract, and
player is fully aware of the implications arising out of this contract and the regulations of
the GFA, UEFA and FIFA. Player is also fully aware of the waiver contained in paragraphs
7.1 and 7.2 above, and herein and expressly acknowledges and reaffirms the same”.
4.
Each of the parties to this dispute filed a different version of the exhibit B to the first
employment contract. In accordance with clauses 1 and 3 of the exhibit B attached to the
first employment contract submitted by the player, the club undertook to pay him, inter
alia, the following amounts:
a. GIP 2,800 as monthly salary; and
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b. GIP 50 per goal scored, to be paid “individually only at the end of the full season on a
season by season basis and only in the event that the player had played a minimum of
75% full games during the entire season”.
5.
On the other hand, in accordance with clauses 1 and 3 of the exhibit B attached to the first
employment contract submitted by the club, it undertook to pay the player, inter alia, the
following amounts:
a. EUR 1,000 as monthly salary; and
b. EUR 50 per goal scored, to be paid “individually only at the end of the full season on
a season by season basis and only in the event that the player had played a minimum
of 75% full games during the entire season”.
6.
On 1 August 2018, the player and the club concluded an official document issued by the
Department of Employment from the Government of Gibraltar. Accordingly, the player
would be entitled to a monthly remuneration of GIP 910.
7.
On 9 August 2019, the player and the club signed another employment contract
(hereinafter: the second employment contract), valid for “one football season, including
domestic and UEFA competitions, each season comprised of ten (10) calendar months with
each season commencing on each August 1st and terminating on each May 31st, unless
extended by UEFA Competitions (…)”.
8.
Clause 2.1 of the second employment contract reads, inter alia, as follows: “In
consideration for his services, the club shall pay the player the compensation and other
benefits set forth in exhibit B. All such compensation shall be paid gross and subject to all
applicable taxes and contributions”.
9.
Additionally, clause 6 of the second employment contract established, inter alia, the
following:
“6.1 The parties agree that this contract is subject to the laws of Gibraltar. Player expressly
waives the application of any applicable GFA, UEFA and/or FIFA regulations unless and until
a court in Gibraltar decides on the merits of any claim under this contract.
6.2 The parties agree that, in the case of any dispute between the parties arises out of this
contract, and prior to any legal proceedings instituted, the parties shall first try to settle the
dispute in an amicable manner. If such amicable solution is not found, then the aggrieved
party shall file a complaint with the competent board on JAMS Mediation and Arbitration
to decide on such dispute, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction on the matter”.
10.
Finally, in accordance with clauses 1 and 5 of the exhibit B attached to the second
employment contract, the club undertook to pay the player, inter alia, the following
remuneration:
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a. GIP 900, as monthly salary; and
b. EUR 30 “per goal or assist subject to qualifying for the UEFA Champions League or
UEFA Europe League.”
11.
On 17 July 2020, the player put the club in default via e-mail and granted it with a 10 days’
deadline in order to proceed the payment of EUR 12,950, corresponding to his monthly
salaries from October 2018, September, October, November and December 2019; plus EUR
950 as bonus for the 19 goals scored (being EUR 50 for each of them).
12.
On 10 August 2020, the player sent the club another e-mail stating that it had not paid the
outstanding amounts and giving notice of (freely translated to English): “the beginning of
his proceedings before FIFA”.
13.
In accordance with the information provided by the Gibraltarian Football Association (GFA):
“There are two distinct contract for each player. The first one on each player’s name have
been submitted by the players themselves whilst the second contract are the ones the club
registered with the association. It is apparent that whilst the club signed contracts with the
players they then submitted a different contract to the association without the player’s
knowledge.
Both players were registered with the association for Mons Calpe SC. Their period of
registration were as follows: Leonardo Ezequiel Carboni From 09/08/19 to 08/01/20 […]”.
II.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FIFA
14.
On 2 September 2020, the player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A brief summary of
the position of the parties is detailed in continuation.
a.
15.
The claim of the player
In his claim, the player inter alia requested payment of the following amounts:
a. Outstanding remuneration in the total of EUR 12,950 “plus interest”, broken down as
follows:
(i)
EUR 2,800 corresponding to his the salary of October 2018;
(ii)
EUR 9,200 corresponding to his salaries of September, October, November and
December 2019 (being EUR 2,300 for each of them); and
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(iii)
EUR 950 corresponding to the bonus for the 19 goals scored (being EUR 50 for
each of them).
b. Compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 6,900.
16.
According to the player, he started his employment relationship with the club in 2018 and
had a great performance during the season. Thus, in spite of his salary of October 2018
being in default, the parties decided to continue with their employment relationship for the
next year. Nevertheless, the club allegedly failed to pay his monthly entitlements of
September, October, November, and December 2019.
17.
In this respect, the player referred to the default notices sent to the club on 17 July and 10
August 2020, as well as to the content of art. 14bis of FIFA Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (RSTP).
18.
Accordingly, the player stressed that the club did not reply to his letters, nor provided him
with the relevant payment. Consequently, the player claimed that he terminated the second
employment contract with just cause and, hence, that the club shall be liable to pay him
outstanding remuneration and compensation for the breach.
b.
The reply of the club
19.
First and foremost, the club challenged FIFA’s competence to hear the dispute based on the
wording of the first and the second employment contracts.
20.
As to the substance, the club mentioned that it did not recognize the version of the first
employment contract submitted by the player and clarified that the remuneration agreed
between the parties was different. In support of its allegations, the club filed its own version
of the document, according to which the club undertook to pay the player a monthly salary
of EUR 1,000 (instead of EUR 2,800).
21.
As per the second employment contract, the club stressed that the player failed to perform
his duties as from November 2019 and, subsequently, requested to be transferred to the
Gibraltarian club, Club San Joseph, in December 2019.
22.
In addition, the club stated that all the amounts due to the player were already paid. In this
respect, the club also held the player is not entitled to receive any bonus for performance
because the team did not qualify to the European competitions.
23.
In light of the above, the requests for relief of the club were the following:
a. To order that FIFA is not competent to hear this demand;
b. Ad cautelam, to dismiss the claim; and
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c. Ad cautelam and alternatively, to acknowledge that the salary of the player
corresponding to October 2018 amounts to GIP 910.
c.
The rejoinder of the player
24.
After being invited to do so, the player submitted his comments to the club’s reply and, in
particular, regarding the authenticity of the first employment contract signed by the parties.
25.
To this extent, the player filed a copy of the correspondences exchanged with Mr. Jasen
Deli (allegedly the club’s sports director) via e-mail, describing the terms of the employment
offer received on 5 July 2018. In addition, the player also referred to the correspondences
exchanged with Mr. Leonardo Vela, another representative of the club, in relation to the
renewal of their employment relationship.
26.
In continuation, the player stressed that the club had never questioned the quantum due
to the player, so that it tacitly confessed its default.
27.
Finally, the player clarified that the differences in the amounts mentioned by the contracts
signed between the parties arise from a club’s attempt to evade from its tax obligations
d. The final comments of the club
28.
Lastly, the club submitted its final comments and reiterated its allegations regarding the
validity of the first employment contract. Specifically, the club filed the original version of
the document via DHL and pointed out several differences between the two different
annexes B, concluding that the player’s version was forged.
29.
By doing so, the club remarked that the player’s claim should be entirely rejected.
III.
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER JUDGE
a.
Competence and applicable legal framework
30.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber Judge (hereinafter also referred to as DRC
Judge) analysed whether she was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect,
she took note that the present matter was presented to FIFA on 2 September 2020 and
submitted for decision on 16 June 2021. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the
January 2021 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the
aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
31.
Subsequently, the DRC Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition February 2021), the she is, in principle,
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competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute
with an international dimension between an Argentinean player and a Gibraltarian club.
32.
However, the DRC Judge also acknowledged that the club contested the competence of
FIFA’s deciding bodies on basis of the wording of the first and the second employment
contracts, which supposedly contained a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of
the Gibraltarian National Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the NDRC).
33.
To this extent, the DRC Judge went to analyse whether the employment contracts at the
basis of the present case actually contained such reference in favour of the Gibraltarian
NDRC. By doing so, the DRC Judge observed that there is no clear and exclusive jurisdiction
clause included neither in the first nor in the second employment contract. On the contrary,
the DRC Judge wished to highlight that both documents presents a series of contradictory
references to the competence of ordinary courts, arbitration and sportive courts, such as
clauses 7.1, 7.2 and 7.4 of the first employment contract and clauses 6.1 and 6.2 of the
second employment contract.
34.
Consequently and based on the wording of the abovementioned clauses coupled with the
club’s submission regarding the competence of the Gibraltarian NDRC, the DRC Judge was
firm to determine that it could not be established with sufficient clarity which of the referred
judicial decision-making bodies (if any) would be competent to hear the dispute at stake.
35.
Therefore, taking into consideration the absence of a clear and unequivocal jurisdiction
clause in compliance with the DRC well-established jurisprudence, the DRC Judge decided
to dismiss the arguments raised by the club as to the competence and to confirm that FIFA
is competent to adjudicate on the matter.
36.
Having established the above, the DRC Judge analysed which regulations should be
applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, she confirmed that, in
accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(edition February 2021), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 2 September
2020, the August 2020 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
b.
Burden of proof
37.
The DRC Judge recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12
par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the DRC Judge stressed
the wording of art. 12 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which she may consider
evidence not filed by the parties.
38.
In this respect, the DRC Judge also recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe
3 of the Regulations, FIFA’s judicial bodies may use, within the scope of proceedings
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pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated
or contained in TMS.
c.
Merits of the dispute
39.
Her competence and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC Judge
entered into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the DRC Judge started by
acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the
documentation on file. However, the DRC Judge emphasised that in the following
considerations she will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which
she considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
40.
Subsequently, the DRC Judge moved to the substance of the matter, and took note of the
fact that the parties strongly dispute whether the second employment contract was
terminated with just cause by the player and the consequences that follow.
41.
In this context, the DRC Judge acknowledged that it was her task was to determine:
a. When was the second employment contract terminated by the player?
b. Did the player have just cause to terminate the second employment contract?
c. Which are the consequences that follow?
42.
The DRC Judge then proceeded to the analysis of each matter.
i. When was the second employment contract terminated by the
player?
43.
Having carefully analysed the parties’ submissions and the documentation on file, the DRC
Judge noted that the player argued that his salaries from October 2018 and September,
October, November, and December 2019 remained outstanding, so that he had no other
option rather than to terminate his employment relationship with the club.
44.
Additionally, the DRC Judge further acknowledged that, by the time said salaries became
due, the player did not send the club any default or termination notice, which were only
delivered on 17 July and 10 August 2020 i.e. when the second employment contract would
already been expired.
45.
Nevertheless, the DRC Judge took due consideration of the fact that the club did not dispute
– and, on the contrary, expressly confirmed – that the second employment contract was
terminated by the player by the end of 2019. In this respect, the DRC Judge specifically
highlighted that the club informed that the player requested to be transferred to a third
club “by his own will”, but did not present any further information and/or evidence
whatsoever.
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46.
Likewise, the DRC Judge also observed that player’s registration with the club before the
GFA was ended on 8 January 2020.
47.
In light of the abovementioned considerations, the DRC Judge recalled the jurisprudence of
the Chamber in similar cases where there has been no written notice of termination and
determined that, taking into consideration the overall developments of the case as well as
the parties’ submissions, the second employment contract was terminated by the player by
the end of December 2019.
ii. Did the player have just cause to terminate the second
employment contract?
48.
After establishing the above, the DRC Judge turned her attention to the documentation on
file and observed that the club did not submit any evidence capable of rebutting the player’s
allegations in regards to his outstanding remuneration.
49.
In particular, the DRC Judge recalled that club claimed that the remuneration due to the
player was paid in full, however did not present any proof in support of this allegation.
50.
With this in mind, the DRC Judge referred to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural
Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry
the respective burden of proof. Consequently, the DRC Judge considered that by 8 January
2020 the club had failed to pay 5 monthly salaries (i.e. October 2018 and September,
October, November and December 2019) without a prima facie contractual basis.
51.
In light of such important delay in payment, the DRC Judge deemed that the player could
in good faith believe that, in spite of a hypothetical notice informing about its default, the
club would have persisted in the non-compliance with the financial terms of the second
employment contract. Furthermore, the DRC Judge recalled the solid DRC jurisprudence
according to which such persistent and substantial non-compliance of the contractual
obligations by the club can justify the unilateral termination of the agreement as well as it
can hold the club liable for breach of contract.
52.
In consideration of the specific constellation described above as well as the contents of art.
14, par. 2 of the Regulations, the DRC Judge found that the player had just cause to
terminate the second employment contract.
53.
The club shall hence bear the consequences that follow.
iii. Which are the consequences that follow?
54.
With due consideration of the above, the DRC Judge went on analysing the consequences
arising from the termination of the second employment contract with just cause by the
player.
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55.
In this regard, the DRC Judge initially noted that the player asserted that, by the time of the
termination, his salaries from October 2018 and September, October, November and
December 2019 remained outstanding, as well as the bonuses for the 19 goals scored
(being EUR 50 for each of them).
56.
In addition, the DRC Judge observed that the parties dispute the quantum of the
remuneration due to the player as to the salary of October 2018. Specifically, the DRC Judge
highlighted that both the player and the club filed different versions of the annex B to
the first employment contract and, hence, argued that the counterparty was trying to
mislead the facts.
57.
In order to address the matter, the DRC Judge firstly recalled the FIFA long-standing
jurisprudence according to which, as a general rule, FIFA’s deciding bodies are not
competent to decide upon matters of criminal law and that such affairs fall into jurisdiction
of the competent national criminal authority.
58.
After a thorough analysis of the documentation brought forward by the parties, the DRC
Judge considered that the club could not establish to a comfortable satisfaction degree that
the version of the second employment contract submitted by the player was indeed forged.
Accordingly, the DRC Judge found it crucial to her conclusion the facts that: (i) it remained
undisputed by the club that the employment offer sent to the player at the beginning of
their employment relationship stipulated that he would be entitled to a monthly
remuneration amounting to EUR 2,800; (ii) the club’s representative confirmed the
remuneration due by the player via e-mail and WhatsApp messages; and (iii) both of the
documents (i.e. the one presented by the club and the one presented by the player) were
registered before the GFA.
59.
Having established the above, it was the position of the DRC Judge that the evidence
presented by the player lead her to a higher threshold of certain than the one provided by
the club and, therefore, that she could not uphold the club’s argumentation in this regard.
60.
As a consequence, and in line with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the
DRC Judge determined that the club shall be liable to pay to the player the following
amounts:
a. EUR 2,800 corresponding to the salary of October 2018;
b. EUR 2,300 corresponding to the salary of September 2019;
c. EUR 2,300 corresponding to the salary of October 2019;
d. EUR 2,300 corresponding to the salary of November 2019; and
e. EUR 2,300 corresponding to the salary of December 2019.
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61.
Additionally, taking into consideration the player’s request as well as the constant practice
of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard as well as the specific request for relief of
the Claimant, the DRC Judge decided to award the player interest at the rate of 5% p.a.
on the outstanding amounts as from the date of the claim.
62.
As to the bonuses requested by the player, the DRC Judge stressed that there was no
evidence on file capable of demonstrating its performance. Consequently, the DRC Judge
deemed that the player’s request should be rejected.
63.
In continuation, the DRC Judge turned to the calculation of the amount of compensation
payable to the player by the club in the case at stake. In doing so, the DRC Judge firstly
recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of
compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the
contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country
concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the
new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years,
and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
64.
In application of the relevant provision, the DRC Judge held that she first of all had to clarify
as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC Judge
established that no such compensation clause was included in the contracts at the basis of
the matter at stake.
65.
As a consequence, the DRC Judge determined that the amount of compensation payable
by the club to the player had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out
in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. To this extent and in order to establish the amount of
compensation to be paid by the club, the DRC Judge took into account the remuneration
due to the player in accordance with the second employment contract as well as the time
remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the player after
the early termination occurred.
66.
In this respect, the DRC Judge pointed out that at the time of the termination of the second
employment contract, it would run for another 5 months (i.e. from January to May 2020).
Consequently, she concluded that the remaining value of the second employment contract
as from its early termination by the player until the regular expiry of the contract amounts
to EUR 11,500 (i.e. 5 times EUR 2,300 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the
final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.
67.
Subsequently, the DRC Judge observed that the player remained unemployed after the
termination of his contractual relationship with the club and, hence, was not able to
mitigate the damages suffered.
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68.
On account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case
at hand, the DRC Judge decided that the club, in principle, should pay the amount of USD
11,500 to the player, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of
compensation in the present matter.
69.
However, taking into consideration the player’s request as well as the constant practice of
the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the DRC Judge duly observed that the
player’s claim is limited to EUR 19,850. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of non
ultra petita, the DRC Judge confirmed that the amount of EUR 7,850 is to be awarded to
the player, corresponding to the difference between the player’s petitum and the
outstanding remuneration awarded (cf. par. 60, supra).
70.
The DRC Judge also decided to award the player interest on said compensation at the rate
of 5% p.a. as of the date of claim until the date of effective payment.
71.
Finally, the DRC Judge referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which
stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the
consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts
of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.
72.
In this regard, the DRC Judge highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure
to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the
maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.
73.
Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC Judge decided that, in the event that the
club does not pay the amounts due to the player within 45 days as from the moment in
which the player, communicates the relevant bank details to the club, provided that the
decision is final and binding, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration
periods shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and
4 of the Regulations.
74.
The DRC Judge recalled that the above-mentioned bans will be lifted immediately and prior
to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis
par. 3 of the Regulations.
75.
Lastly, the DRC Judge concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief
made by any of the parties.
d.
76.
Costs
The DRC Judge referred to article 18 par. 2 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“DRC proceedings relating to disputes between clubs and players in relation to the
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maintenance of contractual stability as well as international employment related disputes
between a club and a player are free of charge”. Accordingly, the DRC Judge decided that
no procedural costs were to be imposed on the parties.
77.
Likewise and for the sake of completeness, the DRC Judge recalled the contents of art. 18
par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
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IV. DECISION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER JUDGE
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Leonardo Carboni, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Mons Calpe SC, has to pay to the Claimant, the following amounts:
- EUR 12,000 as outstanding remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as from 2 September 2020
until the date of effective payment; and
- EUR 7,850 as outstanding remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as from 2 September 2020
until the date of effective payment.
4.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5.
The Claimant is directed to immediately and directly inform the Respondent of the relevant
bank account to which the Respondent must pay the due amount.
6.
The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with
this decision to [email protected], duly translated, if applicable, into one of the official FIFA
languages (English, French, German, Spanish).
7.
In the event that the amount due, plus interest as established above is not paid by the
Respondent within 45 days, as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank
details to the Respondent, the following consequences shall arise:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three
entire and consecutive registration periods. The aforementioned ban mentioned will be
lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.
(cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).
2. In the event that the payable amount as per in this decision is still not paid by the end
of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall
be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee.
8. This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber Judge:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
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NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party
within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted
version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland
www.fifa.com | legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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