DRC Overdue Payables
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-17106
Decision of the
Players’ Status Chamber
passed on 26 February 2025
regarding a contractual dispute concerning the player Thiago Ezequiel
Almada
BY:
Javier VIJANDE PENAS, Argentina
CLAIMANT:
Atlanta United FC, USA
Represented by Litigation Centrefield Llp
RESPONDENT:
S.A.F. Botafogo, Brazil
Represented by Joan Milà
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-17106
I. Facts of the case
1.
On 30 June 2024, the United States league Major League Soccer (hereinafter: MLS), on
behalf of its club Atlanta United FC (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the Brazilian club S.A.F.
Botafogo (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded a transfer agreement (hereinafter: the
Transfer Agreement) whereby the services of the player Thiago Ezequiel Almada
(hereinafter: the Player) were transferred to the Respondent on a permanent basis.
2.
In clause 2 of the Transfer Agreement, the Respondent undertook, inter alia, to pay the
following amounts:
“2. Transfer Fee. In consideration of the Transfer from MLS to [the Respondent], [the
Respondent] agrees to pay to MLS a guaranteed transfer fee of Twenty-One Million And
No/100 Dollars (U.S. $21,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other deductions (the
“Transfer Fee"), which shall be payable as follows:
2.1. Three Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $3,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable within five (5) business days following the receipt of
the Player’s International Transfer Certificate (“ITC") (as defined below) by [the
Respondent].
2.2. Three Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $3,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before September 30, 2024.
2.3. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before December 31, 2024.
2.4. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before March 31, 2025.
2.5. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before June 30, 2025.
2.6. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before September 30, 2025.
2.7. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before December 31, 2025
2.8. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before March 31, 2026.
2.9. Two Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $2,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before June 30, 2026.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-17106
2.10. One Million And No/100 Dollars (U.S. $1,000,000.00), net of any taxes or any other
deductions, which shall be payable on or before September 30, 2026.”
3.
Additionally, clause 6 stipulated (quoted verbatim):
“6. Default. If [the Respondent] (i) fails to make any payment due to MLS under this
Agreement by the due date for payment or (ii) fails to make any required notification to
MLS under this Agreement by the date specified herein, then the following provisions shall
apply:
6.1. With respect to (i), if [the Respondent] fails to pay any installment of the Transfer Fee
and/or the Sell-on Fee under this Agreement within thirty (30) business days following
their respective due dates, the total amount of such payment(s) (less any installment(s)
previously paid) installment an/or the correspondent amount of the Sell-on fee shall
become immediately due and payable without notice;
6.2. With respect to (i) and (ii), interest shall accrue on any overdue amount(s) at the rate
of Five Percent (5%) per annum. Such interest shall accrue on a daily basis from (x) the
date of default until the actual date of payment of the overdue amount(s) with respect to
(i) and (y) the last date by which [the Respondent] was required to provide notification
until the actual date of payment of the overdue amount(s) with respect to (ii). [the
Respondent] shall pay the interest together with the overdue amount(s); and/or
6.3. With respect to (i) and (ii), MLS and/or the MLS team to which the Player was assigned
(“the MLS Team") shall also have the right to commence proceedings against [the
Respondent] in accordance with Article 12bis of the FIFA Regulations and [the
Respondent] acknowledges that MLS and or the MLS Team shall be entitled to request
the immediate payment of the overdue sums and the imposition of sanctions on [the
Respondent] in accordance with Article 12bis (4) of the FIFA Regulations”
4.
Furthermore, clause 8.1 of the Transfer Agreement established, inter alia, the following:
“8.1 MLS represents and warrants, and covenants to [the Respondent] that:
8.1.1. the Player is currently under contract with MLS, which owns the registration and
all the playing rights and related benefits of the Player, and that no third party will
attempt to assert any right therein against [the Respondent]; (…)”
5.
In clause 20, the Transfer Agreement provided the following regarding the Claimant’s right
to enforce the terms therein:
“20. Assignment. The rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall not be assignable,
provided that MLS shall have the right to assign any or all of its rights and obligations
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-17106
hereunder to any affiliate of MLS, which affiliate may be formed under U.S. or foreign
law; provided further that in any such case, such assignment shall not relieve MLS of its
obligations hereunder. It is further acknowledged and agreed by [the Respondent] that
in addition to MLS, the MLS Team shall have the right and standing to enforce the terms
of this Agreement for and on behalf of MLS and itself, including, but without limitation,
enforcing the terms of this Agreement against [the Respondent] in any proceedings
commenced before any competent body, including FIFA and the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (the “CAS”).”
6.
On 11 July 2024, per the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the Player’s ITC was delivered to
the Respondent.
7.
On 22 July 2024, MLS, on behalf of the Claimant, sent an invoice for the first instalment of
the transfer fee to the Respondent.
8.
Between 30 July 2024 and 23 August 2024, MLS, on behalf of the Claimant, and the
Respondent exchanged emails, wherein MLS followed up regarding the unpaid invoice and
the Respondent assured that it would make the payment, asking for more time to “sort it
out” and eventually saying it would pay the amount within 15 days (i.e., 18 September 2024).
9.
On 3 September 2024, MLS, on behalf of the Claimant, sent a default notice to the
Respondent for the first instalment. In the default notice, MLS provided the Respondent 10
days to fulfil the payment of USD 3,000,000.
10. On 31 October 2024, MLS, on behalf of the Claimant, sent a default notice to the
Respondent for the second instalment. In the default notice, MLS stated that the overdue
transfer fee instalments now amounted to USD 6,000,000 and provided the Respondent
10 days to pay the amount.
II. Proceedings before FIFA
11. On 15 November 2024, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
parties’ position is detailed below.
a. Position of the Claimant
12. In its claim, the Claimant first addressed the issue of its standing to sue, arguing that in
accordance with clause 6.3 of the Transfer Agreement, the Claimant was empowered to
bring proceedings against the Respondent in accordance with art. 12bis of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players.
13. In this regard, the Claimant explained that MLS operates as a “single entity” league,
meaning a limited liability company whereby club operators own an equal financial stake
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-17106
in MLS, not just their individual team. According to the Claimant, per the single entity
structure, MLS serves as the entity entering into transfer agreements with clubs outside of
MLS, on behalf of the respective MLS club involved in the registration or transfer of the
applicable player.
14. The Claimant further cited clause 20 of the Transfer Agreement which stated that the MLS
club had the right to enforce the terms of the Transfer Agreement against the Respondent
before FIFA or CAS.
15. Thus, the Claimant concluded that it has standing to bring the claim against the
Respondent.
16. Then, the Claimant stated that, as of the date of filing the claim, no payments in relation to
the transfer fee had been made by the Respondent. In this context, the Claimant explained
that the first instalment had fallen due 5 days after the ITC receipt and the second
instalment was due on or before 30 September 2024.
17. The Claimant went on to argue that the Respondent now owes the sum of USD 21,000,000
with interest accruing at the rate of 5% p.a. in accordance with clause 6.2 of the Transfer
Agreement.
18. The requests for relief of the Claimant were the following (quoted verbatim):
“In view of the foregoing, the Claimant respectfully requests that the PSC concludes
and/or orders as follows:
i. that the Claimant’s claim is admissible and well-founded;
ii. that the Respondent is in breach of the Transfer Agreement and has overdue payables
in the sum of $21,000,000.00 (Twenty-One Million US Dollars) (net of any taxes or any
other deductions) which should be paid immediately;
iii. that the Respondent is liable to pay accrued interest on this debt from 22 July 2024
(the date of the Invoice of the First Instalment) to the date of effective payment, at the
contractually agreed rate of 5% (five percent) per annum in accordance with clause 6.2
of the Transfer Agreement;
iv. that an immediate registration ban be imposed on the Respondent (or such other
sanction as deemed appropriate by the PSC) in respect of the overdue payables; and
v. in accordance with Article 25 paragraph 5 of the Procedural Rules, the Respondent
shall pay the procedural costs pertaining to these proceedings before the PSC.”
b. Position of the Respondent
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-17106
19. In its response to the claim, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s position.
20. First, the Respondent challenged the Claimant’s standing to sue, arguing that the Transfer
Agreement made no mention to the Claimant and that the obligations and entitlements
from the Transfer Agreement were specific to MLS. For instance, the Respondent cited the
language which provided that the transfer fee was “payable to MLS” and that the amounts
were payable “in consideration of the Transfer to the Club”.
21. In this respect, the Respondent argued that since all payments and notices under the
Transfer Agreement were to be made to MLS, rather than the Claimant, there was no basis
to consider the Claimant an alternative creditor. The Respondent further raised the
concern that allowing the Claimant to collect these sums on behalf of MLS would expose
the Respondent to a duplicate claim in the future.
22. Additionally, the Respondent referenced clause 8.1.1 of the Transfer Agreement, arguing
that it prevented any third parties from initiating proceedings or asserting claims against
the Respondent.
23. Subsidiarily, the Respondent acknowledged that it did not pay the first and second
instalment of the transfer fee in due time. However, the Respondent claimed that it did not
owe the full amount of the transfer fee.
24. In this sense, the Respondent argued that clause 6.1 of the Transfer Agreement
(hereinafter: the Acceleration Clause) provided only that in the event of default of any
instalment for 30 business days following the respective due dates, “the total amount of
such payment(s) (less any instalment(s) previously paid) installment an/or the correspondent
amount of the Sell-on Fee shall become immediately due and payable without notice” .
25. The Respondent argued that this language was at least ambiguous as to what part of the
transfer fee the provision refers to. It further stated that as the drafter of the Transfer
Agreement, MLS should have developed the language sufficiently clearly to avoid a
prospective misinterpretation of the contract. Therefore, the Respondent alleges that the
provision should be interpreted against MLS.
26. Consequently, the Respondent argued that the Acceleration Clause shall be understood to
mean that the Claimant was only entitled to the amounts which were due up until the
present date, in this case the first and second instalment, totalling USD 6,000,000.
27. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that only the USD 6,000,000 can be considered an
“overdue payable” in accordance with art. 12bis of the RSTP, because the Claimant never
put the Respondent in default in writing for the remaining USD 15,000,000. The
Respondent further asserted that the amount of USD 21,000,000 cannot be considered an
overdue payable when imposing a sanction and claimed no other aggravating
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-17106
circumstances were present and, therefore, the disciplinary sanctions should not be
imposed.
28. In addition, the Respondent argued that because the Claimant brought the claim according
to art. 12bis of the Regulations, the amount awarded should be limited to only the overdue
payables of USD 6,000,000.
29. The requests for relief of the Respondent were the following (quoted verbatim):
“SAF Botafogo respectfully requests the Players’ Status Chamber of the FIFA Football
Tribunal to:
a. Dismiss the claim of Atlanta United FC in its entirety.
b. Subsidiarily, should the Chamber consider the Claimant has a standing to sue, partially
accept the Claim and award the amount of USD 6,000,000.00 as overdue payment.
c. In any scenario, dismiss the request to apply sporting sanctions.
d. In any scenario, decide that Atlanta United FC shall bear all costs of the present
proceedings.”
III. Considerations of the Players’ Status Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
30. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Chamber (hereinafter: the Single Judge)
analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took
note that the present matter was presented to FIFA on 15 November 2024 and submitted
for decision on 26 February 2025. Taking into account the wording of art. 31 of the January
2025 edition of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand.
31. Furthermore, the Single Judge referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 2 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. g) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) (January
2025 edition), the Players’ Status Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake,
which concerns a contractual dispute with an international dimension between a club from
the United States of America and a Brazilian club.
32. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, the Single Judge confirmed that, in accordance
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-17106
with its art. 29, the January 2025 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
33. The Single Judge recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Single Judge
stressed the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which he may
consider evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence
generated by or within the TMS.
c. Merits of the dispute
34. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Single Judge
entered into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Single Judge started by
acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the
documentation on file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that in the following
considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which
he considered pertinent for assessing the matter at hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
35. The Single Judge then moved to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerns a claim
by a club against another club for overdue payables arising from a transfer agreement.
36. First, the Single Judge recalled that the Claimant alleged that it has standing to bring the
claim against the Respondent and argued that no payments in relation to the transfer fee
had been made by the Respondent. Thus, the Single Judge noted that, according to the
Claimant, the Respondent owes it USD 21,000,000 plus interest.
37. Then, the Single Judge observed that, conversely, the Respondent challenged the
Claimant’s standing to sue and, subsidiarily, mentioned that it does not owe the Claimant
the full amount of the transfer fee.
38. In this context, the Single Judge acknowledged that his tasks were to determine whether
the Claimant has standing to sue and, if so, what amount is owed by the Respondent.
a) Does the Claimant have standing to sue?
39. Regarding the Claimant’s standing to sue, the Single Judge considered the Claimant’s
arguments in favour of its standing to be persuasive, in that clauses 6.4. and 20 of the
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-17106
Transfer Agreement specifically contemplated the present situation and assigned the right
to the Claimant to enforce the terms of the Transfer Agreement.
40. More specifically, the Single Judge noted that these clauses assigned the Claimant the right
to commence proceedings in accordance with art. 12bis of the RSTP, with the “MLS Team”
being “entitled to request the immediate payment of the overdue sums and the imposition of
sanctions in accordance with Article 12bis (4) of the FIFA Regulations.”.
41. Furthermore, the Single Judge referred to the established jurisprudence of the Football
Tribunal, wherein, on previous occasions, the Football Tribunal found standing to exist in
similar transfer agreements executed by MLS on behalf of its club where the club was not
a formal signatory to the transfer agreement.
42. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that indeed the Claimant has standing to bring the
present claim before FIFA.
b) What is the amount owed by the Respondent?
43. Turning to the amounts claimed, the Single Judge pointed out that the parties do not
dispute that the Respondent failed to pay to the Claimant the first two of ten instalments
of the transfer fee arising from the Transfer Agreement within their due dates, and they
indeed remained outstanding.
44. Nonetheless, the Single Judge remarked that the Respondent disputes that the
Acceleration Clause was unambiguous in awarding the entire remaining balance of the
transfer fee and, therefore, should be interpreted against the Claimant insofar as only the
unpaid first two instalments are owed as a consequence of non-payment.
45. While acknowledging that the language could have been written more eloquently, the
Single Judge did not determine that the Acceleration Clause is “ambiguous” or “unclear”
regarding the consequence of a default, as the Respondent suggested.
46. In fact, the Single Judge wished to mention that it would be an unreasonable reading of the
clause to interpret the provision to mean that, in the event of an instalment being overdue
for 30 days, that respective amount was now due immediately without notice, as the
amount was already due. The Single Judge found that the language “the total amount of such
payment(s)” and “shall immediately become due” is sufficiently clear to establish that the total
amount of the transfer fee was accelerated upon non-payment for 30 days of any
instalment.
47. Hence, and in accordance with the principle pacta sunt servanda, the Single Judge decided
to award the Claimant the full transfer fee in the amount of USD 21,000,000 net of any
taxes or any other deductions.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-17106
48. Regarding interest, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant provides that the interest shall
accrue as from 22 July 2024, which it stated reflected the date of the invoice sent by MLS
for the first instalment.
49. In this regard, the Single Judge highlighted that (i) the payment due dates relating to the
transfer fee and/or their corresponding interest payments were not contingent on an
invoice being provided to the Respondent, and (ii) the due date of the first instalment could
have been understood to be 18 July 2024, five business days following the Respondent’s
receipt of the ITC 11 July 2024, with the interest potentially accruing as from 19 July 2024.
However, since the Claimant limited its request for relief to 22 July 2024, the Single Judge
decided to award interest on the first instalment of USD 3,000,000 starting from 22 July
2024.
50. By the same token, based on the Claimant’s argument that the interest accrued from the
invoice date, rather than the due date expressed in the Acceleration Clause, the Single
Judge found that, pursuant to the Acceleration Clause, the accelerated amounts fell due 30
business days following their respective due dates, which falls on 29 August 2024. Meaning,
the due date for the accelerated amounts was actually 29 August 2024. Thus, the Single
Judge decided to award interest on the second and subsequent instalments as from 30
August 2024.
ii. Art. 12bis of the Regulations
51. In continuation, the Single Judge referred to art. 12bis par. 2 of the Regulations, which
stipulates that any club found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days
without a prima facie contractual basis may be sanctioned in accordance with art. 12bis par.
4 of the Regulations.
52. To this end, the Single Judge confirmed that the Claimant put the Respondent in default of
payment of the amounts sought and granted it a 10-day deadline to cure such breach of
contract.
53. Accordingly, the Single Judge confirmed that the Respondent had delayed a due payment
without a prima facie contractual basis for more than 30 days. It followed that the criteria
enshrined in art. 12bis of the Regulations was met in the case at hand.
54. The Single Judge further established that by virtue of art. 12bis par. 4 of the Regulations it
has competence to impose sanctions on the Respondent. On account of the above and
bearing in mind that the Respondent had previous sanctions, the Single Judge decided to
impose a fine of USD 150,000 on the Club in accordance with art. 12bis par. 4 lit. c) of the
Regulations.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-17106
55. In this connection, the Single Judge highlighted that a repeated offence will be considered
as an aggravating circumstance and lead to a more severe penalty in accordance with art.
12bis par. 6 of the Regulations.
iii. Compliance with monetary decisions
56. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Single Judge referred to art. 24
par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
57. In this regard, the Single Judge highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the
failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any
new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The
overall maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and
consecutive registration periods.
58. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must
pay the full amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Claimant within 45 days of
notification of the decision, failing which, at the request of the Claimant, a ban from
registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration
of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on
the Respondent in accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
59. The Respondent shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank
account provided by the Claimant in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached
to the present decision.
60. The Single Judge recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior
to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par.
8 of the Regulations.
d. Costs
61. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules, according
to which in disputes between clubs, costs in the maximum amount of USD 25,000 are
levied. As per art. 25 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, the Single Judge will decide the amount
that each party is due to pay, in consideration of the parties’ degree of success and their
conduct during the procedure, as well as any advance of costs paid.
62. Based on the above, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent shall bear the costs
of the current proceedings before FIFA.
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-17106
63. According to Annexe 1 of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied
on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the
maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to USD 25,000.
64. In light of the above, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to
the amount of USD 25,000 and concluded that said amount has to be paid by the
Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.
65. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge recalled the contents of art.
25 par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
66. Lastly, the Single Judge concluded his deliberations by rejecting any other requests for
relief made by any of the parties.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-17106
IV. Decision of the Players’ Status Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Atlanta United FC, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, S.A.F. Botafogo, must pay to the Claimant the following amount(s):
- USD 3,000,000 (net of any taxes or any other deductions) as outstanding
remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 July 2024 until the date of effective
payment;
- USD 18,000,000 (net of any taxes or any other deductions) as outstanding
remuneration plus 5% interest p.a. as from 30 August 2024 until the date of effective
payment.
3.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
4.
A fine in the amount of USD 150,000 is imposed on the Respondent, which must be paid
to FIFA within 30 days of notification of this decision. Such fine must be paid to the
following bank account with a clear reference to the case FPSD-17106:
UBS Zurich
Account number 230-366677.61N (FIFA Players’ Status)
Clearing number 230
IBAN: CH12 0023 0230 3666 7761 N
SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A
5.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
6.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
7.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-17106
8.
The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of USD 25,000 are to be paid by the
Respondent to FIFA. FIFA will reimburse to the Claimant the advance of costs paid at the
start of the present proceedings (cf., note relating to the payment of the procedural costs
below).
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-17106
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 57 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 16