Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 September 2007,
in the following composition:
Slim Aloulou (Tunisia), Chairman
Philippe Diallo (France), member
Zola Majavu (South Africa), member
Carlos Soto (Chile), member
Philippe Piat (France), member
on the claim presented by the club
A, X,
as Claimant,
against the player
B, X,
represented by Mr S,
and the club
C, Y,
represented by Mr T,
as Respondents,
regarding a dispute about the breach of an employment contract
and the inducement to breach an employment contract.
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 15 June 2004, the player B (d.o.b. 27 August 1986) and the X club, A,
concluded a trainee contract (“Contrat de joueur stagiaire”) valid for a period of
two years, until 30 June 2006.
2.
On 11 August 2006, the player and the Y club, C., concluded an employment
contract valid for a period of two years, until 30 June 2008.
Proceeding in front of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee
concerning the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate
3.
On 11 and 15 August 2006, the Y Football Association (the Y-FA, Y) requested the
X-Football Association (XXX) to issue the international transfer certificate (ITC) for
the player B. The latter was to be registered with the club C as a professional
player.
4.
On 16 August 2006, the XXX addressed the Y-FA and thereby forwarded a letter
of the X League (Professional Footballligue, xxx). Therein, the xxx stated that the
player had been bound to the X club A until 30 June 2006 by means of the trainee
contract. In accordance with the x collective agreement for professional football
(“Professional Footballcharter of X”), a professional contract had been offered to
the player. Furthermore, the xxx emphasised that its Legal Commission established
on 1 August 2006 the absence of the player and decided that based on the
aforementioned collective agreement for professional football, the player is
obliged to sign a professional contract with the club A. Based on these reasons,
the XXX refused to issue the relevant ITC.
5.
On 18 August 2006, the Y-FA contacted FIFA and requested the intervention of
the latter in order to obtain international clearance for the player B. In this
respect, the Y-FA stated that the contractual relationship between the player in
question and the x club A had expired on 30 June 2006 and had not been
renewed. Therefore, the Y-FA considered the player B to be free to seek
employment with another club.
6.
Upon the request of FIFA to the XXX to either issue the ITC for the relevant player
or to indicate reasons for a possible refusal, the XXX forwarded a letter of its
affiliated club A. The x club stated that on 15 June 2004, it had concluded a
trainee contract with the player B valid until 30 June 2006. Furthermore, the
player signed a training agreement which obliged the player in its art. 12 to sign a
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
2
professional contract with A after expiration of the trainee contract. In application
of this clause, A offered the player in due time on 5 April 2006 a professional oneyear contract. On 31 May 2006, the players’ agent of the player, Mr D (licensed
players’ agent by the XXX) accepted the offer of a professional contract.
Subsequently, the player resumed his training with A on 26 June 2006 but
suddenly left the club without further notice. The x club explained that it had
been forced to institute legal proceedings against the player in front of the Legal
Commission of the xxx. The latter established the absence of the player and
decided that the player has to sign a professional contract with the club A. A
emphasised that C never contacted it in order to negotiate a possible transfer of
the player. For all these reasons, the x club is opposing to the issuance of the
relevant ITC. Furthermore, the x club informed FIFA that it intends to lodge a
complaint for breach of contract committed by the player in front of the labour
courts in A. Besides, A asked the Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA to deal with
the contractual dispute at stake. In order to reach an amicable agreement in the
matter, the x club proposed C that it pays compensation in the amount of EUR
500,000 for the transfer of the player.
7.
On 29 August 2006, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee considered
that the contractual relationship between the player B and A had not been
renewed upon its expiry by the signature of a new employment contract. That
assumption was supported by the fact that no such contract was presented as well
as by the decision of the Legal Commission of the xxx stating, inter alia, that the
player has to sign a contract. Equally, the Single Judge emphasised that the
provisions of the x collective agreement for professional football have a national
impact and thus cannot have any effect in another country.
8.
On account of the above, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that he had no
alternative but to doubt on the current existence of a contractual relationship
between the player and A.
9.
To that regard, the Single Judge acknowledged that a contractual dispute existed
between the player, B, and the club, A, in particular on the validity and legal
effects of the training agreement concluded between the parties.
10.
Under the given circumstances, the Single Judge decided to authorise the Y-FA to
provisionally register the player B for its affiliated club C, pending the outcome of
the contractual labour dispute between the player and the x club as to the
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
3
substance of the matter, which would have to be dealt with by the Dispute
Resolution Chamber.
Claim of A
11.
On 15 September 2006, the x club referred once again to the contents of the
trainee contract and the training agreement concluded between itself and the
player. Furthermore, A emphasised that it proposed on 5 April 2006 an
employment contract to the player, which was accepted by the player’s agent on
31 May 2006. Subsequently, the player resumed his training on 26 June 2006 but
suddenly left the club without further notice. Finally, the x club reiterated that
according to the decision of the Legal Commission of the xxx the absence of the
player had been established and it had been decided that the player has to sign an
employment contract with the x club.
12.
The x club referred to the x collective agreement for professional football,
particularly its art. 261 and 262 and to the respective jurisprudence of the x courts.
According to this jurisprudence, if the employer proposes an employment contract
to the employee and the latter accepts the proposal but then refuses to sign the
employment contract, the employee becomes responsible for breach of contract.
Furthermore, A referred to the case Olympique de Marseille c/ Mathieu Flamini
and Arsenal PFC (decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport [CAS] 2004/A/761
dated 31 October 2005). In that case, the player never accepted the proposals
presented by the club Olympique de Marseille and the club did not propose the
essentialia negotii of an employment contract to the player. E contrario to this
decision, if the proposal of Olympique de Marseille had contained the essentialia
negotii of an employment contract and if the player had accepted the offer of
Olympique de Marseille, CAS would have accepted the claims of Olympique de
Marseille. Furthermore, the French club referred to the case Le Havre AC c/ Charles
N’Zogbia and Newcastle (CAS 2004/A/791 dated 27 October 2005) according to
which CAS considered that by refusing to sign a trainee contract, the player
breached his contractual obligations based on the training agreement concluded
with the club. Therefore, the CAS partially accepted the claim put forward by the
French club and obliged the player and the new club to compensate the x club for
the occurred breach of contract.
13.
Based on these considerations, the x club underlined that the player was obliged
to sign the proposed and by himself accepted employment contract by no later
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
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than 31 August 2006. Furthermore, the x club emphasised that C never contacted
it in order to find a solution concerning a possible transfer of the player.
14.
Therefore, the x club claimed that the player B and C shall be jointly and severally
liable for the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the amount of
EUR 500,000.
Response of the player B and C.
15.
On 21 November 2006, the player B and C confirmed that the x club offered the
player on 5 April 2006 to enter into an employment contract for the duration of
one season. However, the player denied that the players’ agent D had any
authority to accept this offer of the club on his behalf. On 26 June 2006, the
player visited the x club’s training ground for a final occasion whilst still
contracted to the A solely on the basis of the trainee contract and the training
agreement. Both agreements expired on 30 June 2006.
16.
The Respondents underlined that as from 30 June 2006, no written contract exists
between the player and the x club. Furthermore, the Respondents emphasised
that there was no subsisting contractual relationship between the player and the x
club and considered the approach of the Claimant to be alarming as it seeks to
impose contractual duties and obligations on parties who are no longer
contractually bound to one another. This principle would be contrary to art. 13 of
the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players which provides that an
employment contract may be validly terminated by expiry of that contract. The
Respondents therefore consider the training agreement to be of disputable
validity and deem that it is not in accordance with the principles of international
labour law and the specificity of sport.
17.
Furthermore, with reference to art. 25 par. 6 of the Regulations for the Status and
Transfer of Players, the Respondents submitted that the Dispute Resolution
Chamber has only to “take into account” the provisions of the x Charter when
considering this matter and is not bound to apply and/or enforce national law if it
is not acceptable with reference to the specificity of sport. Furthermore, the
Respondents emphasised that there was no negotiation as to the key features of
the employment relationship, i.e. the financial conditions and the duration of the
labour relationship. In fact, at the age of 17, by signing the training agreement
and the trainee contract, the player committed himself to at least 2 years with the
Claimant and to possible further 3 years thereafter under a non-negotiable
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
5
professional contract, potentially therefore, to a 5 year relationship, whereby he
would have no influence over the financial conditions of the final 3 years. The
Respondents submitted that such a contractual structure would be an onerous
burden to place on a 17-year old, who was still a minor at the time, and would be
in conflict with art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of
Players.
18.
With respect to the N’Zogbia case, the Respondents emphasised that in that case,
the x club had been entitled to claim compensation for breach of the “training
agreement” and not for breach of the X collective agreement for professional
football. The Claimant had, however, failed to bring this important point to the
attention of the Dispute Resolution Chamber.
19.
Furthermore, the Respondents referred to the case Club Atlético Peñarol v/ Carlos
Heber Bueno Suarez, Christian Gabriel Rodriguez Barotti & Paris Saint-Germain
(CAS 2005/A/983 & 984). On the basis of that case, the Respondents were of the
opinion that although the X collective agreement for professional football does
not allow for an automatic extension to playing contracts as a player may refuse
an offer, it does heavily favour clubs as it denies the players the freedom to
negotiate, reject or accept the offer without then facing a sanction. The
Respondents highlighted that such an inequitable regime would be contrary to
the FIFA Regulations.
20.
In summary, the Respondents emphasised that it should be noted that there is no
existing jurisprudence of the CAS wherein art. 261 of the X collective agreement
for professional football has been considered in isolation and where the
conclusion has been reached that the obligations that the X collective agreement
for professional football seeks to impose are binding and enforceable. Whilst
acknowledging the existence of the X collective agreement for professional
football and its attempt to place extra-contractual obligations on the player after
the expiry of the contractual agreements in place, the Respondents submitted that
such obligations must only be “taken into account” by the Dispute Resolution
Chamber due to the unfair nature of such an agreement. The Respondents
therefore requested that the Chamber takes the opportunity to conclude that the
X collective agreement for professional football cannot be used to impose an
obligation on the player to sign a contract, particularly in a case like the one at
stake where there is no underlying contract in place between the parties.
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
6
21.
In the event that the Chamber concludes that the type of contractual structure
imposed by the X collective agreement for professional football is legally and
morally acceptable, then the Respondents in any event contended that the
Claimant failed to fully comply with the requirements of the X collective
agreement for professional football so as to place any obligation on the player. In
this respect, the Respondents stated that the pre-contractual correspondence
between the club and the agent of the player is not a written contract as per art. 2
par. 2 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, that the offer did
not contain all essentialia negotii and that the player never accepted the offer of
the Claimant. The Respondents underlined that the X collective agreement for
professional football requires the acceptance by the player and not by an agent.
However, the player emphasised that he had told the agent that he could not
accept the offer since it provided him less security and the financial terms offered
were less favourable than those under the trainee contract. Therefore, the
Respondents submitted that the agent has acted independently of the player and
purported to respond to the Claimant’s offer without any authority or instruction,
as no representation agreement existed between the agent and the player.
22.
Furthermore, the Respondents emphasised that by his presence at the Claimant’s
training ground on 26 June 2007 the player was never demonstrating an
acceptance of any further contractual relationship with the Claimant beyond 30
June 2006. The Respondents underlined that on 26 June 2007, the player was still
contractually bound to the Claimant under the trainee contract and the training
agreement, and he was in effect complying with his contractual obligations.
23.
Moreover, the Respondents underlined the fact that the player was actually
offered terms which were substantially less favourable than what he was currently
receiving.
24.
Equally, the Respondents stressed that the X collective agreement for professional
football cannot have any impact on C due to its territorial limits.
25.
Finally, the Respondents concluded that there are no remedies available under the
FIFA Regulations against the player and/or C (including but without limitation art.
17 par. 3 and 4 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players
respectively) other than for a claim for training compensation under art. 20 and
Annex 4 of the aforementioned Regulations.
26.
In view of all the above, the Respondents concluded that:
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
7
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it is clear that no contractual relationship exists between the player and the
Claimant as the trainee contract and the training agreement expired on 30
June 2006;
it is only on the basis of the X collective agreement for professional football
that the Claimant seeks to claim the imposition of an obligation on the player
to sign a contract with the Claimant. The Respondents contest the validity of
the imposition of such an onerous obligation where there is no equality in the
bargaining position between the parties;
even in the event that the Chamber was to ratify the existence of an
obligation under the X collective agreement for professional football, the
Respondents dispute whether the Claimant has actually complied with its
obligations under the said collective agreement to make an offer to the player
which contains sufficient information for the player to be able to consider it.
Even if the Claimant did satisfy this obligation, the player did not personally
accept the alleged offer. It was only an agent acting without his authority
who had done so;
in the event that the Chamber considers that the Claimant’s offer was
sufficient and that the player had accepted it, the Respondents submit that
the only sanction under the X collective agreement for professional football is
the three-year interdiction to play for another club in X, which, as accepted by
all parties, cannot be deployed outside X. So the consequences under the said
collective agreement have no effect upon the player’s professional career
outside X and not against C.
27.
Based on these considerations, the Respondents concluded that there can be no
compensation for breach of contract as no breach of contract had actually
occurred, since no written employment contract had ever existed. Furthermore,
even if the Claimant was deemed to be entitled to compensation for breach of the
allegedly offered one-year contract, the maximum compensation payable would
be the amount of EUR 31,680 (one year at EUR 2,640 salary per month).
28.
The Respondents, however, submitted that no compensation for breach of
contract is payable in this case and that the only claim which the former club can
bring upon expiry of a contract is one for training compensation. In this respect,
the Respondents emphasised that the Claimant failed to lodge such a complaint
and that the trainee contract had been the first professional contract of the
player. Under such circumstances, training compensation would only be
theoretically payable to the Claimant as the former club in accordance with Art. 3
par. 1 of Annex 4 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players. Based
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
8
upon the training period from 1 July 2004 to the date of expiry of the trainee
contract on 30 June 2006, the maximum amount of training compensation
potentially payable to the Claimant would be EUR 180,000.
29.
However, the Respondents pointed out that the Claimant is not entitled to the
payment of any training compensation in this case. In this respect, the
Respondents referred to the contents of art. 6 par. 3 of Annex 4 of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players according to which the
contractual offer shall be at least of an equivalent value to the current contract.
To that regard, the Respondents underlined that in the case between ADO Den
Haag and Newcastle United FC in respect of the player Tim Krul, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber concluded that where a professional contract has not been
offered as stipulated by art. 6 of Annex 4 of the aforementioned Regulations, no
training compensation was payable. The Respondents deem that the Chamber
should follow its existing jurisprudence as confirmed in the Tim Krul case, which is
to state that “…the Claimant did not show enough interest in the player’s services
as a professional. With such behaviour, the Claimant forfeited its entitlement to
receive training compensation…”.
30.
Based upon the above submissions, the Respondents request the Chamber to
make the following orders:
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that the Claimant’s claim for breach of contract be dismissed in its entirety as
the contractual relationship between the player and the Claimant ended by
expiration on 30 June 2006;
that the provisions of the X collective agreement for professional football
invoked by the Claimant are of disputable validity and cannot be enforced
by the Chamber as they impose an onerous obligation where there is no
equality in the bargaining position between the parties;
that in any event, the Claimant has failed to comply with its obligations
under the X collective agreement for professional football to make an offer
to the player which contains sufficient information for the player to be able
to accept it;
that in any event, the player did not personally accept the alleged offer and
it was an agent acting without the player’s authority to do so;
that in any event, the only remedy available under the X collective
agreement for professional football is the three-year prohibition for the
player to play for another club in X; a sanction which cannot be deployed
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
9
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outside X and which cannot have any effect on the player’s registration with
C;
that there can be no damages for breach of contract as no such contract
exists and even if the Claimant could prove otherwise, it has failed to
appropriately quantify its losses;
that the Claimant has failed to properly plead a claim for training
compensation and even if it had done so, it would not be entitled to training
compensation in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annex 4 of the Regulations
for the Status and Transfer of Players; and finally
that no other club and/or association which trained the player from the
beginning of the season of his twelfth birthday to the date of his
registration with C is entitled to claim any training compensation following
the player’s registration with C as such registration was a “subsequent
transfer” in accordance with art. 3 par. 1 of Annex 4 of the Regulations for
the Status and Transfer of Players.
Replication of A
31.
On 28 November 2006, FIFA invited the Claimant to provide it with its replication.
On 16 January 2007, FIFA reminded the Claimant to do so. After expiration of the
second deadline, on 1 February 2007, A referred to its claim dated 15 September
2006 and reiterated its position. Furthermore, the X club informed FIFA that it had
mandated its representatives to lodge a complaint against the player and C in
front of the labour court in X.
Rejoinder of the player B and C.
32.
On 26 February 2007, the Respondents submitted that the Claimant failed to
comply with the deadlines set by FIFA. Therefore, FIFA would have no option but
to close its file. Secondly, the Respondents put forward that according to the
Commentary to art. 22 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players,
which states that according to the principle of litispendency, a case pending in
front of civil courts cannot be dealt with by sports arbitration, FIFA has no longer
jurisdiction to hear this case.
33.
Finally, the Respondents reiterated their conclusions of their response dated 21
November 2006.
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
10
34.
Upon request of FIFA, A responded on 29 March 2007 that it did not start any
proceedings in front of the labour court in X and that therefore, the case would
only be pending in front of FIFA.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
As to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Chamber analysed whether it was competent to deal with the
matter at stake. In this respect, it referred to art. 18 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber. The present matter was first submitted to FIFA and its
Dispute Resolution Chamber by means of the statement of A dated 23 August
2006 during the proceeding in front of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status
Committee concerning the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC).
As a consequence the Chamber concluded that the revised Rules Governing
Procedures (edition 2005) on matters pending before the decision making bodies
of FIFA are applicable on the matter at hand.
2.
With regard to the competence of the Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the abovementioned Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its
jurisdiction in the light of articles 22 to 24 of the current version of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2005). In accordance
with art. 24 par. 1 in connection with art. 22 (a) of the aforementioned
Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate disputes between
clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability if there
has been an ITC request and if there is a claim from an interested party in relation
to such ITC request, in particular regarding compensation for breach of contract.
3.
As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber stressed that it is the
competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a X club, a X player
and an Y club regarding a claim for compensation for breach of contract in
relation to the maintenance of contractual stability following an ITC request.
4.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand,
to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
11
(edition 2005) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the relevant contract at the
basis of the present dispute was signed on 15 June 2004 and that the claim was
lodged at FIFA on 23 August 2006. In view of the aforementioned, the Chamber
concluded that the current FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players
(edition 2005, hereinafter: the Regulations) are applicable on the case at hand as
to the substance.
As to the substance
5.
Entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by
acknowledging the documentation contained in the file, and in view of the
circumstances of the case, focused on the question whether an unjustified breach
of an employment contract possibly concluded between the player and A
occurred, which party is responsible for such potential breach of contract and
whether inducement to breach of contract occurred. Depending on the answers to
these questions, the Chamber would also have to verify and decide if
compensation is payable and whether sanctions for breach of contract and
inducement to breach of contract have to be applied.
6.
Thereafter, the members of the Chamber considered that the crucial problem in
the present procedure is the question, if the player was still contractually bound to
the X club at the time when he signed the employment contract with the Y club.
In this respect, first of all, the Chamber took note that it is not contested that the
trainee contract signed between the player B and the club A on 15 June 2004
expired on 30 June 2006. Furthermore, the Chamber acknowledged that it is not
contested either that the training agreement concluded between the player and
the X club expired as well on 30 June 2006. Therefore, the Chamber stressed that
no written contract exists between the X club and the player as from 30 June
2006. Equally, the deciding authority was eager to emphasise that, as a
consequence, no obligation for the player could be based on any of the
aforementioned conctracts after the relevant date.
7.
Furthermore, the Chamber took note that on 5 April 2006, A offered to the player
a professional one-year contract in application of art. 12 of the training
agreement. The Respondents did not contest that on 31 May 2006, the player’s
agent, Mr D, accepted the offer of a professional contract. In this respect, the
Chamber took into consideration that the player never personally accepted the
offer of the X club and that the Respondents contested the legitimacy of the
acceptance by the players’ agent. Particularly, the Respondents were of the
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
12
opinion that the pre-contractual correspondence between the club and the agent
of the player cannot be considered a written contract as per art. 2 par. 2 of the
Regulations, that the offer did not contain all essentialia negotii of an
employment contract and that the player never accepted the offer of the
Claimant.
8.
To that regard, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that when acting as
the representative of the player, the attitude of the agent was not in line with the
due diligence. In particular, the Chamber underlined that the pre-contractual
correspondence between an agent and a club cannot legally bind the player in the
sense of a conclusion of a contract. In this respect, the Chamber was furthermore
eager to emphasise that the signature of an employment contract has in any case
to be considered as a strictly personal right of the employee and that therefore,
the signature of a players’ agent cannot replace the signature of the player. The
Chamber stressed that this consideration is as well in line with art. 18 par. 1 of the
Regulations, according to which the agent shall be named in the contract, if he is
involved in the negotiation of a contract. However, the Chamber emphasised that
neither the Regulations nor the Players’ Agents Regulations stipulate the
possibility for an agent to sign an employment contract on behalf of the player he
represents.
9.
Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the players’ agent D when accepting the
contract offer made by Ahas effectively acted independently of the player. To that
regard, for the sake of good order, the Chamber stated that in view of the
considerations made under point II., 8. above, the question whether the agent
acted on the basis of express instructions by the player can remain unanswered. In
any case, no evidence in this respect can be found in the file either. On the
contrary, the player expressly contested having authorised the agent to such
action.
10.
Consequently, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that the X
club and the player were no more contractually bound by any valid (employment)
contract at the time the player signed the contract with C.
11.
In continuation, the Chamber referred to its constant jurisprudence in identical
cases concerning the X collective agreement for professional football and
particularly its art. 261 and 262 and emphasised once again that a player cannot
be coerced to sign an employment contract based on this collective agreement.
Equally, the said jurisprudence considers that the provisions of the French
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
13
collective agreement for professional football have a national impact and thus
cannot have any effect in another country.
12.
In view of the above, the Chamber came to the conclusion that no unjustified
breach of an (employment) contract concluded between the player and A
occurred. As a consequence, no compensation is payable.
13.
In continuation, the Chamber deemed it important to point out that contrary to
the case concerning the player Charles N’Zogbia to which the X club is referring, in
the case at stake also the training agreement between the player and A had come
to a conclusion prior to the player signing for C. Therefore, the conclusions of the
CAS in its award CAS 2004/A/791 regarding the player N’Zogbia to award
compensation for breach of the training agreement are not of any relevance for
the case at hand.
14.
Based on the conclusion reached, i.e. no breach of contract without just cause
occurred, the Chamber concluded that C can also not be held responsible for
inducement to breach of contract.
15.
Therefore, the Chamber decided to reject the claims filed by A in their entirety.
16.
Finally, the Chamber clarified that since the X club had not lodged any claim with
regard to a possible entitlement to training compensation, it had not to deal with
that aspect and the present decision is without prejudice to any decision possibly
taken in that respect at a later stage.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the club A against the player B and C is rejected.
2.
According to art. 61 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of
appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of
notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance
with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose
hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing
the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
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legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Markus Kattner
Deputy General Secretary
Encl.
CAS directives
A, X / Player B, X and C., Y
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