Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 May 2009,
in the following composition:
Slim Aloulou (Tunisia), Chairman
Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member
Caio Cesar Vieira Rocha (Brazil), member
Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member
Carlos Soto (Chile), member
on the claim presented by
the club, U
as “Claimant”
against
the player, A
as “Respondent 1”
and
the club, R
as “Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant”
regarding a contractual dispute between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
The player A from G (hereinafter: Respondent 1), born on 28 June 1985, and the club R
(hereinafter: Respondet 2 / Counter-Claimant), concluded an employment contract dated 1
February 2008 (hereinafter: first contract), valid from 1 July 2008 until 30 June 2013, with a
monthly salary of EUR 11,000, due in 14 equal instalments per season, plus a bonus of EUR
360,000 net per season.
2.
The player also concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: second contract) with the
club U (hereinafter: the claimant), dated 17 March 2008, for the amount of USD 2,400,000
for the first season and USD 1,200,000 for the second season, valid from 1 July 2008 to 1
June 2010. According to art. IX, the validity of the second contract is subject to the
confirmation by the B Football Association (hereinafter: BFA that the player is eligible to
play (ratification of the contract).
3.
In its art. X (hereinafter: termination clause), the second contract provides a compensation
of USD 160,000 in case of termination of the contract without just cause or without mutual
agreement of the parties concerned.
4.
Art. XIV par. 5 of the second contract stipulates: “any Transfer The Player have to by to the
club 50% from the new contract”.
5.
On 3 May 2008 the Respondent 1 sent a termination letter to the Claimant, by means of
which he informed the latter that he was not in a position to execute the “prilmary agree”
he signed “on 19/03/2008” since he was obliged with his current club (i.e. the club L
[hereinafter: L]). Therefore, he stated that the referred agreement should be considered
cancelled.
6.
On 25 August 2008, the S Football Federation (hereinafter: SFF) requested FIFA’s
intervention in order to obtain the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) for the
Respondent 1 from the I Football Federation (hereinafter: IFF).
7.
In light of the ITC proceedings it became known to FIFA that:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
8.
The Respondent 1 concluded a contract with L with validity until the end of June
2008, which was terminated by a mutual agreement signed by L and the Respondent
1 on 15 May 2008.
On 8 June 2008, the IFF issued the relevant ITC in favour of the BFA.
On 8 July 2008, the SFF requested the ITC from the IFF.
On 14 July 2008, the IFF informed the SFF that the ITC had been issued in favour of
the BFA.
After FIFA’s intervention, the BFA issued the ITC in favour of the SFF.
Notwithstanding the issuance of the ITC, the Claimant lodged a claim, on 15 October 2008,
against the Respondent 1 for breach of contract without just cause, claiming compensation
of USD 2,000,000 from the Respondent 1 and claiming that the Respondent 2 / CounterClaimant be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such compensation.
Furthermore, the Claimant stated that it would leave the question whether or not to
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impose sporting sanctions on the Respondent 1 and/or 2 / Counter-Claimant to the
discretion of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).
9.
The Claimant alleged having signed an employment contract with the Respondent 1 on 17
March 2008, valid from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010, since the Respondent 1 confirmed that
his current contract with L was valid until May/June 2008. Subsequently to the signature,
the Claimant found out via the press that the Respondent 1 was apparently engaged with L
as from the seasons 2008/2009 until 2010/2011, and thus contacted L to find an amicable
settlement. In the end, such settlement was not necessary since upon the ITC request of the
BFA, L did not oppose and consequently the IFF issued the relevant ITC to the BFA without
objections.
10.
Finally, the Respondent 1 did not join the Claimant since he was engaged with the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant as from the season 2008/2009 until 2011/2012. Upon the
SFF’s request to the BFA to issue the ITC, the Claimant opposed. According to the Claimant,
the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant offered to pay the termination clause of the second
contract, amounting to USD 160,000, if the Claimant did not oppose to the ITC’s issuance.
The Claimant did not accept the said offer since it doubted that the first contract was
actually signed on 1 February 2008, given that through the Respondent 1’s agency, Fairplay
Agency (hereinafter: Fairplay), the Respondent 1 signed a document on 20 March 2008
accepting the contractual offer of the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant.
11.
After FIFA’s intervention, and in order not to interfere with the career of the Respondent 1,
the Claimant did not oppose to the issuance of the ITC, but lodged a claim for breach of
contract in front of the DRC.
12.
In this context, the Claimant, first and foremost, refers to art. XIV par. I of the second
contract which supposedly stipulates that if the Respondent 1 is transferred to a third club,
50% of the total value of the second contract is payable to the Claimant as transfer
compensation, i.e. a minimum of USD 1,200,000. Furthermore, the Claimant holds that the
costs involved in engaging the Respondent 1 as well as the very short, even insufficient,
period of time to find a replacement for the Respondent 1 should also be taken into
consideration when calculating the amount payable to the Claimant as compensation. On
account of the above, the Claimant demands a compensation for breach of contract
amounting to USD 2,000,000, ex aequo et bono.
13.
In his response, the Respondent 1 alleged having signed the first contract with the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant on 1 February 2008, and having signed the second
contract with the Claimant on a later stage, containing, inter alia, the condition, that the
second contract would come into force in case the Respondent 1 would not play for the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant. According to the Respondent 1, the Respondent 2 /
Counter-Claimant did not know of the signature of the second contract.
14.
Furthermore, the Respondent 1 states that the date of the document signed with Fairplay
(i.e. dated 20/03/08) had been altered by hand.
15.
In this context, the Respondent 1 asserts that the contract signed with the Claimant is null
and void, since demanding its compliance would result in a breach of the first contract
without just cause.
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16.
Subsidiary, in case the DRC decides that the second contract is valid, the Respondent 1
states that the breach of the contract was with just cause, since, in order to comply with the
first contract, he had to breach the second contract, otherwise he would have breached the
first contract.
17.
Eventually, in case the DRC decides that the breach occurred without just cause, the
Respondent 1 understands that the breach was not during the protected period and that
the compensation requested is not due since there is a clause in the contract which
stipulates the compensation in such a case (i.e. USD 160,000). If the contract is terminated
without just cause, a compensation amounting to USD 160,000 would be due, reason for
which a compensation of USD 2,000,000 would make no sense if the contract never even
came into force.
18.
According to the Respondent 1’s interpretation of art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations), the protected period starts when the
contract comes into force. In line with this interpretation, since the early termination of the
contract in the case at hand took place even before the contract came into force, hence,
even before the protected period started (neither during the protected period nor outside
of it), sporting sanctions should not be imposed.
19.
Finally, the Respondent 1 demands the Claimant to be ordered to pay any procedural costs
and legal costs in connection with the present proceedings.
20.
In its response, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant reiterated that the first contract was
signed on 1 February 2008, one month before the second contract. In order to prove this
statement, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant presented a copy of the e-ticket of the
flight of the Respondent 1, a copy of the hotel receipt during the Respondent 1’s stay in S
from 1 February 2008 to 2 February 2008, a copy of the Respondent 1´s passport containing
the relevant visa for the X territories valid till 9 May 2008, and a copy of medical
examinations performed on 2 February 2008.
21.
Equally, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant states that it would have been impossible for
the Respondent 1 to sign the first contract after May 2008, since he had no valid visa in
order to enter to S. Furthermore, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant asserted that the
reason why the first contract was signed in February 2008 was to ease the procedure in
order to obtain the working and residence permit of the Respondent 1 in S, which he
finally obtained as from 8 July 2008.
22.
The Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant also remarked that the art. IX of the second contract
stipulates that the contract starts on 1 July 2008 and its validity is subject to the registration
of the player with the BFA. Therefore, when the Respondent 1 terminated his contract, in
May 2008, he was not yet registered with the BFA, and thus, the contract, in that moment,
was not in force. For this reason, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant deems that the
second contract should be understood as a pre-contract, or “promise of a contract”, and, as
a consequence, art. 17 of the Regulations is not applicable.
23.
Pertaining to the alleged offer made by the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant to the
Respondent 1 through Fairplay, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant rejected such offer,
asserting that the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant was not related to the issuance of the
relevant document presented in the file by the Claimant, and that since the document’s
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date is handwritten, while the rest of the document is typed, it has been manipulated. In
this context, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant holds that it makes no sense to make an
offer to the player on March 2008 when the first contract was already signed in February
2008. Furthermore, the document being a fax, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant
outlined that there is no fax report, hence, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant did never
receive such document, which, additionally, the player alleged not having signed. The only
theory which the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant thinks is feasible, would be that the
Respondent 1’s agents manipulated such document in order to negotiate a better offer
with the Claimant, making the latter believe that they were simultaneously negotiating
with the Claimant and the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant. The only employment offer
which the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant recognizes is the one made to the Respondent
1’s agent in June 2007 while the Respondent 1 was rendering his services for I.
24.
With regard to the signature of the second contract, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant
alleged having been unaware of such signature till July 2008 when the ITC request was
made to the IFF, otherwise the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant would have addressed its
request, through the IFF, to the BFA.
25.
After becoming aware of the second contract, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant made
an offer to U so that the latter would not oppose to the issuance of the ITC, since the 1st
Division Championship in S had already started. However, the Claimant rejected the offer
and asked for USD 2,000,000.
26.
Notwithstanding, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant pointed out that the Claiamant, as
an act of bad faith, requested the ITC from IFF in June 2008 while the player had already
sent his termination letter in May 2008.
27.
As a consequence of this act of bad faith, and since the Respondent was not able to
participate in matches for the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant during July, August and
half of September 2008, being finally registered at the IFF for the Respondent 2 / CounterClaimant on 15 September 2008, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant lodged a counterclaim against the Claimant, demanding from the latter a compensation of USD 110,000, this
amount being 2.5 monthly salaries payable to the Respondent 1 by the Respondent 2 /
Counter-Claimant (EUR 41,666 each).
28.
Finally, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant requests the DRC to reject the claim.
Subsidiary, if the claim was accepted, the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant requests to fix
the compensation payable to the Claimant at the amount of USD 160,000, in accordance
with the termination clause of the second contract. Additionally, the Respondent 2 /
Counter-Claimant requests to be absolved of any responsibility for the alleged breach of
contract and to declare the Claimant responsible for the procedural costs.
29.
In its position to the counter-claim, the Claimant referred to its previous statements. In
addition, and upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant asserted not being in possession of the
original document allegedly issued by Fairplay, the authenticity of which was contested by
the Respondents 1 and 2.
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II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber analysed whether it was competent to deal
with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to
FIFA on 15 October 2008. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3
of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules
and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a of the
Regulations, it is competent to adjudicate on disputes between clubs and players in relation
to the maintenance of contractual stability if there has been an ITC request and if there is a
claim from an interested party in relation to such ITC request, in particular regarding its
issuance, regarding sporting sanctions or regarding compensation for breach of contract.
3.
As a consequence of all of the above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is the competent
body to decide on the present affair regarding a dispute relating to the maintenance of
contractual stability in which an ITC request was made and regarding compensation for
breach of contract.
4.
Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1
and 2 of the Regulations, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 15 October
2008, the current version of the Regulations (edition 2008) is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
5.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established,
the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter.
6.
Consequently, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all recalled that the Respondent 1
and the club, I had entered into an employment contract set to expire in June 2008.
7.
In continuation, the Chamber acknowledged that, prior to the expiry of the
aforementioned contract, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant
concluded an employment contract dated 1 February 2008, stipulating a validity period
from 1 July 2008 until 30 June 2013.
8.
Moreover, the Chamber took note that the Respondent 1 and the Claimant concluded an
employment contract dated 17 March 2008, stipulating a validity period from 1 July 2008
until 1 June 2010.
9.
Having taken due note of the above, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 3 of the
Regulations, according to which a professional shall be only free to conclude a contract
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with another club if his contract with his present club has expired or is due to expire within
six months.
10.
In this regard, the Chamber noted that since the employment contract concluded with I was
set to expire at the end of June 2008, the player was entitled to conclude a contract with a
new club as from January 2008, valid as from July 2008.
11.
Consequently, the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note that the
Respondent 1 concluded two employment contracts valid as from 1 July 2008 (i.e. one with
the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, dated 1 February 2008, and one with the Claimant,
dated 17 March 2008) and that, in this respect, the Claimant alleged disbelieving that the
first contract had been actually concluded prior to the second contract.
12.
In this context, upon study of the relevant documentation submitted to the file, the
Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that the Claimant has not presented any suitable
evidence in order to corroborate its allegation. Therefore, the decision-making body
concluded that the respective argumentation of the Claimant could not be upheld and
hence, that the first contract signed by the player was the one concluded with the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, dated 1 February 2008, prior to the conclusion of the
second contract signed with the Claimant, dated 17 March 2008.
13.
Consequently, the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note that the
Respondent 1 asserted having signed the first contract with the Respondent 2 / CounterClaimant on 1 February 2008, and having signed the second contract with the Claimant at a
later stage. In respect of the compliance of the second contract, the Respondent 1 stated
that the breach of this contract was with just cause, since in order to comply with the first
contract he had to breach the second one, otherwise he would have breached the first
contract.
14.
In this regard, in lack of any relevant defense which could possibly justify the termination
of the employment contract concluded between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant, the
Dispute Resolution Chamber established that, by entering into a labour contract with the
Claimant valid as from the same date (i.e. 1 July 2008) as the contract concluded with the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, the Respondent 1 had breached his employment
contract with the Claimant without just cause.
15.
In this respect, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section
of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period shall last “for three
entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a
contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional”. In
this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that the player had been 22 years
of age when he signed his employment contract with the Claimant on 17 March 2008,
entailing that the breach of the relevant contract had occurred within the applicable
protected period.
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16.
Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of such breach of contract during the protected period committed by the
Respondent 1.
17.
In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all established that, in accordance with
art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent 1 is liable to pay compensation to the
Claimant.
18.
Prior to proceeding to the calculation of the amount of compensation, the Chamber placed
emphasis on the primacy of the principle of the maintenance of contractual stability, which
represents the backbone of the agreement between FIFA/UEFA and the European
Commission signed in March 2001. This agreement and its pillars represent the core of the
former (editions 2001 and 2005) as well as of the 2008 version of the Regulations, which all
stakeholders – including player and club representatives – agreed upon in 2001.
19.
Above all, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by the
above Regulations concerning in particular compensation for breach of contract without
just cause serve as a deterrent discouraging the early termination of employment contracts
by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent deciding
authorities would represent an inappropriate example towards all the football actors.
20.
In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party (either the player
or the club, as the case may be) has proven to be an efficient mean and has always found a
widespread acceptance since it guarantees that the fundamental principle of the respect of
the contracts is duly taken care of.
21.
Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in article 17 of the Regulations are
applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players, signifying that both clubs
and professionals who are seen to have committed a breach of contract without just cause
will in all cases be subject to pay compensation and, under specific circumstances, also
subject to the imposition of sporting sanctions.
22.
Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the
amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the
members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the
Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated in particular and unless
otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration
for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria,
including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the
existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up
to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former
club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls
within a protected period. The Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the list of
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objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to
ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.
23.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as
to whether the relevant employment contract between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant
contains a provision by which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation for breach of contract. Upon careful examination of the employment
contract concluded between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant, the members of the
Chamber took note that art. X of the second contract provides for a compensation of USD
160,000 in case of termination of the contract without just cause or without mutual
agreement of the parties concerned.
24.
As a consequence, on account of the above-mentioned consideration, the members of the
Chamber determined that the amount of compensation for breach of contract without just
cause to be paid by the Respondent 1 to the Claimant is USD 160,000, in accordance with
art. X of the contract at the basis of the dispute.
25.
Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note that the Claimant was claiming, in
accordance with art. XIV par. 5 of the contract concluded with the Respondent 1, 50% of
the total value of the second contract as transfer compensation, as allegedly stipulated in
the said contract in case the Respondent 1 is transferred to a third club.
26.
In this respect, the Chamber emphasized that, as stated in point II.12 of its considerations,
the first contract signed by the Respondent 1 was the one concluded with the Respondent
2 / Counter-Claimant, dated 1 February 2008, prior to the signature of the contract with the
Claimant, hence, the Respondent 1 had not been transferred from the Claimant to the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, and therefore the above-mentioned article is not
applicable.
27.
In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach of
contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions
against the Respondent 1 in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited
provision stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting
sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the
protected period.
28.
In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that, as established under point
II.15. above, the breach of contract by the Respondent 1 had occurred during the applicable
protected period. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the
Regulations, the Respondent 1 had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on
his eligibility to participate in any official football match. This sanction shall take effect
from the start of the next season of the Respondent 1’s club following the notification of
the present decision.
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29.
Finally, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question whether, in
view of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent 1’s current club, i.e. the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, must be considered to have induced the Respondent 1 to
breach his contract with the Claimant without just cause during the protected period, and
therefore shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, for two registration periods.
30.
In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, which provides,
inter alia, that it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing
a professional who has terminated his contract without just cause has induced that
professional to commit a breach. In this regard, the members of the Chamber underlined
that, in accordance with their consideration stated in point II.12., the contract concluded
with the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant was signed by the relevant parties prior to the
contract concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 and that therefore no
inducement could have taken place. Consequently, the Dispute Resolution Chamber
decided that no sporting sanctions would be imposed on the Respondent 2 / CounterClaimant.
31.
Furthermore, and with regard to the joint and several liability of the Respondent 2 /
Counter-Claimant and the Respondent 1 for the payment of compensation for the breach
of contract, the Chamber referred to art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, according to which
the professional and his new club (emphasis added) shall be jointly and severally liable to
pay compensation. In this context, the Chamber recalled that the contract concluded
between the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant was signed prior to
the contract concluded between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant (cf. point II.12 above).
Consequently, the Chamber established that the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant shall not
be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation by the player, since the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant is not the new club of the Respondent 1.
32.
In conclusion, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Respondent 1 has to pay
USD 160,000 to the Claimant as compensation for the unjustified breach of his employment
contract during the protected period. In this respect, the Dispute Resolution Chamber also
determined that the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant is not jointly and severally
responsible for the payment of the above-mentioned amount of compensation due to the
Claimant.
33.
Furthermore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent 1 shall be sanctioned with a
restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official football matches, taking
effect as from the start of the next season of the Respondent 1’s club following the
notification of the present decision.
34.
Finally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber held that the Respondents 1 and 2’s claims for
procedural costs as well as the Respondent 1’s claim for legal costs were rejected in
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accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective
longstanding jurisprudence.
35.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by
considering the counter-claim lodged by the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, by means of
which the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant demanded a compensation of USD 110,000
from the Claimant, since the latter, as an alleged act of bad faith, requested the ITC from
IFF in June 2008 while the Respondent 1 had already sent his termination letter in May
2008, and as a consequence the Respondent 1 was not able to participate in matches for
the Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant during July, August and half of September 2008.
36.
In this regard, the members of the Chamber considered that, first and foremost, the
Claimant had concluded an employment contract with the Respondent 1, and consequently
insisted in its compliance since it was interested in the services of the Respondent 1, as
stated during the ITC procedure. Furthermore, after FIFA’s intervention in the ITC
procedure, and in order not to interfere with the career of the Respondent 1, the Claimant
did not oppose to the issuance of the ITC, but focused on the financial aspects of the
dispute.
37.
In this context, on account of the aforementioned consideration, the Dispute Resolution
Chamber concluded that the bad faith of the Claimant could not be presumed, and
therefore, the members of the Chamber rejected the counter-claim lodged by the
Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, U, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent 1, A, has to pay the amount of USD 160,000 to the Claimant, U, within 30
days of notification of the present decision.
3.
The Claimant, U, is directed to inform the Respondent 1, A, directly and immediately of the
account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
4.
If this amount is not paid within the aforementioned time limit, an interest rate of 5% per
annum as of the expiry of the said time limit will apply and the matter will be submitted,
upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee so that the necessary disciplinary sanctions
may be imposed.
5.
A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the
Respondent 1, A. This sanction shall take effect as of the start of the next season of the
player’s club following the notification of the present decision.
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6.
The Respondent 2 / Counter-Claimant, R, is not jointly and severally liable for the payment
of the aforementioned compensation.
7.
Any further requests filed by the parties are rejected.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly
within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in
accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto.
Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal,
the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal
with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber
Markus Kattner
Deputy Secretary General
Encl.
CAS directives
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