Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 May 2011,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman ad interim
Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member
Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member
Ivan Gazidis (England), member
Alejandro Marón (Argentina), member
on a matter between the player
G,
as Claimant / Counter-Respondent
and the club
K,
as Respondent / Counter-Claimant
and the club
E,
as intervening party
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties.
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 28 July 2009, the player, G (hereinafter: the player), and the club K,
(hereinafter: K), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract)
valid from 6 August 2009 until 30 June 2012.
2.
The contract, in its art. 4.1, provided for a monthly remuneration of EUR 826, a
Christmas bonus of EUR 826, an Easter bonus and a holiday benefit amounting to
EUR 413.
3.
Furthermore, the player provided the FIFA administration with a “private
agreement” dated 27 July 2009, which was allegedly concluded between K and
the player, but was only signed by the latter. However, the agreement is written
on official paper of K.
4.
According to this “private agreement”, the player should have received for the
first season (from 27 July 2009 until 30 June 2010) the amount of EUR 150,000
payable as follows:
EUR 60,000 as signing-on fee;
EUR 9,000 due at the end of each month as from September 2009 until June
2010.
For the second season (from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011), the player should
receive the amount of EUR 160,000, payable as follows:
EUR 30,000 on 30 August 2010;
EUR 40,000 on 30 September 2010;
EUR 10,000 due at the end of each month as from October 2010 until June
2011.
Finally, the parties agreed for the third season (from 1 July 2011 until 30 June
2012) the amount of EUR 170,000, payable as follows:
EUR 35,000 on 30 August 2011;
EUR 45,000 on 30 September 2011;
EUR 10,000 due at the end of each month as from October 2011 until June
2012.
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In addition, K had to pay to the player the following bonuses:
EUR 20,000 in case the team reaches “Playoffs”,
EUR 30,000 in case the team qualifies for the UEFA Champions League,
EUR 20,000 in case the team wins the Cup Final.
5.
On 17 September 2009, the player lodged a complaint before FIFA against K,
claiming that the latter had breached the contract, since it had neither paid the
signing-on fee, nor asked the Football Association F (FAF) to provide the Football
Federation H (FFH) with the International Transfer Certificate (hereinafter: ITC).
6.
In this respect and with regard to the absence of the signature of K on the
“private agreement”, the player held that the K never disputed the validity of this
agreement.
7.
Furthermore, the player provided FIFA with a correspondence from the Football
Association F dated 27 August 2009 which confirmed that the latter did not
receive any ITC request. Moreover, K allegedly neither asked the “Superleague” to
register the employment contract, nor made sure that the player had an insurance
protection. As evidence, the player provided FIFA with a correspondence from the
“Superleague” dated 20 August 2009. According to this letter, the “Superleague”
did not receive any employment contract concluded between the player and K.
Therefore, the player could neither be registered in country G, nor participate in
official matches for K.
8.
Nevertheless, the player already trained with the team and participated in a
friendly match.
9.
On 13 August 2009, however, the player decided to leave K and to go to country
F, in order to clear his situation with the “Nationale des Footballeurs
Professionnels”.
10.
On 19 August 2009, the alleged agent of the player received a correspondence
from K, according to which the latter club had requested the player to fulfil his
duties; this is, to participate in the trainings and matches of the team of K, even
though the player had allegedly played for K between 1 and 13 August 2009.
11.
However, the player informed K that he did not receive the aforementioned letter
dated 19 August 2009 directly from them, but from a person who is not his agent.
Furthermore, the player confronted K with the fact that it did not send the
contract to the “Superleague”. Therefore, and with regard to the ITC, which has
not been requested, the player concluded that he was not contractually bound to
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K. The player asked K to pay him the amount of EUR 150,000 in order to settle the
matter amicably. In its response, K informed the player on 31 August 2009 that it
terminated the contract with a just cause, since the player did not respect the
contract by being absent.
12.
As a consequence, the player requested the payment of a total amount of
EUR 520,000 as set out below:
EUR 60,000 as signing-on fee for the season 2009/10,
EUR 410,000 as compensation for breach of contract, composed of the agreed
remuneration until 30 June 2012,
EUR 50,000 for moral prejudice and interest.
13.
Along with its reply, K lodged a counterclaim, alleging that the player had never
showed up in training. In this respect, it also confirmed the exchange of
correspondence mentioned by the player.
14.
Moreover, K explained that at first it did not lodge a claim against the player,
since it did not wish to jeopardise his career, but under these new circumstances, K
requested compensation for breach of contract and sporting sanctions against the
player.
15.
According to K, the player based his right to terminate the contract on the
allegation that the Football Federation H had not requested the ITC, as well as on
“Regulation[s] of the Professional Football Players”. According to art. 7 of these
Regulations, “the contract between a club and a player […] is submitted to the
Football League for ratification with responsibility of the club within five days
from its execution at the latest. If no action is taken within the aforementioned
deadline and if the club has not submitted to the Football League a copy of the
contract he has in his hands and to submit to the Football Federation H for
approval registration card of professional football player, without the signature of
the club”. Therefore, K concluded that the player should have submitted the
employment contract to the Football Federation H instead of terminating it. Said
Regulations would not authorise the player to terminate the contract in case K
had not provided the Football League with a copy of such contract. Moreover K
stated that art. 7 of the afore-mentioned Regulations does not mention that the
validity of the contract depends on the ratification by the Football League, i.e. the
“Superleague”.
16.
With regard to the ITC, K stated that according to art. 1 of Annexe 3 to the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the FIFA
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Regulations), the ITC must be requested on the last day of the registration period
of the new association. Therefore, K had time until the end of August 2009. Since
the behaviour of the player had showed from the beginning that he would not
comply with his contractual obligations, K decided to wait to request the ITC.
17.
Furthermore, K contested the validity of the “private agreement”, since only one
party, i.e. the player, had signed it. K allegedly saw this agreement for the first
time attached to the claim of the player.
18.
In addition, K mentioned that according to art. 5.6 of the contract, “the player is
entitled to buy the remainder of his contract by paying out to the club the
amount of EUR 1,000,000”. Therefore, according to K, it would be entitled to
receive the amount of EUR 1,000,000 plus 5% interest as from 1 September 2009.
Moreover, K requested sporting sanctions for the duration of six months.
19.
In his replica, the player provided FIFA with his position regarding the
counterclaim filed by K repeating his previous statements. Additionally, the player
stated that the judges had to interpret the contract regarding the intention of the
parties. The “private agreement” was drafted on official paper of K and repeats
the substantial points of the employment contract. In the exchange of
correspondence between the player and K, the latter club never contested the
validity of the “private agreement”. During his sojourn in country G, the player
could use a car, what results from the “private agreement”. According to the
player, this fact shows that the parties followed the “private agreement”.
20.
Furthermore, on the website it was published that the player had signed an
employment contract for the duration of two years and for the amount of
EUR 150,000 per season. Moreover, the player finds inexplicable that he should
abandon the amount of EUR 240,000 from his previous club to receive a monthly
remuneration of EUR 826.
21.
The player stated that, according to art. 14 of the FIFA Regulations, a party can
terminate a contract for just cause without any consequences.
22.
Furthermore, the player mentioned that in order to be in a position to participate
in official matches with K, the player should have been registered with K, what is,
continuously, only possible upon receipt of the ITC. The position of K that it still
had time to request the ITC is, according to the player, a singular argument.
Moreover, the player argued that the behaviour of K not to lodge any claim
before FIFA shows that it was never interested in continuing the employment
contract concluded with him. This, in opposition to the player, who discontinued
the employment contract concluded with his previous club.
23.
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24.
In continuation, the player held that since the official registration period was
already terminated, he had to conclude an employment contract with the club E
(hereinafter: E), which was competing in the third division in country F. The player
allegedly always complied with the contract and was serious.
25.
In addition, the player also requested sporting sanctions against K, since the latter
club had breached the contract during the protected period. The player asked for
an interdiction of national and international transfers to be imposed on K for the
duration of two registration periods.
26.
Moreover, the player pointed out that K had requested the amount of
EUR 1,000,000 from a player, who should receive, according to K, EUR 826 per
month. Art. 5.6 of the contract stipulated in fact that “the Player is entitled to buy
the remainder of his contract, by paying out to the Club the amount of
EUR 1,000,000”. In this respect, the player stated that art. 5.6 of the contract
referred to a redemption from the contract and not to a breach of contract.
Therefore, according to the player, this clause does not refer to art. 17 of the FIFA
Regulations.
27.
Finally, the player provided the FIFA administration with his new employment
contract, dated 19 September 2009, concluded with E, valid from the date of its
signature until 30 June 2012 at the latest. In case E would participate in the “Ligue
2”, i.e. the second professional division, the employment contract would be
extended for one season (2010/11). The same rule would apply if E reached the
“Ligue 1”, i.e. the first professional division during the season 2010/11.
28.
The above-mentioned contract, in its art. 3, provided for a monthly remuneration
of EUR 7,600 as well as, at the most, EUR 450 per month for the player’s expenses
during the season 2009/10. For the season 2010/11, the player should receive a
monthly remuneration of EUR 16,000 as well as EUR 450 per month for his
expenses if E played in the “Ligue 2”. For the season 2011/12, the parties agreed a
monthly remuneration of EUR 17,000 plus the amount of EUR 450 for the
expenses of the player if E played in the “Ligue 2”. In case E would reach the
“Ligue 1”, the player should receive a remuneration of EUR 23,000 as well as
EUR 450 for his expenses.
Furthermore, the parties agreed the following bonuses (cf. art. 4 of said contract):
29.
EUR 15,000 if E would reach the “Ligue 2”, pro rata to 28 matches of this
championship, in which the player participated as from 1 October 2009. The
player should receive the full amount if he participated in at least 20 matches
of said championship;
EUR 24,000 if E would reach the “Ligue 1”, pro rata to the number of
matches, in which the player effectively participated;
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EUR 12,000 in case the player would participate in 20 matches of the
championship of the “Ligue 2”;
EUR 12,000 in case the player would participate in 30 matches of the
championship of the “Ligue 2”;
EUR 24,000 in case the player would participate in 20 matches of the
championship of the “Ligue 1”;
EUR 24,000 in case the player would participate in 30 matches of the
championship of the “Ligue 1”.
30.
In its response to the counterclaim, E asserted that the positions of the player and
K are only related to each other, but not to them. In particular, art. 17 par. 2 and 4
of the FIFA Regulations would not apply in the present matter, since the dispute
concerns a breach of contract between the player and K, and E was not an
accomplice and can therefore not be liable for any damages.
31.
Furthermore, E stated that according to art. 22 a) of the abovementioned FIFA
Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to decide about
financial compensation and sporting sanctions in labour disputes concerning
complaints lodged by clubs, which claim against a player and his new club, since
the issuance of the ITC was refused. However, on 27 August 2009, the Football
Association F allegedly confirmed that the ITC had not been requested by the
Football Federation H.
32.
Moreover, the enrolment of the player followed the termination of the
employment contract. Before, the player had to register himself in country F as an
applicant for work. E is therefore allegedly not responsible for the present
situation. Anyway, E did not induce the player to leave K which breached the
contract; on the contrary, it has allegedly respected all national and international
regulations, acted transparent and in good faith.
*****
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II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber)
analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this
respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the FIFA Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(edition 2008). The present dispute was submitted to FIFA on 17 September 2009.
As a consequence, the Chamber concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter
at hand.
2.
With regard to the competence of the Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in
the light of the articles 22 to 24 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players (edition 2010). In accordance with art. 1 par. 1 of the aforementioned
Regulations, which describes the scope of the relevant Regulations, in connection
with articles 24 par. 1 and 22 b) of said Regulations, the Dispute Resolution
Chamber is competent to decide on the present litigation with an international
dimension concerning an employment-related dispute between a player and K,
with the involvement of a E.
3.
In continuation, the DRC viewed the argument of E which stated that art. 22 a) of
the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players would not establish the
Chamber’s jurisdiction in the present litigation. In this respect, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber referred to the abovementioned point and underlined that its
jurisdiction is based on art. 22 b) in connection with art. 17 par. 2 of said
Regulations.
4.
Thereafter, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this
respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2009), and
also considering that the disputed facts arose on 13 August 2009 and the present
claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 17 September 2009, the previous edition of
the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2008; hereinafter:
the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
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5.
The competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the applicable
regulations having been established, the DRC entered into the substance of the
matter. It started by acknowledging that the player provided two documents, an
employment contract and a private agreement which could constitute an
employment relationship between him and K.
6.
First of all, the Chamber turned its attention to the validity of the
abovementioned documents. In this respect, it took note of the player’s
statement, according to which the latter understood that he was not contractually
bound, since K had failed to request the ITC and to send the contract to the
“Superleague” for its registration. However, the player claimed payments based
on the contract he considered null and void.
7.
On the other hand, the DRC took into account the argument of K which
mentioned that the validity of the contract would not depend on its registration
by the “Superleague” and that it still had time to request the pertinent ITC in
order to register the player.
8.
Bearing in mind these two contradictory positions, the Chamber referred to the
documentation on file and took note that the contract was signed by both parties
and also includes all “essentialia negotii” of an employment contract such as the
duration, the subordination of the employee to the employer, the personal
performance and the remuneration.
9.
Moreover, the members of the Chamber recalled that according to art. 1 par. 2 of
Annexe 3 to the Regulations, the ITC must be requested on the last day of the
registration period of the new association, at the very latest.
10.
In continuation, the DRC referred to the relevant registration period within the
Football Federation H, which lasts from 1 July until 31 August. Therefore, the
members of the Chamber concluded that the K had effectively time to request the
ITC until 31 August 2009.
11.
Furthermore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note that neither the
Regulations, nor the employment contract itself include any clause that the permit
by the “Superleague” would be a prerequisite for the validity of the contract.
12.
Therefore, the DRC considered the relevant contract as binding, i.e. that the
parties had concluded a valid employment contract on 28 July 2009 with a
duration from 6 August 2009 until 30 June 2012.
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13.
With regard to the private agreement, the members of the Chamber duly noted
that it was signed by the player only. Nevertheless, it was apparently written on
official paper of K.
14.
In this respect, the DRC turned its attention once again to the defence of the
player, who considered the private agreement as valid due to several arguments,
as well as to the argumentation of K which contested the validity of the private
agreement.
15.
Subsequently, the Chamber recalled that according to the general legal principle
of the burden of proof, any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact
shall carry the burden of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules).
16.
In view of the above, the DRC unanimously concluded that since the player was
claiming remuneration based on a private agreement, he should prove that such
agreement had indeed been concluded validly.
17.
According to the player, K contested the validity of the private agreement for the
first time during the proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Based
on the documentation on file, the DRC had to note that in the exchange of
correspondence between the player and K, the latter club had neither contested
the validity of the private agreement, nor referred to said agreement.
18.
With a view to the abovementioned consideration, the Chamber pointed out that
a party cannot contest a fact of which it was not aware of. As soon as K got to
know about this agreement, it contested its validity. Furthermore, the DRC could
not find any indication in the previous exchange of correspondence on the part of
K which would speak for the validity of the agreement. Therefore, this singular
argument of the player had to be rejected.
19.
Moreover, the player also alleged that he could use a car during his stay in country
G which, according to him, resulted from the private agreement.
20.
In this context, the Chamber considered that the player had neither provided any
documentary evidence at all proving that K had lent him a car, nor that the parties
had started executing said private agreement.
21.
Furthermore, the player stated that it had been published on the website that he
had signed a two years employment contract with K stipulating an amount of
EUR 150,000 per season as remuneration.
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22.
In this regard, the DRC pointed out that any kind of information could be
published in the internet. In particular, it took note that even the contract period
mentioned on was wrong, i.e. two years instead of three. Moreover, is not a
website which could be attributed to K. Consequently, the members of the
Chamber unanimously concluded that an extract from such a website does not
constitute sufficient evidence that in fact a valid agreement was concluded.
23.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber also took into account the fact that the private
agreement was drafted on official paper of K including all the essential points of a
contract, as well as the objection of the player that he would not have abandoned
the salary offered by his previous club, in order to conclude a contract with K for a
lower salary.
24.
Notwithstanding the above, the members of the Chamber had to acknowledge
that said facts indeed speak for a valid additional agreement to the contract, but,
on the other hand, these arguments would only present indication and could not
replace a missing signature of either party which is one of the “essentialia negotii”
of a valid employment contract.
25.
Consequently, the DRC concluded that the player had not provided enough
documentary evidence for the conclusion of a valid private agreement.
26.
After having established that although the private agreement is not valid, the
player and K still had concluded a valid employment contract, the DRC observed
that both parties to the contract alleged that the other party had breached the
contract within the protected period.
27.
The Chamber stated that, in view of these contradictory positions, it first of all had
to analyse which party had terminated the contract, and if so, with or without just
cause, and subsequently to determine whether a party is accountable for
compensation.
28.
In this respect, the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note that, on the one hand,
the player asserted that K had breached the contract, since the latter club did not
pay the signing-on fee. Furthermore, K apparently neither requested the ITC, nor
sent a copy of the contract to the “Superleague”. Finally, on 31 August 2009, K
had sent a termination letter to the player. On the other hand, K alleged that the
player never showed up in training and that it still had time to request the
relevant ITC, in order to register the contract at the “Superleague”.
29.
Taking into account all of the above, the DRC recalled points 10 and 11, according
to which the behaviour of K cannot be considered as a breach of contract.
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Moreover, it referred to point 25 above, and concluded that even the nonpayment of the signing-on fee would not constitute a breach of contract, since
said amount is based on an invalid private agreement, and can therefore not be
considered as outstanding.
30.
Notwithstanding the above, the player left country G on 13 August 2009, i.e.
before having asked the Football Association F and the Football League if they
had received an ITC request, respectively a copy of the pertinent employment
contract. Based on those facts, the DRC unanimously concluded that such
departure by the player constitutes a breach of contract within the protected
period.
31.
Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of such breach of contract during the protected period.
32.
In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all established that, in
accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay
compensation to K. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of
art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the player’s new
club, i.e. E, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In
this respect, the DRC was eager to point out that the joint liability of the player’s
new club is independent from the question as to whether or not the new club had
committed an inducement to a breach of contract. This conclusion is in line with
the well-established jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber that was
repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Notwithstanding
the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2
of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that
any club signing a professional player who has terminated his contract without
just cause has induced said professional player to commit a breach. In any event,
the Chamber determined that it would attend the question of the possible
inducement to a breach of contract by E at a later stage of its deliberations, i.e.
after having discussed the outcome of the compensation due by the player to K.
33.
Moreover, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by
the Regulations concerning, in particular, compensation for breach of contract
serve as a deterrent discouraging the early termination of employment contracts
by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent
deciding authorities would represent an inappropriate example towards all
stakeholders within the football family.
34.
In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party (either the
player or the club, as the case may be) has proven to be an efficient means and has
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always found a widespread acceptance, since it guarantees that the fundamental
general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda” is respected.
35.
Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in art. 17 of the
Regulations are applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players,
signifying that both clubs and professional players who are seen to have
committed a breach of contract will in any case be subject to pay compensation,
and, under specific circumstances, also to the imposition of sporting sanctions.
36.
Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of
the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the matter at stake. In
doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance
with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be
calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the
basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned,
the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract
and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a
maximum of five years, as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the
former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual
breach falls within a protected period. The Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled
that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of
criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is
awarded to the prejudiced party.
37.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify whether the relevant employment contract between the player and K
contains a provision, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon
an amount of compensation for breach of contract.
38.
K affirmed that the relevant employment contract includes a clause (art. 5.6 of the
contract) on the “buy-out” of the player amounting to EUR 1,000,000 and,
therefore, asked for a compensation amounting to EUR 1,000,000 plus 5% interest
as from 1 September 2009. The player for his part rejected the application of said
article, bearing in mind his remuneration as alleged by K, i.e. EUR 826 per month.
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39.
Taking into account the argumentation brought by both parties, the Chamber had
to determine that the compensation stipulated in art. 5.6 of the contract, i.e. the
amount of EUR 1,000,000, would be disproportionate compared to the player’s
actual monthly income of EUR 826 as per the same contract.
40.
Consequently, the Chamber decided that the compensation payable to K cannot
be based on the amount stipulated in art. 5.6 of the contract, and therefore
rejected the argument of K.
41.
As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice
suffered by K in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other
parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber emphasized beforehand that each request for compensation
for contractual breach has to be determined by the Chamber on a case-by-case
basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well
as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience
gained throughout the years.
42.
Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to K in the
present matter, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the remuneration due
to the player under the existing contract, criterion which was considered by the
Chamber to be essential. In this context, the DRC deemed important to emphasise
that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Dispute Resolution
Chamber to take into consideration “the existing contract and/or the new
contract” in the calculation of the amount of compensation.
43.
In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber established, on the one hand, that
the employment contract signed on 28 July 2009 by and between the player and
K, had been set to expire on 30 June 2012. The player had undisputedly not
received any salary until and including 13 August 2009, entailing that the total
value of his employment contract with K for the remaining contractual period of
three seasons was composed of the monthly salaries amounting to approximately
EUR 29,000.
44.
The members of the Chamber then turned their attention to the essential criterion
relating to the fees and expenses possibly paid by the former club for the
acquisition of the player’s services so far as these have not yet been amortised over
the term of the relevant contract. However, the Dispute Resolution Chamber held
that it had not been provided with any information by K, reason for which this
criterion could not be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the
applicable amount of compensation in the present matter.
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45.
Likewise, the Chamber also held that K had omitted to provide the Dispute
Resolution Chamber with any information regarding the costs it had allegedly
incurred for the player’s replacement or any offers it had possibly received for the
transfer of the player, reason for which such factors could not be taken into
account for the calculation of the compensation for contractual breach neither.
46.
The Chamber then turned its attention to the aspect relating to the “specificity of
sport” which is equally explicitly referred to in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. At
the outset, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that this important aspect has
been recognised by the European Union and has repeatedly been referred to by
the CAS for the purpose of establishing the applicable amount of compensation in
case of a contractual breach, ensuring that the decisions rendered are not only just
and fair from a strictly legal point of view, but that they also correspond to the
specific needs and interests of the football world and its stakeholders. In this
regard, and with reference to the respective jurisprudence of the CAS, the DRC
recalled that the specificity of sport allows for it to take into account the
circumstance that players can be considered the main asset of a club in terms of
their sporting value, but also from a rather economic point of view.
47.
In light of the foregoing, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it did
not have any information regarding the player’s role in K team, and was,
therefore, not able to estimate if the sporting damage caused to K by the player’s
unilateral breach of contract was particularly important. Consequently, the
members of the Chamber could not determine any considerable sporting damage
which shall equally be compensated by the player.
48.
In this context, the Dispute Resolution Chamber was also eager to stress that the
employment contract concluded between K and the player had, at the moment
the latter player had left K and gone to country F, still approximately the entire
contract duration, i.e. three years. In this respect, the Dispute Resolution Chamber
pointed out that the player had left K only one week after the date on which the
contract had come into force, fact that the Chamber decided to take into account
as an aggravating circumstance.
49.
In sum, the Chamber concluded that the amount of compensation for breach of
contract to be paid by the player to K is firstly composed of the amount of EUR
29,000 being the reflection of the remuneration due to the player under the
previous contract. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the relevant
breach of contract occurred right at the beginning of the contract, the Chamber
considered that the total amount of EUR 30,000 is to be considered an appropriate
and justified amount of compensation to be awarded to K. In this respect, the
members of the Chamber finally deemed it imperative to emphasise that the
sanctioning nature of the provisions contained in art. 17 of the Regulations cannot
be disregarded, this, in particular, with respect to the player’s subsequent
employment contract, which provided for a much higher remuneration.
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50.
Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the
specificities of the matter at hand, the Chamber decided that the player must pay
the amount of EUR 30,000 to K as compensation for breach of contract.
Furthermore, E is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant
compensation.
51.
In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach
of contract in question, and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting
sanctions against the player and his new club in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 and
4 of the Regulations. The cited provisions stipulate that, in addition to the
obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player
found to be in breach of contract during the protected period and on any club
found to be inducing a breach of contract during the protected period.
52.
In this regard, the DRC recalled that the player had left K after one week only, and
that it is disputed by the parties whether the player had even played for K. Based
on the documentation on file, the Chamber determined that the contract had not
even started to be executed. Therefore, the DRC unanimously concluded not to
impose any sporting sanctions, neither on the player, nor on E.
53.
In conclusion, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the claim of the
player and to partially accept the counterclaim of K, by obliging the player to pay
the total amount of EUR 30,000 to K as compensation for unjustified breach of his
employment contract. In this respect, the Chamber also determined that E is jointly
and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned amount of
compensation to K.
*****
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III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, G, is rejected.
2.
The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club K, is partially
accepted.
3.
The Claimant / Counter-Respondent, G, has to pay to the Respondent / CounterClaimant, Club K, the amount of EUR 30,000 as compensation for breach of
contract, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision.
4.
If the aforementioned sum is not paid within the aforementioned time limit,
interest at the rate of 5% per annum will fall due as of expiry of the abovementioned time limit until the date of effective payment, and the present matter
shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for its
consideration and a formal decision.
5.
The intervening party, Club E, is jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned
payment.
6.
Any further request filed by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club K, is
rejected.
7.
The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, K, is directed to inform the Claimant /
Counter-Respondent, G, immediately and directly of the account number to which
the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of
every payment received.
*****
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Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber
Jérôme Valcke
Secretary General
Encl.
CAS directives
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