Training Compensation
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 7 April 2011,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman ad interim
Jon Newman (USA), member
Todd Durbin (USA), member
on the claim presented by the club,
H,
as Claimant
against the club,
U,
as Respondent
regarding a training compensation dispute
related to the player L
I.
Facts of the case
1.
According to the player passport issued by the Football Federation S (FFS), the
player L (hereinafter: the player), born on 17 March 1989, was registered with the
club H (hereinafter: the Claimant) as an amateur as from 1 April 2002 until 31
December 2004, and as a professional as from 1 January 2005 until 31 October 2009.
2.
The sporting season in country S, during the period of registration of the player
with the club H, ran as follows:
- for the years 2002 until 2004, it followed the calendar year. This is, it ran from 1
January to 31 December each year;
- for the seasons 2005 until 2009, it ran from 15 November until 14 November of
the following year.
3.
According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the
Football Federation S issued an ITC in favour of the Football Federation I (FFI) on 15
January 2010, mentioning the Claimant as the player’s last club.
4.
According to a confirmation from the Football Federation S, the player was
registered with the club U (hereinafter: the Respondent) on 15 January 2010.
5.
According to the player passport, issued by the Football Federation S, the Claimant
is a category II club.
6.
According to a confirmation from the Football Federation I, the Respondent
belonged to category I when the player was registered with it.
7.
On 9 June 2010, the Claimant contacted FIFA, asking for the relevant proportion of
training compensation from the Respondent. In particular, the Claimant asked for
an amount of EUR 415,000 plus interest at the rate of 5% as from 15 February 2010.
8.
The Claimant stated that, after expiry of the player’s contract, the player signed a
contract with the Respondent, despite being offered a new contract of greater
value than the previous one by the Claimant, and despite the Claimant allegedly
being interested in the player’s services.
9.
In its reply, the Respondent rejected the claim lodged against it. It referred to art. 6
par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and
held that the Claimant did not fulfil the conditions laid out in said provision for the
entitlement to claim training compensation. In particular, the Respondent argued
that the Claimant did not offer a contract to the player, neither in writing nor via
registered mail. It held that there were only oral discussions and negotiations but,
eventually, there was no written offer from the Claimant which met the
prerequisites stipulated in said article, i.e. no evidence of an offer made by the
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Claimant via registered mail. The Respondent stated that this was also confirmed by
the player. Additionally, the Respondent held that the four conditions stipulated in
art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the above-mentioned FIFA regulations were to be met
cumulatively.
10. In its comments to the Respondent’s statements, the Claimant maintained its
previous position. Particularly, it argued that the requirement that a contract has to
be offered (by the previous club) in writing and via registered mail could merely be
interpreted as a way to secure evidence regarding the offer. Consequently,
according to the Claimant, the non-fulfilment of these formal requirements did not
automatically result in the club being deprived of the right to claim training
compensation.
11. The Claimant stated that it had offered a contract to the player well in advance of
the 60-day deadline, and that the value of this contract would have exceeded the
value of the player’s former contract.
12. In support of its claim, the Claimant provided FIFA with extensive Emailcorrespondence with regard to the conclusion a new contract between the
Claimant and the player and/or the apparent agent of the player. In this respect,
the following could be noted:
The player’s former contract with the Claimant, valid until 31 October 2009,
provided for the following.
- a maximum “guaranteed monthly salary” of 26,000, which could, depending on
match appearances, be raised to a maximum level of 40,000, plus “social security
contributions and all other applicable taxes”;
- Bonuses “payable according to what is agreed between [the Claimant] and the
Player’s council.”
On 9 October 2008, a club representative sent an Email to the player, mentioning,
inter alia, the following:
- “As I understand, you have 25,000 now, or? (…) This is just a first proposal, but
by raising about 30-40% immediately in a fixed basic salary plus a possibility to
individual bonus is not so bad.”;
- “Bonus proposal:
1st place (…) 300,000
2nd place (…) 200,000
3rd, 4th place (…) 150,000
(Playing from start in 75% of the games is required for bonus)”;
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- “Think about this contract set-up, and we can discuss from that!”.
On 10 October 2008, the same club representative sent another email to the player,
which read, inter alia, as follows:
- “Monthly salary
2009: 40,000
2010: 45,000
2011: 50,000
2012: 55,000.
Bonus agreement as below.
Are we getting closer?!”
On 13 October 2008, the player responded, also by email, stating the following:
- “Thank you for the proposal.
I’ll wait and see for a couple of days now (…) before we continue discussing the
contract.”
On 16 December 2008, said club representative sent an email to the player’s
apparent agent, mentioning, inter alia, the following:
- “I understand your view of the situation, but we have an economic reality which
can’t live up to these demands (…). But I can’t offer both a high fixed income
and a sign-on and on top of that pay a very high individual bonus (plus the
collective bonus you demand!)”;
- “We want a 4 year contract with L.
The monthly salary starts at 48,000 and increases with 5,000 each year.”
- “The other proposal, which I have already offered, was as follows:
4 year contract.
Monthly salary:
2009 44,000/month
2010 48,000/month
2011 52,000/month
2012 56,000/month.
Individual bonus:
300,000 1st place (…)
200,000 2nd place (…)
150,000 3rd, 4th place (…) (playing in Europe).
Playing in 75% of the matches from start.
No collective bonus (…)”;
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On 15 January 2009, the player’s apparent agent wrote back to the club
representative, making a counter-offer with the following conditions:
- “Term of agreement: 4 years.
2009: 48,000/month
2010: 53,000/month
2011: 58,000/month
2012: 63,000/month.
Bonus in addition to the collective agreement:
1st place (…)300,000/year
2nd place (…)200,000/year
Any other place (…) qualifying for playing in Europe 150,000.
Playing from start in 60% of the games is required for the individual bonus to be
payable.
Release clause: H is obliged to accept an offering from a third club amounting to
at least € 750,000.
If this is OK you can call [the player] to your office and he will sign the contract.”
The club representative replied on the same day, stating:
- “75% of the games from start and of course no release clause, and we are
agreed.”
Subsequently, the parties apparently disagreed over the stipulation of a release
clause. In this regard, the club representative stated in an Email, dated 30 April
2009, the following: “I have discussed as follows with the board to show that we
really wants L [i.e. the player] to sign and also to show (in writing in the contract)
that [the Claimant] won’t stop L the day he is ready to take the next step. (…)”
13. The Claimant furthermore argued that, according to Law, the way in which an offer
is presented had no relevance for its binding effect. Consequently, the offers made
towards the player were legally binding.
14. According to the Claimant, since the offer was made via Email and a response to
the offer(s) was received from the player, there could be no doubt that the player
had received the offer. The Claimant also explained that the above-mentioned
negotiations continued for over six months and that, although the Claimant,
eventually, was not able to offer the player the remuneration he had demanded,
the efforts to keep the player with the Claimant had been persistent and sincere.
15. Overall, the Claimant held that the fact that the offer was transmitted by email, but
not via registered mail, did not exclude the Claimant from being entitled to training
compensation.
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16. Additionally, for the case that the Dispute Resolution Chamber should be of the
opinion that there was not enough evidence to prove that the Claimant offered a
contract to the player, the Claimant requested to obtain the opinion of the player
in this regard and, alternatively, to summon him to an oral hearing before the DRC.
17. In its final comments, the Respondent referred to its previous statement and
reiterated it entirely.
18. After the closure of the investigation phase, the Claimant submitted additional
documentation, displaying correspondence between the Claimant and the
Respondent, as well as between the Claimant and the agent of the player. From the
documentation submitted, it can be noted that the Claimant expressed its on-going
interest in keeping the player towards the Respondent, and that the player’s agent
expected the Claimant to be entitled to training compensation.
II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber analysed which procedural rules were
applicable to the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter
was submitted to FIFA on 9 June 2010. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), is applicable to the matter
at hand (cf. article 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations (edition 2009), the Dispute
Resolution Chamber was competent to adjudicate on a dispute relating to training
compensation between a club and an club.
3.
In this respect, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that contrary to the
information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 1 April 2011 by means of which the
parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member C and the
member G refrained from participating in the deliberations in the case at hand, due
to the fact that the members have the same nationality as the Respondent.
Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in the presence of
three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations.
4.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations were applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26
par. 1 and 2 and art. 29 of the 2008, 2009 and 2010 edition of the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the present claim was
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lodged on 9 June 2010 and that the player was registered with the Respondent on
15 January 2010, the 2009 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations)
was applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
5.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of
the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts and the
documentation contained in the file.
6.
In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the player was registered with the
Claimant as an amateur as from 1 April 2002 until 31 December 2004, and as a
professional as from 1 January 2005 until 31 October 2009, and that he was
registered with the Respondent as a professional on 15 January 2010.
7.
Equally, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant lodged a claim in front of
FIFA against the Respondent, requesting payment of training compensation in the
amount of EUR 415,000 plus interest at the rate of 5% as from 15 February 2010,
based on the alleged transfer of the player to the Respondent and his registration
as a professional with the latter.
8.
Likewise, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent rejected the claim
lodged against it, referring to art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, arguing
that the Claimant had not fulfilled the conditions laid out in said article in order to
be entitled to receive training compensation. In particular, the Chamber noted that
the Respondent held that the Claimant had not offered a contract to the player,
neither in writing nor via registered mail.
9.
Therefore, the Chamber focussed its attention on the following questions:
-
Is the Claimant, in principle, entitled to claim training compensation from the
Respondent?
In particular, did the Claimant offer a contract to the player in a way which
meets the prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations?
If so, and if training compensation is due, which is the relevant amount to be
paid?
10. At the outset of its deliberations, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 2 par.
1 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is, inter alia, due when a
professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations before the
end of the season of his 23rd birthday. Likewise, the Chamber underlined that art. 6
of Annexe 4 of the Regulations contained special provisions regarding players
moving from one Association to another Association inside the territory of the
European Union (EU) and/or the European Economic Area (EEA).
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11. In this respect, the Chamber noted that it was not disputed by either party that the
case at hand involved a professional player being transferred between clubs of two
different associations before his 23rd birthday and that therefore, in principle, a
payment of training compensation would be due. However, the Chamber also
acknowledged that it was undisputed between the parties that art. 6 of Annexe 4
of the Regulations was applicable to the present dispute, stipulating additional
prerequisites for the entitlement to such compensation.
12. The Chamber subsequently recalled the content of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations, according to which no training compensation is payable if the former
club does not offer the player a contract, unless the former club can justify that it is
entitled to such compensation. In particular, the Chamber noted that, according to
the wording of said provision, the former club must offer the player a contract in
writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract
and that such an offer shall be at least of an equivalent value to the current
contract.
13. The Chamber then took note that the Claimant argued that the player had signed a
contract with the Respondent, despite having been offered a new contract by the
Claimant, which would allegedly have been of greater value that the current
contract of the player.
14. Likewise, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent mainly based its
rejection of the claim upon art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations. In
particular, the Chamber noted that the Respondent argued that the Claimant had
not fulfilled the conditions laid out in said article in order to be entitled to receive
training compensation. The Chamber took due note of the argumentation of the
Respondent, according to which the conditions, as stipulated in said provision of
the Regulations, were to be met cumulatively, and that the Claimant had not
offered a contract to the player, neither in writing nor via registered mail.
15. The Chamber went on to take due note of the Claimant’s statement in response to
the above argumentation. The Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant stated
that it had offered a contract to the player well in advance of the 60-days deadline,
as provided for in art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, and that the value of
such contract would have exceeded the value of the player’s former contract.
Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the Claimant argued that the formal
requirement according to which a contract offer had to be made in writing and via
registered mail was merely to be seen as a way to secure evidence regarding such
offer. Equally, the Chamber noted that the Claimant held that the non-fulfilment of
these formal prerequisites would not automatically entail the loss of entitlement
for training compensation.
16. In this respect, the Chamber considered it crucial to examine whether the Claimant
had offered a contract to the player in accordance with the prerequisites of art. 6
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par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations. In other words, the Chamber deemed it to be
the core issue of the case at hand to examine whether the Claimant is entitled to
training compensation in the light of the conditions laid out in art. 6 par. 3 of
Annexe 4 of the Regulations.
17. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Chamber carefully studied the
documentation on file, in particular the email-correspondence submitted by the
Claimant. The Chamber was eager to recall that the validity of these emails was not
disputed by the Respondent.
18. From the content of said emails, the Chamber noted that the Claimant made several
contract offers to the player, with a final offer consisting of a monthly salary of
44,000, which would have increased in the course of the subsequent seasons up to
an amount of 56,000. The Chamber also took note that, in addition, the player
would have been entitled to receive various individual bonuses. Taking into account
that the player’s previous contract with the Claimant provided for a monthly salary
of 26,000, which could, depending on match appearances, be raised to a maximum
level of 40,000 (plus social security contributions and all other applicable taxes), the
Chamber deemed that the value of the contract offers made to the player exceeded
the remuneration based on the player’s previous contract.
19. Likewise, the Chamber remarked that the first email of the Claimant containing an
offer of a contract, sent to the player, was dated 9 October 2008. In other words,
such offer was made more than 60 days before the expiry of the player’s former
contract (which was valid until 31 October 2009).
20. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that three of the conditions, as stipulated in
art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations (cf. above point 21.), i.e. that there had
to be an offer of a contract, that such a contract offer had to be made at least 60
days before the expiry of the previous contract and that the respective offer had to
be at least of an equivalent value as the current contract of the player, were
fulfilled.
21. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber turned its attention to the argument of
the Respondent, according to which the player had confirmed that he had not
received any contract offer from the Claimant. In this respect, the Chamber recalled
the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which each party
claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof.
Since, however, the aforementioned allegation was not corroborated by any
confirmation or statement from the player, the Chamber was not convinced by the
argumentation of the Respondent in this regard.
22. Subsequently, the Chamber emphasized that art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations also stipulated that a contract offer had to be made in writing via
registered post. The Chamber deemed it to be undisputed between the parties that
this formal prerequisite, per se, was not fulfilled, since the aforementioned contract
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offers were transmitted by means of email correspondence. The Chamber noted
that the parties disagreed over the legal consequences thereof. In this respect, the
Chamber recalled that the Claimant argued that it was, notwithstanding the above,
entitled to training compensation, while the Respondent held that the nonfulfilment of the aforementioned formal prerequisite led to the Claimant not being
entitled to such compensation.
23. Bearing in mind the above, the Chamber went on to establish the legal
consequences of the fact that there was a contract offer which was made more
than 60 days before the expiry of the player’s current contract and which was of
greater value than the current contract, but which did not meet the formal
prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, since it was not made
via registered mail.
24. In this respect, the Chamber carefully examined both the wording and the ratio
legis of the aforementioned formal prerequisite, as well as the argumentation
submitted by both parties. In this regard, after extensive deliberations, the Chamber
considered that a strict adherence to the wording of said article may, at first glance,
indicate that a club shall not be entitled to training compensation in case it does
not strictly fulfil the stipulated formal requirements. However, the Chamber was of
the opinion that it is rather the ratio legis of the formal prerequisite which provides
for a comprehensive answer to the question at hand.
25. In this respect, the Chamber considered that the requirement that a contract offer
shall be made “in writing via registered post” was established with the aim of
facilitating the proof of a club to demonstrate that it had, indeed, made a contract
offer to a player and that it was, therefore, entitled to training compensation. E
contrario, the Chamber concluded that a club, which does not meet said
prerequisite, is not automatically prevented from claiming training compensation.
The Chamber equally based this appreciation on the first sentence of art. 6 par. 3 of
Annexe 4 of the Regulations which provides for the possibility that a club, even if it
does not offer a contract to a player, is generally granted the possibility to “justify
that it is entitled to [training compensation]”.
26. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the fact that the Claimant did not offer a
contract in writing and via registered mail did not per se exclude the Claimant from
claiming training compensation. The Chamber was, however, eager to highlight
that the Claimant, therefore, had to justify that it was entitled to such
compensation. Equally, the Chamber recalled that, according to the principle of
burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, any party
claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof.
27. On account of the above, the Chamber went on to examine whether the Claimant
had provided sufficient proof as regards the latter’s justification to claim training
compensation. The Chamber considered that such justification can, in general, be
manifested by a club by displaying a bona fide interest in keeping the player in
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question in its team and by showing a proactive attitude vis-à-vis the respective
player, so as to clearly manifest that the club intends to count on the player for the
future.
28. To establish whether the Claimant had demonstrated such an interest and attitude,
the Chamber carefully studied the documentation on file. First of all, it turned its
attention on the extensive email-exchange on file. In general, the Chamber was of
the opinion that the statements made therein by representatives of the Claimant
and the player and/or an apparent representative of the player constituted typical
contract negotiations of a club and a player, with the former being interested in
concluding a new employment contract and the latter seeking to achieve the most
favourable financial conditions possible. In particular, the Chamber noted that the
Claimant transmitted a “first proposal” to the player on 9 October 2008 “by raising
[the player’s salary] about 30-40% immediately (…) plus a possibility to individual
bonus”. Likewise, the Chamber noted that the Claimant sent another email to the
player on 10 October 2008, asking, among others, “Are we getting closer?!”. The
Chamber also took note that the player, by means of an email dated 13 October
2008, acknowledged that he had taken note of the club’s offers. Furthermore, the
Chamber referred to an email dated 16 December 2008 in which the Claimant
stated “We want a 4 year contract with [the player]”, while proposing an increased
salary as a response to respective demands of the player and/or his apparent
representative. Finally, the members of the Chamber also acknowledged the
content of an email dated 30 April 2009, in which the Claimant expressed the
following: “(…) we really wants [the player] to sign and also to show (in writing in
the contract) that [the Claimant] won’t stop [the player] the day he is ready to take
the next step (…)”.
29. On account of the above, the Chamber was convinced that the Claimant had in fact
displayed a bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player, by making, in the
course of evident contractual negotiations, several offers with constantly increasing
financial conditions. The Chamber considered that the proof submitted by the
Claimant was convincing and sufficient in the light of art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules.
30. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Claimant could justify its entitlement
to training compensation, in accordance with the first sentence of art. 6 par. 3 of
Annexe 4 of the Regulations. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant
was entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent, based on the
international transfer of the player from the Claimant to the Respondent.
31. Having established the aforementioned, the Claimant went on to calculate the
amount of training compensation due.
32. In this respect, the members of the Chamber referred to the content of art. 6 par. 1
lit. a) of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, according to which, in case a player moves
from a lower to a higher category club, the calculation shall be based on the
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average training costs of the two clubs. Therefore, the Chamber recalled that the
Claimant belonged to the category II (indicative amount of EUR 60,000 within
UEFA) and that the Respondent belonged to category I (indicative amount of EUR
90,000 within UEFA) when the Claimant was registered with it. Likewise, the
Chamber emphasised that, according to art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations, the training costs for the seasons between a player’s 12th and 15th
birthday shall be based on the training and education costs of category IV clubs
(indicative amount of EUR 10,000 within UEFA).
33. Equally, the Chamber recalled that, in the case of a transfer of a professional player,
training compensation is calculated on a pro rata basis for the time the player was
effectively trained by his previous club (cf. art. 3 par. 1 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations).
34. Taking into account the above considerations, the Chamber turned its attention to
the fact that the player was registered with the Claimant as from 1 April 2002 until
31 December 2004 as an amateur (i.e. during a period of 33 months during the
seasons of the player’s 13th, 14th and 15th birthday), and as a professional as from 1
January 2005 until 31 October 2009 (i.e. during a period of 58 months during the
seasons of the player’s 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st birthday).
35. In view of the above, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant’s claim
and to award him an amount of training compensation of EUR 402,500, as well as
default interest as from the 31st day of registration of the player with the
Respondent, i.e. interest on the aforementioned amount at a rate of 5% as from 15
February 2010.
36. Lastly, the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination
with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings
before the Dispute Resolution Chamber, costs in the maximum amount of 25’000
are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in
consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings (cf. art. 18 par. 1
of the Procedural Rules).
37. In respect of the above, and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has
been partially accepted, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent has to bear
the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.
38. According to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to
be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute.
39. On that basis, the Chamber held that the amount to be taken into consideration in
the present proceedings is EUR 415,000, based on the claim of the Claimant.
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Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the
proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.
40. Considering that the case at hand allowed to be dealt with following a reasonable
procedure and did not pose particular factual difficulty, but that it was adjudicated
by the Dispute Resolution Chamber in corpore, the Chamber determined the costs
of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 9,000.
41. In this respect, the Chamber took into account that the Claimant had paid the
advance of costs in the amount of CHF 5,000 in accordance with art. 17 of the
Procedural Rules.
42. In view of all of the above, the Chamber concluded that the amount of CHF 9,000
has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings.
Thereof, the amount of CHF 4,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to FIFA and the
amount of CHF 5,000 directly to the Claimant.
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III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, H, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, U, has to pay to the Claimant, H, the amount of EUR 402,500,
plus interest at a rate of 5% p.a. as from 15 February 2010 until the date of
effective payment, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present
decision.
3.
If the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the aforementioned
deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s
Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and decision.
4.
Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, H, are rejected.
5.
The final amount of costs of the proceedings amounting to CHF 9,000 is to be paid
by the Respondent, U, as follows:
5.1. The amount of CHF 4,000 has to be paid within 30 days of notification of
the present decision to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to
case no.:
UBS Zurich
Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)
Clearing number 230
IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U
SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A
5.2. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant, H.
6.
The Claimant, H, is directed to inform the Respondent, U, immediately and directly
of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
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According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Jérôme Valcke
Secretary General
Encl.: CAS directives
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