Acórdão do FIFA
Processo 210664_2011-02-11

Data
11/02/2011

Labour Disputes


Texto da decisão

Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 5 February 2010,

in the following composition:

Slim Aloulou (Tunisia), Chairman
Michele Colucci (Italy), member
Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member
Ivan Gazidis (England), member
Zola Majavu (South Africa), member

on the claim presented by the player,

X,

as Claimant / Counter-Respondent

against the club,

FC-S,
as Respondent / Counter-Claimant

regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties

I.

Facts of the case

1.

On 12 December 2006, the player, X (d.o.b. 19 February 1982; hereinafter:
“Claimant” or “player”) and the club FC S (hereinafter: “Respondent” or “club”)
signed an employment contract valid as from 1 January 2007 until 30 June 2009.

2.

According to the employment contract and an additional agreement signed on 12
December 2006, the player had the right to receive, inter alia, the following
amounts:
- monthly salary in the amount of EUR 40’000 gross payable as of 1 January 2007,
- signing-on fee in the amount of EUR 250’000 gross to be paid as follows:
 EUR 100’000 to be paid in January 2007,
 EUR 50’000 to be paid in January 2008,
 EUR 100’000 to be paid in January 2009.

3.

According to the employment contract, the player’s agent Y cooperated in the
concluding of the contract on behalf of the player.

4.

On 23 March 2007, the player contacted FIFA arguing that the employment
contract had been signed in G without the presence of the players’ agent Y,
although the player only understands P. To his surprise, he had signed an
employment contract which provided for figures in “gross” amounts instead of
“net” and, thus a substantial amount would have been subtracted for G taxes.

5.

The player points out that after having signed the employment contract, he
returned to B and waited for the performance of the registration of his
employment contract with the G Football Federation (hereinafter: G FF), which,
according to the player, was a condition precedent for the contract and the
additional agreement to enter into force, and the payment of the first instalment
of the signing-on fee amounting to EUR 100’000 allegedly due on 1 January 2007.

6.

The player further submitted that the club never registered him with the G
Football Federation, because the B Football Federation (hereinafter: B FF) refused
to issue the International Transfer Certificate (hereinafter: ITC). Furthermore, the
player explained that on 17 January 2007, he informed the club that the B Football
Federation would not issue his ITC based on a decision of a B Court, which
provided that the player should deposit the amount of EUR 870’000 before being
able to be transferred. The player pointed out that the FC S club had never
requested FIFA to assist with respect to his provisional registration as allowed by
Annexe 3 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

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7.

The player further argued that the club neither showed any interest in his services
by not replying to his letters of 17 and 25 January 2007, nor requested his ITC, nor
made use of the possibility to register him provisionally, nor assisted him with the
difficulties he has had in B. Consequently, so the player, the club tacitly declared
the annulment of the employment contract.

8.

As a result and given the fact that the employment contract was not registered, in
addition to being drafted in G, the player is of the opinion that the employment
contract is null.

9.

Consequently, the player requests that the employment contract is declared null
and void and he claims 50% of the contractual value in the total amount of USD
725’000 for moral and financial damages, which consists of:
- 50% of 30 months of salary, i.e. USD 600’000,
- 50% of the signing-on fee, i.e. USD 125’000.

10.

In its response, the FC S contests the allegations of the player.

11.

It explains that on 11 December 2006 a meeting was held between the player, his
father, interpreters and the club, where the details of the contract were discussed,
in particular, the salary and terms of payment. The player was apparently
informed about the G tax law and the club was assured that no transfer
compensation would be due to the player’s former club, since the player’s
employment contract with his former club had been duly terminated. A second
meeting was held, on 12 December 2006, where the employment contract as well
as the written confirmation by the player that he is not under contract with any
other club were signed.

12.

Following the player’s return to B the club found out that another B club, P, was
holding negotiations with the player. Thus, on 20 December 2006, the FC S
informed the G Football Federation that an agreement of employment was
reached between the club and the player. On 26 December 2006, the player’s
former club informed the FC S that it will not agree to release the player as it was
“in possession of the player’s economic and financial rights” through an agency.
Thereafter, the club contested the position of the player’s former club and on 4
January 2007, the G Football Federation requested the player’s ITC from the B
Football Federation.

13.

The club points out that on 9 January 2007, the B Football Federation denied the
issuance of the ITC, however, not based on a court order or any contractual
obligations of the player as affirmed by the player, but based on the fact that the
player himself requested the B Football Federation on 27 December 2006 to deny
the ITC in case the G Football Federation would request it. The club contacted the

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B Football Federation and contested all allegations of the player with regard to
the alleged non-validity of the employment contract.
14.

Thereafter, on 19 January 2007, the club acknowledged from the media that the
player had accepted to train with club P. The club asserts having continued to
obtain the player’s registration until the closing of the registration period. It
further presented an e-mail message dated 9 February 2007 from the alleged new
lawyer of the player addressed to the club looking for an amicable solution and
referring to mistakes made by the player or his representatives.

15.

As regards the allegation of the player with regard to the non-validity of the
employment contract, the club pointed out that a competent interpreter had been
present during both meetings and the player had rejected the offer of obtaining a
translation into P of the contract. Moreover, the club stressed that the word
“brutto” meaning “gross” appears 9 times in the agreement. In addition, “brutto”
is “bruto” also in P.

16.

Furthermore, the club pointed out that the player himself requested the B Football
Federation to deny the issuance of the relevant ITC and thus the player must be
held liable for the “provisional non-validity” of the employment contract signed
between them. Moreover, it emphasized that according to the media the player
already orally concluded a new employment contract with club P on 19 January
2007.

17.

Due to these circumstances, the club rejects the claim put forward by the player
and lodged a counterclaim against the player for breach of contract in the light of
the player’s request to the B Football Federation to deny the issuance of the
relevant ITC and thus frustrating the club’s right to perform the contract inter
partes.

18.

In particular, the club requests that the amount of compensation for breach of
contract should be calculated by the damage caused by the non-performance of
the agreement at the player’s fault. If the player had orderly performed the
agreement, the club would not have had to scout for and employ another player
to substitute him. The club had to sign the player W and had to pay to a players’
agent the amount of EUR 600’000 in four instalments as well as the amount of
EUR 2’500’000 to W’s former club.

19.

Therefore, the club claims that the damage suffered and caused by the nonperformance of the employment contract by the player amounts to EUR 3’100’000.

20.

In his replica, the player rejected the club’s counterclaim by firstly stating that
there was never a discussion concerning the gross nature of the contractual

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amounts. In this respect, the player submitted his father’s written statement, who
confirmed that the FC S told his son that he would receive a monthly salary of EUR
40’000 free of tax, that his son was never asked if he had obligations with another
company and that his son requested a translation of the contract.
21.

The player adds that the club never provided him with a translation and after
having sent the contract to a translator he realized that he had been betrayed.
Thereafter, he informed the B Football Federation about the contractual fault and
the trap that he was led into. The player insists that the contract being drafted in
G only was invalid in the light of International, European and G law.

22.

Secondly, the player explained that the B Football Federation did not deny the ITC,
but only informed the G Football Federation about the player’s correspondence.
The player is of the opinion that the B Football Federation was impeded to issue
the ITC after having been informed of the B court order. The FC S could have paid
the judicial deposit of EUR 870’000 on his behalf in accordance with the decision
of the B court and the ITC would have been issued. However, the FC S chose not to
pay and thus, declared that it was no longer interested in his services.

23.

The player contests the contents of the alleged e-mail sent by an alleged
representative of the player (cf. point I/14. above).

24.

After 4 months of inactivity the player signed an employment contract with the B
club, D.

25.

With regard to the compensation claimed by the club, the player again
emphasized that he has not been responsible for the non-fulfilment of the
employment contract. Equally, the player again mentioned that the FC S did not
pay the amount of EUR 870’000, thus the club was of the opinion that he was
worth nothing, but now it is arbitrarily requesting the amount of EUR 3’100’000.
Moreover, he argued that the FC S can still transfer the player W for a higher
amount and thus there is no damage.

26.

The club maintained its previous position in the duplica, elaborating its arguments.
It first mentioned that the player had clearly been responsible for the non-issuance
of the relevant ITC. Moreover, the club pointed out that the confirmation of the
player’s father is not objective and cannot be taken into account. Furthermore, the
contract was based on a model agreement provided by the G Football Federation
to be used for all the associated G Liga licensed clubs. Equally, the arguments of
the player with regard to a possible future transfer of the player W are pure
speculation.

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27.

On 5 April 2007, the signed an employment contract with the B club, D, in
accordance with which he was entitled to receive the monthly salary of 20’0000.
The relevant employment contract is valid until 4 April 2010.

28.

The player was loaned to club P as from 1 May 2007 until 31 December 2009
receiving the monthly salary of 40’000 until 30 June 2008 and as from 1 July 2008
until 31 December 2009 the monthly salary of 25’000. Moreover, club P and the
player signed an “Image Rights Sub-Licensing Agreement” valid as from 17 July
2008 until 31 December 2009, according to which the player is entitled to receive
22 instalments of 25’000 and 35’000 as from 1 August 2008 until 25 January 2010
“for the licensed rights”.

29.

Furthermore, the player was loaned to the club C as from 2 February 2009 until 31
December 2009 receiving the monthly salary of 59’000.

II.

Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1.

First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 23 March 2007. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2005;
hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21
par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules, edition 2008, in combination with art. 18 par.
2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules).

2.

Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2009) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an
international dimension between a B player and FC S.

3.

Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to
the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with
art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(edition 2009), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 23 March
2007, the 2005 edition of the said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

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4.

The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members
of the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts and
documentation contained in the file.

5.

In doing so, the Chamber firstly acknowledged that it was not contested by the
parties that, on 12 December 2006, they had signed an employment contract with
a duration as from 1 January 2007 until 30 June 2009.

6.

In this respect, the members of the Chamber took due note that, on the one hand,
the Claimant maintained inter alia that the employment contract is to be
considered null and void, based on the non-registration of the employment
contract with the G Football Federation and on the fact that the employment
contract was signed in G without the player having received a translation of it.
Therefore, the player considers to have been deceived by the club. As a result, the
player demands 50% of the contractual value in the total amount of USD 725’000
for moral and financial damages.

7.

The Chamber took into account that the club, on the other hand, contested the
player’s allegations. In particular and with regard of the alleged non-validity of
the employment contract, the club explained that the non-registration of the
employment contract was in fact a result of the player’s request to the B Football
Federation to deny the issuance of the relevant ITC. With regard to the language
of the employment contract, the club stressed that a competent interpreter was
present during the meetings before signing the contract and that the player’s
argument that he was deceived by the club must be rejected.

8.

In view of these circumstances, the club lodged a counterclaim against the player
as the latter frustrated the club’s right to perform the contract inter partes.
Consequently, the club claims compensation for the non-performance of the
employment-contract by the player in the amount of EUR 3’100’000.

9.

Having taken due note of the above, the Chamber referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules, according to which any party deriving a right from an alleged
fact shall carry the burden of proof.

10.

Applied to the matter at stake, the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
as a first step took note that the player held that the employment contract was
null and void as it was signed in G, although he only understands P and requested
a translation. In particular, the player held that the salary and terms of payment
stated in the contract which he thought were to be paid “net”, were “gross”
instead.

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11.

In this respect, the Chamber noted that the contract was indeed signed in G and
that according to the Respondent, “brutto” is “bruto” also in P, which statement
had not been contested by the Claimant.

12.

In this context, the Dispute Resolution Chamber noted that the documentation
presented by the player in support of his position essentially consisted of a
declaration of his father, who apparently had assisted the player in the
negotiation of the contract. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber held
that the impartiality of the individual who had issued the relevant declaration at
least had to be questioned and that, therefore, the declaration could not serve as
objective evidence for the player’s allegation that he had not been provided with
a translation of the employment contract.

13.

Regardless of the foregoing and more importantly, the Chamber was eager to
emphasise that a party signing a document of legal importance without
knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own
responsibility.

14.

Furthermore, the player held that the nullity of the employment contract is also a
result of its non-registration as the relevant ITC was not issued. In this context, the
player pointed out that the B Football Federation was impeded to issue such ITC
after having been informed of the B court order, which provided that the player
should deposit the amount of EUR 870’000 before being able to be transferred.

15.

Moreover, the player pointed out that the club did not show any interest in the
player’s services as it could have asked the assistance of FIFA with respect to his
provisional registration or it could have paid the judicial deposit of EUR 870’000
on his behalf for the issuance of the ITC.

16.

In this respect, the Chamber deemed it fit to point out that, as a general rule, the
non-registration of an employment contract or non-issuance of an ITC does not
automatically render an employment contract invalid.

17.

What is more, with regard to the non-issuance of the ITC in the specific case at
hand, the Chamber took note that the club presented a copy of the letter dated
27 December 2006 addressed by the player to the B Football Federation, in which
he asked the latter not to issue the ITC on behalf of the G Football Federation
should the G Football Federation ask the B Football Federation to do so. In fact,
the B Football Federation, in its reply dated 9 January 2007 to the G Football
Federation, pointed out that the player had requested it not to issue the ITC. The
Chamber recalled that according to the player, the B Football Federation had not
issued the relevant ITC in the light of the order issued by a B court. After careful
study of the pertinent documentation on file, the Chamber noted that such court

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order was pronounced on 16 January 2007, whereas the B Football Federation had
informed the G Football Federation about the non-issuance of the ITC as early as
on 9 January 2007. Consequently, the Chamber concurred that it had to reject the
player’s arguments in this respect and agreed that it was indeed the player who
had hindered the issuance of the relevant ITC. What is more, by sending the said
letter dated 27 December 2006 to the B Football Federation, the player
demonstrated that he had no intention to respect the obligations that he had
entered into with the club by means of the pertinent employment contract.
18.

With respect to the Claimant’s allegation that the Respondent had not shown any
interest in the player’s services, the Chamber took note of the documentation
presented by the Respondent and was eager to highlight that the Respondent had
in fact informed the B Football Federation and other B entities that had claimed
“the rights” to the player about the contractual situation between the
Respondent and the Claimant.

19.

In addition, the Dispute Resolution Chamber could not at all back the player’s
position that the non-payment of the judicial deposit of EUR 870’000 by the club
on the player’s behalf for the issuance of the ITC, should be interpreted as a sign
of no interest in the player’s services from the club’s part. Consequently, the
members of the Chamber unanimously rejected such argument.

20.

On account of the documentation presented by the Respondent in its defence,
and having assured themselves that the player had not presented any other
documentation to corroborate his allegations, the members of the Dispute
Resolution Chamber concluded that the respective argumentation of the player
could not be upheld.

21.

With the aforementioned considerations in mind, the Chamber unanimously
concurred that, in fact, the player was to be held liable for breach of the
employment contract without just cause.

22.

The members of the Chamber then referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section
of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period shall last
for “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry
into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday
of the professional”. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out
that the player had been 24 years of age when he signed his employment contract
with the Respondent on 12 December 2006 valid as from 1 January 2007, entailing
that the breach of the relevant contract had occurred within the applicable
protected period.

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23.

In view of the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of such breach of contract during the protected period committed
by the player.

24.

In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all established that, in
accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay
compensation to the club. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous
contents of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the
player’s new club, i.e. D, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of
compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint
liability of the player’s new club is independent from the question as to whether
the new club has committed an inducement to contractual breach. This conclusion
is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber that was
repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

25.

Prior to proceeding to the calculation of the amount of compensation, the
Chamber placed emphasis on the primacy of the principle of the maintenance of
contractual stability, which represents the backbone of the agreement between
FIFA/UEFA and the European Commission signed in March 2001. This agreement
and its pillars represent the core of the former (editions 2001, 2005 and 2008) as
well as of the 2009 version of the Regulations, which all stakeholders – including
player and club representatives – agreed upon in 2001.

26.

Above all, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by
the above Regulations concerning in particular compensation for breach of
contract without just cause serve as a deterrent discouraging the early termination
of employment contracts by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm
response by the competent deciding authorities would represent an inappropriate
example towards all the football actors.

27.

In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party (either the
player or the club, as the case may be) has proven to be an efficient means and has
always found a widespread acceptance since it guarantees that the fundamental
principle of the respect of the contracts is duly taken care of.

28.

Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in article 17 of the
Regulations are applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players,
signifying that both clubs and professionals who are seen to have committed a
breach of contract without just cause will in all cases be subject to pay
compensation and, under specific circumstances, also subject to the imposition of
sporting sanctions.

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29.

Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of
the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing
so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art.
17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in
particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the
dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the
specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract
and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a
maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the
former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual
breach falls within a protected period. The Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled
that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of
criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is
awarded to the prejudiced party.

30.

In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the Claimant and
the Respondent contains a provision by which the parties had beforehand agreed
upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. Upon careful
examination of the employment contract concluded between the Claimant and
the Respondent, the members of the Chamber assured themselves that this was
not the case in the matter at stake.

31.

As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice
suffered by the Respondent in the present matter had to be assessed in
application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In
this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasised beforehand that each
request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the
Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of
the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of
football and its experience gained throughout the years.

32.

Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the
Respondent in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract,
which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential.

33.

In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber established that the employment
contract between the Respondent and the Claimant, signed on 12 December 2006,
had been set to expire on 30 June 2009 and according to the additional
agreement of the contract amounted to a total contractual value of EUR 1’450’000
(cf. no. I/2. above).

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34.

The members of the Chamber then turned to the essential criterion relating to the
fees and expenses possibly paid by the former club for the acquisition of the
player’s services in so far as these have not yet been amortised over the term of
the relevant contract. In this regard, however, the Dispute Resolution Chamber
took into account that it had not been provided with any information or
documentation by the Respondent, due to which this criterion could not be taken
into account for the purpose of assessing the applicable amount of compensation
in the present matter.

35.

The Chamber then turned its attention to the aspect relating to the “specificity of
sport” which is equally explicitly referred to in article 17 par. 1 of the Regulations.
At the outset, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that this important aspect
has been recognised by the European Union and has repeatedly been referred to
by the CAS for the purpose of establishing the applicable amount of compensation
in case of contractual breach, ensuring that the decisions rendered are not only
just and fair from a strictly legal point of view, but that they also correspond to
the specific needs and interests of the football world and its stakeholders. In this
regard, and with reference to the respective jurisprudence of the CAS, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber recalled that the specificity of sport allows for it to take into
account the circumstance that players can be considered the main asset of a club
in terms of their sporting value but also from a rather economic point of view.

36.

In light of the foregoing, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that the
sporting damage caused to the Respondent by the player’s unilateral breach of
contract without just cause was particularly important. In this respect, the
members of the Chamber considered the fact that the player suddenly had to be
replaced in the course of an ongoing season. The foregoing led the Chamber to
conclude that the breach of the employment contract by the player has prevented
the Respondent from counting on one of its players and from possibly negotiating
his transfer to a third club for a financial profit and has, thus, caused a
considerable sporting damage to the Respondent, which shall equally be
compensated by the player.

37.

In this context, the Dispute Resolution Chamber was also eager to stress that the
Claimant had never fulfilled his contractual obligations towards the Respondent
during the entire duration of the contract, which the Chamber decided to take
into account as an aggravating circumstance.

38.

On account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specifies of the
case at hand, the Chamber concurred that the amount of EUR 725’000 is to be
considered an appropriate and justified amount of compensation for breach of
contract to be awarded to the Respondent. In this respect, the members of the

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Chamber finally deemed it imperative to emphasise that the sanctioning nature of
the provisions contained in article 17 of the Regulations cannot be disregarded.
39.

Consequently, the Chamber decided that the player, X, must pay the amount of
EUR 725’000 to the club, FC S, as compensation for breach of contract.
Furthermore, the club D is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the
relevant compensation.

40.

In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach
of contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting
sanctions against the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations.
The cited provision stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay
compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in
breach of contract during the protected period.

41.

In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17
par. 3 of the Regulations, the player had to be sanctioned with a restriction of
four months on his eligibility to participate in any official football match. This
sanction shall take effect as from the notification of the present decision.

42.

In conclusion, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Claimant, X, has
to pay EUR 725’000 to the Respondent, FC S, as compensation for the unjustified
breach of his employment contract during the protected period. In this respect,
the Dispute Resolution Chamber also decided that the club D is jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the above-mentioned amount of compensation
to FC S (cf. art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations).

43.

Furthermore, the Chamber decided that the player shall be sanctioned with a
restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official football
matches, taking effect as from the notification of the present decision.

44.

The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that the claim of the Claimant is rejected and the counterclaim of
the Respondent is partially accepted.

*****

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III.

Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1.

The claim of the player, X, is rejected.

2.

The counterclaim of the club, FC S, is partially accepted.

3.

The player, X, is ordered to pay the amount of EUR 725’000 to the club, FC S,
within 30 days of notification of the present decision.

4.

The B club D is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned
compensation.

5.

If this amount is not paid within the aforementioned time limit, interest at the
rate of 5% per annum as of the expiry of the said time limit will apply and the
matter will be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its
consideration and decision.

6.

The club, FC S is directed to inform the player X and the club D directly and
immediately of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to
notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

7.

A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed
on the player X. This sanction shall take effect as of the notification of the present
decision.

8.

Any further request filed by the club FC S is rejected.

*****

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Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Markus Kattner
Deputy Secretary General

Encl.

CAS directives

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