Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 November 2007,
in the following composition:
Slim Aloulou (Tunisia), President
Mario Gallavotti (Italy), Member
Zola Majavu (South Africa), Member
Michele Colucci (Italy), Member
Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), Member
on the claim presented by the
Club A,
as Claimant,
against the
Player B,
as first Respondent,
and the
Club C,
as second Respondent,
regarding a dispute about the consequences of the breach of an employment contract
and the possible inducement to breach of an employment contract.
I.
Facts of the case
1.
The player B (hereinafter; the player) and the club A (hereinafter; club A) had
concluded an employment contract valid from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007,
stipulating for the season 2005/06 the player’s right for a lump sum of USD
200,000, due on 10 July 2005, ten monthly salaries of USD 10,000 each, payable
from August 2005 to May 2006, and match bonuses in the amount of USD
100,000, distributed pro rata according to the number of matches of the Turkish
championship for which the player was summoned. For the season 2006/07, the
employment contract stipulated the same financial entitlements and due dates
analogue to the season 2005/06.
2.
On 14 and 15 March 2006, the player claimed before FIFA to be released from
the contract, since the salary for November 2005 was paid on 6 February 2006
only instead than on 15 December 2005, and since the salaries for December
2005 as well as January and February 2006 were still unpaid.
3.
On 17 March 2006, club A lodged a claim before FIFA against the player for
unexcused absence as of 15 March 2006, requesting that he shall be ordered to
immediately resume duty. On that occasion, it was emphasized that all financial
obligations towards the player had been respected.
4.
On 4 April 2006, club A provided its position regarding the player’s claim and
thereby reiterated its former request. Furthermore, club A submitted copies of
payment receipts signed by the player, according to which a total of USD 332,000
had been paid to him.
5.
On 12 April 2006, the player replied to club A’s position, and thereby particularly
declared that one of the payment receipts submitted by club A, i.e. a receipt
dated 19 December 2005 over the amount of USD 46,000, was forged since he
had neither signed such a document nor received the relevant amount. The
player also insisted that he was never paid the salaries from December 2005 to
February 2006. Therefore, the player requested to be released from the
employment contract and claimed for the outstanding salaries and bonuses as
well as for compensation.
6.
On 20 April 2006, club A submitted the originals of the above-mentioned
payment receipts.
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Club A/Player B & club C
1st decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC)
7.
On 27 April 2006, the DRC passed a first decision in this dispute, and thereby
emphasized that, as a general rule, it has no competence to adjudicate on
alleged criminal offences, such as forgery of signature or documents. As a
consequence, in such cases, the DRC has to refer the parties to the competent
national criminal authorities. Moreover, the DRC stated that, again as a general
rule and with the possible exception of cases of evident divergence of the
signatures, as long as the falsification of a signature or a document is not
established by a final and binding decision of a competent criminal authority,
the DRC has no alternative but to presume the authenticity of the signature or
the document in question.
8.
In view thereof, in essence the DRC concluded that from the beginning of the
season 2005/06 until the day of the player’s departure from club A on 15 March
2006, the amount of USD 324,000 had become due, and the total amount of USD
332,000 had been paid to the player.
9.
As a result, the DRC concluded that club A had respected all its financial
obligations towards the player and that therefore the player had no just cause to
terminate the employment contract with club A unilaterally before its expiration.
The player had thus to resume duty with club A immediately.
Procedure before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS 2006/A/1100)
10.
The player appealed against the decision of the DRC before the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and thereby applied for the stay of the execution of
the challenged decision. On 6 July 2006, the CAS admitted the player’s
application for the stay of execution. The player had thus not to resume duty
with his club at least until the CAS renders a final award on the merits of the
relevant dispute.
11.
On 15 November 2006, the CAS passed its final decision in the matter and
thereby concluded that the player had breached the contract without just cause.
Insofar, the CAS confirmed the decision of the DRC. However, with regard to the
consequences to the above, the CAS annulled the decision of the DRC as far as
the latter had decided that the relevant employment contract was still valid and
that the player had therefore to immediately resume duty. The CAS recalled that
a person cannot be compelled to remain in a particular employment. A player
who breaches an employment contract without just cause may be liable for
damages or even be imposed a sanction based on Article 17 of the Regulations
for the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter; the Regulations), but is not
subject to an injunction to remain with his employer.
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12.
Since the application of the criteria stipulated in Article 17 of the Regulations
allows a considerable scope of discretion in the calculation of the compensation
for breach of contract, the CAS respected FIFA’s autonomy in this regard and
referred the case back to the DRC in order for it to calculate the compensation
due by the player to club A. At the same time, the CAS provided the DRC with
certain guidelines for the making of its respective decision. The relevant decision
shall in particular be guided by the Articles 337d par. 1 and 42 to 44 of the Swiss
Code of Obligations. Moreover, when deciding about the compensation payable
by the player, the economic loss club A suffered by the player’s premature
termination of the contract shall be taken into consideration.
2nd procedure before the DRC
13.
On 26 January 2007, club A submitted its arguments with regard to the
consequences of the breach of contract, and thereby claimed for USD 1,574,000
to be paid by the player as compensation for breach of contract:
o
USD 8,000
Difference between the amount that had been paid to the
player from the beginning of the season 2005/06 to the day the player left
club A, i.e. 15 March 2006, and the amount that had become due in this
period of time
o
USD 66,000 Amount corresponding to the non-amortised part of the
lump sum of USD 200,000 for the season 2005/06, which was paid to the
player on 10 July 2005
o
USD 1,5 Mio. club A’s estimated sporting and financial damage fixed ex
aequo et bono, since:
the player left the club outside the registration period and thus
made it impossible to be immediately replaced,
the player could not be used for the remaining period of his
contract, i.e. 1 year and four months,
the opportunity to negotiate the transfer of the player to another
club at the end of the season 2005/06 was lost,
EUR 400,000 had to be invested to replace the player,
the player breached the contract during the protected period.
14.
Furthermore, club A claims for the joint and several liability of the player’s new
club, the Saudi Arabian club C (hereinafter; club C) to pay such compensation in
accordance with Article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations.
15.
Finally, club A claims for a sporting sanction against the player, i.e. a restriction
on his eligibility to play in official matches during six months, and for sporting
sanctions against club C, i.e. a ban from registering any new player, either
nationally or internationally, for two registration periods.
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Club A/Player B & club C
16.
On 19 February 2007, club C provided its reply to club A’s claim, and thereby
mentioned that it had never induced the player to breach his contract with club
A. The employment contract was signed with the player on 26 July 2006 on the
basis of the decision of the CAS regarding the stay of execution.
17.
On 5 March 2007, the player submitted his position to club A’s petition. Thereby,
he informed FIFA that on 18 December 2006, he had lodged a criminal complaint
before the Criminal Investigation Office of the Canton of Vaud against the
President and the Vice-President of club A, on the grounds of document forgery,
with respect to two payment receipts submitted by club A before the DRC and
the CAS.
18.
In this respect, it is the opinion of the player that such criminal proceedings could
have an influence on the decision of the DRC in the matter at hand in case it
would be established that the relevant documents were in fact forgeries.
19.
Therefore, the player asks the DRC to stay the present proceedings until a final
decision is taken by the afore-mentioned criminal authorities regarding the
criminal action launched by the player.
20.
Besides the above, the player is of the opinion that at this stage of the
procedure, the true extent and quantum of the damages cannot be properly
assessed, since this would also be depending on the outcome of the mentioned
criminal procedure. However, the player stated that with respect to its claim for
compensation, club A had neither asserted the invoked facts nor submitted
relevant documentary evidence.
21.
On 9 July 2007, club A objected to the suspension of the present proceedings as
requested by the player, and moreover, mentioned that nobody within club A
had been contacted by any Swiss judiciary body in relation with the criminal
procedure allegedly initiated by the player.
22.
The DRC is asked to decide, in a first step, about the player’s request for
suspension of the present proceedings, and in case that request is rejected, about
the sanctions for the unjustified breach of contract committed by the player.
23.
NB: In reply to a request from FIFA to the Criminal Investigation Office of the
Canton of Vaud to be informed about the criminal procedure allegedly initiated
by the player, the investigating magistrate stated that FIFA cannot be provided
with information on the mentioned procedure pending before the Criminal
Investigation Office of the Canton of Vaud, since FIFA is not a party to the
relevant procedure.
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Club A/Player B & club C
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) had to analyse whether it was
competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, it referred to art. 18
par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. The present matter was initially
submitted to FIFA on 14 March 2006, as a consequence the DRC concluded that
the revised Rules Governing Procedures (edition 2005) on matters pending
before the decision making bodies of FIFA are applicable on the matter at hand.
2.
With regard to the competence of the DRC, art. 3 par. 1 of the above-mentioned
Rules states that the DRC shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of articles 22
to 24 of the current version of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2005). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in connection with art. 22
(b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the DRC shall adjudicate on employmentrelated disputes between a club and a player that have an international
dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the DRC is the competent body to decide on the present
litigation involving a club and a player with different nationalities regarding a
dispute in connection with the consequences of the already established breach
of an employment contract concluded between the parties.
4.
Subsequently, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations for the Status
and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In
this respect, the DRC referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2005) in their version
in accordance with FIFA circular no. 995 dated 23 September 2005, and, on the
other hand, to the fact that the relevant contract at the basis of the present
dispute was signed on 15 June 2004, and the claim was lodged at FIFA on 14
March 2006. In view of the aforementioned, the DRC concluded that the 2005
edition of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players
(hereinafter; the Regulations) is applicable on the case at hand as to the
substance.
5.
Entering into the substance of the matter, the DRC acknowledged the
documentation contained in the file, and in view of the circumstances of the
case, first of all recalled that the aim of the present procedure was not to pass a
decision on the question whether a breach of contract has occurred in this
matter and which party to the contract shall be held responsible for such breach
of contract. In fact, the DRC emphasised that these questions had already been
decided first by the DRC on 27 April 2006 and then by the CAS in its decision
dated 15 November 2006, whereby it was decided that the player had breached
the employment contract in question without just cause (cf. above, section I.,
paragraph 11.). This decision of the CAS has, in the meantime, become final and
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Club A/Player B & club C
binding. Therefore, the aim of the present procedure is solely to determine the
consequences of the mentioned breach of contract.
6.
In view of this fact, the DRC focused on the question of the consequences of the
above-mentioned breach of contract. However, as a preliminary question, the
DRC had to define the impact that the penal procedure apparently pending in
front of a Swiss criminal tribunal (cf. above, section I., paragraph 17.) may have
on the procedure at stake.
7.
As far as the preliminary question is concerned, the DRC declared that the fact
that a penal procedure appears to be pending in front of a criminal authority
with respect to questions related to the breach of contract that had occurred in
this matter, cannot have an impact on the present procedure. Particularly, such
proceedings may not cause the suspension of the procedure of civil law at hand
until the relevant criminal authority has rendered a decision that has become
final and binding. The DRC stated that it is aware that, theoretically, a risk exists
that the present decision and the decision which may be taken by the criminal
authority allegedly addressed by the player could be contradicting. Nevertheless,
the DRC maintained that the present procedure is not to be suspended until a
possible decision of the said criminal authority has become final and binding,
and based such conclusion on the following considerations.
8.
First of all, and although this was absolutely uncontested by the parties to the
present procedure, the DRC recalled, for the sake of completeness, that it has
competence to pass a decision in the matter at stake (cf. above, section II.,
paragraphs 1. to 3.).
9.
Furthermore, the DRC made reference to the presumption of innocence, which is
a basic and universal legal principle that finds application in every legal system
within the scope of penal issues. According to the mentioned principle, no
person shall be considered guilty of a penal offence until convicted by a court by
means of a decision that has become final and binding. In the present case, no
final and binding decision appears to have been taken by the authority
apparently addressed by the player with respect to the President and the VicePresident of club A, accused of document forgery. The presumption of innocence
with respect to the mentioned accused persons is therefore to be considered as
upheld, and the DRC must thus be in a position to pass a decision in the present
matter on the basis of the facts such as they were presenting at the moment of
the decision at stake being taken.
10.
In continuation, the DRC pointed out that if the introduction of a penal
procedure related to the substance of a procedure of civil law pending before a
competent deciding body of an association or an arbitration tribunal would
inevitably lead to the suspension of the latter procedure, the risk of an abusive
use of such procedural course of action would be very high. In fact, it is to be
taken into consideration that the course of a penal procedure and its speed
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Club A/Player B & club C
always lie, to a certain degree, in the hands of the accuser. Therefore, should the
accuser have chosen dilatory tactics within the procedure of civil law pending
before a competent instance of an association or an arbitral tribunal, he would
simply have to address a penal authority with an issue related to the civil
dispute. Once the procedure of civil law would consequently be suspended, the
accuser would then, with the means at his disposal, try to delay the penal
procedure in question whenever possible, in order not to obtain a final and
binding decision from the penal authority as long as possible. Throughout the
entire proceedings of penal law, the procedure of civil law would be suspended.
11.
In matters of football, particularly disputes between clubs and players with the
latter being the respondent, the risk of an abusive use of the above described
course of procedural action is all the more important, since the duration of the
career of a professional football player is limited in time to approximately 10 to
15 years. Once a player terminates his football career and is thus not anymore
registered as a football player at any of the associations member of FIFA, he is
consequently also not anymore subject to the jurisdiction of FIFA. Therefore,
would a player, by means of the above described dilatory tactics, succeed in
delaying a procedure pending before a competent deciding body of FIFA beyond
the end of his career, he could thus escape from the jurisdiction of FIFA. Any
procedure against such a player would have to be terminated due to a lack of
substantiality, as there would be no means to enforce a decision of a deciding
body of FIFA against a former player which is not registered anymore as a player.
This would be to the detriment of the claimant, i.e. a club in a civil dispute, or
FIFA, in case of a disciplinary procedure, and would ultimately put at risk the
entire system of dispute settlement and resolution between players and clubs
established within the Regulations of FIFA.
12.
In the present case, the DRC noted that the player was informed by means of the
decision of the DRC dated 27 April 2006 that the DRC, as a general rule, has no
competence to adjudicate on alleged criminal offences, such as forgery of
signature or documents, and that therefore, in such cases, parties have to be
referred to the competent national criminal authorities. Furthermore, the DRC
noted that, regardless of the fact that the afore-mentioned decision was notified
to the parties on 16 May 2006, the player waited until 18 December 2006 to
introduce a penal procedure before a criminal authority with regard to the
alleged forgery of signature or documents. Considering that such a long period
of time had elapsed, the DRC questioned whether the player had, in fact, the
intention to obtain a decision of the DRC in the matter at stake within a
reasonable period of time or if he rather followed dilatory tactics in the present
procedure.
13.
Equally, the DRC recalled that the CAS, and the DRC as well, had already passed
decisions, that had become final and binding, regarding the breach of contract
and the responsible party for it, on the basis of the documents that are claimed
to be a forgery by the player. Also with respect to those decisions both
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Club A/Player B & club C
aforementioned deciding bodies had passed judgments that could theoretically
be contradictory to conclusions possibly reached by the penal authorities
allegedly addressed, without suspending the relevant procedures.
14.
As a result to the above, the DRC concluded that in view of the presumption of
innocence and the risk of an abusive use of the above-mentioned procedural
course of action as well as the previous decisions of the DRC and the CAS passed
in relation to the present dispute, the proceeding at stake shall not be
suspended until a final and binding decision of the penal authority addressed by
the player is obtained.
15.
Finally, in support of its above-mentioned conclusion, the DRC made reference to
a decision of the CAS in the matter CAS 2003/O/486, whereby the CAS declared
that an arbitral tribunal can stay its proceedings in case there is a pending
criminal case, but is not obliged to do so, since the principle “le penal tient le
civil en l‘état” is not applicable to international arbitration in Switzerland. The
DRC did not see any reason why this approach adopted by the CAS should not
apply also to procedures pending before the deciding bodies of FIFA.
16.
Having said that, the DRC turned its attention to the question of the
consequences of the breach of contract without just cause committed by the
player. In this respect, the DRC mentioned that in accordance with art. 17 of the
Regulations, it has to assess the compensation payable by the player to club A
for breach of contract (art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations), to decide whether the
player’s new club, i.e. club C, is to be considered jointly and severally liable
together with the player for the payment of such compensation to club A (art.
17 par. 2 of the Regulations), and to judge if sporting sanctions have to be
applied against the player (art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations) and/or the player’s
new club, club C for possible inducement to breach of contract (art. 17 par. 4 of
the Regulations).
17.
As far as the compensation payable for breach of contract is concerned, the DRC
firstly recalled that according to art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, contractual
breaches without just cause, whether inside or outside the protected period, give
rise to payment of compensation. According to the quoted provision, the
compensation amount shall be calculated, in particular, with due consideration
for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further
objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits
due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time
remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the
fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term
of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected
period. The list of objective criteria is not exhaustive.
18.
The DRC furthermore stated that it falls under its responsibility to estimate the
prejudice suffered by club A in the case at hand, not only in accordance with the
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Club A/Player B & club C
above-stated criteria contained in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations and in due
consideration of all specific circumstances of the present matter, but also with
their specific knowledge of the world of football, as well as with the experience
the DRC itself has gained throughout the years. As the CAS already indicated, in
its award of 15 November 2006, art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows a
considerable scope of discretion in the calculation of the compensation for
breach of contract.
19.
Before starting with the actual assessment of the compensation to be paid by the
player to club A, the DRC first and foremost was eager to emphasise that the
club had not substantiated a considerable part of its claimed damage, but simply
referred to the principle of ex aequo et bono. In other words, club A had not
specified its request in detail but had left it to the DRC and its discretion to assess
the relevant amount in view of the various arguments presented and the
Regulations.
20.
For the calculation of the amount of compensation due by the player, the DRC
firstly turned its attention to the remaining remuneration and other benefits due
to the player under the existing contract, i.e. the contract signed with club A,
which criterion was considered by the DRC to be essential.
21.
In this respect, the DRC first of all had to establish the remaining duration of the
employment contract between the player and club A, in order to ascertain the
remaining value of the employment contract in question. The said employment
contract was concluded between the parties to the contract for a duration from
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. In order to establish the date of the anticipated
termination of that employment contract, the DRC made reference to the
decision of the CAS dated 15 November 2006 in the procedure CAS 2006/A/1100,
particularly paragraph 8.2 of the cited decision, whereby the CAS decided that
the date of 14 March 2006 has to be considered as the date of the termination of
the employment contract in question. The remaining duration of the
employment contract concerned was therefore from 15 March 2006 to 30 June
2007, i.e. 15 and a half months out of a total duration of 36 months.
22.
In order to establish the remaining value of the employment contract between
the player and club A, the DRC recalled that the employment contract in
question stipulated for the season 2005/06 the player’s right for a lump sum of
USD 200,000, due on 10 July 2005, ten monthly salaries of USD 10,000 each,
payable from August 2005 to May 2006, and match bonuses in the amount of
USD 100,000, distributed pro rata according to the number of matches of the
Turkish championship for which the player was summoned. Furthermore, for the
season 2006/07, the employment contract stipulated the same financial
entitlements and due dates analogue to the season 2005/06.
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Club A/Player B & club C
23.
The remaining value of the employment contract between the player and club A
therefore amounts to USD 391,000, calculated on the basis of the following
elements:
•
•
•
•
•
lump sum for season 2005/06 (USD 200’000),
amortised from 10 July 2005 to 14 March 2006
salaries from 15 March 2006 until end of season 2005/06
lump sum for season 2006/07
salaries for season 2006/07
total
USD 66,000
USD 25,000
USD 200,000
USD 100,000
USD 391,000
The DRC refrained from taking into consideration the match bonuses invoked by
club A, as the obligation of their payment was only hypothetical. In fact, they
would become due only in case of the completion of certain conditions, the
fulfilment of which cannot be considered as self-evident.
24.
Furthermore, the DRC took into consideration that within the period from the
beginning of the season 2005/06 to 14 March 2006, USD 8,000 more than the
amount that had become due during this period of time had been paid to the
player by club A. Such amount was therefore to be reimbursed by the player to
club A.
25.
Moreover, the DRC took into consideration that according to the information at
its disposal, it was not established that club A had paid any compensation for
the transfer of the player at the time of acquiring his services. Therefore, such an
element could not be taken into account within the process of the assessment of
the compensation for breach of the employment contract
26.
Finally, the DRC took into consideration the further arguments of club A,
contained in section I. paragraph 13 above. In this respect, the DRC stated that
particularly the fact that the player had breached his employment contract with
club A after less than two years of duration, thus regardless of his age, during
the protected period (cf. below, section II, paragraphs 30. and 31.), is to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance for the evaluation of the
compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, with respect to club A
allegation that EUR 400,000 had to be invested to replace the player, the DRC
stated that club A has not presented any evidence for such claim, due to which it
could not be taken into consideration.
27.
In view of all of the above-mentioned elements, the DRC concluded that the
amount of USD 600,000 as compensation for breach of contract within the
protected period is to be considered as an appropriate and reasonable amount
of compensation.
28.
In continuation, the DRC focused on the further consequences of the breach of
contract in question, and in this respect, first of all decided that, in accordance
with art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the new club of the player, i.e. club C,
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Club A/Player B & club C
must be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of the abovementioned amount of compensation. In this respect, the DRC was eager to point
out that the joint liability of the player’s new club is independent from the
question as to whether the new club has committed an inducement to
contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established
jurisprudence of the DRC that was repeatedly confirmed by the CAS.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the DRC recalled that according to art. 17
par. 4 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the
contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract
without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach.
29.
The DRC then tackled the question of sporting sanctions against the player in
accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates
that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall
be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected
period.
30.
The protected period comprises a period of three entire seasons or three years,
whichever comes first, following the entry into force of an employment contract,
if such contract was concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional
player, or to a period of two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first,
following the entry into force of an employment contract, if such contract was
concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional player (cf. point 7 of the
definitions of the Regulations).
31.
In the present case, the relevant employment contract was valid as of 1 July
2004, and the unjustified breach of contract by the player occurred on 14 March
2006, i.e. 1 year and 8 and a half months later. Consequently, regardless of the
age of the player at the time of signing the contract, during the protected
period. The DRC had thus, in principle, the power to impose a sporting sanction
on the player for breach of contract, as the unjustified breach occurred within
the protected period.
32.
Therefore, the DRC decided that the player had to be sanctioned with a
restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in any official football
match, starting as of notification of the present decision.
33.
Finally, the DRC had to analyse whether, in view of art. 17 par. 4 of the
Regulations, the player’s new club C is to be found responsible for having
induced the player to terminate his contract with club A without just cause
during the protected period, and therefore shall be banned from registering any
new players, either nationally or internationally, for two registration periods. In
this respect, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the case at
stake as well as the explanations of club C, the DRC decided that the
presumption contained in the Regulations cannot be upheld, and that therefore,
no sporting sanctions shall be imposed on club C for inducement to breach of
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Club A/Player B & club C
contract in accordance with art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations. In particular, the DC
pointed out that club C had decided to acquire the player’s services only after
the first decision of the DRC and, most importantly, only following the decision
of the CAS accepting the player’s request for the stay of the execution of the said
DRC decision.
34.
In conclusion, the DRC decided that the player has to pay USD 600,000 to club A
as compensation for unjustified breach of an employment contract during the
protected period, in application of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this
respect, the DRC also decided that club C is jointly and severally responsible for
the payment of the above-mentioned amount of compensation to club A (art. 17
par. 2 of the Regulations). Furthermore, the DRC decided that the player shall be
sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in
any official football match, starting as of notification of the present decision (art.
17 par. 3 of the Regulations). Any further claim of the Claimant was rejected.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of club A is partially accepted.
2.
The player B has to pay the amount of USD 600,000 to club A within 30 days of
notification of the present decision.
3.
The club c is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned
compensation.
4.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent directly and immediately of
the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the DRC
of every payment received.
5.
If the afore-mentioned amount is not paid within the aforementioned time limit,
a 5% interest rate per annum as of the expiry of the said time limit will apply
and the matter will be submitted to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its
consideration and decision.
6.
A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is
imposed on the player B. This sanction shall take effect as of notification of the
present decision.
7.
Any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected.
8.
According to art. 61 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes this decision may be appealed
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be
sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receiving notification of this decision
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and has to contain all elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives
issued by the CAS, copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days
following the expiry of the time limit for the filing of the statement of appeal,
the appellant shall file with the CAS a brief stating the facts and legal arguments
giving rise to the appeal (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Château de Béthusy
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
[email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the
Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Jérôme Valcke
Secretary General
Encl.
CAS directives
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