Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 November 2007,
in the following composition:
Slim Aloulou (Tunisia), Chairman
Gerardo Movilla (Spain), member
Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (United Arab Emirates), member
John Didulica (Australia), member
Mohamed Mecharara (Algeria), member
on the claim presented by
the club, A, X,
Represented by Mr S,
as Claimant,
against
the player, B, X,
and
the club, C, Y,
as Respondents,
regarding a contractual dispute arisen on the basis of an employment contract signed between
the Claimant and the player.
I.
Facts of the case
1.
The player B, the Player, born 22 July 1981, and the X club, A, the Claimant, entered into
an employment agreement valid from 11 May 2004 until 31 December 2004. The Player
was loaned by the X club, D (hereafter: D), with which a valid employment contract
existed until 1 August 2005, to the Claimant for the above mentioned period of time.
2.
On 11 July 2005, the Claimant filed with FIFA a claim against the Y club, C, the
Defendant, and the Player for breach of the aforementioned employment agreement
and made the following allegations:
- In June 2004, the Defendant wanted to sign four of the Claimant’s players, including
the Player. In June 2004, the Claimant and the Defendant had an exchange of
correspondence relating to the transfer of the Player ending with the Defendant’s
written offer dated 18 June 2004 for a compensation of USD 300’000 plus 40% of a
possible future transfer amount. On 20 June 2004, this offer was once again confirmed
in writing by the Defendant. The Player travelled to Y on the basis of this offer on 23
June 2004. However, only a few days following the trip, the Defendant had cancelled
the transfer transaction by telephone.
- On 26 July 2004, the Defendant and the Y Football Federation (YYY) requested that the
X Football Association (XXX) issue an international transfer certificate (ITC) for the
Player.
- On the same day, the Player ceased employment with the Claimant.
- On 29 July 2004, the Player filed a claim against D for allegedly outstanding salaries
due prior to his loan to the Claimant. The employment agreement between the Player
and D was subsequently cancelled by a court ruling dated 29 July 2004. The Player had
not mentioned in the relevant court proceedings that he was currently on loan to the
Claimant. The cancellation of the employment agreement concluded with D was a
provisional measure. The judge had arranged to authorize the XXX to release the
Player so that he may reach an agreement with another club. At the same time, the
first hearing with respect to the claim filed by the Player was set for September 2004.
On the basis of the received order, the XXX had issued the ITC in favour of the
Defendant, even though the employment agreement with the Claimant continued to
be valid.
- The Claimant attended the hearing set for September 2004 and stated its rights as the
lessee of the Player, following which the order indicating provisional measures was
cancelled on 15 September 2004. At the same time, the judge fined the Player … 8,800
for abuse of process. This decision explicitly held that the contractual relationship
between the Player and D had been resumed and the relationship with the Claimant
had never been terminated. This court ruling entered into force.
- The Claimant asserts that the Player violated his employment agreement by
transferring to Y on the basis of an erroneously issued ITC (breach of art. 21 of the FIFA
Regulations governing the Status and Transfer of Players (2001 edition). hereafter: the
Regulations).
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
2
3.
Consequently, the Claimant requested that:
a) Compensation in the amount of USD 1’000’000 be obtained from the Player for the
breach of the employment agreement. The Claimant considers such compensation to
be adequate, given that the Defendant offered USD 300’000, plus 40% on a future
transfer compensation, to the Claimant for the transfer of the Player. Given the
disloyal conduct of the Defendant, it would not be possible to remain any longer in a
contractual relationship with the Defendant for the purpose of determining the 40%
for a possible future transfer. Thus, the Claimant must be awarded the entire offer
plus damages, i.e. a total of USD 1’000’000. In the alternative, the Claimant claims
compensation in the amount of USD 400’000, which corresponds to the offer made by
the Defendant on 20 June 2004 for the transfer of the Player. The Claimant further
requests interest payment of 5% per year from the judgment until payment,
b) to impose a 6-months ban on the Player, within the meaning of art. 23 par. 1 lit. c of
the Regulations,
c) To declare the Defendant jointly and severally liable in respect of the compensation
to be paid by the Player,
d) To impose a transfer ban on the Defendant, within the meaning of art. 23 par. 2 lit. a
of the Regulations,
e) To impose a suspension on the Defendant, within the meaning of art. 23 par. 2 lit. d
of the Regulations,
f) To oblige the Defendant to pay the Claimant USD 1’000’000 plus 5% interest per year
from the judgment until payment.
4.
In reply to the Claimant’s complaint, the Defendant claims that there was no contractual
tie between itself and the Claimant. It alleged that it had acquired the Player from D
and not from the Claimant. In support of its allegations, the Defendant submitted the
ITC dated 3 August 2004 issued by the XXX, which mentions D as the Player’s last club. In
addition, the Defendant underlined that the Player was merely on loan to the Claimant.
According to the Defendant, the Claimant, despite not being authorised to do so, had
attempted during the period of loan to transfer the Player to the Defendant.
5.
The Player claimed for his part that the Claimant was practicing forum-shopping. He
alleged that the present case had already been judged by X courts. In addition, the
circumstances did not have any international dimension, given that both he and the
Claimant were "X". According to the Player, FIFA thus had no competence to decide.
Equally, the Player underlined that his main contract was with E, from which he was
transferred to Y. He pointed out that he had merely played on loan for the Defendant
from 11 May 2004 until 31 December 2004 for a salary of … 350 only. In addition, he
maintained that although the Defendant was not authorized to transfer him to a third
club, the Claimant had started contractual negotiations with the Defendant. As a result,
the Player's employment agreement with the Claimant had been cancelled.
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
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Furthermore, he maintained that D had also cancelled the employment agreement that
it had with him.
6.
On 13 April 2006, the Defendant supplemented its statement of defence, claiming that
the Claimant should take action against D - not the Defendant - given that D had been
the Player's main club. It further assented to the submissions of the Player made before.
As evidence, the Defendant submitted a written document issued by the XXX on 26 July
2004, in which the XXX asked the “football federation of ………” whether the Player
registered with D could be transferred to the Defendant. A letter from the legal division
of the XXX dated 2 August 2004 was further submitted, stating inter alia that the Player
was entitled to find another club within the meaning of the claim brought against D.
Original wording in the English translation: „….. The Judges of the Labor Court have
accepted the protection request related to the complaint made by the professional
player B and have granted permission to the plaintiff to make negotiations for transfers
to other sports clubs due to the termination of the sportive relationship between the
parties. The player is hired by A and for this reason, according to Law 9.615/99, article
39, the granting of the temporary privilege is only dependant the contract made by the
club which gives its player for rent and it is valid for the duration of the agreement;
therefore after the his relationship with the club that hires him ends, his relationship
with the club that gives the privilege shall also end. If this relationship with the club that
gives the privilege ends because of his responsibilities, the company that takes the
privilege shall compensate the arised losses. Within the framework of the above
mentioned facts, it is decided that it shall be notified to ... that the player B is released
free and it must be informed to its member A. “ … Football Federation”. The Defendant
further submitted a data sheet of the XXX, according to which the contractual
relationship between the Claimant and the Player was cancelled by a court ruling on 3
August 2004.
7.
In continuation, the Claimant reiterated its former submissions and asserted that it had
agreed with D in clause 2 of the loan agreement that it would be able to arrange the
definite transfer of the Player up until 30 July 2004 against payment in cash to the lessor.
The Player had co-signed this agreement. Consequently, according to the Claimant, it
was authorized to negotiate the Player’s national or international transfer.
8.
Furthermore, the Claimant underlined that the YYY had asked the Player's transfer on
behalf of the Defendant on 26 July 2004. The Player must therefore have signed an
employment agreement with the Defendant while the employment agreement with D
was still valid and, above all, while the employment agreement with the Claimant was
still in force.
Additionally, the Claimant requested that FIFA judged the present matter. The
acquisition of the Player and/or irregular transfer to the Defendant had never been
discussed during the court proceedings before the X authorities. In addition, the Player –
not the Claimant – had initiated the above-mentioned proceedings. The conduct of the
9.
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
4
Player and the Defendant were classic cases governed by art. 17 and 18 of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, 2005 edition.
10.
In its rejoinder of 19 June 2006, the Defendant claimed that it had relied on the official
documents of the XXX with respect to the transfer of the Player. According to these, the
loan agreement with the Claimant had been cancelled, the Player remained bound only
to D (whereby the contractual relationship with this club had also been terminated
prematurely) and the Player had been obtained from the latter in a proper manner. As
evidence, the Defendant submitted a letter from D, in which the latter released the
Defendant from a payment obligation with respect to a "formation fee of 5% (five
percents)".
11.
In its rejoinder of 10 July 2006, the Player, referring to his declarations already made
during the proceedings, requested that the Claimant’s claim be rejected. He claimed that
if FIFA was to deal with the present matter, the position of D rather than that of the
Defendant ought to be sought since he was transferred to Y by this club and not by the
Claimant.
12.
Upon FIFA’s request, the YYY presented an undated employment contract concluded
between the Defendant and the Player with validity as from 20 July 2004 to 30 July 2008.
In this employment contract, D is mentioned as the Player’s last club.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Chamber analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
stake. In this respect, it referred to art. 18 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).
The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 11 July 2005. As a consequence, the
Chamber concluded that the revised Rules Governing Procedures (edition 2005) on
matters pending before the decision-making bodies of FIFA are applicable to the matter
at hand (hereafter: the Procedural Rules).
2.
With regard to the competence of the Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the above-mentioned
Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the
light of art. 22 to 24 of the current version of the Regulations for the Status and
Transfers of Players (edition 2005). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with
art. 22 (a) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall
adjudicate on disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of
contractual stability if there has been a request for the issuance of an ITC and if there is
a claim from an interested party in relation to such ITC request, in particular regarding
its issuance, regarding sporting sanctions or regarding compensation for breach of
contract.
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
5
3.
In this respect, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the file contains the
Player’s ITC issued by the XXX on 3 August 2004 after having the YYY apparently asked
for the said document towards the XXX on 26 July 2004.
4.
As a consequence, as a first step, it was concluded that the Dispute Resolution Chamber
was the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a X club, a X
player and a Y club related to the maintenance of contractual stability as, at the latest
when the YYY asked for the issuance of the Player’s ITC towards the XXX, what allegedly
happened on 26 July 2004, the present matter acquired an international dimension in
the sense of point II., 2. above.
5.
On account of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the Respondents’ arguments,
according to which no international aspect would be given in the present matter and,
therefore, FIFA not competent to decide on it, cannot be backed at all.
6.
Once the competence of the Chamber had been established, the members of the
Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of
Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the
Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations for the
Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2005) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the
relevant employment agreement at the basis of the present dispute was signed on 11
May 2004 and the claim was lodged at FIFA on 11 July 2005. In view of the
aforementioned, the Chamber concluded that the former FIFA Regulations for the Status
and Transfer of Players (edition 2001, hereafter: the Regulations) are applicable to the
case at hand as to the substance.
7.
Subsequently, and entering into the substance of the present matter, the Chamber
acknowledged the above-mentioned facts as well as all the other documents on file.
8.
In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging that the Claimant and the Player
entered into an employment agreement valid as from 11 May 2004 until 31 December
2004. Equally, the members of the Chamber noted that the Player was loaned by D, with
which a valid employment agreement existed until 1 August 2005, to the Claimant for
the mentioned period of time (i.e. 11 May 2004 until 31 December 2004).
9.
Furthermore, the Chamber acknowledged that, according to the Claimant, at the end of
July 2004 and after having stopped rendering his services to the Claimant, the Player
lodged a complaint against D before a X labour court for allegedly outstanding salary
payments that became due prior to his loan to the Claimant. Moreover, the Chamber
noted that due to this claim lodged by the Player, the invoked X court declared the
termination of the contractual relationship between the Player and D on a provisional
basis. In addition, the members of the Chamber noted that, allegedly, the Player did not
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
6
mention during this proceedings in front of the X court that, at this time, he was
contractually bound to the Claimant.
10.
To that regard, the Chamber noted that the documents presented by the Claimant
during the proceedings in front of FIFA fully support the allegations mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. The Chamber furthermore acknowledged that neither the
Defendant nor the Player denied the aforementioned allegations made by the Claimant
and, therefore, decided that they tacitly accepted them.
11.
In continuation, the Chamber particularly noted that the Claimant, apparently after
having found out about the aforementioned provisional measures taken by a X court,
attended the subsequent ordinary hearing of the relevant X court that took place in
September 2004 claiming its rights as the then actual club of the Player and, with such
behaviour, effected a court ruling, according to which, inter alia, the uninterrupted
existence of the contractual relationship between the Player and the Claimant was
confirmed. Additionally, the members of the Chamber noted that, according to the
Claimant, the relevant decision rendered by the X court in September 2004 entered into
force, circumstance which was again denied neither by the Player nor the Defendant.
Consequently, and by referring to its considerations mentioned under point II., 10. set 2
above, the Chamber once more decided that the Respondents tacitly accepted these
allegations made by the Claimant.
12.
As a consequence of all of the above, the Chamber concurred that the Player unilaterally
and without just cause terminated the contractual relationship entered into with the
Claimant by having stopped rendering his services to the latter in summer 2004, i.e.
during the course of the employment contract concluded by and between him and the
Claimant with validity until 31 December 2004.
13.
In this context, for the sake of good order, the Chamber deemed it of particular
importance to underline that the alleged arrears of D in paying the Player his salary
payments due prior to his loan to the Claimant did not constitute any reason for the
Player to terminate his activity towards the Claimant. Apparently, the Claimant itself was
in no default with its own obligations towards the Player on the basis of the
employment agreement concluded on 11 May 2004. At least, no such lapses were
claimed by the parties concerned. Equally, the Chamber deemed it necessary to point
out that the Claimant cannot be held responsible for the obligations of D towards the
Player. Therefore, the Chamber stressed that the Player committed a rough breach of his
employment agreement towards the Claimant by having ceased employment with it at
the end of July 2004 when he lodged a complaint against D for apparently outstanding
salary payments.
14.
Equally, the Chamber deemed it worth to mention that the Player’s allegations that no
contractual tie existed between him and the Claimant due to X court rulings when he
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
7
signed on with the Defendant were not supported by any documentary evidences. In
fact, according to the documents on file, the second instance of the X authorities
expressly declared the uninterrupted existence of the contractual relationship between
the Player and the Claimant. Therefore, and in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules, the members of the Chamber decided that the allegations of the
Player was in no way substantiated. In other words, the Chamber once again emphasised
that the labour relationship between the Player and the Claimant was in force when the
Player proceeded to the conclusion of the employment contract with the Defendant,
which is the reason why the said conclusion of an employment contract must be
considered as a breach of contract towards the Claimant.
15.
In consequence of the above, i.e. due to the fact that the behaviour of the Player must
be considered as a breach of contract without just cause, and in application of art. 21 to
23 of the Regulations, the members of the Chamber stated that they had now to address
the issue of possible financial or sporting sanctions against the Player for unjustified
breach of contract.
16.
In this context, the Chamber first of all reiterated that the employment agreement
between the Player, born on 22 July 1981, and the Claimant had entered into force on
11 May 2004, i.e. prior to the Player’s 28th birthday. Moreover, the Chamber stated that
the month to be considered as the date of the breach of the relevant employment
agreement by the Player is July 2004, i.e. the month on which the Player stopped playing
for the Claimant, circumstance which, as mentioned ahead, was not contested by the
Respondents and, thus, tacitly accepted. Additionally, the Chamber pointed out that the
Player, besides having stopped his activity towards the Claimant during the course of the
relevant employment agreement in summer 2004, entered into a new labour
relationship with the Defendant as from 20 July 2004, in other words while still being
contractually bound to the Claimant.
17.
In view of this, the Chamber declared that the Player had breached the employment
contract without just cause during the so-called protected period in the sense of art. 21
par. 1 (a) of the Regulations.
18.
The Chamber then acknowledged that in accordance with art. 21 par. 1 (a) of the
Regulations, in case of a unilateral breach of contract signed up to the player’s 28th
birthday without just cause, (i) compensation shall be paid by the defaulting subject and
(ii) sporting sanctions may be imposed.
19.
Consequently, as a next step, the Chamber focussed its analysis on the amount of
compensation for the unjustified breach of contract due by the Player to the Claimant
and, in this respect, examined the not exhaustive list of objective criteria in art. 22 of the
Regulations. According to this provision, these criteria shall include, in particular, the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract, the time
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
8
remaining on the existing contract and/or the new contract, the fees and expenses paid
or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether
the contractual breach falls within the period defined in art. 21 par. 1 of the
Regulations.
20.
In addition, the Chamber noted that the Claimant requested compensation in the
amount of USD 1,000,000 plus interests of 5% per year from the judgment until
payment.
21.
The members of the Chamber emphasised that apart from the objective criteria in the
sense of the above-mentioned provision, the Regulations leave the Chamber a certain
scope of discretion to decide on an amount ex aequo et bono.
22.
The first criteria the Chamber took into consideration regarding the amount of
compensation due was the remuneration under the employment agreement between
the Player and the Claimant and the length of time remaining on the said agreement. In
this regard, the Chamber took into consideration that the Player would have been
entitled to receive from August 2004 until December 2004 on account of salaries the
total amount of BRL 1,750 (= approx. USD 1,000) from the Claimant.
23.
The second criteria the deciding authority took into consideration was the salary agreed
upon under the new employment contract with the Defendant for the time remaining
on the existing employment agreement. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the
Player and the Defendant had agreed on a monthly salary (incl. payment in advance and
league match bonuses, both pro rata temporis) in the amount of approx. USD 100,000
for the season 2004/2005.
24.
Equally, the Chamber took into consideration that the Defendant during the apparent
negotiations regarding the Player’s transfer, once presented a written transfer offer
amounting to USD 300,000.
25.
In light of all of the above, after long deliberations, the members of the Chamber came
to the conclusion that the Player is liable to pay compensation for breach of contract to
the Claimant in the amount of USD 126,250. The Chamber considered this amount to be
appropriate and reasonable on the basis of the specific circumstances of the present
matter and in application of art. 22 of the Regulations.
26.
As a consequence of the above, the Chamber decided to reject any further claims of the
Claimant with regard to compensation payable by the Player in connection with the
breach of contract committed by the latter.
27.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant furthermore requested interest
payments in the amount of 5% per annum from judgment until payment. Thereto, and
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
9
in application of its well-established jurisprudence, the Chamber decided that an interest
rate of 5% per year, as requested by the Claimant, shall apply on the compensation of
USD 126,250. Yet, and by referring again to its constant jurisprudence, the Chamber
decided that the starting date of the relevant interest rate shall be the date of the
notification of the present decision and not, as requested by the Claimant, the day of
the present judgment.
28.
In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant asked for the imposition of sports
sanctions on the Player on the basis of art. 21 par. 1 (a) in combination with art. 23 par. 1
(c) of the Regulations. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that in accordance
with art. 21 par. 1 (a), in case of an employment contract signed up to the player’s 28th
birthday, besides compensation, sports sanctions shall apply if a unilateral breach of
contract has occurred. Taking into account that the Player was born on 22 July 1981 and
that the relevant breach of the employment contract concluded in May 2004 took place
in summer 2004, the Chamber reiterated that the relevant periods of time in the sense
of art. 21 par. 1 (a) of the Regulations are met. However, the Chamber underlined that,
in general, a player who breached his employment contract during the protected period
just risks the imposition of sporting sanctions besides the obligation to pay
compensation. In other words, the Chamber pointed out that the imposition of sports
sanctions is not mandatory at all but rather appropriate besides the obligation to pay
compensation in case of extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, the Chamber
emphasised that the Regulations leave a certain scope of discretion to it regarding the
imposition of sporting sanctions.
29.
In this respect, after short deliberations, the Chamber concurred that, in the present
case, no extraordinary circumstances appear to exist that would justify the additional
imposition of sporting sanctions on the Player. In particular, the Chamber took into
consideration that the Player who, according to the documents on file, omitted to
mention in front of the X court authority at the end of July 2004 that he was
contractually bound to the Claimant, already had to bear the consequences for this
procedural malpractice as financial sanctions were imposed on him by the subsequent X
court order rendered in September 2004. The Chamber was of the unanimous opinion
that other extraordinary circumstances, which would justify the additional imposition of
sporting sanctions on the Player, do not exist in the present matter. Therefore, the
Chamber decided that the Player shall not be punished by any further sanctions besides
the compensation payable to the Claimant amounting to USD 126,250 plus interests of
5% per year as from the date of notification of the present decision until the day of the
effective payment for the breach of contract occurred.
30.
In view of the above, the Chamber concurred to refrain from the imposition of any
sporting sanctions on the Player. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject such
requests made by the Claimant against the Player.
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
10
31.
In continuation, the Chamber focussed its analysis on the accountability of the
Defendant for the alleged inducement to the contractual breach between the Player
and the Claimant.
32.
In this respect, the Chamber first referred to lit. (c) of art. 23 par. 2 of the Regulations,
according to which, a club seeking to register a player who has unilaterally breached a
contract during the so-called protected period in the sense of art. 21 par. 1 (a) of the
Regulations, will be presumed to have induced a breach of contract. As a consequence, it
falls under the Defendant’s responsibility to demonstrate that it should not be held
responsible for having induced the breach of contract.
33.
Therefore, and bearing in mind that a valid employment agreement between the
Claimant and the Player existed at the time the Defendant signed an employment
contract with the Player, the Chamber examined as to whether the Defendant acted
bona fide when concluding its employment contract with the Player.
34.
In this regard, the Chamber referred to the general due diligence requested of a club in
that it shall verify that it does not take a player under contract who has still a valid
contract with another club.
35.
In this context, the Chamber stated that in the case that a player and/or his players’
agent or even more the association of the former club of the player ascertain upon
request of the club whishing to engage the player that there is no contractual link
between the player and another club and provided no indications to the contrary
appear, the new club is, as a general rule, allowed to trust on the information received.
36.
As a consequence of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Defendant was allowed
to believe that the Player was free at the time when it signed the employment contract
with it for the period from 20 July 2004 until 30 July 2008. In particular, the Chamber
considered that the Defendant was allowed to believe that the Player was free as D, and
not the Claimant, was mentioned as the Player’s last club on the ITC issued by the XXX
on 3 August 2004. In this regard, as already mentioned above, the contractual
relationship between the Player and D, at that moment, was cancelled due to the
provisional order rendered by a X court authority. In other words, the Chamber
unanimously concluded that the Defendant was allowed to believe that the Player was
free of any contractual obligation, and thus free to sign a new employment contract
towards another club, at the moment of the conclusion of the employment contract
with the Defendant with validity until July 2008. In this regard, the Chamber deemed it
also of outmost importance to underline that no indications seem to have been in
existence related to the fact that the Player was at that time actually bound to the
Claimant. In fact, even in the employment contract concluded and signed between the
Player and the Defendant, D was mentioned as the Player’s club of origin.
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
11
37.
In view of the above, the Chamber was bound to conclude that the Defendant acted
bona fide when concluding the employment contract with the Player. At least, no
indications to the contrary appeared to exist. Therefore, so the Chamber in an
unanimous decision, the presumption in the sense of art. 23 par. 2 (c) cannot be applied.
As a consequence, the Chamber concluded that the Defendant did not induce the Player
to breach the employment agreement that he had with the Claimant.
38.
Consequently, the Defendant has to pay neither compensation to the Claimant for
breach of contract nor shall be sporting sanctions imposed on it, which is the reason why
any requests made by the Claimant in this respect against the Defendant were rejected
in their entirety by the Chamber.
39.
Finally, the Chamber decided that in accordance with art. 14 par. 3 of the FIFA
Regulations governing the Application of the Regulations, the Defendant is jointly liable
for the compensation (i.e. USD 126,250 plus interests of 5% per annum as from the date
of notification of the present decision until the effective day of payment) payable by the
Player to the Claimant.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim lodged by the Claimant, A, is partially accepted.
2.
The player, B, is ordered to pay USD 126,250 plus interests of 5% per annum as from the
notification of the present decision until the effective date of payment to the Claimant,
A, within the next 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision.
3.
The Defendant, C, is jointly and severally responsible for the payment of the abovementioned amount to the Claimant, A.
4.
In the event that the player B or the club C do not comply with the present decision, the
matter shall be submitted to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee, so that the necessary
disciplinary sanctions may be imposed.
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant, A, is rejected.
6.
The Claimant, A, is instructed to inform the B and the club, C, immediately and directly
of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
7.
According to art. 61 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes this decision may be appealed before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS
directly within 21 days of receiving notification of this decision and has to contain all
elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, copy of which
we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for the
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
12
filing of the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file with the CAS a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne, Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
On behalf of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Jérôme Valcke
Acting General Secretary
Encl.
CAS directives
A., X / Player B, X & Club C, Y
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