Training Compensation
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the s ub-com m ittee of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber (DRC)
passed on 30 November 2017,
in the following composition:
Thom as Grim m (S w itzerland), Deputy Chairman
Roy Verm eer (Netherlands ), member
Jérôm e Perlem uter (France), member
on the claim presented by the club,
Club A, Country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding training compensation in
connection with the player, Player E
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
According to the player passport issued by the Football Association of Country B (Football
Association F) the player, Player E, born on 4 January 1999, was registered as an amateur
with its affiliated club, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), as follows:
Club
Registration dates
Category
Club A
as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011
2
Club A
as from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012
2
Club A
as from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013
2
Club A
as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014
2
2.
The football season in Country B runs from 1 July to 30 June of the following year.
3.
According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 24
August 2015, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorised the transfer
of the minor player, Player E (hereinafter: the player), from Country B to Country D.
Likewise, on 4 September 2015, the player was registered as a professional with the Club
of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), and the International Transfer
Certificate (ITC) of the player was issued by the Football Association F in favour of The
Football Association of Country D (Football Association G) on 3 September 2015,
indicating the Claimant as the player’s last club.
4.
Also according to the TMS, the Respondent belonged to the club category 1 at the time
the player was registered with it.
5.
On 5 May 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent asking
to be awarded training compensation in connection with the first professional
registration of the player with the Respondent. In particular, the Claimant requested EUR
300,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 30 days after the player’s registration with the
Respondent and that the latter bear any possible costs of the present proceedings.
6.
In this context, the Claimant referred to art. 25 par. 6 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: FIFA Regulations), according to which, FIFA decisionmaking bodies shall apply the aforementioned regulations whilst taking into account,
inter alia, national laws, and held that, under Law of Country B, the Claimant was not in
a position to offer the player a contract in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of
the FIFA Regulations. In particular, the Claimant referred to an award issued by the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (hereinafter: Award H), according to which the CAS
recognized that it is forbidden under Law of Country B to offer the player a contract
before he reaches the legal minimum age of 16 years old and that it cannot be expected
from a club to risk criminal sanctions in order to retain its entitlement to training
compensation, and stated that the present matter is identical to the case at the basis of
the Award H.
7.
In this regard, the Claimant provided extracts of the relevant provisions of Law of Country
B as well as a copy of a royal decree, in accordance with which no valid and binding
employment contract can be concluded with football players under the age of 16. In this
respect, the Claimant highlighted the criminal sanctions that could be imposed on a club
in the event of an offence.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
2
8.
Furthermore, the Claimant compared general CAS jurisprudence in connection with art.
6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations to the Award H, in which award the CAS
panel concluded that, considering the particularities of the case at the basis of the Award
H, what in other matters could be insufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine and bona
fide interest in keeping the player, in the Award H it came to a different conclusion. In
this respect, the Claimant argued that CAS clearly makes a distinction between the
situation in which the training club could have offered the player a professional contract,
but failed to do so, and the situation in which the training club did not legally have such
possibility. In particular, the Claimant asserted that the burden of proof required in the
last situation is much lower, since the training club only has to convince the panel that
the club would have offered the player a contract if it had the possibility to do so.
9.
In this respect, the Claimant referred to jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(DRC), pursuant to which, the fact that a club could have offered the player a contract
but failed to do so was a crucial factor in deciding that no training compensation was
payable. The Claimant further argued that, a contrario, where a club was not in the
position to offer the player a contract, the conclusion must be that training compensation
is payable, unless there are other factors showing that the club was no longer interested
in the player.
10.
In this context, the Claimant held that, in April 2014, the player, who at that time was 15,
communicated his decision to leave the club and his deregistration took effect as of 1st
July of the following season, i.e. 1 July 2014, in line with the Football Association F
regulations. The Claimant stressed that the only reason why it did not offer the player a
contract was the legal impossibility, due to his age. In particular, the Claimant recalled
that it is well-known for its state of the art training facilities and that it has developed a
policy aimed at social integration and education of its young players that lead to sporting
success, where well-known players, such as Player J, Player K, Player L, Player M and Player
N were trained.
11.
With regards to the player, the Claimant submitted a copy of the player’s evaluations
dated between December 2009 and December 2013 and asserted that the results of his
evaluations show his talent, his positive development, with increasing scores that were
amongst the highest of his team, and the club’s advice, which in the Claimant’s opinion
show the specific attention that was given to the player and his development, with the
aim to prepare him for professional football, and the Claimant’s interest in retaining him
for the future. In particular, the evaluations submitted contained the following
comments:
-
evaluation dated 21 December 2013: the player’s stamina is considered as a
strength, whereas it is suggested that he needs to work on his “start speed,
acceleration and duel strength”,
-
evaluation dated April 2013: “[the player] is the leading player of the group. This
season he made progression on his personality in the team and also in executing
his tasks with the teamplay. Working points are still to score more and to
penetrate more in the penalty area. Keep up the good work and we wish you all
the best next season in the U15 team”,
-
evaluation dated April 2012: “[the player] played an outstanding 2nd period and
has developed both tactically as mentally (playing for the team). Improving
movement between the lines and speed of action. The player is considered to be
very important for the team and he is now better coping with this role (he now
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
3
realizes that he needs other players around him in order to succeed). The next
two seasons will be defining = how will he be coping with the increasing
importance of physical strength?”,
12.
-
evaluation dated March 2012: “very talented: ([the player] is ahead of the other
players)”,
-
evaluation dated December 2011: “[the player] is playing on a level that we may
expect from a player with his talents. He has difficulties when playing against
more physical players = he needs to play quicker and smarter. Talent that will
need to progress a lot on a mental and tactical level as he is lacking physical
strength at the moment”,
-
evaluation dated 19 December 2011: “after a hesitating start [the player] played
a very good first period and is considered to be a very important player for the
team. He stands out above the average, which sometimes leads to negative
reactions. We will raise the bar in the next period and we will work on his
shortcomings to make this top player even better!”.
Likewise, the Claimant provided a copy of unsigned invitations to the national team
drafted in Language of Country B for matches to be played on 28 October 2013, on 27
November 2013 and on 22 January 2014 as well as the following player’s statistics with
the Claimant’s youth teams:
Goals scored per
season
Minutes played per
season (%)
Assists per season
U11
U12
U13
U14
U15
20
25
29
14
11
90%
84%
90%
88%
83%
22
10
30
21
19
13.
Equally, the Claimant submitted an interview between Two Journalists of Country B and
Country D who closely follows players in Country D, which reads as follows: “I [The
Journalist of Country B] haven’t seen him play but they tell me he’s like all those small
skilful guys (…). [The player] was one of the best players in [the Claimant] U14s and U15s
(…). He left this summer after a dispute, not that [the Claimant] thought he was not good
enough (…). From what I’m told [the Claimant] wanted to keep [the player], but they had
some reservations about [his brother], who isn’t the tallest for his age – [the Claimant]
have a policy of wanting tall goalkeepers. [The player’s father] wanted both boys at the
same club, so that’s why they decided to leave [the Claimant]”. In this respect, the
Claimant further provided mass media articles, published between 19 February 2015 and
5 October 2016, which describe the player as “wonderkid”, that refer to him as one of
the “60 best young talents in the world football” and that compare him to Player O.
14.
As to the calculation of training compensation, the Claimant held that between 1 October
2009 and 31 July 2014, art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations contained the
“exception to the exception”, by means of which, if the event giving rise to the right to
training compensation occurred before the end of the season of the player’s 18th birthday,
training compensation shall not be calculated on the basis of category 4 clubs but
following the regular calculation method.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
4
15.
In this regard, the Claimant asserted that, in line with consistent jurisprudence of FIFA
and CAS regarding the retroactive application of the relevant regulations as well as with
the FIFA Circular number 1437, the amendment of art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations is not applicable to the present matter since, during the period the player
was registered with the Claimant, it was not in force. Similarly, the Claimant submitted
an extract of an EPFL “Q&A session with FIFA” dated 5 February 2015, according to which
to the question “is the higher amount, respectively training costs of the new club (i.e.
category 1 club up to USD 90,000), applicable for the training period of a player between
2009-2014?” the FIFA representative replied that “to answer this question it is most
relevant to know when the elements to the dispute arose (…). In this case at hand it would
probably seem to be the training period. Therefore it might still be possible to apply the
old provision in force between 2009 and 2014, respectively the higher amount defined as
the training costs incurred by the new club, if the training occurred in that period of time.
Ultimately, it will be up to the [DRC] to finally take a decision regarding this aspect”.
Equally, the Claimant provided a copy of a slide of a presentation supposedly made by
EPFL, according to which, after 2014 and in accordance with the FIFA Circular number
1437, the “exception to the exception” contained in the 2009 edition of the Regulations
is removed but the FIFA DRC does not apply the new provision retrospectively.
16.
In light of the foregoing, the Claimant concluded that the amount payable as training
compensation must be determined by the FIFA Regulations that were in place at the time
during which the player was trained by the Claimant, irrespective of future changes. As a
result, the Claimant asserted that, considering that the player was registered with the
Respondent when he was 16, that the Claimant is a category 2 club and that the
Respondent belongs to category 1, EUR 300,000 are payable as training compensation,
i.e. EUR 75,000/season for the seasons 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014.
17.
In its reply, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim by stating that the latter failed
to comply with the requirements of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations. In
this respect, the Respondent referred to DRC and CAS jurisprudence and held that, in the
absence of a contract offer, the burden of proof lies on the party claiming training
compensation, who shall unambiguously demonstrate that it had a bona fide and
genuine interest in retaining the player in order to be able to offer a contract to him at a
later date, and that such intention has to have been manifested in a pro-active way,
including communicating such interests to the player.
18.
In particular, the Respondent asserted that the Claimant is not able to provide sufficient
evidence of its interest in retaining the player and that such absence arises because the
Claimant did not have such interest and did not genuinely intend to retain his services
beyond the season 2013/2014.
19.
In this respect, the Respondent submitted a declaration of the player’s father, according
to which “[the Claimant] rarely spoke to me about [the player’s] future and did not
discussed any plan for him beyond the 2013/2014 season” and the Claimant “made no
attempt to convince me or [the player] that [the Claimant] was committed to [him] or that
they were considering offering [him] a contract in the future”. As a result, the Respondent
asserted that, after the end of the season, having still not received any approach from the
Claimant to invite him to re-register with it for the following season, the player
reasonably concluded that the Claimant was no longer interested and therefore
proceeded to leave the club and seek other opportunities.
20.
Moreover, the Respondent did not dispute that the Claimant was unable to offer the
player a contract, but rejected that this fact alleviates its obligation to show bona fide
and genuine interest in order to retain its entitlement to training compensation.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
5
21.
In this respect, and as to the documentation provided by the Claimant, the Respondent
asserted that they are inadequate and insufficient. In particular, the Respondent stated
that:
-
the player’s performance evaluations and appearance data show a steady decline
in the player’s performance over time, including a decrease in the minutes played
per season, his goals per season and his number of assists per season;
-
the Claimant failed to provide any performance data or evaluation reports in
relation to the season 2013/2014 and stated that this omission is striking since it
was the player’s last season at the Claimant and is what will need to be analysed
to determine whether the Claimant sufficiently discharged the burden of proof.
In this respect, the Respondent acknowledged that the player was injured for
some time of that season, but insisted that his injury does not justify the
complete absence of such records and that the Respondent considers that the
effect of the injury on the Claimant’s interest in retaining the player is highly
material;
-
it is surprising that the Claimant has no evidence of its discussions with the player
regarding his future, yet it claims that he was one of the leading players in his
year group in season 2012/2013;
-
as to the purported “call-ups” of the player to the national team, the
Respondent challenged the veracity of the invitations on the basis that they were
neither signed nor printed on the letterhead of the Football Association F.
Equally, the Respondent submitted a declaration of the player’s father, according
to which he was in the national team on 3 occasions but did not play in a single
competitive match for the National Team of Country B during his registration
with the Claimant;
-
as to the interview with The Journalist of Country B, the Respondent pointed out
that he has no connection to the player or the Claimant and that he has not even
seen the player in action at the time the article was written;
-
as to the mass media articles, the Respondent held that they cannot be accepted
since the Claimant is trying to use them as evidence of its intention to retain the
player but they were published after the player joined the Respondent.
22.
Additionally, the Respondent asserted that the purpose of Annexe 4 of the FIFA
Regulations is to ensure solidarity between football clubs and to encourage clubs to train
young players by compensating their expenses if the player subsequently decides to leave
the training clubs contrary to their wishes. However, the Respondent argued that such
system cannot operate to the detriment of players’ freedom to move, particularly when
a player’s training club has not offered him the opportunity to continue his career with
it, as it would constitute a breach of EU law in relation to the free movement of workers.
23.
In light of the foregoing, the Respondent held that the Claimant has shown no interest
in retaining the player beyond the 2013/2014 season and that it has given the player no
reason to believe that he had the opportunity to build a career with it. In this context,
the Respondent stated that, even with the understanding that no training compensation
was payable, after the Claimant’s release, it took the player a year to secure a new club.
In particular, the Respondent argued that, if it had considered that training compensation
was payable for the player, it would not have registered the player, and his prospects of
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
6
finding a new club would have been diminished and possibly even extinguished through
no fault of his own, which, in the Respondent’s opinion, cannot possibly be the intention
of the FIFA Regulations.
24.
Furthermore, the Respondent alternatively argued that, if any, the amount payable as
training compensation would be EUR 40,000. In this respect, the Respondent submitted
that the triggering element for the payment of training compensation, pursuant to art.
20 of the FIFA Regulations, is not the training of the player with the Claimant but the
professional registration of the player with the Respondent or, alternatively, when the
Respondent’s liability crystallised following the player’s registration. Consequently, the
Respondent stated that, pursuant to art. 26 of the FIFA Regulations, and considering that
the player entered into the scholarship agreement with the Respondent on 1 July 2015
and that he was registered with the Respondent in September 2015, the 2014 edition of
the FIFA Regulations, which does not contain the “exception to the exception”, is
applicable to the present matter.
25.
As to the retrospective effect of laws, the Respondent asserted that it is prohibited under
Swiss law, unless it is expressly dealt with in the relevant regulations, it is limited in time,
does not lead to serious inequality, it is justified by relevant grounds and does not infringe
vested rights.
26.
In this respect, the Respondent argued that the CAS award the Claimant referred to in
fact confirms the Respondent’s position. In the relevant CAS award, the CAS Panel found
that applying art. 26 par. 2 of the Regulations would violate the prohibition on
retrospective effect as it does not fall within the exceptions. In particular, the Respondent
alleged that CAS took a decision based upon which edition of the FIFA Regulations it
considered had the closest connection to the facts of the case, which in the present matter
would be the edition 2014 of the FIFA Regulations, since it is the edition that was in force
when the player left the Claimant, signed a contract with the Respondent, was registered
for the Respondent and training compensation was purported to have fallen due.
27.
In this regard, the Respondent submitted that art. 26 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations should
be upheld in the present matter and that the retrospective application of the 2014 edition
of the FIFA Regulations could in any event be justified since the amendment to art. 5 par.
3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations was introduced to rectify the “exception to the
exception”, which, in the Respondent’s opinion, was contrary to public policy and
potentially unlawful if applied in practice. In particular, the Respondent referred to a
decision passed by the European Court of Justice, in accordance with which,
disproportionate compensation would be a serious risk of constituting an unjustified
restriction on the player’s ability to move between clubs within the EU, and held that FIFA
amended this provision before it had been applied in order to comply with EU law. In
light of the foregoing, the Respondent concluded that the retrospective application in
the CAS award the Claimant referred to was justified in order to avoid the application of
the “exception to the exception”, whereas in the present matter, “the retrospective
application of the amendment is required precisely to avoid the application of such
potentially unlawful provision”.
II.
Cons iderations of the s ub-com m ittee of the DRC
1.
At first, the sub-committee of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: subcommittee) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this
respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 May 2017.
Consequently, the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
7
Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural
Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the sub-committee referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which states
that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in light of arts 22 to 24
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In accordance with art. 3 of
Annexe 6 in conjunction with art. 24 par. 3 and art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), the sub-committee is competent to decide
on the present dispute relating to training compensation between clubs belonging to
different associations handled through TMS.
3.
Furthermore, the sub-committee analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this
respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of said Regulations
(editions 2015 and 2016), and considering that the player was registered with the
Respondent as a professional on 3 September 2015, the 2015 edition of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the
matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
The competence of the sub-committee and the applicable regulations having been
established, the sub-committee entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the sub-committee started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as
the arguments and documentation submitted by the parties. However, the subcommittee emphasized that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts,
arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment
of the matter at hand.
5.
First of all, the sub-committee took note that the Claimant submitted that it is entitled to
receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 300,000, on
the basis that the player had signed his first professional contract with the Respondent.
6.
Likewise, the sub-committee noted that the Respondent, for its part, rejected the claim
arguing that the Claimant has not made a contract offer to the player in accordance with
art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations and has not shown genuine and bona fide
interest in keeping the player.
7.
In addition, the sub-committee took into account that it has remained uncontested that
the player signed his first professional contract with the Respondent.
8.
In this respect, and hereby referring to the rules applicable to training compensation, the
sub-committee stated that, as established in art. 1 par. 1 in combination with art. 2 par.
1 lit. i. of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general
rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21 when a player is registered for
the first time as a professional before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday.
9.
Moreover, the sub-committee referred, in particular, to art. 6 of Annexe 4 of the
Regulations, which contains special provisions regarding players moving from one
Association to another Association inside the territory of the European Union
(EU)/European Economic Area (EEA). More specifically, the sub-committee turned its
attention to art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 which stipulates, inter alia, that the former club
must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the
expiry of his current contract.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
8
10.
In view of the above, the sub-committee stated that, first and foremost, it had to verify
whether art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations applies in the present case as lex
specialis, and, in the affirmative, to determine if the Claimant had complied with the said
provision in order to be entitled to training compensation.
11.
As far as the applicability of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations is concerned, the
sub-committee stated that, as the player moved from a club in Country B to a club in
Country D, i.e. moved from one Association to another Association inside the territory of
the EU, said article is applicable. Therefore, the sub-committee concluded that the
aforementioned provision applies in the case at hand as lex specialis.
12.
On account of the above, the sub-committee analysed whether or not the Claimant had
complied with the prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations in order
to be entitled to training compensation.
13.
In this sense, the sub-committee emphasized that, in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 sent. 1
of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, if the former club does not offer the player a contract,
no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled
to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via
registered mail at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract (cf. art. 6 par. 3
sent. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations).
14.
In this context, the sub-committee pointed out that the Claimant acknowledged not
having offered the player a professional contract on the basis that he was under the legal
minimum age of 16 when deregistering from the Claimant. In this respect, the Claimant
submitted that in accordance with Law of Country B, no valid and binding employment
contracts can be concluded with football players under the age of 16.
15.
On account of the above and the documentation on file, the sub-committee concluded
that it has remained undisputed that the Claimant was not in the position to offer the
player a contract.
16.
Having said this, in continuation, the sub-committee proceeded to analyse if the Claimant
could justify that it is nevertheless entitled to training compensation for the player’s first
registration as a professional with the Respondent.
17.
In particular, the sub-committee examined whether the Claimant had provided sufficient
proof in support of said justification to receive training compensation. The subcommittee referred to the constant jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in
this regard, which was confirmed by CAS, and considered that such justification can, in
general, be manifested by a club by displaying a genuine and bona fide interest in
keeping the player in question in its team and by showing a proactive attitude vis-à-vis
the respective player, so as to clearly manifest that the club intends to count on the player
for the future.
18.
In this respect, the sub-committee, and hereby referring to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural
Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall
carry the burden of proof, recalled that the burden of proof to demonstrate any
justification to receive training compensation notwithstanding not having offered a
contract to the player, i.e. a genuine and bona fide interest of the Claimant in retaining
the services of the player, lies with the Claimant. Equally, the sub-committee recalled that,
according to the well-established jurisprudence, this justification is limited to very
exceptional circumstances and shall be analysed on a case-by-case basis.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
9
19.
Having said that, the sub-committee examined the documentation submitted by the
Claimant and highlighted that, although the player was registered with the Claimant
until 30 June 2014, his last evaluation dates back to 21 December 2013. Equally, the subcommittee deemed that the comments outlined in the player’s evaluations do not
constitute conclusive evidence demonstrating that the Claimant had a genuine and bona
fide interest in keeping the player in its team beyond the 2013-2014 season. Likewise, the
sub-committee underscored that the Claimant had not provided documentation
demonstrating the player’s role in the Claimant’s team for the future or that it had
communicated such future plans to the player and/or his parents. Consequently, the subcommittee concurred that the Claimant had not demonstrated a proactive attitude vis-àvis the player, so as to clearly manifest that it intended to count on the player for the
future.
20.
In light of the above, the sub-committee concluded that the Claimant had not provided
sufficient and conclusive evidence demonstrating that it had in fact a genuine and bona
fide interest in retaining the player. Consequently, the sub-committee concurred that the
aforementioned considerations could lead to no other conclusion than that the Claimant
failed to comply with the prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations in
that it could not justify that it is entitled to training compensation in spite of not having
offered the player a contract. In view of the foregoing, the sub-committee decided that
the Claimant is not entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent for
the training and education of the player and that, thus, the Claimant’s claim had to be
rejected.
21.
As a result, and taking into account the above, the sub-committee did not deem it
necessary to discuss and analyse the other arguments brought up by the parties to the
present dispute.
22.
Lastly, the sub-committee referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination
with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the
DRC relating to disputes regarding training compensation, costs in the maximum amount
of CHF 25,000 are levied. It is further stipulated that the costs are to be borne in
consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and that, in accordance
with Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on
the basis of the amount in dispute.
23.
In respect of the above, the sub-committee held that the amount to be taken into
consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 300,000 related to the claim of the
Claimant. Consequently, the sub-committee concluded that the maximum amount of
costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000 (cf. table in Annexe A).
24.
Considering the above, and taking into account the complexity of the case as well as the
outcome of the decision, the sub-committee determined the costs of the current
proceedings to the amount of CHF 20,000, which shall be borne by the Claimant.
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
10
III.
Decision of the s ub-com m ittee of the DRC
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is rejected.
2.
The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 20,000 are to be paid by the
Claimant to FIFA, CHF 5,000 of which have already been paid as advance of costs at the
start of the present proceedings. Consequently, the additional amount of CHF 15,000 is
to be paid by the Claimant to FIFA w ithin 30 day s as from the date of notification of
the present decision, to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no.
XXX:
UBS Zurich
Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)
Clearing number 230
IBAN: CH 27 0023 0230 3666 7701U
SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS
directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the
elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we
enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the
statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving
rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the sub-committee of the DRC:
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Enclosed: CAS directives
Training compensation for the player, Player E
(Club A, Country B / Club C, Country D)
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