Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 October 2016,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member
Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player A, Country B,
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the partie
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 23 August 2013, the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: Club C or the
Respondent), the Club of Country B, Club E and the Player of Country B, Player
A (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed an agreement (hereinafter: the loan
agreement) for the loan of the Claimant from Club E to Club C as from 24
August 2013 until 23 August 2015.
2.
Pursuant to the loan agreement, Club C committed to pay the amount of EUR
2,000,000 to Club E as transfer compensation.
3.
On 24 August 2013, the Claimant and Club C concluded an employment contract
(hereinafter: the contract), valid as from 28 August 2013 until 27 August 2015.
4.
In accordance with art. 5 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive an
annual salary of EUR 1,000,000 payable in twelve equal monthly instalments of
EUR “83,334”.
5.
Art. 5.3 of the contract further stipulates that “[the Claimant] is entitled with
winning bonuses per Company policies”.
6.
Furthermore, art. 6 of the contract titled “the [Respondent] Commitments”
provides, inter alia, for the following:
“3. The [Claimant] will be granted a paid 30 days annual leave, and its date will
be determined by agreement of the two parties
4. The [Respondent] provides the [Claimant] with a furnished accommodation
to use during the period of the contract.
5. The [Respondent] will provide the [Claimant] with a proper car to be used
during the period of this contract.
6. The [Respondent] shall provide the [Claimant] with five two-ways businessclass air tickets annually from City F to City G.
7. To provide the [Claimant], his wife and his children with a health insurance,
according to the [Respondent]’s regulations in force.
8. To provide the [Claimant] with a comprehensive insurance against injury,
disability and death.
(…)
11. The [Respondent] pays the [Claimant]’s financial dues in case of injury in
accordance with the terms of the comprehensive insurance policy”.
7.
Besides, art. 7 of the contract which concerns the “Player Commitments” states,
inter alia, the following:
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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“9. To inform the [Respondent] in case of any injury, and to subject to
examination and treatment by the [Respondent]’s doctor or by any other body
determined by the [Respondent].
10. To commit and be under the treatment procedures determined by the
medical staffs which are determined by the [Respondent].
(…)
12. Not to contact or negotiate any other club for the duration of this contract
and according to the regulations.
(…)
20. Not to retire by his desire for the duration of the contract”.
8.
On 8 February 2014, the Claimant suffered a knee injury.
9.
On 15 August 2014, the Respondent, the Claimant and his agent, Agent H,
signed a document titled “Settlement Agreement” which reads as follows:
“WHEREAS
- On August 24, 2013, the [Respondent] and the [Claimant] entered into an
employment agreement valid until August 27, 2015 (the ‘Employment
Agreement’).
- Further to an injury occurred to the [Player] on 08 February 2014, the
[Claimant] – after several surgery interventions and medical treatments – is still
medically unfit to play at least until December 2014.
- The Parties intend to mutually regulate their current reciprocal obligations
under the Employment Agreement.
The parties agree on the following:
1. The Employment Agreement shall remain valid until December 31, 2014, and
the [Claimant] shall receive full salary until such date, on December 31, 2014,
the employment agreement which signed On August 24, 2013 shall be
terminated.
2. The [Claimant] shall be treated in Country B by a doctor of his choice and [the
Respondent] shall reimburse a minimal cost, to be mutually approved.
3. Upon December 31, 2014, [the Respondent] can elect to maintain the validity
of the Employment Agreement provided that the [Claimant] will be medically fit
and also provided that upon the request of the [Respondent] the [Claimant]
accepts to be transferred to another club.
4. The Agent hereby represents and guarantees the respect of the above
obligations and both the [Claimant] and the Agent hereby declare that they are
fully satisfied with the terms of this settlement agreement and have no claims
toward the [Respondent]”.
10.
On 31 December 2014, the Respondent remitted to the Claimant and his agent a
document titled “Termination Notice” which states the following:
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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“Further to our settlement agreement signed on the 14th of August 2014, we
hereby confirm that the Employment Agreement, as defined therein, will be
terminating on December 31, 2014, and thereafter, [the Respondent] shall have
no further obligation”.
11.
On 5 January 2015, Club E informed the Claimant that the employment contract
concluded between them was suspended until 23 August 2015 and that
consequently it had no obligation towards him until that date.
12.
On 14 April 2015, Club C sent a correspondence to the Claimant’s agent
confirming that the employment contract was mutually terminated on 31
December 2014.
13.
On 16 February 2016, the Claimant sent a default notice to Club C, stressing on
the illegality of the settlement agreement as well as of the “termination notice”
and therefore requesting the payment of EUR 500,000 as salaries and 60,939.88
as reimbursement of medical costs.
14.
On 23 February 2016, Club C replied to the Claimant’s default notice, insisting
that the latter and his agent expressly acknowledged that they were satisfied
with the content of the settlement agreement. In this regard, the Respondent
points out that the letter sent on 31 December 2014 constitutes a mere
confirmation of the content of the settlement agreement. In addition,
regarding the claim for reimbursement of medical costs, the Respondent alleges
that its obligation was limited to the costs “mutually approved” up until 31
December 2014.
15.
On 16 May 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against Club C for
breach of contract, requesting the following:
- EUR 500,004 corresponding to the salaries from January 2015 until June 2015,
plus 5% interest as of each due date (EUR 83,334 x 6);
- EUR 30,000 “to restore the balance between the parties”, plus 5% interest as
of 31 December 2014;
- 60,939.88 as reimbursement of medical costs plus 5% interest as from “the
date each receipt was paid until the date of effective payment”;
- EUR 500,004 as specificity of sport, plus 5% interest as of the date of the
decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber;
- EUR 140,000 as moral damages corresponding to 7% of the total value of the
contract, plus 5% interest as of the date of the decision of the Dispute
Resolution Chamber;
- “the DRC to order the Respondent to disclose how much it paid as bonus title
to the players for title of Cup I in the season 2014/2015, and that such amount
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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should also be paid to [him], plus 5% interest as from the date it was paid until
the date of effective payment”;
- sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent;
- the payment of his attorney fees “at the rate of 20% on the value of the
conviction”.
16.
In his claim, the Claimant first points out that the Respondent was incurring in a
lot of expenses due to the injury, in particular considering the fact that it failed
to enter into an insurance contract in his favour as stipulated in art. 6 of the
contract. Therefore, and with the view of reducing such costs, the Claimant
argues that the Respondent invited him to sign the settlement agreement which
stipulates that “[t]he [Claimant] shall be treated in Country B by a doctor of his
choice and [the Respondent] shall reimburse a minimal cost, to be mutually
approved”. In this respect, stressing on the Respondent’s lack of interest in his
recovery and the risks for his further career, the Claimant asserts that he had no
other option but to sign the settlement agreement and go back to Country B.
The Claimant further explains that on 31 December 2014 he was still far from
being fully recovered.
17.
In view of the above, the Claimant sustains that when the Respondent decided
not “to maintain the validity of the Employment Agreement” on 31 December
2014, it did it due to his injury, which is not a just cause to terminate a contract
as per the jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and of
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
18.
In continuation, the Claimant alleges that pursuant to the settlement
agreement, the Respondent is the only party that has the capacity and power to
terminate or continue with the employment relationship. Accordingly, the
Claimant holds that the settlement agreement is potestative and must be
deemed null and void in accordance with Law of Country J as well as DRC and
CAS jurisprudence.
19.
Besides, the Claimant states that considering the fact that the employment
contract is subsidiary to the loan agreement, the termination of the former
should only have been done as a consequence of the termination of the latter,
which did not happen. In light of the above, the Claimant affirms that the early
termination of the employment contract must be deemed invalid. Having said
this, the Claimant insists that he was put in a very uncomfortable situation
where both clubs refused to be in charge of his employment. Furthermore, the
Claimant points out that his unclear contractual situation combined with his
injury, annihilated his opportunities to find a new club. In this respect, the
Claimant outlines that Club E eventually accepted to re-register him on 6 July
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 5 of 13
2015 based on the fact that the registration period in Country B was closing on
21 July 2015 and that a re-registration in August, i.e. after the original expiry of
the loan, would have been impossible.
20.
The Claimant then requests the reimbursement of the medical costs allegedly
incurred by him between July 2014 and June 2015 and submitted the following
documentation:
- Receipt dated 11 July 2014 in the amount of 8,000 related to “physiotherapy
treatment from the period of 3 June 2014 until 10 July 2014”;
- Receipt dated 13 September 2014 in the amount of 4,600 related to “physical
assessment – functional and to physiotherapy treatment from the period of 18
August until 13 of this year, for the after-surgery rehabilitation of the right
knee, happened on 4 March 2014”;
- Receipt dated 3 October 2014 in the amount of 730 related to a “magnetic
resonance on right knee”;
- Receipt dated 18 October 2014 in the amount of 5,300 related to
“physiotherapy treatment from the period of 14 September until 18 October
of this year, for the after-surgery rehabilitation of the right knee, happened
on 4 March 2014”;
- Receipt dated 25 November 2014 in the amount of 4,700 related to
“physiotherapy treatment from the period of 20 October until 25 November of
this year, for the after-surgery rehabilitation of the right knee, happened on 4
March 2014”;
- Receipt dated 15 December 2014 in the amount of 2,300 related to
“physiotherapy treatment from the period of 26 November until 15 December
of this year, for the after-surgery rehabilitation of the right knee, happened
on 4 March 2014”;
- Receipt dated 11 December 2014 in the amount of 250 related to a “bone
scintigraphy examination”;
- Receipt dated 11 December 2014 in the amount of 950 related to a “magnetic
resonance imaging on the knee”;
- Receipt dated 19 December 2014 in the amount of 2,000 related to a “medical
examination”;
- Receipt dated 6 January 2015 in the amount of 500 related to a “medical
appointment with orthopedist”;
- Receipt dated 6 January 2015 in the amount of 132.76 related to “hospital
services”;
- Receipt dated 8 January 2015 in the amount of 2,000 related to “the
anesthesia medical costs (…) administrated by in occasion of surgical
intervention knee arthroscopy”;
- Receipt dated 8 January 2015 in the amount of 9,800 related to “the surgery”;
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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- Receipt dated 8 January 2015 in the amount of 2,940 related to “professional
fees rendered as 1° auxiliary” by “Dr. K”;
- Receipt dated 8 January 2015 in the amount of 1,960 related to “medical fees
of the surgical proceedings: arthroscopy on right knee”;
- Receipt dated 8 January 2015 in the amount of 400 related to “professional
fees rendered as surgical instrumentation technician”;
- Receipt dated 13 January 2015 in the amount of 1,000 related to “10
physiotherapy sessions and rehabilitation of his right knee”;
- Receipt dated 23 January 2015 in the amount of 10,577.12 related to “hospital
services”;
- Receipt dated 28 January 2015 in the amount of 1,000 related to“10
physiotherapy sessions and rehabilitation of his right knee”;
- Receipt dated 12 February 2015 in the amount of 1,000 related to“10
physiotherapy sessions and rehabilitation of his right knee”;
- Receipt dated 2 March 2015 in the amount of 1,000 related to“10
physiotherapy sessions and rehabilitation of his right knee”;
- Receipt dated 20 March 2015 in the amount of 1,000 related to“10
physiotherapy sessions and rehabilitation of his right knee”.
21.
In addition, the Claimant sustains that the early termination deprived him from
the benefits stipulated in art. 6 pars. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the contract for a period of
six months and consequently claims the amount of EUR 30,000, i.e. EUR 5,000
per month.
22.
In its reply to the claim, the Respondent stresses that the settlement agreement
was not only signed by the Claimant, but also by his agent.
23.
The Respondent further points out that by means of the settlement agreement,
the parties actually amended the contract, establishing a new date of expiry, i.e.
31 December 2014.
24.
Subsequently, the Respondent argues that the settlement agreement did not
grant it an option to unilaterally terminate the contract, but rather constitutes a
mutual termination of the employment relationship. In this regard, the
Respondent insists that the Claimant did not submit any element demonstrating
that he was coerced to sign said agreement.
25.
In continuation, the Respondent explains that in order to recoup part of the
costs incurred for the transfer of the Claimant, i.e. the transfer compensation
paid to Club E and the remuneration paid to the Claimant, it reserved the right
to maintain the contractual relationship in case of transfer of the Claimant to
another club. In this respect, the Respondent outlines that the possibility to
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 7 of 13
maintain the original duration of the contract was subject to two cumulative
conditions as per paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement: (i) the Claimant is
fit to play and (ii) the Claimant accepts the transfer to another team. In view of
above, and since the first condition was not met, the Respondent states that it
sent a letter to both the Claimant and his agent to confirm the termination on
31 December 2014, to which none of them raised any objection. Besides, the
Respondent rejects the Claimant’s assertion as to the alleged potestative nature
of the abovementioned paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement. In this
respect, the Respondent points out that the Claimant had the right to accept or
deny his transfer to another club and, hence, the maintenance of the
contractual relationship was subject to his approval.
26.
Finally, the Respondent sustains that the Claimant is not entitled to the
reimbursement of the medical costs allegedly incurred by him since they were
not “mutually approved”.
27.
In his replica, the Claimant reiterates that his injury was the main and only
reason why the settlement agreement and the termination notice were made.
In addition, the Claimant outlines that the Respondent demonstrated in its
submission that it was no longer interested in his services but only in his market
value.
28.
Furthermore, the Claimant argues that his agent was not a party to the
employment contract and that, therefore, the fact that he signed the settlement
agreement is irrelevant.
29.
Subsequently, the Claimant insists on the potestative nature of the settlement
agreement, emphasising that only the Respondent could “elect to maintain the
validity of the Employment Agreement”. The Claimant further rejects the
Respondent’s argument that the maintenance of the contractual relationship
was subject to his approval. In this respect, the Claimant underlines that he has
actually never been in a position to express his consent since said condition was
subsidiary to the main one, i.e. him being fit, which has never been fulfilled.
30.
In continuation, the Claimant alleges that he was fully focused on his recovery
and that is the reason why he did not complain about the termination back
then, but points out that the default notice and subsequent claim in front of
FIFA “clearly demonstrates his disagreement with what happened”.
31.
In its final comments, the Respondent first insists on its good faith, pointing out
that in spite of the fact that as per “the standard terms and condition of all
football employment agreements and the relative collective bargain
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 8 of 13
agreements”, it was entitled to terminate the contract due to the Claimant’s
incapacity to play for more than six months, it accepted to maintain the
relationship and kept paying his salaries for ten and a half months without
receiving anything in return. In view of the above, the Respondent concludes
that the settlement agreement was actually more favourable to the Claimant.
32.
Finally, the Respondent argues that in virtue of the principle of severability,
even if paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement was deemed potestative and
therefore null and void, the other clauses would remain valid.
33.
On 6 July 2015, the Claimant was re-registered with Club E based on the
employment contract concluded by both parties on 1 July 2012 and valid until
30 June 2016. Pursuant to such contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive as
from 1 July 2015 a monthly salary of 260,000. Nevertheless, on 1 January 2016,
the Claimant and Club E concluded a new employment contract, valid until 31
December 2017, according to which the Claimant is entitled to a monthly salary
of 160,000 for the 2016 season and 170,000 for the 2017 season.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the
Chamber or the DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the
matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was
submitted to FIFA on 16 May 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the
matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal
with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with
an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of
Country D.
3.
Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as
to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance
with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(edition 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 16 May
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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2016, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this
respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts
as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will
refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it
considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In this regard,
the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant and the
Respondent signed an employment contract initially valid as from 24 August
2013 until 23 August 2015. Furthermore, the Chamber observed that on 15
August 2014, the parties concluded a settlement agreement, which constitutes
the document at the heart of the dispute.
5.
In this context, the Chamber first reviewed the claim of the Claimant, who
maintains that the settlement agreement grants a right of unilateral
termination in favour of the Respondent only and must therefore be considered
null and void due to its potestative nature. Furthermore, the DRC observed that
the Claimant argues that he was obliged to sign the settlement agreement due
to the Respondent’s lack of interest in his recovery and the risks for his further
career. In view of the above, the Chamber took note that the Claimant considers
that the Respondent terminated the contract on 31 December 2014 due to his
injury and should therefore be held liable for breach of contract without just
cause.
6.
Having established the above, the Chamber proceeded to the analysis of the
Claimant’s argumentation. In doing so, the members of the DRC first focused on
the Claimant’s argument according to which he was coerced to sign the
settlement agreement due to the Respondent’s disinterest in his recovery.
7.
In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that the Claimant did not submit any
relevant evidence in support of his assertion. Consequently, and after referring
to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules according to which any party claiming a
right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the
Chamber held that the Claimant failed to satisfactorily carry the burden of proof
regarding the alleged coercion.
8.
At this stage, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that in accordance with
longstanding and well-established jurisprudence, a party signing a document of
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule,
does so on its own responsibility.
9.
In continuation, the DRC recalled the content of the settlement agreement
which provides, inter alia, that “[t]he Employment Agreement shall remain valid
until December 31, 2014, and the [Claimant] shall receive full salary until such
date, on December 31, 2014, the employment agreement which signed On
August 24, 2013 shall be terminated” and “[u]pon December 31, 2014, [the
Respondent] can elect to maintain the validity of the Employment Agreement
provided that the [Claimant] will be medically fit and also provided that upon
the request of the [Respondent] the [Claimant] accepts to be transferred to
another club”. In this respect, the Chamber was the unanimous opinion that the
settlement agreement did not establish a right of unilateral termination to the
Respondent, but rather set a new date of expiry of the contractual relationship,
i.e. 31 December 2014, while reserving an option for the Respondent to extend
the latter relationship under certain circumstances. As a consequence, the
Chamber decided to disregard the argument raised by the Claimant and held
that the contractual relationship was due to expire on 31 December 2014. In this
regard, the DRC outlined that the wording of the correspondence addressed by
the Respondent to the Claimant on 31 December 2014 does not give room to
interpretation, the latter correspondence merely confirming the expiry of the
contractual relationship.
10.
Furthermore, and for the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber
wished to point out that the Respondent agreed to cover the Claimant’s medical
expenses and kept complying in full with its obligations towards the Claimant
for almost one year in spite of the fact that the latter was unable to render
services.
11.
On account of the aforementioned, and considering that the parties validly
entered into the settlement agreement on 15 August 2014, the Chamber came
to the conclusion that the contractual relationship ended on 31 December 2014
by expiry of its term and that consequently, none of the parties could be held
liable for the termination thereof.
12.
The foregoing having been said, the Chamber turned its attention to the
Claimant’s claim for reimbursement of the medical costs incurred. In doing so,
the DRC reverted once again to the content of the settlement agreement which
states that “[t]he [Claimant] shall be treated in Country B by a doctor of his
choice and [the Respondent] shall reimburse a minimal cost, to be mutually
approved”. In this respect, the members of the Chamber concurred that by
authorising the Claimant to consult the doctor of his choice in Country B, the
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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Respondent implicitly agreed to cover the related costs. As a consequence, the
Chamber decided to order the Respondent to reimburse the Claimant the
medical costs incurred by the latter until the date of termination of the
contractual relationship, i.e. 31 December 2014, which, according to the
documentation provided by the Claimant, amount to 28,830.
13.
In addition, taking into consideration the claim of the Claimant as well as the
dates of the invoices submitted by the latter, the Chamber decided that the
Respondent had to pay default interest at a rate of 5% as follows:
-
5% p.a. as of 12 July 2014 on the amount of 8,000;
5% p.a. as of 14 September 2014 on the amount of 4,600;
5% p.a. as of 4 October 2014 on the amount of 730;
5% p.a. as of 19 October 2014 on the amount of 5,300;
5% p.a. as of 26 November 2014 on the amount of 4,700;
5% p.a. as of 16 December 2014 on the amount of 2,300;
5% p.a. as of 12 December 2014 on the amount of 1,200;
5% p.a. as of 20 December 2014 on the amount of 2,000.
14.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present
matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from
the date of notification of this decision, the amount of 28,830 plus 5% interest
p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows:
- 5% p.a. as of 12 July 2014 on the amount of 8,000;
- 5% p.a. as of 14 September 2014 on the amount of 4,600;
- 5% p.a. as of 4 October 2014 on the amount of 730;
- 5% p.a. as of 19 October 2014 on the amount of 5,300;
- 5% p.a. as of 26 November 2014 on the amount of 4,700;
- 5% p.a. as of 16 December 2014 on the amount of 2,300;
- 5% p.a. as of 12 December 2014 on the amount of 1,200;
- 5% p.a. as of 20 December 2014 on the amount of 2,000.
3.
In the event that the amount plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance
with the above-mentioned point 2 is not paid by the Respondent within the
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the
FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
4.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
5.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10
days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Marco Villiger
Deputy Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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