Acórdão do FIFA
Processo 1016028-E_2016-10-01

Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 October 2016,
in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member
Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the matter between the club,

Club A, country B,
as Claimant
and the player,

Club C, country D,
as Respondent I

and the club,

Club E, country F,
as Respondent II

and the club,

Club G, country H
as Respondent III

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I.

Facts of the case

1.

On 24 July 2015, the player from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent
I), born on 6 November 1985, and the club from country H, Club G (hereinafter:
Club G or the Respondent III), mutually terminated their contractual
relationship.

2.

On 27 July 2015, the Respondent I and the club from country B, Club A
(hereinafter: Club A or the Claimant), concluded a “Contrat d’Engagement de
Joueur Professionnel” (hereinafter: the contract with Club A), valid as of 1
August 2015 until 30 June 2017.

3.

Pursuant to art. 5 of the contract with Club A, the Respondent I was entitled to
the following remuneration:
 2015-16 season:
- 125,000 as monthly salary payable at the end of the month;
- 1,000,000 as sign-on fee payable after signature of the contract and upon
receipt of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC);
 2016-17 season:
- 125,000 as monthly salary payable at the end of the month;
- 1,000,000 as sign-on fee payable in two instalments of 500,000 on 1
September 2016 and 31 January 2017 respectively.

4.

Furthermore, art. 5.2 of the contract with Club A provides for the following
benefits:
 An accommodation;
 A mean of transport;
 Three return flight tickets for the Respondent I and his family.

5.

Art. 14 further stipulates that “the present contract comes into force upon its
signature by the parties and its homologation by the Football Federation of
country B or, if need be, by the Ligue Nationale de Football Professionnel” (free
translation).

6.

On 4 August 2015, the Respondent I and the club from country F, Club E
(hereinafter: Club E or the Respondent II), concluded an employment contract
(hereinafter: the contract with Club E), valid as of the date of signature until 30
June 2017.

7.

Pursuant to clause 3 of the contract with Club E, the Respondent I was entitled
to the following remuneration:
 2015-16 season: EUR 115,000 (approx. 1,200,000) net payable as follows:
- EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 August 2015;
- Ten equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 payable on the 5 th of the
month from September 2015 until May 2016;

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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 2016-17 season: EUR 115,000 net payable as follows:
- EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 August 2016;
- Ten equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 payable on the 5 th of the
month from September 2016 until May 2017.
8.

Clause 21 of the contract with Club E further provides, inter alia, that:
“2. The [Respondent I] declares that:
a) There is no impediment to the signature of the present contract and to the
link established with the club, once he has full capacity to establish such link, i.e.
to be bound to the club and officially practice the activity of professional
football player in favour of the club, this being an essential condition to the
contract, as acknowledged and signed;
b) That all questions/disputes related to prior contractual relationships with
third parties are definitively settled, this being an essential condition to the
contract, as acknowledged and signed;
c) His sporting registration rights do not belong to another club, this being an
essential condition to the contract, as acknowledged and signed
3. Should the veracity of the facts described in the above-mentioned paragraph
not be established, the present contract shall be deemed null and void, and the
[Respondent I] shall compensate the club with all the amounts due” (free
translation).

9.

On 5 August 2015, the Association of Football Federations of country H issued
the player’s International Transfer Certificate (ITC) in favour of the Football
Federation of country B.

10. On 6 August 2015, the Football Federation of country B registered the
Respondent I.
11. On the same date, the Claimant addressed an e-mail to the Respondent I,
inviting him to collect his sign-on fee and to join the team on 9 August 2015.
12. On 8 August 2015, the Claimant sent a second e-mail to the Respondent I,
taking note of his absence of reply and requesting his location in order to buy
his flight ticket.
13. On 10 August 2015, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the
Respondent I, requesting him to be at the club’s facilities on 11 August 2015 and
informing him that should he not do so, a penalty of EUR 2,000 per day of
absence would be applied.
14. On 13 August 2015, the Association of Football Federations of country H issued
the player’s ITC in favour of the Football Federation of country F.

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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15. On the same date, the Football Federation of country F registered the
Respondent I.
16. On 14 August 2015, the Claimant’s representative informed the Football
Federation of country F about the contract with Club A signed with the
Respondent I and requested its intervention in the matter at stake.
17. On 19 August 2015, the Football Federation of country B addressed a
correspondence to FIFA, requesting its intervention, in particular considering
the fact that the Respondent I had played an official game with the Respondent
II.
18. On 27 August 2015, FIFA replied to the Football Federation of country B,
informing it that the issue related to the player’s ITC delivery was transmitted to
its competent bodies.
19. On 15 and 23 September 2015, the Claimant sent a correspondence to the
Respondent III and the Association of Football Federations of country H, asking
them for explanations regarding the circumstances surrounding the player’s ITC
delivery.
20. On 23 September 2015, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the
Respondent I and Respondent II, informing them that it would lodge a claim in
front FIFA for breach of contract.
21. On 26 October 2015, Respondent II replied to the Claimant, explaining that
when it signed the contract with Club E with the Respondent I, it believed that
the latter was a free agent. In support of its assertion, Respondent II points out
that no dispute arose when it requested the player’s ITC from the Association of
Football Federations of country H. In view of the above, Respondent II concludes
that it cannot be held jointly liable with the Respondent I of any breach.
22. On 2 November 2015, the Claimant sent a new correspondence, rejecting
Respondent II’s argumentation and reiterating its intention of lodging a claim in
front of FIFA.
23. On the same day, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the Respondent
III and the Association of Football Federations of country H, requesting once
again explanations regarding the ITC issue.
24. On 22 December 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the
Respondent I, Respondent II and the Respondent III holding them jointly and
severally liable for breach of contract without just cause and inducement to the
breach respectively. In particular, Club A requested the amount of EUR

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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1,500,000 as well as the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent I,
Club E and Club G.
25. In its claim, the Claimant explains that by signing two contracts covering the
same period of time, the Respondent I breached art. 18 par. 5 of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. Club A further sustains that
Club E and Club G should be held jointly liable to the payment of the
compensation based on art. 17 par. 2 and 17 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players respectively, all the more considering their
lack of reaction to its several correspondence.
26. As to the calculation of the compensation, the Claimant first points out that the
residual value of the contract amounts to EUR 508,250, broken down as follows:
 EUR 270,250 as residual salaries;
 EUR 188,000 as residual sign-on fees;
 EUR 50,000 as monetary value of the benefits provided to the Respondent I
under art. 5.2 of the contract with Club A.
27. In continuation, the Claimant stresses that in order to determine the
compensation, the Dispute Resolution Chamber should take into consideration
the following elements: (i) the significant financial efforts made to hire the
Respondent I; (ii) the breach occurred within the protected period; (iii) its
absence of fault; (iv) the suddenness of the termination and (v) the sporting and
financial damage resulting from the obligation to hire a new player not
perfectly substitutable in a hurry.
28. In its reply to the claim, Respondent II reiterates that it relied on the
information uploaded in TMS according to which “the [Respondent I] mutually
agreed an early termination with his former club” and, therefore, believed in
good faith that the Respondent I was a free agent. In addition, Respondent II
outlines that if the Respondent I had a contract and was registered with
another club, a dispute would have arisen when it requested the player’s ITC,
quod non. In this respect, Respondent II points out that it was only informed of
the contract signed between the Respondent I and the Claimant on 24
September 2015, i.e. more than one month after the signature of the contract
with Club E. In view of the above, Respondent II concludes that it should not be
held jointly liable to pay compensation and sporting sanctions should not be
imposed on it.
29. In his reply to the claim, the Respondent I alleges that the “Contrat
d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel”, i.e. the contract with Club A, does not
constitute a valid contract. First, the Respondent I highlights that it did not
understand the content of the contract with Club A, which was drafted in
French, a language that he does not understand. In this regard, the Respondent
I explains that he interpreted the terms “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur
Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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Professionnel” as “a mandate to be registered in the Federation of country B to
iniciate negociations regarding the future signature of sports labor contract and
not a real professional labor contract”.
30. In addition, the Respondent I sustains that he did not travel to country B and
therefore neither signed any original of the contract, nor was he provided with
a copy of the latter. In this respect, the Respondent I points out that he did not
know that a contract could be concluded via e-mail.
31. In continuation, and should the contract with Club A be deemed valid, the
Respondent I argues that it did not come into force as the requirements
stipulated in art. 14 of the contract with Club A were not complied with.
32. The Respondent I further states that the conviction that he was a free agent was
reinforced by the delivery of his ITC by the Association of Football Federations
of country H in favour of Respondent II.
33. In view of the above, Respondent II and the Respondent I conclude that if any
compensation was awarded, the Association of Football Federations of country
H should be responsible for its payment.
34. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent III did not reply to the
claim.
35. In its replica, the Claimant outlines that it acted diligently before signing the
contract with Club A with the Respondent I, making sure that the latter was a
free agent. In addition, the Claimant insists that several contract offers were
made to the Respondent I before the parties reached an agreement and
concluded the contract with Club A on 27 July 2015.
36. In continuation, the Claimant outlines that upon the Respondent I’s request, the
contract with Club A was translated into English. Moreover, the Claimant points
out that the Respondent I could not ignore that the document constituted a
“professional labor contract” and not a “mandate” for the following reasons: (i)
the contract was signed between him and a club, whereas a mandate is
normally signed between an agent and a player or a club; (ii) the form and the
clauses of a contract and a mandate differ completely; and (iii) the
correspondence addressed to the Respondent I on 6, 8 and 10 August 2015
clearly refer to an employment contract.
37. Furthermore, the Claimant emphasises that the fact that the contract with Club
A was concluded via e-mail does not have influence over its validity, as long as it
contains the essentialia negotii. In this respect, the Claimant points out that
both parties expressed their consent in a written document. In addition, the
Claimant alleges that it bought a flight ticket for the Respondent I to travel to
Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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country B. The Claimant further argues that the contract with Club A was
registered in the framework of the ITC procedure and that, in any case, the
validity of a contract cannot be made subject to its homologation by, or its
registration at the Federation.
38. Regarding Respondent II’s argumentation, the Claimant stresses that its alleged
absence of fault is irrelevant since the joint liability of the new club provided for
in art. 17 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is
automatic. In this respect, the Claimant states that, in a second instance,
Respondent II could lodge a claim against the Respondent I and the Respondent
III to obtain damages.
39. In their joint final comments, the Respondent I and Respondent II reiterate their
preivous argumentation, while emphasising that the Respondent I would not
have agreed on the content of clause 21 of the contract with Club E if he had
been aware that he was bound by a valid employment contract with the
Claimant.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1.

First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 22 December 2015. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing
the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf.
art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2.

Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal
with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with
an international dimension between a club from country B, a player from
country D, a club from country F and an club from country H.

3.

In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable
as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in
accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the claim in the present
matter was lodged on 22 December 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations
(hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the
substance.

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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4.

The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the
Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation
contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following
considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5.

In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in
the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to
establish as to whether, as claimed by the Claimant, a breach of contract had
been committed by the Respondent I, it should first of all pronounce itself on
the issue of the validity of the “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel”
dated 27 July 2015, which was submitted by the Claimant.

6.

In this respect, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent I challenged the
validity of said contract. In particular, the Claimant explains that the latter
document was drafted in a language that he did not understand and that he
interpreted the terms “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel” as “a
mandate to be registered in the Federation of country B to iniciate negociations
regarding the future signature of sports labor contract and not a real
professional labor contract”. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to refer to
its longstanding and well-established jurisprudence and emphasised that a party
signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise
contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. In light of the
above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent I’s reported ignorance of
the French language is not a valid cause to consider the document he signed as
null and void.

7.

Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber proceeded to analyse the
argument of the Respondents that the contract with Club A cannot be deemed
as a valid employment contract. In this respect, the Chamber wished to highlight
that, in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence, in order for an
employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the
signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the
essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the
contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the
remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the
Claimant and the Respondent I.

8.

After careful study of the contract presented by the Claimant, the Chamber
concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent
employment contract, in particular, the fact that the contract establishes that
the Respondent I has to render his services to the Claimant during a fixed period

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I a monthly
remuneration.
9.

Furthermore, the Chamber wished to emphasise that, in a connected world, the
physical presence of the parties is no longer needed to conclude a valid
contract, more and more contracts being now concluded by electronic means
and at a distance. Therefore, the DRC rejected the argument of the Claimant in
this regard.

10. On account of the above, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the
arguments of the Respondent I and the Respondent II cannot be upheld and
that the contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent I on
27 July 2015 was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from the 1
August 2015 until 30 June 2017.
11. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent I challenged the enforceability
of the contract with Club A on the basis that it was not approved by the
Football Federation of country B and the League in accordance with its art. 14.
In this respect, the DRC deemed of pertinence to recall its jurisprudence in
accordance with which the validity or enforceability of an employment contract
cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities,
such as, but not limited to, the registration or homologation procedure in
connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole
responsibility of one party and on which the other party has no influence.
12. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to
the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the
Respondent I.
13. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’
respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was
undisputed that the Respondent I never joined the Claimant in order to offer his
services to the latter in accordance with the relevant employment contract. Also,
it is undisputed that, on 4 August 2015, the Respondent I signed an employment
contract with the Respondent II covering partially the same period of time as
the employment contract the Respondent I signed with the Claimant. By acting
as such, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent I had acted in breach of
the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and is therefore to be
held liable for termination of the contract without just cause.
14. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5
of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with
different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the
Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between
professionals and clubs shall apply.

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
9/14

15. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the
“Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the
protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever
comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is
concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or
two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract,
where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In
this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that given the facts of
the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent I had
obviously occurred within the applicable protected period.
16. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to
the question of the consequences of such unjustified breach of contract
committed by the Respondent I during the protected period.
17. In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber established that, in accordance with
art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent I is liable to pay compensation to
the Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of article
17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Respondent I’s new
club, i.e. the Respondent II, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of
compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint
liability of the Respondent I’s new club is independent from the question as to
whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line
with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly
confirmed by the CAS. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled
that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed,
unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional who has
terminated his contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit
a breach. In any event, the Chamber determined that it would attend to the
question of the possible inducement to breach of contract by the Respondent II at a
later stage of its deliberations, i.e. after having discussed the issue of the
compensation due to the Claimant.

18. Taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber focused
its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of
contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly
reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount
of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided
for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the
law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Respondent I under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time
remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the
fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term
of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected
Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and
that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair
amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.
19. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had
to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the
Claimant and the Respondent I contains a provision by means of which the
parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of
contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation
clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at
stake.
20. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice
suffered by the Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application
of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this
regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for
contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis
taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as
the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience
gained throughout the years.
21. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the
Claimant in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the
remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent under the existing
contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the
Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed
it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations
allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the
new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus
enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed
to a player by both his former and his new club(s).
22. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment
contract between the Claimant and the Respondent I had been set to expire on
30 June 2017. Therefore, as of 4 August 2015, i.e. the date of the breach, the
total value of the Respondent I’s employment agreement with the Claimant for
the remaining contractual period amounted to 4,875,000. On the other hand,
the members of the Chamber established that should the Respondent I have
stayed with the Respondent II until the date of expiry of the contract concluded
with the Claimant, i.e. 30 June 2017, he would have been entitled to receive an
amount equivalent to 2,509,090.70. On the basis of the aforementioned
financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of
remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Respondent I respectively
with the Claimant and the Respondent II over the relevant period amounted to
3,692,045.35.
Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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23. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber
decided that the Respondent I must pay the amount of 3,692,045.35 to the
Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent
II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation (cf.
point II.17 above).
24. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of
the breach of contract by the Respondent I within the protected period, and in this
respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent I in
accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates,
inter alia, that sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in
breach of contract during the protected period. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled,
once again, that art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, which deals with the
consequences of entering into more than one contract covering the same time
period, clearly states that a player shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of
the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between
professionals and clubs.
25. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of
four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the
minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the
protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant
provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words,
the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four
months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not
provide the possibility for deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed
minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances.
26. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the breach of contract
by the Respondent I had occurred during the applicable protected period.
Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the
Regulations, the Respondent I had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four
months on his eligibility to participate in official matches.

27. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the issue of inducement by the
Respondent II and held that considering the small time frame between the
termination of the Respondent I’s contract with the Respondent III and the
signature of the contract with Club E as well as the fact that the International
Transfer Certificate was delivered to it by the Association of Football
Federations of country H, the Respondent II could not have been expected to
know about the contract with Club A at the time of signing the contract with
the Respondent I. In view of the above, the Chamber decided that the issue of
inducement as regards the Respondent II is not to be further considered.

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
12/14

28. Furthermore, the Chamber pointed out that the responsibility for having issued
two International Transfer Certificates lies entirely with the Association of
Football Federations of country H in accordance with art. 9 of the Regulations,
and that, therefore, the Respondent III cannot be held liable for said act.
Consequently, the DRC decided to reject the Claimant’s claim with respect to the
Respondent III.
29. The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing
that any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1.

The claim of the Claimant, Club A, against the Respondent I, Club C, and the
Respondent II, Club E, is partially accepted.

2.

The claim of the Claimant against the Respondent III, Club G, is rejected.

3.

The Respondent I is ordered to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the
date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the
amount of 3,692,045.35.

4.

The Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the
aforementioned compensation.

5.

In the event that the aforementioned amount is not paid within the abovementioned time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the
aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon
request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6.

The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent I and the Respondent II
immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be
made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

7.

A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is
imposed on the Respondent I. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of
the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall
remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season
and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national
cups and international championships for clubs.

8.

Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
*****

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10
days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne, Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected] / www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Marco Villiger
Deputy Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives

Club A, country B / Player Club C, country D / Club E, country F / Club G, country H
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