Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC)
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 October 2012,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
David Mayebi (Cameroon), member
Guillermo Saltos Guale (Ecuador), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player E, from country S,
as Claimant
against the club,
Club W, from country A,
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 27 August 2008, the player E from country S (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the
club W from country A (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment
contract (hereinafter: the contract) and a supplementary agreement, both valid as
from 1 June 2008 until 31 May 2010.
2.
According to the contract and the supplementary agreement, the Respondent
undertakes to provide the Claimant, inter alia, with remuneration in the amount of
EUR 110,000 (EUR 15,000 + EUR 95,000) per season, payable in ten equal instalments
of EUR 11,000, as from 30 August 2008 until 30 May 2009 during the season
2008/2009, and as of 30 August 2009 until 30 May 2010 during the season 2009/2010.
3.
In addition, art. 2 of the contract provides that “[…] the first 12 months of the
player’s contract are considered as probation according to Termination Law of 1967”.
4.
Article 15 of the said contract further stipulates that “The player agrees to adhere to
the Rules, Regulations and By-Laws of the Football Association of country A and/or of
the Dispute Resolution Committee of Football Association of country A in case of any
grievance and/or any dispute with the club”.
5.
Finally, according to art. 17 of the contract, “The club and the player hereby agree
that in case the club plays for any reason during the validity of the player’s
employment contract with club W, in the second or lower division of the League of
country A, the club may terminate the player’s contract for just cause and the player
shall be free to be registered to in any club of him own choice”.
6.
By means of a letter dated 17 December 2008, the Claimant reminded the
Respondent of its arrears and requested the payment of his outstanding salaries for
the months of September (partially) to December 2008.
7.
On the same date, the Respondent terminated the contract with the Claimant, in
writing, based on art. 2 of the contract.
8.
The Claimant also sent the Respondent a termination letter, on 13 January 2009, in
which he points out the Respondent’s arrears towards him in the total amount of
EUR 36,000 and states that, therefore, he has a just cause to end their employment
relation.
9.
On 2 March 2009, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the
Respondent for breach of contract without just cause, requesting the payment of the
total amount of EUR 200,000, made up of:
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- EUR 35,000 in outstanding salaries for September 2008 (EUR 3,000) and for
October, November and December 2008 (3 x EUR 11,000);
- EUR 165,000 as compensation, corresponding to his salaries of January until May
2009 and of August 2009 until May 2010 (15 months x EUR 11,000).
10.
In his position, the Claimant argues that art. 2 of the contract, upon which the
Respondent bases the termination, should be considered as void and null, since a
probation period of one season is inadmissible, excessive and incompatible with its
main objective, namely examining the player’s skills. Furthermore, the Claimant
deems the Respondent’s attitude disrespectful and harmful to his career.
11.
In its reply, the Respondent disputed the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber (hereinafter: DRC), citing the arbitration clause in art. 15 of the contract.
12.
The Respondent and the Football Association of country A(hereinafter: the CFA)
provided FIFA with a copy of the “Regulations for the registration and transfer of
football players” (edition 2005; hereinafter: the Regulations of the CFA), which
establish the following:
a. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Committee (hereinafter:
the Committee):
According to art. 22.11 of the Regulations of the CFA, the Committee is
competent to “adjudicate and/or resolve any financial or other disputes which
may arise: a) between clubs and non-amateur players […]”.
b. with regard to the composition:
Art. 22.1 par. 1 of the Regulations of the CFA establishes that the Committee
consists of five members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, three members). The
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and one member are elected by the Executive
Committee of the CFA, whereas two members are elected by the Football
Players’ Association of country A.
c. with regard to the possibility of an appeal:
Concerning the possibility of an appeal against a decision taken by the
Committee, art. 22.10 stipulates that “any decision of the [Committee] may be
appealed to the Disciplinary Authority of the [CFA]. The Disciplinary Authority
shall finally decide on the appeals referred thereto”.
13.
As to the substance of the dispute, the Respondent insists on its legitimate right to
have terminated the contract with the Claimant based on its art. 2 as well as on the
Termination Law of 1967 of country A.
14.
According to the Respondent, until the date of the termination the Claimant was
entitled to receive the total amount of EUR 49,500, made up of EUR 44,000 of
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salaries for August until November 2008, plus EUR 5,500 corresponding to 17 days of
salary for December 2008.
15.
The Respondent allegedly paid the Claimant the amount of EUR 22,000
corresponding to the salaries of August and September 2008 as per the contract and
the agreement. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to receive the maximum amount
of EUR 27,500.
16.
The Respondent states that the Claimant is not entitled to any type of compensation,
since the Respondent terminated the contract with just cause. According to the
Respondent, the contract would have been terminated anyway, since it had been
relegated to a lower division by the end of the season 2008/2009, according to art. 17
of the contract.
17.
As to the question of competence, the Claimant rejects the jurisdiction of the CFA in
the present case, based on art. 22 and 24 of the FIFA Regulations. The Claimant
deems that the NDRC of country A cannot provide for fair proceedings, since it does
not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, i.e. the NDRC
of country A is composed of five members, three representing the clubs and two
representing the player; in case of a tie, the president would have the casting vote.
Therefore, FIFA is competent to deal with the present affair.
18.
Finally, the Claimant states not having signed any new employment contract, since
his employment with the club A.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber)
analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect,
the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 2 March 2009, thus,
after the aforementioned Rules entered into force on 1 July 2008. Therefore, the
Chamber concluded that the edition 2008 of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the
matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall
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adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have
an international dimension.
3.
At this point, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that, contrary to the information
contained in FIFA’s letter dated 19 October 2012, by means of which the parties were
informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member Q and the member R
refrained from participating in the deliberations in the case at hand, due to the fact
that the member Q has the same nationality as the Claimant and that, in order to
comply with the prerequisite of equal representation of club and player
representatives, also the member R refrained from participating. Thus, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members, in
accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations.
4.
Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body
to decide on the present litigation involving a player from country S and a club A
regarding an employment-related dispute.
5.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 15 of the employment
contract, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to
the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA.
6.
In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and
insisted on the fact that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter, since
the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA allegedly does not respect the principle
of equal representation of players and clubs and, therefore, cannot provide for fair
proceedings.
7.
Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with
art. 22 lit. b) of the 2008 edition of the FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with
a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal,
guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation
of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of
the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the
standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair
proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December
2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles
contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard
Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.
8.
While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether
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the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contains a
jurisdiction clause.
9.
Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 15 of the
employment contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s
jurisdiction. According to said art. 15, “The player agrees to adhere to the Rules,
Regulations and Bye-Laws of the Football Association of country A and/or of the
Dispute Resolution Committee of Football Association of country A in case of any
grievance and/or any dispute with the club”.
10.
In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion
that art. 15 of the employment contract does not make clear reference to a national
dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit.
b) of the aforementioned Regulations. Therefore, the members of the Chamber
deemed that said clause does not constitute an arbitration clause, but rather
establishes a choice of law.
11.
However, the members of the Chamber wished to stress that, even if the contract at
the basis of the present dispute would have included an arbitration clause in favour
of national dispute resolution, the Respondent was unable to prove that, in fact, the
Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA meets the minimum procedural standards
for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the
FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations.
12.
In this respect, the DRC referred to the general principle of equal representation of
players as well as of clubs, and underlined that this principle was one of the very
fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution
chamber to be recognised as such.
13.
Indeed, this prerequisite is not only mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, but also in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of
the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows:
“The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year
renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by
the player and club representatives […]; b) between three and ten player
representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’
associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a
selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club
representatives […].” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following:
“The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This
means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and
the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal […].
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Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group
that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of
the arbitrator list.”
14.
Subsequently, the Chamber acknowledged receipt of the Regulations of the CFA,
provided by the latter and by the Respondent, and began to analyse its content. In
this context, the Chamber noted that, according to art. 22.1.1 of the aforementioned
Regulations of country A, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA, is composed
of 5 members, as follows : a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, one member appointed by
the Executive Committee of the CFA and two members appointed by the Football
Players’ Association of country A.
15.
In view of the aforementioned and taking into account the pre-requisites for the
recognition of the jurisdiction of a Dispute Resolution Chamber at a national level
stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 and the
FIFA NDRC Regulations, the DRC considered that, in light of the documentation
provided by the CFA and the Respondent, the relevant national deciding body does
not appear to be composed of an equal number of players’ and clubs’
representatives, since the representation of the clubs, if any, is not evident.
16.
Therefore, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent was unable to prove that the
Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA had met the minimum procedural
standards for independent arbitration tribunals, as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the
above-mentioned Regulations, in FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA NDRC
Regulations.
17.
In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to
the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that
the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.
18.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the
Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations (edition 2008) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged
on 2 March 2009, the 2008 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present
matter as to the substance.
19.
The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established,
the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, it started to
acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file.
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20.
In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the
parties that, on 27 August 2008, they signed two complementary employment
contracts, in accordance with which the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, a
remuneration in the amount of EUR 110,000 (EUR 15,000 + EUR 95,000) per season,
payable in ten equal instalments of EUR 11,000, as from 30 August 2008 until 30 May
2009 during the season 2008/2009, and as of 30 August 2009 until 30 May 2010
during the season 2009/2010.
21.
In continuation, the Chamber took note that it is undisputed by the parties involved
that the employment relationship had been terminated by the Respondent, in
writing, on 17 December 2008, based on art. 2 of the contract.
19.
The DRC noted that, on the one hand, the Claimant claims that the Respondent has
breached the contractual relationship without just cause, by terminating the contract
unilaterally and without just cause on 17 December 2008, i.e. on the same day that
the Claimant reminded it of the existence of outstanding amounts towards him,
corresponding to his partial salary for September 2008 and his salaries for October
and November 2008. In addition, the Claimant rejects the termination based on art. 2
of the contract, since he deems that the aforementioned clause it to be considered as
void and null, since a probation period of one season is inadmissible, excessive and
incompatible with its main objective, namely examining the player’s skills.
20.
Therefore, the Claimant requests the payment of the total amount of EUR 200,000,
made up of EUR 35,000 in outstanding salaries for September 2008 (EUR 3,000) and
for October, November and December 2008 (3 x EUR 11,000), as well as EUR 165,000
as compensation, corresponding to his salaries of January 2009 until May 2010 (15
months x EUR 11,000).
21.
Subsequently, the DRC noted that, on the other hand, the Respondent insists on its
legitimate right to have terminated the contract with the Claimant based on its art.
2. The members of the DRC further observed that the Respondent claims that, until
the date of the termination, the Claimant was entitled to receive the total amount of
EUR 49,500, made up of EUR 44,000 of salaries for August until November 2008, plus
EUR 5,500 corresponding to 17 days of salary for December 2008. The Respondent
claims having paid the Claimant the amount of EUR 22,000, for his salaries of August
and September 2008 as per the contract and the agreement; thus, the Claimant
would only be entitled to receive at the maximum the amount of EUR 27,500. Finally,
the DRC noted that the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s claim for compensation,
and claims that the contract would have been terminated anyway as per art. 17 of
the contract, since the Respondent had been relegated to a lower division by the end
of the season 2008/2009.
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22.
Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying
issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the
Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been
unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent, and which
party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in
question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the
employment contract was terminated by the Respondent without just cause, it would
be necessary to determine the financial and/or sporting consequences for the party
that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract.
23.
In view of the above, the DRC judge firstly noted that the Respondent bases the
termination of the employment contract on its art. 2.
24.
In this respect, the DRC judge recalled the wording of art. 2 of the aforementioned
contract, which stipulates that, “[…] the first 12 months of the player’s contract are
considered as probation according to Termination Law of 1967”.
25.
Subsequently, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to analyse the question of
whether such clause inserted in an employment contract could be considered valid. In
that regard, the Chamber deemed that the application of the above-mentioned rule
was arbitrary, since it lead to an unacceptable result based on non-objective criteria,
which entitled the Respondent to unilaterally terminate the contract during the first
12 months of the contract. The DRC judge emphasised that the lack of objective
criteria by the application of the relevant rule lead to an unjustified disadvantage of
the Claimant’s financial rights.
26.
In this regard, the members of the DRC considered that the possibility granted to the
Respondent to prematurely terminate the contract within its first year, without the
need to indicate any reasons for it and only based on the fact that such period is to
be considered as a probation period, appeared to be of a highly subjective nature,
entailing that, de facto, it is left to the complete and utter discretion of the
Respondent whether or not it was willing to continue the contractual relationship.
27.
In view of the foregoing, the Chamber was of the opinion that art. 2 of the contract
invoked by the Respondent in order to put an end to the contract was clearly
potestative and that, consequently, the respective argumentation of the Respondent
could not be upheld by the DRC.
28.
In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant claims that the Respondent
has failed to pay his partial salary for September 2008, in the amount of EUR 3,000,
as well as his salaries for October until December 2008, in the amount of EUR 11,000
each. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Claimant provided a copy of his
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letter dated 17 December 2008, by means of which it reminded the Respondent of its
arrears, corresponding to his salaries for September to November 2008.
29.
Subsequently, the Chamber took into account that the Respondent, in turn,
maintains having paid to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 22,000,
corresponding to his salaries for August and September 2008, and therefore admits
having outstanding debts towards him in the amount of EUR 27,500.
30.
At this point and for the sake of good order, the Chamber recalled the basic principle
of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according
to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective
burden of proof.
31.
In this respect, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent bore the burden of proof
regarding the fulfilment of all payments mentioned as outstanding by the Claimant.
In the present case, the Chamber noted that the Claimant provided a copy of his
letter of 17 December 2008, reminding the Respondent of its arrears towards him.
The Chamber, however, observed that the Respondent not only acknowledged
having outstanding debts towards the Claimant but also did not provide the DRC
with any type of documentary evidence regarding the alleged payment of the
amount of EUR 22,000 to the Claimant, regarding his salaries for August and
September 2008.
32.
In view of the foregoing, the DRC concluded that, in accordance with the general
legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as
per the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and, consequently, is to
be held liable to pay the outstanding remuneration due to the latter. Hence, the DRC
judge proceeded with the calculation of the outstanding monies payable to the
Claimant under the terms of the employment contract until the date of termination,
i.e. 17 December 2008.
33.
Based on the foregoing and according to common practice, remuneration is payable
at the end of each month. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the player’s
partial salary of September 2008, as well as his salaries of October and November
2008, in the total amount of EUR 25,000 were outstanding by the time the contract
was unilaterally terminated by the Respondent on 17 December 2008.
34.
Having established the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of
the consequences of the Respondent’s termination of the contract without just
cause.
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35.
Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that
the Claimant is entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent for the
termination of the contract without just cause in addition to the aforementioned
amount of EUR 25,000 on the basis of the relevant employment contract.
36.
The members of the Chamber firstly recalled that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of
the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and
unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due
consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and
further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other
benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract,
the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and
depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
37.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract.
The members of the Chamber assured themselves that no such compensation clause
was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
38.
As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in
application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The
Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of
criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation
payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the
discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber
emphasized beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach
has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all
specific circumstances of the respective matter.
39.
In order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present
case, the members of the Chamber first turned their attention to the remuneration
and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new
contract, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. The
members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art.
17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the
existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of
compensation.
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40.
In accordance with the contract signed by the Claimant and the Respondent, which
was to run for sixteen months more, i.e. until 31 May 2010, after the breach of
contract occurred, the Claimant was to receive the total amount of EUR 176,000,
corresponding to his salaries for December 2008 until May 2010.
41.
Subsequently, the Chamber took note of the fact that the Claimant claims not having
signed any new employment contract, since the end of his employment with the
Respondent.
42.
For all the above reasons, the DRC decided to partially accept the claim of the
Claimant and holds the Respondent liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR
25,000 as outstanding remuneration, plus interests of 5% p.a. as of the date of claim
until the date of effective payment, as well as the amount of EUR 176,000, plus
interest of 5% p.a. as of the date of this decision until the date of effective payment,
as compensation for breach of contract.
43.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by
establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, player E, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant, player E, is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, club W, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, player E, within 30 days
as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the
amount of EUR 25,000, plus interests of 5% p.a. as of the date of claim until the date
of effective payment.
4.
The Respondent, club W, has to pay to the Claimant, player E, within 30 days as
from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in
the amount of EUR 176,000, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of the date of this decision
until the date of effective payment.
5.
If the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the above-mentioned
time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and a formal decision.
6.
Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, player E, are rejected.
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7.
The Claimant, player E, is directed to inform the Respondent, club W, immediately
and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to
notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to
the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain
all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of
which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for
filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal
arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Markus Kattner
Deputy Secretary General
Encl.
CAS directives
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