Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 September 2017,
in the following composition:
Thom as Grim m (S w itzerland), Deputy Chairman
John Bram hall (England), member
Johan v an Gaalen (S outh Africa), member
Pav el Piv ov arov (Rus s ia), member
Moham ed Al-S aikhan (S audi Arabia), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Play er A, Country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 19 August 2010, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the
Claimant) lodged a claim before FIFA against the club from country D, Club C
(hereinafter: the Respondent) for breach of contract, claiming outstanding
remuneration and compensation, based on contracts concluded with the
Respondent and Company Z (hereinafter: the company).
2.
This claim remained unanswered by the Respondent and, on 6 November 2014,
the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) decided that the Respondent was liable for
breach of contract and that, therefore, the Respondent should pay to the
Claimant outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract.
3.
Moreover, the DRC considered that the claim of the Claimant based on the service
contract (cf. number I./24. below) did not fall under the competence of the DRC
and that, thus, the part of the claim based on the service contract was considered
inadmissible.
4.
The DRC decision was appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) by the
Respondent only.
5.
On 4 July 2016, the CAS rendered an award setting aside the decision of the DRC
and deciding inter alia the following:
“The Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association was competent to adjudicate and decide the matter at hand.
The decision issued on 6 November 2014 by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association is set aside.
The legal proceedings related to the claim filed by the [Claimant] against the
[Respondent] are referred back to the FIFA DRC for review, observing the due
process of law.”
6.
In the relevant award, the CAS established that the scope of the appeal
proceedings was limited considering the Respondent’s requests and specifications
during the hearing not to enter into the merits of the case. In particular, the CAS
established the following:
“(…), both parties devoted substantial parts of their submissions to the merits
of the case. Therefore, the Panel found it important to clarify specifically
whether its interpretation was correct that, even if it were to find that the FIFA
DRC was competent to adjudicate the matter at hand, it would nevertheless be
prevented from entering into the merits as the Club explicitly requested that in
such case the Panel was asked to decide “that the Appealed decision is
upheld”.
As a consequence of the inquiry of the Panel in this respect, the representatives
of the [Claimant] and the [Respondent] confirmed their agreement to such
interpretation and to the limited scope of these proceedings as defined by the
[Respondent] in its prayers for relief at the hearing”.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 2 of 23
7.
Regarding the competence of the DRC to decide on the present matter, the CAS
determined inter alia the following:
- “(…) based on article 22(b) of the FIFA Regulations, the only possible exception
would be when the parties have agreed to refer their disputes to a national
arbitration tribunal established by a national federation. Since CAS is no such
national arbitration tribunal, the Panel finds that the precondition for this
exception is not applicable and that the FIFA DRC, based on the FIFA
Regulations, rightfully accepted jurisdiction.”
- “although the [contractual extension – cf. number I./22. and following below]
referred to the arbitration clause in favour of CAS as set out in the [private
contract – cf. number I./16. and following below], the dispute at stake relates
only to the [Claimant] and the [Respondent]. The Panel finds that any disputes
between the [Claimant] and the [Respondent] had to be resolved in accordance
with the FIFA Regulations, and therefore had to be adjudicated in the first
instance by the FIFA DRC”.
8.
The Respondent appealed the CAS award to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
9.
On 7 February 2017, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the appeal and confirmed
the CAS award.
10.
Following the CAS award, the proceedings before the DRC were reopened and,
considering that the DRC’s competence was already established by the CAS, the
Respondent was invited to submit its position as to the substance of the matter
only.
Facts as to the substance of the case:
11.
On 28 August 2008, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document titled
“THE CONTRACT on performance of professional duties by non-amateur-Football
player of Club C” (hereinafter: the first standard contract), valid until 28 August
2009.
12.
The first standard contract establishes as “Subject of the Contract” that “The
[Respondent] undertakes to employ the [Claimant] as a professional football
player (non-amateur football player) of soccer team Club C, to pay wages and to
provide with the working conditions necessary for performance of such work and
stipulated by the legislation of Country D, and the [Claimant] undertakes to
perform work as the football player of [Respondent], using thus all professional
skills with the purpose of achievement by [Respondent] high sports results”.
13.
Article 4.1 of the first standard contract establishes that “for performance of the
duties stipulated by the present contract, the wages, according to the list of staff
of [Respondent] are monthly paid to the [Claimant]”.
14.
Article 5.4 of the first standard contract establishes that “In case [Claimant]
without valid excuse will refuse performance of the present contract or the
contract will be terminated under the initiative of [Respondent] because of
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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[Claimant]’s fault, [Claimant] pays to the [Respondent] monetary indemnification
at a rate of three-monthly income”.
15.
In accordance with article 7.1 of the first standard contract, ”All disputes and
disagreements which may arise during performance of obligations under the
present contract, coordinate the parties by negotiations. The parties are obliged
to abstain from the decision of disputes among themselves in courts of the
general jurisdiction, for this purpose it is necessary to use the appropriate bodies
of Professional football league of Country D, Football Federation from Country D,
FIFA and the Court of Arbitration for Sport”.
16.
On the same date, 28 August 2008, the Claimant, the Respondent and the
company signed a document titled “Employment contract of the athlete Player A”
(hereinafter: the private contract) valid from the date of signature until 28 August
2009 or “at the end of the sports season 2008/2009, whichever of the two occurs
later”.
17.
The private contract establishes the following in its “Preamble”:
- “the [Respondent] wishes to employ the Athlete to act in its Professional
Team, for one sportive season, from 28, August, 2008 to August 28, 2009 in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Contract”;
- “the company acting as an owner of [Respondent] hereby agrees to make
payments under this contract”:
- “It is agreed that The Preambles constitute an integral part of this contract”.
18.
According to article 2.1 of the private contract, the company shall pay the
Claimant a basic salary of EUR 6,500,000 plus EUR 1,000,000 regarding “the
transferring compensation of the athlete”, payable in instalments as follows:
- EUR 3,500,000 “free taxes”, due on the signing date;
- EUR 2,000,000 “free taxes”, due on 25 September 2008;
- EUR 2,000,000 “free taxes”, due on 25 October 2008.
19.
Article 3.1 of the private contract establishes that “During the entire duration of
this Contract between the Athlete, Company and the [Respondent], the Athlete is
entitled to”:
- 3.1.1 “Bonus per match: in accordance with the Regulation of Club C”.
- 3.1.2 fringe benefits such as flight tickets, furnished house, hotel costs, school
fees for his children.
20.
Article 4 of the private contract establishes a possibility to extend the contract for
one or two seasons, in which case the Claimant would be entitled to a
remuneration of EUR 6,000,000. In case the parties agree on an extension, “the
Parties shall agree in writing by no later than 30 April 2009”.
21.
Article 5 of the private contract establishes that
- 5.1 “Any dispute arising from or related to the present contract will be
submitted exclusively to an arbitration procedure before the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (TAS-CAS) in Lausanne, Switzerland, and resolved
definitively in accordance with the Code-of sports-related arbitration”.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 4 of 23
-
-
5.2 “The Panel will consist of three arbitrators and the language of the
arbitration will be English. The final award shall be unappealable and fully
enforceable by and between the Parties before the FIFA Competent
Committee, which decision shall be considered as final and binding”.
5.3 “This contract, its interpretation and any disputes arising thereof shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of Country D and to
the FIFA Regulations and in case of conflict of laws, the FIFA Regulations
shall prevail”.
22.
On 17 November 2008, the Claimant, the Respondent, which is referred to as
“Employer” in this document, and the company signed a document titled “Term
of Employment Contract Extension” (hereinafter: the contractual extension), by
means of which the parties extended “the state period of validity of related
contract” until 31 December 2011, in accordance with article 4 of the private
contract dated 28 August 2008, establishing the remuneration for the seasons
2010 and 2011, in its articles 2.a) and 2.b), as follows:
Season 2010
The Respondent (“Employer”) will pay the Claimant the amount of EUR
6,000,000 divided in two equal instalments on 25 August 2009 and 25
September 2009;
Season 2011
The Respondent (“Employer”) will pay the Claimant the amount of EUR
6,000,000 divided in two equal instalments on 25 August 2010 and 25
September 2010.
23.
Article 3 of the contractual extension establishes that “to be continue being valid
for the contractual however extending period, all the rest clauses of the
Employment contract firmed between [Respondent] and [Claimant] in 28 August
2008 and that they had not damaged no modification with the present
instrument from Extension”.
24.
On 1 April 2009, the Claimant, the Respondent and the company signed a
document named “Service Contract” valid until 31 December 2011, by means of
which the Claimant was hired as “Consultant to advise the [Respondent] on the
assembly’s football team, the Technical Commission, modernizing the
management of soccer, identification of talents, acting, even when prompted, the
recruitment of players, comment on financial terms for the loan and pay athlete
in search quality technical and professional athletes to be engaged in training and
creation of conditions for training and preparation for the athletes to think in
terms of training to be established, and represent the [Respondent] in all
countries and clubs to football that is requested to be present in that capacity”.
25.
According to said “Service Contract” the Claimant was entitled to “26% the
importance equal amount from his salary established in the contract of
employment signed on 28 August 2008 and the term of option signed on 17
November 2008, this amounts to be paid on the same dates of those contracts”.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 5 of 23
26.
Article 5.1 of the “Service Contract” establishes that “The [Respondent] may use
the image of the [Claimant] for the disclosure of his, with, and therefore warn
you in advance of at least fifteen days where the event to be held depends on the
physical presence of the [Claimant]”.
27.
Moreover, the “Service Contract” establishes that “The company signing this
Agreement as a responsible [Respondent] solidarity with the obligations assumed
by it with the player in this instrument”.
28.
On 20 January 2010, the Claimant and the Respondent signed another document
titled “THE CONTRACT on performance of professional duties by non-amateurFootball player of Club C” (hereinafter: the second standard contract), valid from
6 January 2010 until 31 December 2010, which contents are the same as the first
standard contract.
29.
On 9 August 2010, the Claimant terminated the contractual relationship in writing
alleging just cause. In his notice of termination, the Claimant referred to his
correspondence, allegedly addressed to the Respondent and the company on 26
July 2010, as well as to the correspondence dated 7 August 2010 sent to the
President of the Respondent, which both allegedly remained unanswered.
30.
On 11 August 2010, the Claimant initiated a debt collection request against the
company before the Debt Collection Office of Baar, Switzerland.
31.
On 13 August 2010, the company was declared bankrupt.
32.
On 19 August 2010, with a subsequent amendment in his replica on 20 June 2017,
the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of
contract.
33.
On 17 April 2011, the Claimant filed a claim against the company before the
Bankruptcy office in Zug, Switzerland, claiming a total amount of CHF 22,659,806
regarding wages and requested collocation of such amounts as a first class claim.
34.
In his claim lodged against the Respondent before FIFA on 19 August 2010, the
Claimant asked to be awarded the following monies:
Outstanding remuneration:
EUR 6,000,000 on the basis of the contractual extension:
EUR 361,772.94 according to art. 3.1.2 of the private contract;
EUR 1,847,240 on the basis of the service agreement.
Compensation:
EUR 7,650,000 on the basis of the contractual extension and the service contract.
35.
In the amended claim submitted in his replica on 20 June 2017, the Claimant
requested the following :
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 6 of 23
- Outstanding remuneration:
EUR 6,000,000 on the basis of the contractual extension, plus 5% interest p.a.
on EUR 3,000,000 as from 25 August 2009 and 5% interest p.a. on EUR
3,000,000 as of 25 September 2009;
- Compensation for breach of contract:
EUR 5,683,674.30 taking into account the residual value of the contractual
extension and his income with a new club, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 9
August 2010; and
- that sporting sanctions be imposed on the Respondent.
36.
According to the Claimant, the Respondent and the Claimant concluded an
employment contract on 28 August 2008, i.e. the private contract, which
established the possibility of extending the contractual period. Subsequently, the
Respondent and the Claimant signed the contractual extension establishing a new
contractual period until 31 December 2011 and determining the remuneration for
the seasons 2010 and 2011.
37.
According to the Claimant, the Respondent failed to pay the instalments that fell
due on 25 August 2009 and 25 September 2009 in the amount of EUR 3,000,000
each in accordance with the contractual extension. In particular, regarding some
of the payments he did receive, the Claimant submitted copies of the following
receipts of money transfers made by the company to the Claimant:
- EUR 3,500,000, dated 4 September 2008;
- EUR 1,333,350, dated 21 October 2008;
- EUR 1,000,000, dated 19 February 2009;
- EUR 35,000, dated 19 February 2009.
38.
The Claimant stated having held several meetings with the Respondent to try to
solve the situation, without success. As a consequence, the Claimant held that he
contacted the Respondent on 26 July 2010, requesting the payment of the
outstanding remuneration of EUR 6,000,000 within 10 days. In this respect, the
Claimant submitted a copy of an undated default notice addressed to the
Respondent and the company, requesting the payment of the amounts due on 25
August 2009 and on 25 September 2009. Since no payment was received, the
Claimant terminated the contract, on 9 August 2010, invoking just cause
considering that his remuneration for the entire 2010 season had been
outstanding for almost a year.
39.
Moreover, the Claimant stated that, before terminating the contract, he also
contacted the company in order to receive the relevant amounts, since the
company also signed the relevant contracts and was the owner of the
Respondent.
40.
Therefore, according to the Claimant, on the date of the claim, the amount of
EUR 6,000,000 was outstanding as per the contractual extension.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 7 of 23
41.
The Claimant informed FIFA that he remained unemployed as from 9 August 2010
until 27 January 2011, on which date he signed an employment contract with the
club from country B, Club E, valid from 27 January 2011 until 31 December 2011.
This employment contract establishes a monthly salary of 70,000 in the currency of
Country B.
42.
Although, following the CAS award, the Respondent was invited to submit its
position as to the substance of the matter only, in light of the relevant CAS award
and the subsequent confirmation of such award by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the
Respondent held in its reply that the DRC is not competent to hear the present
matter and submitted several arguments challenging the competence of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber to decide on the present matter.
43.
In this respect, the Respondent held that the CAS award and the judgement of
the Swiss Federal Tribunal are not applicable as to the DRC’s jurisdiction in the
present matter, because both are based on incomplete facts, since the Respondent
was not involved in the first invalidated proceedings and the proceedings were
not based on the important factual evidence which was now presented.
44.
According to the Respondent, the scope of review of the CAS and the Swiss
Federal Tribunal as appellate bodies was too narrow and they were deprived of
the benefit to consider the new evidence presented only at this stage.
45.
Moreover, the Respondent affirmed that based on the standard contracts of 2008
and 2010, the appropriate bodies of the Professional Football League of Country
D would be competent, rather than the DRC. On the other hand, even if the
Claimant had a valid claim regarding the payments established in the private
contract and the contractual extension and the Respondent were actually
responsible for any payment, the CAS would have exclusive jurisdiction.
46.
The Respondent stated that the DRC is not an arbitration body but rather a body
of an association as confirmed by the CAS and the Swiss federal Tribunal and for
this reason, any decision passed would not serve as a decision enforceable
pursuant to the New York convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. Moreover, the clear intent of the parties was to submit
any dispute to the CAS.
47.
In this respect, the Respondent explained that the company was a party to these
contracts and there was no employment relationship between the company and
the Respondent and the company was not part of the "FIFA family". Therefore,
according to the Respondent, it was the intention of the parties to establish the
jurisdiction of the CAS.
48.
In particular, the Respondent held that (i) the Respondent was not a party to the
contractual extension, (ii) it had no payment obligations to the player and (iii)
that the FIFA Regulations were not applicable.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 8 of 23
49.
Moreover, according to the Respondent, since it was no party to the private
contract and the contractual extension, the present dispute is between the
Claimant and the company, to which the FIFA Regulations cannot apply, and they
certainly cannot derogate from the arbitration clause agreed between the parties.
Therefore, considering that the private contract and the contractual extension
clearly provide for jurisdiction of the CAS triggering the ordinary arbitration
proceedings in accordance with the CAS Code, the agreement of the parties is
valid and binding on the parties.
50.
In addition, the Respondent affirmed that the claim is time-barred according to
the law of Country D, considering that the claim lodged before FIFA does neither
interrupt nor suspend the statute of limitations. The Respondent held that the
claim is also time-barred according to Swiss law, since the DRC is neither an
ordinary court nor an arbitration tribunal.
51.
The Respondent explained that the company was the principal shareholder in
“Company X”, which for its part was the Respondent's principal shareholder.
Moreover, the Respondent added that the company was also the Respondent’s
sponsor “at all relevant times”. In this respect, the Respondent provided a witness
statement from its Vice-President and the General Director of the Respondent as
well as several invoices issued by a hotel in Barcelona to “Company Z”.
52.
Furthermore, according to the Respondent, foreign players have a different
labour status than national players and need to obtain a license to work from the
Agency of Foreign Labor Migration Affairs of Country D. In order to acquire such
license, the Respondent has to submit an employment contract concluded
between the Respondent and the foreign player.
53.
According to the Respondent, the general proceeding was that the company
requested the Respondent to accept a foreign player in the team, following which
the Respondent signed an employment contract with the player and registered
him with the Football Federation of Country D. The player would then play for
the Respondent and receive a salary in accordance with the relevant employment
contract. In this respect, the Respondent affirmed that it was never involved in
further payments to foreign players as well as that all negotiations were handled
by the company directly with the player.
54.
Moreover, allegedly due to statutory currency restrictions in Country D, the
Respondent was not entitled to make foreign-exchange transactions to the
benefit of its football players. Therefore, the company, domiciled outside Country
D, made all the foreign-exchange transactions, since the restrictions under the law
of Country Ds were not applicable to the company.
55.
The Respondent stated having paid the wages established in the first and second
standard contracts in national currency, which are shown in the Respondent’s
monthly wages lists. According to the Respondent, these lists also demonstrate
that the Claimant acknowledged receipt of the relevant payments by signing the
lists. In this regard, the Respondent provided several payroll lists for the relevant
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 9 of 23
period, containing the signature of players, including the Claimant, related to
amounts paid in Currency of Country D.
56.
Therefore, the Respondent held that any payments of salaries other than what
was established in the standard contracts would be arranged for and paid by the
company. In particular, the Respondent held that the company paid the Claimant
in total EUR 11,010,053 between 29 August 2008 and 10 December 2009. In
support of its argument, the Respondent presented copies of 18 receipts of
transfers of different amounts adding up to EUR 11,010,053 made by the
company to the Claimant.
57.
In addition, the Respondent insisted that the payments established in the private
contract were in Euro and thus, should have been made exclusively by the
company. For the same reason, the payments established in the contractual
extension should also be made by the company. In this respect, the Respondent
provided a legal opinion in the sense that the private contract is actually a “civillaw sponsorship agreement” in which the company accepted the obligation to
pay the Claimant in foreign currency. The Respondent further held that the
Respondent did not become a party by means of the contractual extension.
58.
The Respondent insists that it was not aware of any of the aforementioned
payments, private contracts and further documentation, which it allegedly only
had access to upon review of the company’s bankruptcy file.
59.
According to the Respondent, the contractual extension was an initiative of the
Claimant and the company and the Respondent was not aware of the extension.
The document was allegedly drafted by the Claimant’s agent and translated by
the Claimant’s wife, reason why the wording of the contractual extension and its
translation into English creates uncertainty, rendering its wording unreliable.
60.
The Respondent stated that only Mr I, who signed the contractual extension as
the “Acting General Director of the club”, without having the legal capacity to do
so, was aware of such proposal. In addition, Mr I did not speak Portuguese or
English and was allegedly misled by the company. The Respondent never intended
to sign the contractual extension or be a party to the private contract in the first
place and the stakeholders of the Respondent did not approve the extension.
61.
The Respondent further stated that, in accordance with Swiss law, the
interpretation of the private contract and contractual extension shall take into
account the respective wording, the contractual system, the purpose of the
contracts and interest of the parties, the history of the contracts and the conduct
of the parties after conclusion of the contracts. In particular, it has to be examined
how the parties to the private contract and contractual extension understood the
agreements and who was the actual party to such agreements and in which role.
62.
In this context, the Respondent held that the burden of proof lies with the
Claimant, since he is the party claiming on the basis of the private contract and
contractual extension.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 10 of 23
63.
In this respect, the Respondent recalled that the contractual extension was
carelessly drafted. According to the Respondent, the abbreviation Employer
allegedly refers to the company and thus, the company shall pay the salary.
Considering the difference between the versions of the contract in Portuguese
and English, it is not clear who shall make the payments to the Claimant.
Furthermore, the Respondent held that the company was the employer in the
private contract and there is no reason why in the extension of the private
contract the Respondent would become the employer.
64.
Regarding the termination of the contractual relationship by the Claimant, the
Respondent stated having never received any default notice from the Claimant
before the termination. The Respondent alleged that the Claimant played the last
game on 1 August 2010 after which he left Country D without informing the
Respondent of his departure.
65.
In this respect, the Respondent affirmed that all emails regarding negotiations
and payments were exchanged between the Claimant and the company, which
clearly demonstrates that the Respondent was not the debtor, and it submitted
several emails exchanged between the Claimant and Mr K, allegedly the CEO of
the company, in this respect.
66.
In addition, the Respondent held that the Claimant contacted the company on 7,
8 and 9 August 2010 and not the Respondent. According to the Respondent, this
demonstrates that the Claimant negotiated exclusively with the company and
regarded the company as his debtor, even requesting a Debt Registry Extract
regarding the company and also having initiated debt collection proceedings
against it.
67.
According to the Respondent, upon initiating debt proceedings against the
company, in which he allegedly clearly requests the payment of the amounts
claimed in the present matter, the Claimant clearly acknowledges that the
payments under the private contract and the contractual extension were to be
made by the company.
68.
Moreover, the Respondent affirmed that, after the company was declared
bankrupt, the Claimant submitted claims to the Bankruptcy Office, and requested
the collocation of his claim based on his employment relationship with the
company in the first class, submitting a copy of the private contract and the
contractual extension.
69.
Therefore, the Respondent requested that, in case the DRC would consider that
the Respondent was party to the private contract and contractual extension and
had to make payments to the Claimant, the DRC shall consider that the Claimant
waived his right to claim against the Respondent, due to his legal and other
actions brought solely against the company.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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70.
The Respondent affirmed that the Claimant only lodged the claim against the
Respondent before FIFA after the opening of the bankruptcy proceedings against
the company for amounts already included in his debt enforcement, since he was
concerned that the company would not be able to make the relevant payments.
71.
According to the Respondent, in any case, the amount of compensation claimed
must be reduced because the Claimant did not do all in his power to reduce
damages or avoid it altogether, having remained unemployed between 9 August
2010 and 27 January 2011.
72.
Additionally, according to the Respondent, the amount of compensation due, if
any, must be reduced to the extent to which the Claimant would be satisfied from
the company’s liquidator. Qualifying as an employee, the Claimant will benefit
from the classification of his claims submitted in the bankruptcy proceedings
relating to the company as first class claims according to the applicable law.
According to the Respondent, this is very likely to lead to the full or almost full
satisfaction of his submitted claims.
73.
Finally, the Respondent held that the procedural and legal costs incurred by the
Respondent as a result of the claim should be imposed on the Claimant.
74.
In his replica, the Claimant held that the arguments raised by the Respondent as
to the competence of the DRC should not be considered, since the CAS had
already decided in this respect. In any case, the Claimant insisted on the
competence of the DRC to decide on the present matter, stating that article 7.1 of
the standard contracts establish the competence of FIFA. Moreover, the Claimant
recalled the argument of the CAS in the sense that “the Panel would like to
emphasise again that the dispute between the parties deals only with the
payments under the [contractual extension] and, indeed under this contract only
the [Respondent] (the “Employer”) was responsible for the payments to the
[Claimant]”.
75.
In continuation, the Claimant stated that the Respondent is trying to make the
case more complex than it actually is. In particular, the Claimant explained that on
28 August 2008, the Claimant and the Respondent entered into an employment
relationship, concluding two employment contracts, a standard employment
contract and a private employment contract. The standard contract contained
standardized clauses regarding the main terms and conditions, except for a
remuneration. On the other hand, the private contract had as main objective to
set out the remuneration due by the Respondent to the Claimant.
76.
Subsequently, on 17 November 2008, the parties decided to extend the private
contract, concluding the contractual extension and amending some clauses of the
private contract and, on 6 January 2010, the Claimant and the Respondent
concluded another standard employment contract with the same terms and
conditions as the first standard employment contract, without establishing any
remuneration.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 12 of 23
77.
The Respondent failed to pay the first two instalments of the contractual
extension, reason why the Claimant put the Respondent in default and afterwards
terminated the contractual relationship with the Respondent.
78.
Regarding the governing law, the Claimant held that the Respondent failed to
demonstrate that the law of Country D should apply and that there is a reason to
deviate from FIFA Regulations and Swiss law. Moreover, he stated that the parties
agreed on the application of the FIFA Regulations.
79.
In continuation, the Claimant insisted on his claim, making references to several
arguments raised in the CAS award, in particular to the fact that only the
Respondent was responsible to pay the Claimant the remuneration for his services
as player, according to the contractual extension.
80.
Moreover, the Claimant emphasised that the burden of proof regarding the
payment of the remuneration established in the contractual extension lies on the
Respondent and that it failed to present such proof.
81.
The Claimant added that considering the amount outstanding at the moment of
termination, he clearly had just cause to terminate the contract. As a
consequence, since the Claimant terminated the contract with just cause due to
non-payment of the contractual remuneration, the Respondent would have to
demonstrate otherwise. However, the Respondent has not provided any
documentary evidence that would justify why the DRC should take a different
decision.
82.
The Claimant also affirmed that the non-registration of private contracts with the
relevant Association do not render such agreements invalid.
83.
Moreover, the Claimant held that the private contract clearly establishes that the
Respondent employs the Claimant to act in its professional team as well as that
the company is acting as an owner of the Respondent. Finally, all contracts were
duly signed and stamped by the Respondent.
84.
In addition, the Claimant stated that the company’s participation was secondary
only to comply with the payments on behalf of the Respondent, but does not
relieve the Respondent from being the primary debtor. The Claimant further
deemed that it does not make any sense that he would have to continue to play
for the Respondent without receiving his remuneration.
85.
The Claimant made reference to Swiss law and stated that even if a third party is
able to have payment obligations assigned to it, the primary obligor, i.e. the
Respondent, will not be relieved of its liability to pay for amounts that remain
unpaid by the third party, i.e. the company.
86.
The Claimant also stated that by writing both to the company and the
Respondent regarding the outstanding remuneration, the Claimant did not
absolve the Respondent from its liability. However, considering that the company
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 13 of 23
had been making payments to the Claimant on behalf of the Respondent, it was
reasonable to follow-up on payments with the company. The Claimant added that
the Respondent remained the employer and the primary debtor.
87.
The Claimant further held that all agreements were drafted by the Respondent
and the main negotiations were done with the Respondent and, thus, the
Respondent cannot question the contents of the agreements signed raising
mistakes in wording. By signing the contracts, it agreed to its terms and the
company being a shareholder of the Respondent, ratified the authority of Mr I to
sign on behalf of the Respondent.
88.
The Respondent presented its final comments on the present matter, requesting
that the company joins the present procedure as well as a hearing with all persons
involved in the conclusion of the private contract and contractual extension.
89.
The Respondent stated that the Claimant is distorting the facts in an attempt to
find a new debtor, after having lost the real debtor, i.e. the company. The
Respondent further held that the Claimant failed to discharge his burden of proof
and did not submit any bank account statement to avoid demonstrating that all
payments were received from the company.
90.
The Respondent recalled that the company was not a shareholder of the
Respondent, but a shareholder of “Company X”, which was the principal
shareholder of the Respondent and, thus, the company was allegedly not in
contact with the Respondent’s management.
91.
The Respondent insisted on its arguments and, in particular, on the fact that it
was not a party to the private contract and contractual extension and that it
never paid any amount based on such agreements. Moreover, the Respondent
held that the Claimant did not dispute most of the Respondent’s arguments,
simply trying to mislead the decision-body.
92.
In addition, the Respondent held that, upon the Claimant’s request, the company
declared, between March and June 2009, that the funds received from the
company were not salaries from the Respondent, but “subsidies in kind as a
reward for games”. The Respondent provided different statements issued by the
company. One of the statements declares that the Claimant “regularly receives
grants in kind as a prize for games, as a contract of employment signed between
him, Club C and Company Z in 28/08/2008, Clause 3 – Bonus and Benefits of the
Contracted Office”. The Respondent explained that such declarations were
disclosed in proceedings at a court in Country B involving the Claimant and the
Club F.
93.
The Respondent added that the person representing the company and signing the
private contract and contractual extension faced criminal proceedings in Country
D and that, thus, the Respondent cannot be held liable for such agreements.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 14 of 23
94.
The Respondent stated that it never, neither explicitly nor implicitly, expressed its
intention to conclude a contract with the Claimant in which it would be bound as
debtor of the Euro compensation of the Claimant as per the private contract.
95.
Moreover, the Respondent held that, in case it would be considered that the
Respondent is liable to pay any amount related to the private contract and the
contractual extension, the submitted bank extracts demonstrate that the company
paid the Claimant the aggregate amount of EUR 11,010,053, while the
remuneration due under the private contract was EUR 7,500,000. Therefore, it can
be assumed that the remaining EUR 3,510,053 have also been already paid by the
company in the context of the contractual extension, since the private contract
provided for no other payments, and the burden of proof lies on the Claimant.
96.
The Respondent further raised new arguments, affirming that the Claimant is
involved in proceedings in front of a court in Country B, by means of which the
Club F lodged a claim against the Claimant for misappropriation of funds,
involving the company. Therefore, the Respondent requested that the Claimant
disclose his financial dealings with the company in full or that the company joins
the present proceedings.
97.
Furthermore, the Respondent stated that the fact that the Claimant chose to not
disclose the facts above, undermines his credibility and shows that he had a close
relationship with the company.
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 19 August 2010. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008;
hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of
the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016), the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be
competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employmentrelated dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B
and an club from country D.
3.
However, the members of the DRC took note that the Respondent had challenged
the competence of the DRC to adjudicate the present matter, even though it had
been invited to provide its position as to the substance of the present matter only.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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4.
At this point, the members of the DRC recalled that the present matter had
already been decided upon by the Dispute Resolution Chamber on 6 November
2014 and that the Respondent lodged an appeal against said DRC decision in
front of the CAS. In particular, the Chamber took note that, during the hearing at
the CAS, the parties confirmed their agreement to limit the scope of the appeal to
the issue of the competence of the DRC (cf. number I./6. above).
5.
The Chamber further noted that, considering the description of the background
facts in the relevant CAS award, the CAS Panel was informed of the bankruptcy
proceedings involving the company and that the Claimant had submitted a claim
against the company with the relevant bankruptcy office.
6.
Furthermore, the Chamber took into account that the CAS decided to set aside
the DRC decision adopted on 6 November 2014 as well as to refer the matter back
to FIFA for review. In particular, the members of the DRC took note that the CAS,
in the relevant award, established that the DRC is competent to decide on the
present matter, stating inter alia that “any disputes between the [Claimant] and
the [Respondent] had to be resolved in accordance with the FIFA Regulations, and
therefore had to be adjudicated in the first instance by the FIFA DRC”.
7.
Furthermore, the DRC acknowledged that the Respondent challenged the CAS
award in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. On 7 February 2017, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal confirmed the decision adopted by the CAS.
8.
In this respect, the Chamber recalled that in light of art. 57 par. 1 and art. 58 par.
1 of the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA DRC is bound by the findings of CAS panels in
appeal proceedings of decisions passed by the DRC. In casu, CAS clearly found, as
mentioned above, that FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to enter
into the merits of the present matter.
9.
Considering all the above, the members of the DRC unanimously concluded that,
in light of the fact that the competence of the DRC to deal with the present
matter was already determined by the CAS in the aforementioned appeal
proceedings, it was not necessary to proceed with an analysis and discussion on
the issue of the competence of the DRC to deal with the present matter.
10.
Therefore, the DRC concluded that, as already established by the CAS, the DRC is
competent to decide on the employment-related dispute between the Claimant
and the Respondent in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players.
11.
In continuation, the Chamber reverted to the argument of the Respondent,
according to whom the present matter is barred by the statute of limitations on
the basis of the law of Country D and Swiss law. In this regard, the members of
the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 5 of the aforementioned Regulations,
according to which, inter alia, the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall not hear any
case subject to the said Regulations if more than two years have elapsed since the
event giving rise to the dispute. The present claim having been lodged in front of
the DRC on 19 August 2010 and the event giving rise to the dispute having
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 16 of 23
occurred on 9 August 2010, the members of the Chamber had to reject the
respective argument of the Respondent and confirmed that the present petition
was lodged in front of the DRC within said two years’ period of time and is, thus,
not barred by the statute of limitations in accordance with art. 25 par. 5 of the
aforementioned Regulations.
12.
Having said that, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as
to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance
with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016) and considering that the present claim was lodged on 19
August 2010, the 2009 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the
substance.
13.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as
the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the
Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the
facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand.
14.
At this point, the Chamber wished to emphasise that, in line with the decision
passed by the DRC on 6 November 2014, the service contract is not strictly
employment-related within the framework of a player and club relationship and
therefore, does not fall under the competence of the DRC and that, consequently,
any amount claimed on the basis of the service contract cannot be considered.
15.
In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a
claim against the Respondent for breach of contract requesting outstanding
remuneration and compensation for breach of contract.
16.
In this respect, the Chamber first of all acknowledged that the Claimant
terminated the relevant contract on 9 August 2010 in writing, invoking just cause.
17.
The DRC took note that the Claimant held that although he was entitled to
receive the total amount of EUR 6,000,000 in two instalments, which fell due on
25 August 2009 and 25 September 2009 on the basis of the contractual extension,
in spite of his default notice, he had not received any such payments from the
Respondent at the moment when he terminated the contract.
18.
On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Respondent rejected the
Claimant’s claim arguing inter alia that it was not legally bound by the private
contract and the contractual extension.
19.
In this respect, the DRC took note that the Respondent alleged not having been
aware of the private contract and the contractual extension until it had access to
the company’s bankruptcy file. In particular, the Respondent held that it was not
a party to the private contract and the contractual extension invoking various
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 17 of 23
arguments, one of which being that these contracts were allegedly signed by an
unauthorized person on behalf of the Respondent.
20.
Moreover, the Chamber took note that the Respondent held that it made
payments to the Claimant on the basis of the first and second standard contracts
only as well as that it could not assume financial obligations in EUR, alleging that
payments in a foreign currency are forbidden under the law of Country D.
21.
Additionally, the Chamber noted the Respondent’s argument that the Claimant
was aware that the company was the party liable to pay his remuneration and
even considered the company to be the debtor, in light of the correspondence he
exchanged with the company claiming payment of the remuneration established
in the private contract and contractual extension from the company and the debt
enforcement proceedings he initiated against the company.
22.
At this point, the Chamber reverted to the Respondent’s request for the company
to be involved as a party in the present matter. In this respect, the DRC referred to
the contents of art. 6 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and rejected the Respondent’s
request, considering that a company is not a member of FIFA and thus, cannot be
a party in the present matter.
23.
Subsequently, the DRC acknowledged that the Claimant, for his part, insisted on
his claim, stating, inter alia, that the Respondent is the employer and thus, the
party responsible for payment of his remuneration and that the Respondent had
signed all the contracts.
24.
In this respect, the members of the DRC were eager to state that the Respondent’s
argumentation that it was not bound to the private contract and the contractual
extension because they were signed on behalf of the Respondent by a nonauthorized person cannot be upheld. Indeed, the DRC pointed out that, in
accordance with the principle of good faith, to be respected by the parties during
the conclusion of contracts, the Claimant could reasonably believe, in good faith,
that the person signing the relevant agreements on behalf of the Respondent was
legally authorized to sign them. Equally and in accordance with the principle of
burden of proof, as set out in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC
outlined that the Respondent did not provide documentary evidence
demonstrating that the Claimant was or could have been aware of the alleged
situation outlined by the Respondent at the moment of signing the pertinent
contracts. In this context, the members of the DRC further highlighted that the
signatures on the relevant contracts are accompanied by the Respondent’s stamp.
25.
In continuation, the DRC concluded that the arguments raised by the Respondent
regarding foreign currency restrictions and that it was not aware of the private
contract and the contractual extension could not be upheld, considering that the
Respondent duly signed and stamped both contracts, thereby accepting their
contractual terms.
26.
On account of these considerations, the members of the Chamber concurred that
the arguments put forward by the Respondent with respect to its allegation that
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 18 of 23
it is not legally bound to the private contract and the contractual extension must
be rejected.
27.
Having established the above, the members of the DRC recalled that the claim of
the Claimant is mainly based on the contractual extension as well as that the first
and second standard contracts do not specify any remuneration payable to the
Claimant for his services, whereas they do establish, inter alia, that the
Respondent employs the Claimant as a player.
28.
In this respect and considering the arguments of the Claimant and the
Respondent, the DRC analysed the contents of the contractual extension in
greater detail so as to determine the party responsible for paying the Claimant’s
remuneration.
29.
In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the contractual extension clearly defines
the Respondent as the “Employer” and clearly establishes that the “Employer”
was responsible to pay the Claimant’s remuneration.
30.
For the sake of completeness, bearing in mind that the employment contract
signed between the Claimant and the Respondent on 28 August 2008 which is
mentioned in art. 3 of the contractual extension has not further been specified in
said art. 3, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with the private contract
signed on 28 August 2008, the Respondent is referred to as the employer of the
Claimant and the company as the owner of the Respondent. In addition,
according to the first standard contract concluded on 28 August 2008 the
Respondent “undertakes to employ the [Claimant] as a professional football
player (non-amateur football player) of soccer team Club C, to pay wages and to
provide with the working conditions necessary for performance of such work and
stipulated by the legislation of Country D, and the [Claimant] undertakes to
perform work as the football player of [Respondent], using thus all professional
skills with the purpose of achievement by [Respondent] high sports results”.
31.
Having taken note of the various employment-related contracts concluded by and
between the Claimant and the Respondent as well as by and between the
Claimant, the Respondent and the company, the members of the Chamber
established that the Claimant and the Respondent entered into an employment
relationship and that the Claimant would render his services to the Respondent
only. In other words, there is no reciprocal exchange of obligations between the
Claimant and the company and it is, therefore, unquestionable that the Claimant
carried out his services as a player on behalf of the Respondent and not on behalf
of the company. What is more, the private contract clearly refers to the company
as the owner of the Respondent and, therefore, there is a clear link between the
company and the Respondent. It thus appears that the company was merely
included as a third party in the relevant contracts as a payment instrument.
32.
On account of the above considerations, the members of the DRC decided to
reject the arguments put forward by the Respondent and established that the
Respondent is the party responsible to pay the Claimant his remuneration
established in, inter alia, the contractual extension.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 19 of 23
33.
Having established the above, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant and the
Respondent signed the contractual extension on 17 November 2008 extending
employment relationship until 31 December 2011. In particular, the DRC
acknowledged that the contractual extension established that the Claimant was
entitled to receive the amount of EUR 6,000,000 for each of the seasons 2010 and
2011, to be paid in two equal instalments of EUR 3,000,000, due on 25 August and
25 September 2009, for the season 2010, and on 25 August and 25 September
2010, for the season 2011.
34.
In addition, the DRC recalled that the Claimant terminated the relevant contract
on 9 August 2010 alleging that the aggregate amount of EUR 6,000,000,
corresponding to the two instalments of EUR 3,000,000 each due for the 2010
season, which fell due on 25 August and 25 September 2009, respectively, was still
outstanding in spite of having put the Respondent in default.
35.
In this respect, the Chamber took note that the Respondent, for its part, held that
the monies paid to the Claimant by the company should be taken into account. In
particular, the Respondent held that the Claimant had received remuneration in
the total amount of EUR 11,010,053 between 29 August 2008 and 10 December
2009, providing several receipts of money transfers totalling said amount.
36.
Furthermore, the DRC took note that the Claimant had not contested having
received the relevant money transfers from the company.
37.
In this context, the DRC took into account that in accordance with the private
contract, which was valid as from 28 August 2008 until 28 August 2009, the
Claimant was entitled to receive a total remuneration of EUR 7,500,000 and that
the Respondent demonstrated having remitted the amount of EUR 11,010,053 to
the Claimant between 29 August 2008 and 10 December 2009. Consequently, the
members of the DRC considered that the difference of EUR 3,510,053 corresponds
to the remuneration that fell due in accordance with the contractual extension, of
which the first instalment in the amount of EUR 3,000,000 fell due on 25 August
2009.
38.
On account of the aforementioned, the Chamber established that the
Respondent, without any valid reason, failed to remit to the Claimant a big
portion of the instalment due on 25 September 2009, i.e. the amount of EUR
2,489,947, and that this amount was still outstanding on 9 August 2010 when the
Claimant terminated the relevant contract. Therefore, the Chamber concurred
that the Respondent had seriously neglected its financial contractual obligations
towards the Claimant over a substantial amount of time. Bearing in mind the
Respondent’s allegation that it had not received a default notice from the
Claimant, in spite of the Claimant having submitted a copy of a default notice, in
light of said important delay in payment of such substantial part of the Claimant’s
remuneration, the members of the Chamber deemed that the Claimant could in
good faith believe that, in spite of a hypothetical notice informing about its
default, the Respondent would have persisted in the non-compliance with the
financial terms of the contract.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 20 of 23
39.
On account of the above and taking into consideration the Chamber’s
longstanding jurisprudence in this respect, the Chamber decided that the
Claimant had just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract on 9 August 2010
and that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the
contract with just cause by the Claimant.
40.
Furthermore, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt
servanda, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the
Claimant the amount which was outstanding under the contractual extension at
the moment of the termination, i.e. EUR 2,489,947.
41.
In continuation, having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for
the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant,
the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations,
the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant.
42.
In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for
the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining
on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on
whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
43.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of
contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation
clause was included in the relevant contract.
44.
Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the
Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration
due to the Claimant in accordance with the contractual extension as well as the
time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the
Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber
pointed out that at the time of the termination of the relevant employment
contract on 9 August 2010, the contractual extension would still run until 31
December 2011. Consequently, taking into account the financial terms of the
contractual extension, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the
contractual extension as from its early termination by the Claimant until the
regular expiry of the contract amounts to EUR 6,000,000 and that such amount
shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation
for breach of contract.
45.
In continuation, the Chamber remarked that following the early termination of
the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute, the Claimant had
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 21 of 23
found new employment with the club from country B, Club E, as from 27 January
2011 until 31 December 2011, with which club he would be remunerated with the
total amount of 770,000, which corresponds to the approximate amount of
EUR 336,000. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to
mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract
shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for
breach of contract.
46.
In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay
the amount of EUR 5,664,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of
contract.
47.
As regards the Claimant’s request for 5% interest p.a. on the amounts to be
awarded as of the respective due dates, the Chamber first of all noted that such
request was only included in the Claimant’s amended claim of 20 June 2017.
Indeed, the Claimant’s statement of claim dated 19 August 2010 does not include
any request for interest. Therefore, and given the particular circumstance that the
present matter has been pending for a considerable amount of time in light of
the various proceedings following the DRC decision of 6 November 2014, the
Chamber did not consider it appropriate to grant the Claimant interest on the
amounts awarded as of the respective due dates.
48.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted, insofar as it is
admissible.
2.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in
the amount of EUR 2,489,947, w ithin 30 day s as from the date of notification of
this decision.
3.
The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract
in the amount of EUR 5,664,000, w ithin 30 day s as from the date of notification
of this decision.
4.
In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 2. and 3. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated
time limits, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the
aforementioned time limits and the present matter shall be submitted, upon
request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal
decision.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Page 22 of 23
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must
be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and
shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the
CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry
of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief
stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4
of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Encl. CAS directives
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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