Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 September 2017,
in the following composition:
Thom as Grim m (Sw itzerland), Deputy Chairman
John Bram hall (England), member
Johan v an Gaalen (S outh Africa), member
Pav el Piv ov arov (Russ ia), member
Moham ed Al S aikhan (S audi Arabia), member
on the claim lodged by the club,
Club A, Country B,
as Claimant
against the player,
Play er C, Country B
as Respondent I
and the club,
Club D, Country E
as Respondent II
and the club,
Club F, Country G
as Respondent III
regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 31 December 2011, the Player of Country B, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent
I), born on 10 November 1996, his father and the Club of Country B, Club A
(hereinafter: Club A or the Claimant), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter:
the first contract) valid as from 1 January 2012 until 30 November 2014, “with the
possibility to extend until 30/11/2015 if the club exercise the option” (free translation).
2.
Pursuant to art. 3 of the first contract, “Club A will pay to the [Respondent I] as
remuneration for his services, a net monthly indemnity of 30 000 (…): as well as
benefits in kind (food and accommodation) in the value of 30 000 (…). That is a total
of 60 000 [approx. USD 120]” (free translation).
3.
Art. 5 of the first contract further stipulates that “[m]atch bonuses are set out at the
beginning of the season based on the annual budget established by the Direction”.
4.
Furthermore, art. 9 of the first contract provides for the following:
“The parties agree to solve amicably the disputes that might arise during the execution
of this contract.
Failing that, the dispute will be subject to the arbitration of the Football Federation H,
of CAF or FIFA”.
5.
Besides, according to Club A, on 25 June 2013, the parties, i.e. the Respondent I, his
father and Club A, concluded a second employment contract, valid as from 1 December
2014 until 30 November 2016, “with the possibility to extend until 30/11/2017 if the
club exercise the option” (free translation). In support of its assertion, Club A
submitted a copy of an employment contract (hereinafter: the second contract)
containing the exact same terms as the first contract apart from the clause related to
the remuneration and benefits which reads as follows:
“Club A will pay the [Respondent I] as remuneration for his services, a net monthly
indemnity of 60 000 (…)”.
6.
On 25 November 2013, Club A informed the Football Federation of Country B (Football
Federation H) that the Respondent I was absent since October 2013.
7.
On 6 December 2013, Club A informed the Football Federation H that the Respondent
I had resumed duties and had apologised for his unjustified absence.
8.
On 22 April 2014, Club A requested the Football Federation H’s assistance in order for
the Respondent I to resume duties. In particular, Club A alleges that the Respondent I
had been absent for two months and was allegedly training with Club J.
9.
On 5 July 2014, Club A requested once again the Football Federation H’s assistance,
pointing out that the Respondent I had been absent for four months and took part in
games of the U-20 national team.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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10.
On 10 November 2014, the Respondent I’s father addressed a correspondence to the
club, which, inter alia, reads as follows:
“Since the signature of the employment contract binding you to my son which I
concluded on his behalf in 2013, just after the U17 Championship K, I have not
received a copy of the contract in order to analyse our respective obligations. You did
not deal with diligence the opportunities that were offered to my son. Furthermore, it
is impossible to contact you in order to work on the football career of my son (…). The
foregoing might be detrimental to his career. Therefore, he informed that he does not
want to play with your club any longer.
In view of the above, I herewith inform you of my decision to terminate the
employment contract binding us. I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt
of said termination. In advance, I thank you (…) for taking the necessary steps for the
termination to be effective without delay. If not, I will have to refer the matter to the
competent bodies”.
11.
On 11 November 2014, Club A rejected the termination, stressing that since the
beginning of 2014, the Respondent I had been in breach of his contractual obligations
and requesting the latter to resume duties.
12.
On the same date, Club A requested the Football Federation H’s assistance in order to
amicably solve the dispute between itself and the Respondent I.
13.
On 22 November 2014, Club A addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I’s
father, requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.
14.
On 25 November 2014, the Respondent I’s father addressed a second correspondence
to Club A, reiterating the content of his previous correspondence.
15.
On 30 November 2014, the Respondent I addressed a correspondence to Club A, which
reads as follows:
“Over the last six months I did not receive any payments from your side although I
have constantly asked you to proceed with such payments, because of my really
precarious financial situation. You have always told that the money will arrive, but this
was not true. I am still waiting for these payments. I have unfortunately understood
that you will never make these payments to me and this fact really disappoints me,
considering that I have rendered my services to you in the same timeframe.
Through this severe and continuous violation of the contract and the breach of your
first obligation as an employer, I have lost the confidence in your club to a point that a
continuation of our collaboration is not possible any longer. For this reason I do not
consider myself bound any longer to your club due to your severe faults and herewith
reserves all my rights to proceed against your club for recovering all the damage
caused to me”.
16.
On 3 December 2014, Club A sent a correspondence to the Respondent I’s father,
rejecting the termination and requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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17.
On 30 December 2014, after holding a meeting with the Respondent I and a
representative of the Football Federation H, Club A authorised the Respondent I to
perform a trial test with Club F (hereinafter: Club F or the Respondent III) as from 1
January 2015 until 1 February 2015.
18.
On 1 January 2015, the Respondent I and the Club of Country E, Club D (hereinafter:
Club D or the Respondent II) concluded an employment contract, valid until 31
December 2015 and according to which the Respondent I was entitled to receive a
monthly salary of 4,600 (approx. 160,000).
19.
On 8 February 2015, Club A requested Club F information about the trial tests as well
as the whereabouts of the Respondent I.
20.
On 11 February 2015, Club A addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I’s father,
requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.
21.
On 19 February 2015, Club F sent an e-mail to Club A, informing the latter that the
trial test was not convincing and the Respondent I had entered into an employment
contract with Club D.
22.
On 25 February 2015, Club A addressed a correspondence to Club F, requesting the
latter to confirm that the Respondent I joined Club F in January 2015 and to provide it
with information regarding his signature with Club D.
23.
On the same date, Club A requested the intervention of the Players’ Status Committee
of the Football Federation H.
24.
On 13 March 2015, Club F informed Club A that the Respondent I had actually
performed a trial test in January 2015.
25.
On the same date, the Football Association of Country E requested the International
Transfer Certificate (ITC) of the Respondent I to the Football Federation H.
26.
On 16 March 2015, the Football Federation H rejected the issuance of the ITC, based on
the fact that the Respondent I had a valid contract with Club A until 30 November
2016.
27.
On 15 May 2015, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorised the
provisional registration of the Respondent I with Club D.
28.
On 23 September 2016, Club A lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent
I, Club F and Club D for breach of contract and inducement to the breach respectively.
In particular, Club A requests the Respondent I and Club D to be held jointly and
severally liable to pay the amount of EUR 500,000 as compensation as well as the
imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent I, Club D and Club F.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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29.
In its claim, Club A asserts that following the Respondent I’s good performance during
the U17 Championship K and considering the interest of several prestigious European
clubs, the parties decided to sign the second contract which would enter into force
after the Respondent I’s 18th birthday. In this regard, Club A points out that the second
contract contains all the essentialia negotii and that the Respondent I was registered
at the Football Federation H with said contract under the status of professional.
30.
Nevertheless, Club A states that following the U-17 World Cup, the Respondent I was
absent without justification between 4 November and 6 December 2013. Club A
further alleges that as from the end of February 2014, the Respondent I was again
absent and that thus it legitimately suspended the payment of his salary. In particular,
Club A outlines that it found out that in the meanwhile the Respondent I had trained
with Club J and Club F. In this respect, Club A emphasises that it addressed several
correspondence to the Football Federation H, expressing its concern.
31.
Subsequently, Club A explains that at the end of December 2014, it held a meeting
with the Respondent I, on occasion of the latter, the Respondent I made clear that he
did not want to play any longer for the club. Therefore, in good faith, Club A sustains
that it authorised the Respondent I to travel to Club F in order to perform a trial test.
In this regard, Club A insists that during the meeting, neither the Respondent I, nor his
father challenged the validity or enforceability of the first and second contracts.
32.
In continuation, Club A argues that instead of starting his trial period with Club F, the
Respondent I signed an employment contract with Club D on 1 January 2015, thereby
breaching the second contract.
33.
Having established the above, Club A focuses on the calculation of the compensation
payable. In doing so, Club A outlines that the following criteria should be taken into
consideration by the Dispute Resolution Chamber: (i) the breach occurred within the
protected period; (ii) the remuneration received from his new club; (iii) the loss of a
chance of receiving a transfer compensation and (iv) the specificity of sport. In view of
the above-mentioned criteria, Club A requests to be awarded with the amount of EUR
500,000 as compensation.
34.
Club A further asserts that the Respondent I was induced to breach the contract by
Club D with the complicity of Club F. In particular, Club A asserts that Club F’s
reputation was used in order to ease the Respondent I’s entry in Schengen area and his
transfer to Club D. In this respect, Club A stresses on the bad faith of Club F, which
maintains that the Respondent I performed the trial test in January 2015 whereas
there is evidence that the he had already signed with Club D on 1 January 2015.
Consequently, Club A requests the imposition of sporting sanction on both clubs based
on art. 17 par. 4 and par. 5 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(hereinafter: the FIFA Regulations).
35.
In his reply to the claim, the Respondent I first challenges the competence of FIFA to
deal with the matter based on art. 9 of the first contract (cf. point 4 above). In
particular, the Respondent I asserts that the parties agreed to subject themselves to
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
5
“arbitration”. Therefore, considering that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA is
not an arbitral tribunal and that CAF does not have any competence in employmentrelated matters, the sole competent body is the arbitral tribunal of the Football
Federation H as established in art. 78 of the Statutes of the Football Federation H.
36.
Furthermore, the Respondent I explains that in Club A’s perspective, he “repudiated”
the contract when he allegedly disappeared in February 2014, or at the latest in April
2014. According to the Respondent I, such disappearance constitutes the event giving
rise to the dispute and therefore, Club A’s claim, which was lodged on 23 September
2016, must be deemed time-barred.
37.
As to the substance, the Respondent I asserts that he was free to leave Club A since he
was deemed as an amateur player pursuant to art. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players. In this regard, the Respondent I points out that he was
living with his parents and therefore did not receive the extra amount of 30,000 as
benefits in kind. As a consequence, in accordance with art. 4 of the first contract, the
Respondent I argues that his remuneration amounted to 30,000, which is allegedly
equivalent to half of the minimum wage in Country B and merely constitutes the
reimbursement of his football expenses. The Respondent I further emphasises that the
fact that he considered himself as an amateur is reflected by the terms used in his
correspondence dated 30 November 2014. In particular, the Respondent I highlights
that the words “payment” and “collaboration” rather than “salary” and “employment
relationship” are used. Equally, the Respondent I outlines that he did not terminate an
employment contract but rather “do[es] not consider [himself] bound any longer”.
38.
In continuation, the Respondent I alleges that, aware that the unilateral extension
option included in the first contract would be deemed null and void as per art. 18 par.
2 of the FIFA Regulations, Club A decided to “fabricate” the second contract. In this
regard, the Respondent I firmly denies having ever signed said contract.
39.
The Respondent I then explains that the meeting held in December does not constitute
a proof that a valid employment relationship was in force. In this regard the
Respondent I insists that the reason why he accepted to meet Club A’s representatives
at the end of December 2014 was the rule applicable in Country B according to which
a player needs the authorisation of the last club where he was registered in order for
him to be able to leave the country.
40.
Notwithstanding the above, and should the DRC consider it valid, the Respondent I
argues that the first contract and the second contract must be deemed a “chain
contract”, which de facto bound him for a period running from 1 January 2012 until 30
November 2016, i.e. more than the limitation of three years established in art. 18 par.
2 of the FIFA Regulations.
41.
The Respondent I further points out that the second contract was allegedly signed on
23 June 2013, i.e. 18 months before its entry into force. In this respect, the Respondent
I sustains that the second contract contradicts “the ethical principles of our legal
system as well as the moral values of the community and should therefore be deemed
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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null and void” in accordance with art. 20 par. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations in
combination with art. 27 par. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code.
42.
Subsequently, the Respondent I affirms that he was always at disposal Club A and
stresses that the latter never put him in default. In this respect, the Respondent I
questions why Club A addressed its letters to the Football Federation H or his father
instead of sending them directly to him. Moreover, the Respondent I calls into
question the authenticity of the letters sent to the Football Federation H, which oddly
remained unanswered by the latter. In continuation, the Respondent I alleges that
Club A failed to pay his dues without any valid reason since February 2014. In this
regard, the Respondent I argues that on several occasions he requested orally Club A
to do so.
43.
Furthermore, the Respondent I argues that Club A’s sole concern was to make profit
from his sale. In this regard, the Respondent I sustains that Club A obliged him to go
abroad in order to perform trial tests, emphasising once again that he would not have
been allowed to leave the country without Club A’s permission.
44.
The Respondent I further maintains that in any case Club A did not suffer any damage.
45.
In its reply to the claim, Club F alleges that on 24 September 2014, it addressed a
request to the Consulate of Country G in City L in order to invite the Respondent I for a
trial. Following this request, Club F explains that the Respondent I travelled to Country
G and was on trials between 1 November and 28 November 2014. Subsequently, Club F
states that on 9 December 2014, it requested a second authorisation to the Consulate
of Country G in City L. In this regard, Club F insists that it was not aware of any
contractual relationship binding the Respondent I, which is the reason why the
requests were addressed to the Consulate of Country G and not to Club A. In
particular, regarding the second request, Club F points out that it is the Respondent I
himself who remitted it to Club A on 30 December 2014.
46.
In continuation, Club F contends that the Respondent I arrived in Country G on 10
January 2015 and started to train with the B team. Club F then explains that on or
around 20 January 2015, it informed the Respondent I that he would not be retained
and authorised the Respondent I to go to Paris for personal and administrative reasons
on 25 January 2015. As from that date, Club F alleges that it has not heard from the
Respondent I and therefore assumed that the latter had travelled back to Country B.
47.
In spite of having been invited to do so, Club D did not reply to the claim.
48.
In its replica, Club A insists on the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter.
In particular, Club A points out that neither the first nor the second contract contains a
clear and exclusive arbitration clause in favour of the NDRC of Country B. Furthermore,
Club A outlines that the Respondent I failed to demonstrate that the alleged NDRC
guarantees fair proceedings and complies with the principle of equal representation.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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49.
In continuation, Club A argues that the event giving rise to the dispute is the signature
of the contract between the Respondent I and Club D on 1 January 2015.
50.
Turning to the substance, Club A insists on the authenticity of the second contract. In
this respect, Club A emphasises that in its correspondence dated 10 November 2014,
the Respondent I’s father refers to an employment contract signed in 2013 (cf. point 10
above).
51.
Club A further states that the first and the second contracts have a different grounds
and must therefore be deemed as independent from each other.
52.
Having said the above, Club A states that in accordance with both the first and the
second contract, the Respondent I had to be deemed as a professional. In support of its
assertion, Club A stresses on the link of subordination as well as on the monthly
amount of 60,000 which was paid to the Respondent I “as remuneration for his
services”. Equally, Club A outlines that the Respondent I received a bonus of 41,000 in
December 2013 as well as match bonuses in the amount of 60,000 in January and
February 2014. In light of the foregoing, Club A concludes that the Respondent I was
paid more than the expenses effectively incurred for his football activity.
53.
Besides, Club A firmly challenges the Respondent I’s assertion that he was sent on trials
upon its request, outlining the latter’s failure to submit any evidence in this respect.
54.
Subsequently, Club A asserts that it decided to contact the Respondent I through the
Football Federation H when it realised that the latter Association was able to
successfully call him up.
55.
In continuation, Club A reiterates its assertions regarding Club F’s involvement in the
breach of contract. In particular, Club A questions why Club F terminated the trial after
one week and insured the Respondent I until 20 January 2015 only when the trial
period was initially planned until 8 February 2015.
56.
Furthermore, Club A stresses on the close links existing between the Respondent I’s
agent, Agent M, Club F and Club D.
57.
In any case, Club A states that Club F lacked diligence and should have requested
information about the Respondent I’s contractual situation to the Football Federation
H or at least enquired on the web.
58.
In his final comments, the Respondent I insists on FIFA’s lack of competence and on the
prescription of the claim.
59.
As to the substance, the Respondent I reiterates that he was to be qualified as an
amateur considering the monies due to him. In this respect, the Respondent I outlines
that the status under which he was registered at the Football Federation H is
irrelevant.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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60.
In continuation, the Respondent I challenges once more the authenticity of the second
contract. In this regard, the Respondent I points out that he constitutes a legal person
independent from his father and is therefore not bound by the statements of the later.
The Respondent I further asserts that the correspondence dated 30 November 2014
was sent in order to avoid any issue as regards the unilateral option contained in the
first contract.
61.
Furthermore, the Respondent I asserts that Club A was at all times aware of his
whereabouts and should have directly entered into contact with him instead of going
through the Football Federation H.
62.
In its final comments, Club F reiterates its previous assertions regarding its lack of
involvement in the Respondent I’s alleged breach of contract.
63.
Upon request, the Respondent I submitted the alleged original version of the second
contract.
64.
On 19 August 2015, the Respondent I and the Club of Country N, Club O, entered into
an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until 10 June 2016 and in
accordance with which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration of 100,000 (approx.
900,000). Subsequently, on 28 July 2016, the Respondent I signed an employment
contract with Club P, valid until 30 June 2020 and according to which he was entitled
to a monthly remuneration of 18,000 plus USD 10,000.
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC)
analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it
took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 23 September 2016.
Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’
Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules)
is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber further referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules and took note that the Respondent I challenged its competence to deal with the
claim of the Claimant. In particular, the Chamber noted that the Respondent considers
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
9
that the NDRC of Country B should be the competent body pursuant to art. 9 of the
first contract.
3.
In this regard, the members of the Chamber outlined that the club mistakenly referred
to criteria stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players, whereas its competence in the matter at stake is actually based on art. 24 par.
1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016) since the matter concerns a dispute between a club and a player
as well as, inter alia, his new club in relation to the maintenance of contractual
stability where there has been an ITC and a claim from an interested party regarding
the payment of compensation for breach of contract. In view of the foregoing, the
Chamber concluded that it would, in principle, be competent to deal with the
Claimant’s claim.
4.
The Chamber then reverted to the argument of the Respondent I, according to whom
the present matter is barred by the statute of limitations. In this regard, the members
of the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (edition 2016), according to which, inter alia, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber shall not hear any case subject to the said Regulations if more
than two years have elapsed since the event giving rise to the dispute. The present
claim having been lodged in front of the DRC on 23 September 2016 and the event
giving rise to the dispute being, according to the Claimant, the alleged breach of
contract committed by the Respondent I on 1 January 2015, i.e. when he signed with
the Respondent II, the members of the Chamber had to reject the respective argument
of the Respondent I and confirmed that the present petition was lodged in front of
the DRC within said two years’ period of time. The matter is, thus, not barred by the
statute of limitations in accordance with art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players (edition 2016).
5.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to
the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26
par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016),
and considering that the present claim was lodged on 23 September 2016, the 2016
version of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
6.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the
Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the
arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber
emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts,
arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand.
7.
In doing so, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 31 December 2011,
the Claimant and the Respondent I concluded an employment contract valid until 30
November 2014. The Chamber further observed that, according to the Claimant, on 25
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
10
June 2013, the parties concluded a second employment contract valid as from 1
December 2014 until 30 November 2016. Furthermore, the Chamber also took note of
the Claimant’s allegations according to which the Respondent I breached the alleged
contractual relationship by signing a contract with the Respondent II.
8.
The DRC further noted that the Respondent I, on its part, challenged the authenticity
of his signature contained in the second contract. Moreover, the Chamber noticed that
according to the Respondent I, the level of remuneration established in the
employment contracts does not allow him to be considered as a professional player.
Finally, the DRC took note of the Respondent I’s assertion that the alleged signature of
the second contract constitutes a circumvention of the prohibition established in art.
18 par. 2 of the Regulations regarding the duration of the contracts concluded with
players under the age of 18.
9.
In view of the above, the Chamber first of all deemed that it has to deal with the issue
of the validity of the second contract in view of the allegation of the Respondent I
regarding the alleged forgery thereof.
10.
At this stage, the DRC considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule,
FIFA's deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such
as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs fall into
the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.
11.
In continuation, the DRC recalled that, according to art. 12 par. 6 of the Procedural
Rules, all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and,
therefore, the Chamber focused its attention on the second contract as well as on the
other documents containing the signature of the Respondent I provided by the parties
in the context of the present dispute. In this regard, the DRC pointed out that the
alleged original version of the second contract was provided by the Claimant.
12.
After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing
the relevant signatures, the Chamber had no other option but to conclude that, for a
layman, it is not possible to establish with certainty if the contract is forged or not. In
this regard, the Chamber emphasised that without a decision from a competent
authority establishing that the second contract is forged, the DRC must consider the
latter contract as valid.
13.
What is more, the DRC wished to point out that the content of the letters sent by the
Respondent I’s father and the Respondent himself on 10 and 30 November 2014
respectively tend to confirm that the parties had actually concluded the second
contract. Equally, the Chamber felt comforted in its finding by the fact that the
Respondent I requested the Claimant’s authorisation in order to perform a trial test
with the Respondent III in January 2015.
14.
In view of the above, the Chamber came to the conclusion that on 25 June 2013, the
parties entered into the second contract, in principle valid as from 1 December 2014
until 30 November 2016.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
11
15.
After having established the above, the members of the Chamber turned their
attention to the status of the Respondent I. In order to do so, the Chamber recalled
the content of art. 2 of the Regulations according to which “[a] professional is a player
who has a written contract with a club and is paid more for his footballing activity
than the expenses he effectively incurs”.
16.
In this regard, the Chamber recalled its previous considerations and stressed that the
parties were indeed bound by a written contract, i.e. the second contract (cf. point
II.14 above).
17.
Furthermore, the DRC focused on the remuneration established in the aforesaid
second contract, emphasising that the latter provides for a monthly remuneration of
60,000. In this regard, and considering that as acknowledged by the Respondent I
himself this amount corresponds to the minimum salary in Country B, the Chamber had
no other option than to deem the Respondent I as a professional. In the Chamber’s
opinion, this consideration is confirmed by the Respondent I’s own statement dated 30
November 2016, in which he acknowledged being “bound” to the Claimant.
18.
In continuation, the Chamber turned its attention to the consequence resulting from
the signature of the second contract. In particular, the Chamber outlined that by
signing the second contract, the parties de facto extended the contractual relationship
to five years while art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations stipulates that players under the
age of 18 may not sign a professional contract longer than three years.
19.
Along these lines, it is undisputed that the Respondent I was under 18 years old when
he first signed a contract with Club A. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber held that
the second contract’s period of validity should be reduced to a maximum of three
years as from the beginning of the first contract, i.e. as from 1 January 2012. As such,
the Chamber concluded that the contractual relationship between the parties
effectively expired on 31 December 2014.
20. The foregoing being established, the Chamber turned to the question whether the
Respondent I had breached the contract which bound him to the Claimant until 31
December 2014. In this regard, the DRC wished to emphasise that in spite of the
Respondent I’s letter of 30 November 2014, the latter maintained discussions with the
Claimant during the month of December 2014 and even held a meeting with its
representatives on 30 December 2014. In the Chamber’s opinion, by acting in such way,
both parties demonstrated that they still considered themselves bound by a contract at
the end of December 2014, i.e. the expiry of the contractual relationship.
21. As a consequence, and considering the above, the Chamber came to the conclusion
that when the Respondent I signed a contract with the Respondent II on 1 January
2015, the former was free to do so since he was no longer bound to the Claimant.
22. All the above led the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that the claim of the
Claimant has to be rejected.
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is rejected.
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to
the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all
the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which
we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing
the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal
arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full
address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Encl. CAS directives
Club A, Country B / Player C, Country B / Club D, Country E / Club F, Country G
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