Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 September 2015,
by Philippe Diallo (France), DRC judge,
on the claim presented by the player,
Player A, Country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I. Facts of the case
1. On 31 January 2013, the Player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant),
concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) with the Club of
Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), valid as from the date of
signature until 30 June 2013.
2. According to the clause 4 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled, inter alia, to
the following remuneration:
- EUR 655, corresponding to the Claimant’s monthly salary, payable at the end of
each month;
- EUR 5,000, corresponding to a “bonus of promotion”;
- EUR 9,150, corresponding to four instalments in the amount of EUR 2,287.50, to
be respectively paid on 28 February 2013, 30 March 2013, 30 April 2013 and 30
May 2013.
- “Rent of a house and a car and a ticket from City in Country D to Country B”.
3. In addition, clause 10 of the contract stipulated the following:
“All disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the
Resolution of Financial Disputes of the Football Federation of Country D at first
instance and the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation of Country D at
second instance.”
4. On 10 October 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the
Respondent, and requested the payment of a total amount of EUR 6,936.42, “plus
related interest”, detailed as follows:
- EUR 1,000, corresponding to an outstanding payment for May 2013;
- EUR 5,000, corresponding to the “bonus of promotion”;
- EUR 936.42, corresponding to flight tickets.
5. In its reply, the Respondent argued that FIFA is not competent in this matter,
since article 10 of the contract stated that any and all disputes arising from it
shall be settled in first instance by the “Committee for the Resolution of Financial
Disputes” of the Football Federation of Country D and by the Court of
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Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Arbitration of the Football Federation of Country D in second instance, which
are, according to the Respondent, institutions that are compliant with the
principle of equal representation of players and clubs.
6. After being required to provide more evidence on the alleged competence of the
aforementioned bodies, the Respondent submitted a full copy of the Statutes of
the Football Federation of Country D.
7. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent stated that the Claimant has
been fully paid for the month of May 2013 by means of a payment in the amount
of EUR 5,400, which included the Claimant’s remuneration for the months of
April and May 2013. In reference to the flight tickets, the Respondent considered
that the Claimant was entitled to only one ticket in the amount of EUR 468.21,
which was already paid with the payment in the amount of EUR 5,400.
Consequently, the Respondent considered that all outstanding payments were
settled.
8. In his final comments, the Claimant considered that the Respondent did not
prove that FIFA should not be competent in this case.
9. In addition, the Claimant explained that the payment of EUR 5,400 did not
include his full remuneration for the month of May 2013, which consisted,
according to the Claimant, in the amount of EUR 3,000.
10. As a result, the Claimant requested the payment of an amount of EUR 1,000,
corresponding to outstanding remuneration for May 2013, as well as the
payment of an amount of EUR 5,000, corresponding to the “bonus of
promotion”. In this regard, the Claimant explained that the Respondent tried to
reach him to find an amicable settlement, a fact that, according to him, is in
contradiction with the Respondent’s argument stating that all outstanding
payments have been settled.
II. Considerations of the DRC judge
1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge (hereinafter also
referred to as DRC Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the
case at hand. In this respect, the DRC judge took note that the present matter
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Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
was submitted to FIFA on 10 October 2013. Consequently, the DRC judge
concluded that the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber, (hereinafter: the
Procedural Rules), is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2012, 2014
and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules).
2. With regard to the competence of the DRC judge, art. 3 of the Procedural Rules
states that the DRC judge shall examine his jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24
of the 2012, 2014 and 2015 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players. In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 lit. i. in combination with
art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the DRC judge would, in
principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an
employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player
of Country B and a Club of Country D.
3. However, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Respondent, with reference to
the second part of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations, claimed that not FIFA but the
NDRC of Country D should be competent. In particular, the DRC judge took note
that the Respondent argued that an equitably represented, independent,
national arbitration tribunal such as that demanded by the FIFA Regulations (art.
22 lit. b) of the Regulations) existed in Country D and that the parties had agreed
in clause 10 of the contract that, if a dispute arose, they shall be “settled by the
Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes of the Football
Federation of Country D at first instance and the Court of Arbitration of the
Football Federation of Country D at second instance.”
4. In this regard, the DRC judge observed that the Claimant argued that the
Respondent did not prove that FIFA should not be competent in this case.
5. Taking into account the above, the DRC judge emphasised that it was necessary
to ascertain who is competent to decide on the issue within the football-related
dispute resolution system. In other words, the competence of a national deciding
body on the one side and FIFA on the other must be determined.
6. In this regard, the DRC judge referred to art. 22 b) of the Regulations, according
to which he is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand unless an
independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting
the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at
national level within the framework of the Association and/or a collective
bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an
independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the DRC judge
referred to FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the
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Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
DRC judge further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force
on 1 January 2008.
7. Having said that, the DRC judge further took into account that, on 22 July 2013,
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) issued an award, whereby it decided that
the national arbitration bodies of the Football Federation of Country D fulfil the
requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and
guarantees fair proceedings. Furthermore, the CAS underlined in said award that
FIFA’s deciding body is not an appeal body.
8. In this context, the DRC judge took note that the Deciding Body of Country D at
the basis of the aforementioned CAS decision is the same deciding body as the
one included in the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the contract signed by and
between the Claimant and the Respondent.
9. In view of all the above, the DRC judge established that the Respondent’s
objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be
accepted and that he is not competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter
as to the substance.
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Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
III. Decision of the DRC judge
1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is inadmissible.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10
days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
Avenue de Beaumont 2
CH-1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the DRC judge:
Marco Villiger
Acting Deputy Secretary General
Enclosed: CAS directives
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Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D