Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Jon Newman (USA), member
Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player A, country B & country C
as Claimant
against the club,
Club D, country E
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 10 February 2011, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter; the
Claimant) and the club from country E, Club D (hereinafter; the Respondent)
concluded an employment contract (hereinafter; the contract) valid as of 24
February 2011 until 30 June 2014.
2.
According to clause 5.1 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive from
the Respondent a monthly salary of EUR 7,100 “for each month during which this
[contract] stays in force”.
3.
On 21 June 2012, the parties concluded an “Annex No. 1 to [the contract]”
(hereinafter: the annex), whereby it was agreed as follows:
“The parties agree that existing wording of [clause 5.1 of the contract] shall be
deleted and shall be replaced by a new wording as follows: 1. On the basis of this
agreement, the player shall receive the base remuneration as follows: in the
tournament season 2012/2013, i.e. from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 in the
amount of [EUR 6,100] gross for each month”.
4.
Moreover, art. 2 par. 2 of the annex stipulated that “Other provisions of the
contract remains unchanged”.
5.
On 16 July 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of
FIFA requesting the total amount of EUR 91,300 plus 5% interest as of the due
dates as follows:
a. EUR 6,100 as outstanding salary of June 2013;
b. EUR 85,200 as “compensation after termination (from 01/07/13 –
30/06/14)”
6.
In particular, the Claimant explained that on 30 June 2013, the Respondent
unilaterally terminated the employment contract concluded between the parties
as, according to the Respondent, the contract “was invalid”. In this respect, the
Claimant enclosed a letter from the Respondent which reads as follows: “We
kindly inform you that [the contract] should be considered invalid with effect
from 1 July 2013. Starting from 1 July 2013 contract does not specify a basic
remuneration for its implementation and according to Art. 5 section 1 point 2)
Resolutions 11/12 of the Football Association of country E Management Board:
‘Under pain of invalidity, a contract (…) specifies the basic player’s remuneration
for the whole period which contract stays in force’. Therefore, it should be
deemed that from 1 July 2013, you are no longer the Club D football player and
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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due to this fact you should leave the Club D training camp and cease performance
of the contractual obligations”.
7.
On 5 July 2013, the Claimant replied to the Respondent’s letter asking them for
“the withdrawal of the unilateral termination” by no later than 8 July 2013,
however, according to the Claimant, to no avail.
8.
Furthermore, the Claimant rejected the argumentation of the Respondent to
terminate the contract since in art. 2 par. 2 of the annex, it is specified that the
“other provisions of the contract will not be changed”. Therefore, the Claimant
stressed that it is clear that the contract was valid until 30 June 2014, that the
Respondent terminated the latter without just cause and that thus it must be held
liable for the consequences thereof.
9.
In its reply to the claim, the Respondent firstly questioned the competence of FIFA
to adjudicate on the present matter since it “shall be finally settled by the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of the Football Association of country E because the Football
Association of country E have an adequate procedures and authorities (i.e. DRC of
the Football Association from country E and Football Arbitration Court of the
Football Association from country E)”. In this regard, the Respondent stressed that
the above-mentioned bodies “fulfilled the criteria of a fair trial set out in Article
22 point b) of the FIFA Regulation on the Status and Transfer of Players and FIFA
Circular No. 1010…”
10.
Along these lines, the Respondent requested FIFA “to transfer the case of [the
Claimant] to Football Association of country E DRC…”. In this regard, the
Respondent explained that it had lodged, on 30 June 2013, in front of the DRC of
the Football Association from country E “an application for declaring the contract
invalidity”. Therefore, according to the Respondent, “the case (…) shall be firstly
examined by DRC of the Football Association from country E because the decision
of the DRC of the Football Association from country E on validity or invalidity of
the contract has a preliminary ruling importance for the FIFA DRC proceeding”.
11.
As to the substance of the matter, the Respondent stressed that, in view of the
content of the annex, “the parties agreed that the remuneration shall be
determined solely for the [season 2012/2013]. Therefore, the contract does not
specify the basic remuneration of the Claimant in the [season 2013/2014]”. The
Respondent held that at the end of the season 2012/2013, the parties entered into
negotiations “concerning the determination of basic remuneration of the
Claimant [for the season] 2013/2014, however [the Claimant] did not accept the
proposals of the [Respondent]”.
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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12.
In continuation, the Respondent argued that in accordance with art. 5 section 1
point 2) Resolutions 11/12 of the Football Association of country E Management
Board: “In order to be valid, a contract (…) specifies the basic Claimant’s
remuneration for the entire period of its validity”. Therefore, according to the
Respondent, the contract must be considered invalid. In this regard, the
Respondent stressed that “the fact that the contract defines solely the Claimant’s
remuneration due (…) until 30 June 2013, it should be assumed that the contract
is valid only to that day…”.
13.
The Respondent further asserted that, contrary to the Claimant’s statement, on 19
July 2013, it replied to his letter of 5 July 2013 inter alia as follows:
“…We would like to emphasise that letter dated 30 June 2013 was not a
unilateral termination of the contract, and it was only information about [the
Claimant’s] current situation (…) [The Respondent] file to the Dispute Resolution
Chamber of Football Association of country E (DRC of the Football Association
from country E) an application for declaring a contract invalidity (…) [The
Respondent] release [the Claimant] from the performance of contractual
obligations for the period of duration the legal proceedings before Football
Association of country E DRC (…) However, in the event that despite this fact [the
Claimant] would like to perform the contractual obligations, [the Respondent]
declares that until final decision of appropriate authorities all obligations of [the
Respondent] (…) shall be respected and performed by [the Respondent]…”.
14.
In this regard, the Respondent sustained that contrary to the Claimant’s
arguments, the letter of 30 June 2013 “shall not be consider, in any case, as a
statement of termination of the contract”.
15.
Having been requested by FIFA to provide documentary evidence that there exists
an independent arbitration tribunal on national level, the Respondent informed
FIFA that on 17 December 2013, the DRC of the Football Association from country
E rendered a decision whereby the contract was declared “invalid with effect
from 1 July 2013…”. Therefore, according to the Respondent, “the proceeding
conducted by FIFA DRC should be discontinued”. Moreover, the Respondent
provided a partial copy of the DRC of the Football Association from country E
Statutes.
16.
In his replica, the Claimant rejected the competence of the DRC of the Football
Association from country E since it was “not contracted the jurisdiction of the
[DRC of the Football Association from country E] in the event of a dispute…”
Therefore, according to the Claimant, any decision of the latter national body “is
unacceptable and cannot produce any legal effect”. In this respect, the Claimant
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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17.
explained that despite having been invited to participate in the proceedings
before the DRC of the Football Association from country E, he refused to do so. In
this context, the Claimant provided a letter dated 12 September 2013 addressed
to the DRC of the Football Association from country E objecting to the
competence of the DRC of the Football Association from country E.
The Claimant further denied having been notified of the decision rendered by the
DRC of the Football Association from country E on 17 December 2013 and in this
respect, he argued that it “does not make any sense that on the contract which
has been already unilaterally terminated by the Respondent on 30 June 2013, [the
DRC of the Football Association from country E] decides again on the
termination…”.
18.
As to the alleged invalidity of the contract, the Claimant highlighted that in
accordance with the clear wording of art. 2 par. 2 of the annex “all other
provisions of the contract remain in force without any changes”. Therefore, it is
clear that he had a valid contract with the Respondent for the season 2013/2014.
19.
Furthermore, the Claimant stressed that, contrary to the statements of the
Respondent, the latter party did terminate the contract on 30 June 2013, as it
informed him that the contract was “invalid” and instructed him to “cease
performance of the contractual obligations”.
20.
Finally, the Claimant argued, while enclosing a letter from the Union of
Footballers from country E, that i) the DRC of the Football Association from
country E “cannot decide on compensation for damages, i.e. compensation for
termination of a contract without just cause” and that ii) n the DRC decision “1002610” involving a club from country E, the DRC decided that it was competent
“despite the fact that the Respondent from country E parallel initiated the
proceedings against the Claimant before the [DRC of the Football Association
from country E]”.
21.
In its duplica, the Respondent reiterated that the DRC of the Football Association
from country E had already rendered a decision, declaring the contract concluded
between the parties invalid. Moreover, the Respondent reaffirmed that the DRC
of the Football Association from country E “guarantees fair proceedings”.
22.
Finally, the Respondent reiterated the arguments of its reply as to the substance.
23.
Upon request, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 16 July 2013, he entered into a
new employment contract with the club from country B, Club F valid until 30 June
2015, whereby he was entitled to a monthly remuneration of 735. Moreover, the
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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Claimant stressed that on 23 July 2013, he and Club F concluded an “Amendment
to the Contract” in accordance with which, he was entitled to the following:
a. “A monthly allowance” of 1,550;
b. “a contractual instalment” of 10,000;
c. “Costs of accommodation and subsistence allowance” of 650.
24.
On account of the above, the Claimant sustained that “from the period of 16 July
2013 until 30 June 2014, the Claimant received from Club F (…) the total amount
of 43,752.5 which amounts [to] EUR 22,370”.
25.
In addition, the Claimant informed FIFA that the Respondent paid his salary of
June 2013 in the amount of EUR 6,100. Therefore, the Claimant stressed that “the
amount of EUR 28,470 should be deducted from the total receivables of the
[Claimant]”.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or
the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 16 July 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21
of the 2008 and 2012 edition of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2
in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on
employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an
international dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it would, in
principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation involving a player
from country B and a club from country E regarding an alleged breach of the
employment contract concluded between the aforementioned parties.
4.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies as, according to the Respondent, the
present matter shall be adjudicated by the decision-making bodies of the Football
Association of country E. In this regard, the Chamber took note that, according to
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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the Respondent, the decision-making bodies of the Football Association of
country E comply with the requirements of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations.
5.
6.
Along these lines, the members of the DRC observed that, on 30 June 2013, the
Respondent filed “an application for declaring the contract invalidity” in front of
the DRC of the Football Association from country E and that, on 17 December
2013, said national body issued a decision declaring the contract concluded
between the parties invalid.
Furthermore, the Chamber noted that, on his part, the Claimant rejected the
competence of the DRC of the Football Association from country E as it was “not
contracted the jurisdiction of the [DRC of the Football Association from country E]
in the event of a dispute…” and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to adjudicate
on the present matter.
7.
With the above considerations in mind, the Chamber wished to recall that in
accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an
independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting
the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at
national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective
bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an
independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber
referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the
members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force
on 1 January 2008.
8.
In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of
the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ
than the DRC can settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a
player of an international dimension, is that the competence of the relevant
arbitration tribunal derives from a clear reference in the employment contract.
9.
Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter,
the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost,
analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute
actually contained a clear and exclusive arbitration clause in favour of the DRC of
the Football Association from country E.
10.
With the above-mentioned considerations in mind and after a thorough analysis
of the contract at the basis of the present dispute, the members of the Chamber
concluded that said contract did not contain an arbitration clause in favour of the
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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DRC of the Football Association from country E or any other national body.
Therefore, the members of the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that,
in the present matter, one of the indispensable requirements in order to
determine that another body than the DRC is competent to deal with an
international employment-related dispute is not met.
11.
On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s
objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to
be rejected and that thus the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the
basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to
entertain the Claimant’s claim as to the substance. In this regard and as a
consequence of the above, the DRC wished to emphasise that it is not bound by
the decision issued by the DRC of the Football Association from country E.
12.
Having established the above, the Chamber analysed which edition of the
Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect,
it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations
on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) and considering that the
present claim was lodged on 16 July 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations is
applicable to the present matter as to the substance.
13.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber
continued its acknowledgment of the above-mentioned facts as well as of the
documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in
the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and
documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the
substance of the matter at hand.
14.
First of all, the DRC acknowledged that on 10 February 2011, the parties
concluded an employment contract valid as of 24 February 2011 until 30 June
2014 and according to which, the Claimant was entitled to receive a monthly
salary of EUR 7,100.
15.
Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note that on 21 June 2012, the
parties entered into an annex to the contract whereby it was agreed “…that
existing wording of [clause 5.1 of the contract] shall be deleted and shall be
replaced by a new wording as follows: 1. On the basis of this agreement the
player shall receive the base remuneration as follows: in the tournament season
2012/2013, i.e. from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 in the amount of [EUR 6,100]
gross for each month”. Moreover, the Chamber observed that art. 2 par. 2 of the
annex stipulated that “Other provisions of the contract remains unchanged”.
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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16.
Having said this, the Chamber focused its attention on the position of the
Respondent, which argues that the contract should be considered, as of 1 July
2013, invalid since it does not provide a salary payable to the Claimant. In this
regard, the Chamber took note of the Respondent’s argument that according to
art. 5 section 1 point 2) Resolutions 11/12 of the Football Association of country E
Management Board, “In order to be valid, a contract (…) specifies the basic
Claimant’s remuneration for the entire period of its validity”.
17.
On account of the above, the DRC acknowledged that according to the
Respondent, it should be considered that the employment contract between the
parties was invalid as of 1 July 2013 and that therefore no compensation should
be payable to the Claimant.
18.
Moreover, the members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent stressed that
its letter dated 30 June 2013 “shall not be consider, in any case, as a statement of
termination of the contract”.
19.
In continuation, the Chamber observed that, on his part, the Claimant rejected
the position of the Respondent based on art. 2 par. 2 of the annex which
stipulates that “Other provisions of the contract remains unchanged”. Hence,
according to the Claimant, contrary to what the Respondent argues, the contract
was indeed valid until 30 June 2014. Moreover, the Claimant asserted that the
Respondent’s letter of 30 June 2013 is a clear termination of the employment
contract as the latter party informed him that the contract was “invalid” and
requested him to “cease performance of the contractual obligations”.
20.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber deemed that the issues on
which it would have to pronounce itself in the present matter, considering the
position of the parties, are as follows:
i. Was the employment contract concluded between the parties valid for the
season 2013/2014?;
ii. In the affirmative, did the Respondent actually terminate the employment
contract on 30 June 2013?;
iii. As a third point and in case of affirmative answers to the first two issues, the
DRC would have to examine whether the employment contract had been
unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent.
21.
First of all, and as to the validity of the employment contract after 30 June 2013,
the members of the Chamber focused their attention on the annex. In this regard,
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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the DRC noted that it is explicitly stated therein that the only amended clause of
the contract is clause 5.1.
22.
Along these lines, the Chamber wished to highlight the content of art. 2 par. 2 of
the annex which provides that “Other provisions of the contract remains
unchanged”. Indeed, in the Chamber’s view, the aforementioned article is clear
and leaves no room for interpretation when it established that, with the
exception of clause 5.1, all other provisions contained in the employment
contract, including its period of validity, were not to be changed.
23.
In view of the above, the DRC unanimously decided that the duration of the
contract was not amended by the annex and the contract was thus valid until 30
June 2014. In fact, the Chamber stressed that by means of the signing of the
annex, the only element of the contract that was amended was the Claimant’s
salary for the 2012/2013 season, all other provisions remaining unchanged. As
such, the singing of the contract in conjunction with the subsequent signing of
the annex should not be construed in the way that there is no salary payable to
the Claimant in the season 2013/2014, but rather that the salary of the Claimant
in the aforementioned period of time returned to its original amount, i.e. EUR
7,100.
24.
After having been established that the employment contract concluded between
the parties was valid until 30 June 2014 and that it did provide for a salary
payable to the Claimant for the season 2013/2014, the members of the Chamber
went to analyse the Respondent’s letter of 30 June 2013 in order to establish
whether it was indeed, as claimed by the Claimant, a unilateral termination of the
employment contract by the Respondent. In this respect, the Chamber recalled
that according to the Respondent “the said letter shall not be consider, in any
case, as a statement of termination of the contract”. Moreover, the Chamber took
note that in its letter dated 19 July 2013, the Respondent informed the Claimant
that “We would like to emphasise that letter dated 30 June 2013 was not a
unilateral termination of the contract, and it was only information about [the
Claimant’s] current situation”.
25.
In this regard and after a thorough analysis of the relevant letter, the members of
the Chamber unanimously decided that by means thereof, the Respondent
actually terminated the employment contract between the parties. Indeed, in the
Chamber’s view, the Respondent’s statement “…it should be deemed that from 1
July 2013, you are no longer [a Respondent’s] player and due to this fact you
should leave [the Respondent’s] training camp and cease performance of the
contractual obligations” clearly indicates that the Respondent decided to
unilaterally terminate the employment contract in view of its alleged invalidity. In
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
Page 10 of 14
this respect, the members of the Chamber could not find any other bona fide
interpretation that the Claimant could have given to the content of the
aforementioned letter.
26.
Furthermore and as to whether the employment contract had been terminated by
the Respondent with or without just cause, the Chamber underlined that the only
reason given by the Respondent to terminate the employment contract was its
alleged invalidity which, for the reasons explained above, cannot be upheld.
27.
On account of all the above, the members of the Chamber came to the
unanimous conclusion that on 30 June 2013, the Respondent had terminated the
employment contract without just cause and shall therefore be held liable for the
consequences thereof.
28.
In relation to the above, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art.
17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the
Respondent compensation for breach of contract.
29.
In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for
the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on
the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether
the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
30.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable
by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the
Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the
employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
31.
Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation
to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account
the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment
contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the
professional situation of the player after the early termination occurred. In this
respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of its termination, the
employment contract would run for another twelve months. Taking into account
the foregoing, the Chamber decided that the amount of EUR 85,200 shall serve as
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
Page 11 of 14
the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach
of contract.
32.
In continuation, the Chamber recalled that the player had entered into a new
employment contract with the club from country B, Club F valid as of 16 July 2013
until 30 June 2015 and according to which he was entitled to receive a total
remuneration of “43,752.5 which amounts [to] EUR 22,370” for the period
between 16 July 2013 and 30 June 2014. Consequently, in accordance with the
constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation
of the player to mitigate his damages, the above-mentioned amounts shall be
taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach
of contract.
33.
In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay
the amount of EUR 62,830 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of
contract, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified
amount. Moreover, in accordance with both the long-standing jurisprudence of
the DRC and the claim of the Claimant, the members of the Chamber decided to
grant 5% interest on said amount as of 16 July 2013 until the date of effective
payment.
34.
Finally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present
matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected.
*****
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club D, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as
from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract
in the amount of EUR 62,830 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 16 July 2013 until the date
of effective payment.
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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4.
In the event that the amount plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with
the above-mentioned number 3. is not paid by the Respondent within the stated
time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of
the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must
be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and
shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the
CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry
of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief
stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4
of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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Markus Kattner
Acting Secretary General
Encl.
CAS directives
Player A, country B & country C / Club D, country E
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