Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Jon Newman (USA), member
Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member
on the matter between the player,
Player A, country B
as Claimant
and the club,
Club C, country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
arisen between the parties
I. Facts of the case
1. On 1 September 2010, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the
Claimant), born on 9 April 1982, concluded an employment contract with the club
from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), valid as from the date of
signature until 31 May 2011. On 27 January 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim in
front of FIFA against the Respondent. However, by means of the signature of a
new employment contract, the parties settled the dispute (cf. below in point I. 2.)
2. On 22 August 2012, the Claimant concluded an employment contract with the
Respondent (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the date of signature until
31 May 2014.
3. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to the following basic
remuneration:
- For the 2012-2013 season, nine monthly payments in the amount of EUR 30,000,
due at the end of each month, starting in September 2012 (EUR 270,000 in total).
- For the 2013-2014 season, twelve monthly payments in the amount of EUR
15,000, due at the end of each month, starting in June 2013 (EUR 180,000 in
total), in case the Respondent stayed in the second tier of the football league
system of country D.
4. In addition, the contract entitled the Claimant, inter alia, to the following
bonuses:
- For the 2013-2014 season, EUR 10,000, if the Respondent stays in the second-tier
of country D, due on 17 September 2013.
- EUR 20,000, “if [the Respondent] stays in the play-offs” (in French, “si le club
reste en play off”).
5. Furthermore, clause 3 of the contract included the following:
« Club C et le footballeur acceptent, déclarant et s’engagent que le footballeur
sera payé 190.000€ au titre de ses services près le club au cours de la saison de
football 2012/2013
Club C pour la période passée doit seulement payer au footballeur la somme de
130.000€, les parties se sont entendues sur la somme et le mode de paiement de
cette somme. A la somme de 130.000€ dont le footballeur a droit pour la période
passée le paiement de la somme de 190.000€ pour la nouvelle saison est ajoutée si
bien que dans le cadre de ce contrat il sera effectué un paiement total de
320.000€ (totale des indemnités de la somme de garantie et l’indemnité
mensuelle), les parties n’ont aucun contentieux concernant cet élément. »
"Club C and the football player agree and commit upon that the football player
will be paid € 190,000 for his services to the club during the football season
2012/2013
Club C will only pay the sum of € 130,000 for the previous period, and the parties
have agreed on the amount and method of payment for the said amount. To this
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
2
sum of € 130,000 that the [Claimant] is entitled to receive for the previous period,
€ 190,000 shall be added for the new season, so that in the framework of this
contract a total payment of € 320,000 will be made (total for the collateral and
the monthly allowance), the parties have no dispute on this issue” (note: free
translation from French).
6. In addition, clause 9 of the contract established the following :
« Les litiges nés de ce contrat sont de la compétence exclusive du Conseil de
résolution des litiges. Les parties peuvent faire recours au Conseil d’arbitrage de la
fédération de football du pays D dans les délais contre les décisions du Conseil de
résolution des litiges »
"Disputes arising from this contract are the sole responsibility of the Dispute
Resolution Council. The parties may appeal to the Arbitration Council of the
Football Federation of country D in time against the decisions of the Dispute
Resolution Council" (note: free translation from French).
7. On 17 April 2013, the Claimant informed FIFA about his decision to terminate the
contract with the Respondent with just cause. In particular, the Claimant
explained that “it has been three months since he had not received any
remuneration” and that the Respondent also failed to respect the amicable
settlement for the first contract.
8. On 14 May 2013, the Claimant formally lodged a new claim before FIFA against
the Respondent, and requested the payment of a total amount of “EUR 390,000”,
“plus lawyer’s and other costs”, detailed as follows:
- EUR 130,000, corresponding to the Respondent’s failure to comply with the
“amicable settlement concluded on 22 August 2012”;
- EUR 150,000, corresponding to overdue salaries from January 2013 until May
2013 (EUR 30,000 per month);
- EUR 20,000 as an individual bonus for the Respondent’s classification among the
best six teams in the championship and participation in the play offs of the
2012/2013 season;
- EUR 10,000, for the 2013-2014 season bonus due for the Respondent’s stay in the
second-tier of country D;
- EUR 15,000 per month, for the remaining salaries from June 2013 until May 2014
(calculated as EUR 180,000).
9. In addition, the Claimant declared that following this dispute, the Respondent
sanctioned him for “undisciplinary behaviour”, by imposing salary deductions and
forcing him to play with the reserve team and training on an individual basis. The
Claimant considered that the grounds of this sanction were intended to avoid the
payment of the overdue salaries.
10. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent argued that the Dispute Resolution
Chamber and the Arbitral Tribunal of the Football Federation of country D should
be competent in this dispute, and that this has been acknowledged by the parties
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3
in the contract. However, and despite being requested to do so, the Respondent
did not provide documentary evidence in this regard.
11. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent considered that in any case it
fulfilled its obligations in connection with the first contract, and that this matter
was settled with the signature of the second contract.
12. Furthermore, the Respondent declared that the Claimant failed to fulfil his
contractual obligations in relation to the contract as, inter alia, he failed to
participate in the trainings arranged by the Respondent “on a regular basis” as
from 8 February 2013. Finally, the Respondent considered that the Claimant was
imposed disciplinary sanctions for his “disrespectful conduct against [its] moral
values”, and that in this regard, he was given a fine in accordance with its own
internal disciplinary bylaws. In particular, the Respondent requested from the
Claimant the payment of an amount of 224,277, corresponding to fines imposed
on him, and reimbursement of salaries that were paid too much (EUR 11,111 and
66,517).
13. As a consequence of this, the Respondent attached a letter apparently sent to the
Claimant on 8 April 2013, by means of which it deemed the contract to be
terminated as from that date.
14. Regarding the overdue payments, the Respondent considered that they are
related to the “[Claimant]’ contribution to the [Respondent]”, and that due to the
Claimant’s refusal to serve for two months, he should not be paid for that time
frame. Nevertheless, the Respondent stated that the Claimant was paid for his
“February, March payments plus for his 8 days of April payment”.
15. The Claimant replied to the Respondent’s comments, and highlighted that by
signing the contract, he thought that “this time, the [Respondent]’s management
will fulfil its commitments”. The Claimant also considered that the events in
relation to the contract are due to the Respondent’s will “to hurt and make him
to pay for the 2011 claim he lodged before the FIFA DRC”.
16. In reference to the claimed amounts, the Claimant highlighted that the
Respondent did not provide any evidence for the alleged payment.
17. In addition, the Claimant considered that the sanctions imposed by the
Respondent on him were made in an arbitrary way and that there is no evidence
of his failure to fulfil his obligations with the Respondent.
18. As to the competence, the Claimant declared that he was unaware that the
contracts granted competence to the NDRC of country D. In addition, the
Claimant considered that the NDRC of country D is not independent and it would
not ensure a fair procedure respecting the principle of equal representation of
players and clubs.
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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19. In its final comments, the Respondent mentioned that “we first of all expect FIFA
to inform which authority should be active and authorized” and that it was
explicitly stipulated in the contract that the place of resolution of the dispute shall
be in country D.
20. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that he remained unemployed until 15
December 2013, when he concluded an employment contract with the club from
country E, Club F, valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2015.
According to the said contract, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly
remuneration in the amount of 2,675,400, equivalent to approximately EUR
24,613 as of 15 December 2013.
II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or
Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In
this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 May
2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of
the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter:
the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2012,
2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on
employment-related disputes between a player and a club that have an
international dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be
competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a player from
country B and a club from country D regarding an employment-related dispute.
4.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 9 of the contract,
alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the
relevant employment contract is the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter:
NDRC of country D) and the Arbitration Tribunal of the Football Federation of
country D.
5.
In this regard, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant insisted on FIFA’s
jurisdiction to deal with the present matter, arguing that the NDRC of country D is
not independent and it would not ensure a fair procedure respecting the principle
of equal representation of players and clubs.
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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6.
In view of the above, the members of the Chamber then turned their attention to
said art. 9 of the contract, which reads as follows: “Les litiges nés de ce contrat
sont de la compétence exclusive du Conseil de résolution des litiges. Les parties
peuvent faire recours au Conseil d’arbitrage de la fédération de football du pays
D dans les délais contre les décisions du Conseil de résolution des litiges (Free
translation of the first sentence : "Disputes arising from this contract are the sole
responsibility of the Dispute Resolution Council”). Hence, the Chamber outlined
that said clause explicitly and exclusively refers to a national dispute resolution
chamber, i.e. the “Dispute Resolution Council”.
7.
Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance
with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand,
unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and
respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been
established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a
collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on
an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber
referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the
members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force
on 1 January 2008.
8.
In this respect and regardless of the fact that the relevant employment contract
contains a specific arbitration clause, the members of the Chamber acknowledged
that, in the case at hand, the Respondent has failed to prove that an independent
arbitration tribunal in compliance with the requirements of the FIFA regulations
has been established in country D.
9.
On account of all the above and referring to the principle of the burden of proof
contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber established that
the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the
present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is
competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.
10. The competence of the Chamber having been established, the Chamber analysed
which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be
applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it referred, on the one
hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015), and, on the other hand, to the fact that
the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 May 2013. Therefore, the DRC
concluded that the 2012 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter:
the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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11. Having established the foregoing, and entering into the substance of the matter,
the Chamber continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as
the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of the
matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it
will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it
considered for the assessment of the matter at hand.
12. In particular, the Chamber took note that, on 1 September 2010, the parties
concluded an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until 31
May 2014.
13. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber noted that, on 22 August 2012, the
parties concluded a new employment contract, valid as from the date of signature
until 31 May 2014.
14. Thereafter, the members of the Chamber examined the documentation provided
by the Respondent, by means of which it apparently notified the Claimant, on 8
April 2013, about the termination of the contract with just cause.
15. In this regard, the DRC stressed that the Claimant did not dispute having received
said letter. Consequently, the members of the Chamber unanimously agreed to
establish that the Respondent terminated the employment contract on 8 April
2013.
16. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber turned its attention to the
question related to the early termination of the contract and, in particular, as to
whether said termination by the Respondent was with or without just cause.
17. In particular, the Chamber took note of the Respondent’s allegation, according to
which said termination was due to the Claimant’s alleged “disrespectful conduct
against the moral values” of the Respondent, as well as for his alleged failure to
participate in the trainings “on a regular basis”.
18. In relation to the documentation provided by the Respondent, the DRC recalled
the basic principle of the burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an
alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Similarly, the Chamber
referred to art. 9 par. 1 lit. e) of the Procedural Rules which stipulates that all
documents of relevance to the dispute shall be submitted in the original version as
well as translated into one of the official FIFA languages.
19. In this context, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not provide a translated
version of the documents in support of the aforementioned allegation, enclosed
to its submission in the language of country D only. In view of the foregoing and
taking into consideration art. 9 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC decided that it
could not take into account the relevant documents which were not translated
into an official FIFA language.
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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20. Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent had not sufficiently
substantiated its defense, as it did not present any conclusive documentary
evidence in one of the official FIFA languages, which could corroborate that the
Claimant did not fulfill his commitments as agreed upon in the contract.
21. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber also acknowledged that it had to
examine whether the reasons put forward by the Respondent could justify the
termination of the contract in the present matter.
22. On account of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just
cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the
Claimant and the Respondent and, therefore, concluded that the Respondent had
terminated the employment contract without just cause on 8 April 2013.
Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent is to be held liable
for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause.
23. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with
the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without
just cause by the Respondent on 8 April 2013.
24. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber noted that, according to the clause 3
of the aforementioned contract, the Respondent committed to pay to the
Claimant the amount of EUR 130,000 for the outstanding amounts allegedly due
to the Claimant in connection with the contract signed by the parties on 1
September 2010. In addition, the members of the Chamber also noted that,
according to said contract, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly salary in the
amount of EUR 30,000, for the 2012-2013 season, as well as, inter alia, the
following bonuses:
- For the 2013-2014 season, EUR 10,000, if the Respondent stays in the second-tier
of country D, due on 17 September 2013.
- EUR 20,000, “if [the Respondent] stays in the play-offs” (in French, “si le club
reste en play off”).
25. In this respect, the DRC took into consideration that according to the Claimant,
the Respondent had failed to pay his remuneration in the total amount of EUR
310,000, corresponding to the amount stipulated in clause 3 of the contract, the
unpaid salaries of January, February, March, April and May 2013, as well as the
aforementioned bonuses. Consequently, the Claimant requested to be awarded
with the payment of the total amount of EUR 310,000.
26. Moreover, the DRC noted that the Respondent, in its defense, explained that “in
any case it fulfilled its obligations in connection with [the contract signed on 1
September 2010]”, and provided several documents, however, it did not provide
evidence supporting that the payments of January, February and March 2013, as
well as the payment established in clause 3 of the contract, were paid.
27. Having observed the aforementioned, the members of the Chamber took note
that, due to the termination of the contract by the Respondent on 8 April 2013,
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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any outstanding remuneration that may be due to the Claimant, could only fall
due until said date, without prejudice of any possible compensation that may be
awarded to the Claimant for the early termination of the contract.
28. In this context, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not provide a translated
version of the documents in support of its allegation that it fulfilled its
obligations, enclosed to its submission in the language of country D only. In view
of the foregoing and taking into consideration art. 9 of the Procedural Rules, the
DRC decided that it could not take into account the relevant documents which
were not translated into an official FIFA language.
29. As to the documentary evidence presented in the English language, the Chamber
observed that such documents did not make an explicit reference to the
allegation arisen by the Respondent. Therefore, the DRC decided that said
documents could not be considered as a legitimate basis to prove that the
Respondent fulfilled its obligations.
30. Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent had not sufficiently
substantiated its defense, as it did not present any conclusive documentary
evidence which could corroborate that the remuneration of January, February and
March 2013, as well as the payment established in clause 3 of the contract, were
paid.
31. Moreover, the members of the Chamber also noted that, according to the
Respondent, it imposed a series of salary deductions for the Claimant’s alleged
“disrespectful conduct against [its] moral values”.
32. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that, in principle, a player cannot be
fined for alleged “disrespectful conduct against moral values”, as this is a purely
unilateral and subjective evaluation by the Respondent. Thus, the Chamber
emphasized that, under the specific circumstances of the matter at stake, a
“disrespectful conduct against moral values” cannot be considered as a valid
reason to reduce the Claimant’s salary or to fine him. Hence, the Chamber
considered that by fining the Claimant based on the aforementioned reason, the
Respondent acted in an abusive manner and therefore, decided to also disregard
the fines imposed by it.
33. In addition, the Chamber referred to its previous consideration, according to
which the documentation in the language of country D submitted by the
Respondent in this respect could not be taken into account.
34. Furthermore, and in any case, the Chamber wished to point out that the
imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not
be used by clubs as a means to set off outstanding financial obligations towards
players. Therefore, the Chamber decided not to take into consideration the fines
apparently imposed on the Claimant.
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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35. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber pointed out that according to the
contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive bonus payments linked to the
Respondent’s sporting results. According to the Claimant, bonus payments
totalling EUR 30,000 remained unpaid in connection to said bonuses.
36. In this respect, the Chamber recalled once again the basic principle of the burden
of proof, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged
fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. In particular, the members of the
Chamber noted that the Claimant did not provide enough evidence, in order to
substantiate that said bonuses were effectively due by the Respondent in the light
of its sporting results. Therefore, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s
request relating to outstanding bonus payments.
37. In view of all the above and, in particular, taking into account that the
Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence about the payment of the
relevant outstanding remuneration, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the
general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfil its
contractual obligations towards the Claimant and is to be held liable to pay the
Claimant the amount of EUR 220,000, in view of the outstanding amounts for the
salaries of the period comprised between January 2013 and March 2013, as well as
to the amount stipulated in clause 3 of the contract.
38. In this regard, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1
of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent
compensation for breach of contract in addition to the outstanding salaries on the
basis of the relevant employment contract.
39. In continuation, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for
the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining
on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on
whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
40. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable
by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the
Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the
employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
41. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in
application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations.
The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive
enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the
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Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be
taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body.
42. The members of the Chamber then turned their attention to the remuneration
and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and the new
contract, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. The
members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of
art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the
existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of
compensation.
43. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by
means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income.
According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new
employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount
of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the Claimant’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.
44. Indeed, on 15 December 2013, the Claimant found employment with the club
from country E, Club F. In accordance with the pertinent employment contract,
valid as from 15 December 2013 until 30 June 2015, the Claimant is entitled to
receive, inter alia, a monthly salary of 2,675,400, equivalent to EUR 24,613. In this
regard, the Chamber noted that, as from 15 December 2013 until 31 May 2014,
the respondent would have earned the amount of EUR 147,678.
45. In addition, the DRC observed that, during the period comprised between 15
December 2013 until 31 May 2014, the Claimant would have earned from the
Respondent the amount of EUR 90,000.
46. Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment
contract concluded between the Claimant and the new club for the period as
from 15 December 2013 until and including 31 May 2014 largely exceeds the
residual value of the employment contract with the Respondent for the same
period of time. Therefore, the Chamber decided that, even though the
Respondent is liable for the early termination of the employment contract
without just cause, there is no amount that should be awarded to the Claimant as
compensation for breach of contract for the period as from 15 December 2013
until 31 May 2014, since the Claimant has been able to fully mitigate his damages
for said time period.
47. However, the members of the Chamber noted that as from the termination of the
employment contract on 8 April 2013 until the signature of his new employment
contract on 15 December 2013 with Club F, the Claimant remained unemployed
and, therefore, decided that he should be entitled to receive compensation for
this specific period of time.
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48. In accordance with the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute,
as from 8 April 2013 until 15 December 2013, the Claimant was entitled to receive
the two instalments of EUR 30,000 in relation to the 2012-2013 season, as well as
six monthly instalment of EUR 15,000 each, in relation to the 2013-2014 season
which all add up to the amount of EUR 150,000.
49. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay
compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 150,000 to the
Claimant.
50. In addition, as regards the claimed legal expenses, the Chamber referred to art. 18
par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as to its long-standing and well-established
jurisprudence, in accordance with which no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in proceedings in front of the Dispute Resolution Chamber.
Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s request relating to
legal expenses.
51. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.
III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the
date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of
EUR 220,000.
4.
The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of
notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount
of EUR 150,000.
5.
In the event that the amounts set forth in points 3. and 4. are not paid by the
Respondent within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall
due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be
submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration
and a formal decision.
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6.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
7.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittances under points 3. and 4. are to be
made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another
10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal,
the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to
the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
Avenue de Beaumont 2
CH-1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Marco Villiger
Acting Deputy Secretary General
Enclosed: CAS directives
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