Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 August 2014,
in the following composition:
Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman
Taku Nomiya (Japan), member
Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member
on the claim presented by the club,
Club A, country B
as Claimant
against the player,
Player C, country D,
as Respondent I
and the club,
Club E, country D,
as Respondent II
regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 16 April 2010, the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant)
and the player from country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent I), born on
13 January 1989, concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract)
for a period of five seasons as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2015.
2.
According to clause 3 of the contract, the Respondent I would receive the
following amounts:
- For the season 2010-2011: EUR 90,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments;
- For the season 2011-2012: EUR 100,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments;
- For the season 2012-2013: EUR 110,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments;
- For the season 2013-2014: EUR 125,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments;
- For the season 2014-2015: EUR 140,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly
instalments.
Additionally, the contract states that in the event that the Claimant is promoted
to the “Primera division”, the yearly salary would be multiplied by two, while it
would be divided by two in the event of relegation to the “Segunda división B”.
3.
The first clause of the contract contains a stipulation which reads as follows: “El
presente contrato adquiere plena validez en el momento en el que el JUGADOR
obtenga la carta de libertad del CLUB al que actualmente tiene cedidos sus
derechos federativos y por el tiempo que se fija en el presente contrato, en otro
caso se considerará nulo y sin efecto, sin que quepa indemnización alguna para
ninguna de las partes. Es decir, que el presente contrato queda sujeto a una
condición suspensiva y resolutoria, consistente en que el CLUB debe tener la
documentación necesaria para la inscripción del JUGADOR ante LNFP [Liga de
Fúbol Profesional] y/o Football Federation of country B para disputar la
competición de SEGUNDA DIVISIÓN A como jugador del Club A antes del inicio
de la temporada dos mil diez – dos mil once. Si llegada esta fecha el CLUB no
hubiera obtenido dicha documentación, o esta fuera insuficiente para que la
Liga de Futbol Profesional y/o la Football Federation of country B lo inscriban
como jugador del CLUB, el presente contrato quedará anulado y sin efecto
jurídico alguno entre las partes, sin derecho a ningún tipo de indemnización
entre ambas” (Free translation: the present contract acquires full validity at the
moment the player receives the release certificate from the club which currently
holds his federative rights and for the duration stipulated therein; in any other
case, the contract will be deemed null and void without any right to be
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
2/14
compensated for the parties. That is to say that the present contract is subject to
a suspensive and resolutive condition, meaning that the club must have the
documentation necessary to inscribe the player with the LNFP and/or Football
Federation of country B in order to participate in the competition Segunda Liga
A as a player of Club A, before the beginning of the 2010-2011 season. Should
the club not obtain the abovementioned documentation within the deadline, or
should said documentation be insufficient in order for the Liga de Fútbol
Profesional and/or Football Federation of country B to inscribe him as a club’s
player, the present contract will be considered null and void between the
parties without any right for them to be compensated).
4.
In addition, the first clause also stipulates that “El JUGADOR manifiesta
expresamente que queda libre a partir del día 30/06/2010, por lo que no podrá
considerarse la existencia de un contrato con un tercer club como causa de
resolución del presente contrato” (free translation: the player expressly states
that he will be a free agent as from 30/06/2010; therefore, the existence of
contract with a third club will not be considered as a reason to cancel the
present contract).
5.
Furthermore, clause 6 of the contract provides for a compensation clause
stipulating that in the event that the Claimant terminates the contract prior to
its term, it shall pay 50% of the salary due for the following season. Conversely,
if the early termination is attributable to the Respondent I, he shall pay the
Claimant the amount of EUR 10,000,000.
6.
On 14 June 2010, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with the
club from country D, Club E (currently known as Club E; hereinafter: the
Respondent II) according to which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration
amounting to EUR 6,000 gross.
7.
On 26 July 2010, the Claimant sent a fax to the Respondent I requesting him to
be present at training on 27 July 2010.
8.
On 13 August 2010, the Claimant contacted the Respondent II by fax, stating
that the contract concluded with the Respondent I was sent as an attachment
and that they would speak over the phone in the afternoon.
9.
The Respondent II, in a letter dated 16 August 2010, but apparently received by
the Claimant on 24 August 2010, stated that it considered the affair to be
closed on the following basis:
- The first clause of the contract contains a suspensive condition which foresees
that the contract is null and void if the Claimant does not obtain the
International Transfer Certificate, which it did not since the Football
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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Federation of country D never issued such a certificate. Therefore, this
“contract” is not legally binding;
- The signature of the Respondent I has been forged;
- The Claimant violated art. 18 par. 3 of the the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) since it did not request in
writing the authorisation of Club F before negotiating with the Respondent I.
10. On 23 August 2010, the Claimant sent a further fax to the Respondent I
requesting him to attend training and informing him that if he does not do so
within 24 hours, it would consider his behaviour as a unilateral breach of the
contract. On the same day, the Claimant also requested the Respondent II to
allow the Respondent I to join it and fulfil his contract. Otherwise, the Claimant
informed the Respondent II that in the event of a breach of contract, the latter
would also be held liable to pay the compensation set in clause 6 of the
contract, for inducement to the breach of contract.
11. On 31 August 2010, the Claimant responded to the Respondent II that it still had
the possibility of registering the Respondent I but was impeded from doing so
because of the conduct of the Respondent II and the Respondent I. Additionally,
the Claimant alleged that the contract was signed in the presence of witnesses
who could verify its validity.
12. On 27 January 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent I for
breach of contract as well as against the Respondent II for inducement to the
breach. In this context, the Claimant requests:
- the Respondent I and the Respondent II to be held jointly to pay the amount
set in the compensation clause in the contract (EUR 10,000,000);
- a 6-month ban from playing in official matches to be imposed on the
Respondent I;
- a 2-year ban from registering new players to be imposed on the Respondent
II.
13. In its claim, the Claimant points out that the Respondent I’s agent had provided
assurance that the contract between the Respondent I and his previous club,
Club F, was valid until June 2010 and that therefore, in line with art. 18 par. 3 of
the Regulations, he was free to sign an employment contract with another club.
In this respect, the Claimant makes reference to the above-mentioned
stipulation contained in the first clause of the contract.
14. According to the Claimant, on 26 April 2010, it was contacted by the
Respondent I’s agent requesting a payment on behalf of the Respondent I in
order to compensate the latter for his move to country B. Subsequently, on 5
May 2010 and after the Claimant had rejected such request, the Respondent I’s
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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agent informed the Claimant that the Respondent I in fact requested EUR
30,000 as additional payment and that the Respondent I would sign for another
club if such request was rejected. At the same time, the Respondent I’s agent
mentioned that he would no longer represent the Respondent I.
15. Furthermore, the Claimant explains having unsuccessfully attempted to contact
the Respondent I by phone and sent him a fax on 26 July 2010 requesting him to
be present at its training facilities on 27 July 2010. As the Respondent I was
absent and never answered the Claimant, it supposedly started to investigate
and discovered via the internet that the Respondent I had signed another
employment contract with the Respondent II on 14 June 2010.
16. In relation to the first clause of the contract, the Claimant asserts that it may be
interpreted in two ways: either as a potestative clause, or as a “resolutive” one.
While the former interpretation would render the clause null and void, the
latter resorts to the principle of effectiveness and considers that the condition
referred to in the clause is a condition the fulfilment of which is independent
from the will of both parties. According to the Claimant, no matter the
interpretation chosen, the only condition to the contract is that the player is
free at the end of the season and the lack of an ITC request would not affect
the validity of the contract.
17. In his response, the Respondent I stresses that his previous contract with Club F
was due to expire on 30 June 2011 and not on 30 June 2010. Therefore, the
Claimant should be considered in breach of art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations
since it did not request in writing the authorisation of Club F before establishing
a contact with the Respondent I.
18. Furthermore, the Respondent I acknowledges having signed a pre-contract with
the Claimant without ever having the intention of signing a definitive contract.
The Respondent I also states that the Claimant’s representatives informed him
that the signed document was not binding since it contained a suspensive
condition stipulating that the agreement would only come into force if he could
not find a club in the Ligue 1 or Ligue 2 of country D before the end of the 2010
transfer window. In this respect, he considers that the Claimant’s representatives
abused the fact that he did not speak the language of country B to mislead him.
In addition to that, he challenges the authenticity of the signature contained in
the contract that the Claimant enclosed to its claim and questions the validity of
the contract because he did not understand it and was never provided with a
translation in the language of country D.
19. In its submission, the Respondent II challenges FIFA’s jurisdiction considering
that the conditions set out in art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations, i.e. a dispute
between a club and a player in relation to the maintenance of contractual
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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stability where there has been an ITC request, have not been fulfilled since the
Claimant never requested the aforementioned ITC.
20. With regard to the substance of the matter, the Respondent II reiterates the
arguments raised in its letter dated 16 August 2010. First of all, Claimant
violated art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations. According to the Respondent II, the
Claimant had a positive obligation to enquire about the contractual status of
the Respondent I and could not rely on the mere statement of his agent. In this
regard, the Respondent II submits a copy of the Respondent I’s contract with
Club F which was due to expire on 30 June 2011 as well as a termination
agreement, dated 20 May 2010, signed by the Respondent I and the President of
Club F, registered by the Football Federation of country D on 3 June 2010, and
coming into force on 22 May 2010. On the other hand, the Respondent II
explains that when it first contacted the Respondent I, it was informed about
the ongoing contract with Club F. Thereupon, the Respondent II contacted the
said club which agreed to release the Respondent I without claiming transfer
compensation.
21. Moreover, the Respondent II reiterates the fact that the first clause of the
contract made its validity subject to the Claimant obtaining the documents
necessary to register the Respondent I with the league of country B or the
Football Federation of country B. However, according to the Respondent II, the
Claimant never requested the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate
that would have been necessary for the registration. Therefore, the contract
should be considered null and void.
22. Besides, the Respondent II states that, should the Dispute Resolution Chamber
hold it liable for inducement to the breach of contract, clause 6 of the contract
should be disregarded since the compensation set therein is inequitable and
discriminatory towards the Respondent I. Therefore, the Respondent II requests
the Dispute Resolution Chamber to rely on the amount which would be due if
the Claimant had breached the contract as per clause 6 of the contract and set a
compensation amount of EUR 45,000. In any case, the Respondent II deems that
the compensation set out in the contract should be reduced and requests,
among others, the following elements to be considered:
- the Claimant did not pay any transfer fee or commission for the Respondent
I;
- the Claimant did not participate in the sporting development of the
Respondent I;
- the Claimant did not suffer any sporting harm;
- the Respondent II and the Respondent I mutually terminated the contract on
20 January 2012 without any compensation to be paid.
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
6/14
23. As far as art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulation is concerned, the Respondent II
considers that no sporting sanction should be imposed. First of all, it alleges that
the contract was supposedly breached before coming into force and thus
outside the protected period. Additionally, the Respondent II states that it could
not have induced the breach since it only became aware of the existence of the
contract between the Claimant and the Respondent I after it had signed its own
contract with the latter and completed his registration.
24. According to the information and documentation contained in the Transfer
Matching System (TMS), on 30 January 2012, the Respondent I concluded an
employment contract with the club from country H, Club G, valid as of 27
February 2012 until 10 June 2014 and entitling him to a monthly salary
amounting to 30,000 (approx. EUR 765). However, on 22 January 2013, the
parties terminated the contract and the club “guarantee[d] to the debt to
Player C in the amount of 211 350 in the period until 15 May 2013”.
Subsequently, as per the documentation uploaded into TMS, the Respondent I
entered into an employment agreement with the club from country J, Club I,
valid as of 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2013 and according to which the
Respondent I was entitled to receive USD 10,000 as a sign-on fee as well as a
monthly salary of 395,000. On 6 June 2013, the club from country J terminated
the contract and undertook to pay: “(i) the amount equivalent to your threemonth salaries being a total of Eight Hundred Sixty Six Thousand Seven
Hundred and Ninety (866,790) NET; (ii) your salary of June 2013 being a net
amount of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Nine Hundred and Thirty (288,930); and
(iii) one way economy flight ticket routing Country J-Country D”. Then,
according to the documentation uploaded in the TMS by the club concerned, on
10 December 2013, the Respondent I and the club from country D, Club K,
signed an employment contract valid as of 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2014
and entitling the Respondent I to a monthly remuneration of EUR 4,004 gross.
25. By means of a correspondence dated 23 May 2014, the Football Federation of
country D confirmed that up until 23 July 2010 its affiliated club was known as
Club E and changed its name to Club E on the stated date.
II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 27 January 2011. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf.
art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber further referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules and took note that the Respondent II challenged its competence to deal with
the matter on the ground that the conditions set out in art. 22 lit. a) of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, i.e. a dispute between a club
and a player in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there
has been an ITC request, have not been fulfilled since the Claimant never
requested the aforementioned ITC.
3.
In this regard, the members of the Chamber recalled that according to art. 24
par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations (edition 2014), the
Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with employment-related
disputes with an international dimension.
4.
In this context, the DRC stressed that the employment-related dispute at stake
has an international dimension since it involves a club from country B, a player
from country D and a club from country D and therefore concluded that it is
competent to deal with the matter.
5.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable
as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in
accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players (editions 2010, 2012 and 2014), and considering that the
claim in the present matter was lodged on 27 January 2011, the 2010 edition of
said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.
6.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the
Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation
contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following
considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
7.
In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in
the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to
establish as to whether, as claimed by Claimant, a breach of contract had been
committed by the Respondent I, it should first of all pronounce itself on the
issue of the validity of the relevant employment contract dated 16 April 2010,
which was submitted by the Claimant.
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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8.
In this respect, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent I challenged the
validity of said contract, arguing that his signature was forged. At this point, the
members of the Chamber deemed it important to highlight that it is beyond the
Chamber’s competence to determine as to whether a document or signature has
been falsified or tampered with. In fact, such matters would fall within the
competence of a penal court.
9.
Furthermore, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules, any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall
carry the burden of proof. In this regard, the Chamber took note that the
Claimant had provided the original contract duly bearing the signature of both
parties. On account thereof as well as the contradictory statements of the
Respondent I in this respect, the Chamber concluded that this argument of the
Respondent I had to be rejected.
10. In continuation, the DRC took note that the Respondent I acknowledged having
signed a “pre-contract” on 16 April 2010. However, the Respondent I argued
that the Claimant’s representatives abused the fact that he did not speak
Spanish to mislead him and make him sign a document different from what
they agreed on. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to refer to its
longstanding and well-established jurisprudence and emphasised that a party
signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise
contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. In light of the
above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent I’s reported ignorance of
the language of country B was not a valid cause to consider the document he
signed as null and void.
11. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent II challenged the validity of
the contract on the basis that the first clause of the contract contains a
suspensive condition which foresees that the contract is null and void if the
Claimant does not obtain the International Transfer Certificate, which it did not
since the Football Federation of country D never issued such a certificate.
12. In this respect, the DRC deemed of pertinence to recall its jurisprudence in
accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made
conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not
limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international
transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of one party and on
which the other party has no influence.
13. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber first wished to highlight that,
in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding,
apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should
contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
9/14
the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and
the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively,
the Claimant and the Respondent I.
14. After careful study of the contract presented by the Claimant, the Chamber
concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent
employment contract, in particular, the facts that the contract establishes that
the Respondent I has to render his services to the Claimant during a fixed period
of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I a monthly
remuneration.
15. On account of the above, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the
arguments of the Respondent I and the Respondent II cannot be upheld and
that the contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent I on
16 April 2010 was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from the
2010-11 season until the 2014-15 season.
16. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to
the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the
Respondent I.
17. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’
respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was
undisputed that the Respondent I never joined the Claimant in order to offer his
services to the Claimant in accordance with the relevant employment contract.
Also, it is undisputed that, on 14 June 2010, the Respondent I signed an
employment contract with the Respondent II covering partially the same period
of time as the employment contract the Respondent I signed with the Claimant.
By acting as such, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent I had acted in
breach of the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and is
therefore to be held liable for termination of the contract without just cause.
18. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5
of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with
different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the
Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between
professionals and clubs shall apply.
19. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the
“Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the
protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever
comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is
concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or
two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract,
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
10/14
where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In
this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that given the facts of
the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent I had
obviously occurred within the applicable protected period.
20. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to
the question of the consequences of such unjustified breach of contract
committed by the Respondent I during the protected period.
21. In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all referred to the
provisions of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, in accordance with which a
consequence of terminating a contract without just cause is the payment of
compensation by the party in breach to the counterparty. In this respect, the
members of the Chamber recalled that the Claimant’s claim includes a request
for compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of EUR 10,000,000
corresponding to the amount set in clause 6 of the contract.
22. Having recalled the aforementioned, the Chamber strongly affirmed, however,
that the particular circumstances surrounding the breach of contract by the
Respondent I in the present case had to be taken into consideration in order to
determine whether compensation was payable by the Respondent I and, in joint
liability, the Respondent II (cf. art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations).
23. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the Claimant asserted that it was
informed by the Respondent I and his agent that the former’s contract with
Club F was due to expire on 30 June 2010. The DRC further noted that the
Claimant acknowledged having relied on their statements and never mentioned
having contacted Club F in order to assess the actual contractual situation of the
Respondent I.
24. In light of the above, the Chamber considered that prior to signing the
employment contract with the Respondent I on 16 April 2010, the Claimant had
not taken the necessary measures in order to establish whether or not the
Respondent I was still contractually bound to Club F. What is more, by acting as
stated above, the DRC deemed that the Claimant did not exercise the due
diligence in order to inform itself as to the Respondent I’s contractual situation.
25. In this respect, the members of the Chamber were eager to emphasise that prior
to starting the relevant negotiations and entering into an employment contract
with the Respondent I, in line with the stipulations set forth in art. 18 par. 3 of
the Regulations, the Claimant should have contacted Club F.
26. In particular, bearing in mind the Claimant’s allegation that it was informed
that the Respondent I’s contract with Club F would have ended in June 2010,
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
11/14
the Chamber wished to highlight that if art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations reads
that a professional shall only be free to conclude a contract with another club if
his contract with his present club has expired or is due to expire within six
months, said particular provision may only be seen as a right for the player and
may by no means be understood as an exoneration for a potential club from its
duty of care consisting of contacting in writing a player’s current club before
entering into contractual negotiations with a player. What is more, the
members of the Chamber deemed fit to point out that the Claimant had
explicitly been made aware of the name of the club with which the player was
registered at the time and therefore possessed all the information necessary to
complete its due diligence
27. In light of the considerations mentioned above, the Chamber came to the
conclusion that the Claimant had clearly committed a fault by entering into an
employment contract with the Respondent I who still had a valid contract for
one more season without having previously contacted his current club, and,
consequently, had acted in violation of the Regulations.
28. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber held that, in accordance
with the legal principle of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans, it
could not enforce the Claimant’s claim for compensation for breach of contract
by the Respondent I, since, as established above, the Claimant was itself at fault
by signing the relevant employment contract with the Respondent I on 16 April
2010. In other words, the Chamber concluded that due to the Claimant’s own
fault, i.e. the disrespect of the Regulations, as established above, it could not be
entitled to receive compensation in the case at hand. The Chamber highlighted
that this is in line with existing jurisprudence of the Chamber.
29. Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Claimant’s claim
for compensation for breach of contract against the Respondent I and, in joint
liability, the Respondent II, must be rejected.
30. Any other argument raised by the parties in relation to the payment of
compensation for breach of contract does, therefore, not need to be further
addressed.
31. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences
of the breach of contract by the Respondent I within the protected period, and
in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the
Respondent I in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited
provision stipulates inter alia that sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any
player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period.
Furthermore, the Chamber recalled, once again, that art. 18 par. 5 of the
Regulations, which deals with the consequences of entering into more than one
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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contract covering the same time period, clearly states that a player shall be
subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the
maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs.
32. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of
four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the
minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the
protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant
provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words,
the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four
months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not
provide the possibility for deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed
minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances.
33. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the breach of contract
by the Respondent I had occurred during the applicable protected period. In this
respect, the members of the Chamber outlined that the Respondent I actually
breached two contracts insofar as when he signed his contract with the Claimant he
still had a contract valid for one year with Club F. The latter fact is evidence of the
Respondent’s disregard to the principle of contractual stability. Consequently, the
Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the
Respondent I had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his
eligibility to participate in official matches.
34. In continuation, the Chamber held that the issue of inducement with respect to
the Respondent II is not to be considered since from the documentation on file
it can be noted that the Respondent II duly contacted the club with which he
was registered at the time with a view to sign a contract with the player and
complete his registration, in accordance with the applicable rules.
35. The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing
that any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent I, Player C, is found to have terminated the employment
contract with the Claimant without just cause within the protected period.
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
13/14
4.
A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is
imposed on the Respondent I. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of
the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall
remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season
and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national
cups and international championships for clubs.
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
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Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10
days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne, Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected] / www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Jérôme Valcke
Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives
Club A, country B / Player C, country D / Club E, country D
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