Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed on 12 November 2024
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player
COMPOSITION:
Frans DE WEGER (The Netherlands), Chairperson
Mario FLORES CHEMOR (Mexico), Member
Johan VAN GAALEN (South Africa), Member
CLAIMANT:
Player, Country A
Represented by
RESPONDENT:
Club, Country B
Represented by
pg. 2
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
I.
Facts of the case
The Parties
1.
The parties to this dispute are the Country A player (hereinafter: the Player or the Claimant)
and the Country B club (hereinafter: the Club or the Respondent).
2.
The Player and the Club are hereinafter jointly referred to as the Parties.
The employment offer by the Club to the Player
3.
According to the Player, in February 2024, the legal representative of the Club, Person A
(hereinafter: Person A), contacted his agent, Agent A (hereinafter: the Agent), via WhatsApp
to discuss a possible employment relationship between them. The Player provided
screenshots of a WhatsApp conversation that allegedly took place between these parties.
4.
During the same conversation, Person A provided the Agent with an employment offer to
the Player dated 7 February 2024 (hereinafter: the Offer), which contained the following
terms and conditions:
•
Term: 1.5 football seasons in the 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 seasons;
•
Remuneration:
•
o
2023/2024 season: EUR 200,000 payable in 5 instalments of EUR 40,000 each,
from February 2024 until June 2024.
o
2023/2024 season: EUR 400,000 divided in 10 instalments of EUR 40,000
each, from September 2024 until June 2025.
Other provisions:
“1. In case of Player or Club wishes to terminate this Contract, they can terminate the
contracts with just cause. In case of unfair termination, the party who terminated the
contract unfairly must pay compensation to the other party equal to at least two salaries.
The other party cannot demand any other payments different than this amount; this
amount is the maximum amount for the compensation arises from the termination
without just cause.
pg. 3
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
2. Please be informed that this offer shall be deemed valid if the Player completes a
medical examination and fitness test successfully to the sole satisfaction of [the Club]
and conclusion of a detailed transfer agreement.
3. No additional transfer fees will be paid by the club to the player other than the fees
stated above.
4. This offer will be valid if an agreement is signed between our club and the player.
5. The transfer fee we offered is our last offer. This above-mentioned offer is valid until
the date of 08.02.2024 at 00.00 (CET.+)
6. Please confirm our offer by signing the document.
7. Finally, this letter is top secret and strictly addressed to the person meant to and its
content shall not be disclosed to any third party except for the player.
Should you have any questions regarding the content of this letter, or if we can assist you
in any manner, please do not hesitate to contact us directly by e-mail at
‘****@******************’ and/or ‘*********@***************’”.
5.
The Offer was made on Club letterhead and was signed and stamped by the Club.
6.
Person A and the Agent continued to exchange messages on the above terms.
The correspondence between the Parties
7.
On 8 February 2024 at 13:28, the Player sent an e-mail from his personal account to the
two addresses listed in the Offer, confirming his acceptance of the Offer and requesting
further instructions.
8.
The Player attached a signed version of the Offer to his e-mail.
9.
On 8 February 2024 at 19:21, the Player again contacted the Club and stated that, although
he had not yet received a reply, he had already purchased the tickets to , City A in Country
B for the same night in order to attend the team’s training session the following day. The
Player asked to be provided with the team’s schedule. In addition to the copy of the
correspondence, the Player also provided a screenshot of a flight ticket from City B to City
A.
10. On 8 February 2024 at 23:02, the Club replied to the Player’s e-mail stating that it had “no
knowledge from [the] paperwork”.
11. On 9 February 2024, the Player replied to the Club’s e-mail, stating the following:
pg. 4
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
“I am surprised with your answer in which you stated that you had no knowledge about
the proposal of your Club.
I have to underline that the referred proposal was sent by the lawyer of your Club, which
is duly signed and stamped, and this proposal was accepted by me. I hardly understand
your attitude.
In case [the Club] doesn’t make the necessary transactions for my registration before
Country B FA and to issue my license to play until the end of the current transfer
registration period, the employment agreement between your Club and myself shall be
considered terminated by [the Club] prematurely without a just cause and I shall be left
no other resort but to refer this dispute to be adjudicated to the competent judicial body
of the FIFA”.
12. According to the information retrieved from the FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS), the
registration period in Country B closed on 9 February 2024.
13. On 13 February 2024, the Player sent a further e-mail to the Club in which he pointed out
that they had entered into a valid contract, which had subsequently been terminated by
the Club without just cause. The Player stated that he would seek redress from the relevant
authorities.
14. It should be noted that the Player was never registered with the Club in TMS.
The Player’s updated contractual situation
15. On 14 February 2024, the Player entered into a new employment agreement with the
Country A club B (hereinafter: Club B). Accordingly, he would be entitled to inter alia the
following remuneration:
•
2023/2024 season: monthly remuneration of EUR 13,255 net;
•
2024/2025 season (optional): monthly remuneration of EUR 15,255 net;
•
EUR 40,000 net as a sign-on fee.
16. The Player confirmed that the above contract has been extended until the 2024/2025
season.
pg. 5
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
II. Proceedings before FIFA
17. On 10 June 2024, the Player filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the parties’
position is detailed below.
a. Claim of the Player
18. In his claim, the Player argued that the Parties had entered into a valid and binding
employment contract (i.e., the Offer), which was then breached by the Club without just
cause. He emphasised that the Offer contained the essentialia negotii and that it was duly
accepted within the time limit set out therein.
19. The Player also submitted copies of messages exchanged between his Agent and another
representative, Person B (hereinafter: Person B), allegedly confirming his acceptance and
diligence in purchasing the flight tickets to join the Club. The Player also pointed out that
Person B had even held a video conference with Person A to discuss the training schedule.
The Player provided screenshots of his WhatsApp conversation and written statements
from his representatives.
20. The Player then accused the Club of acting in bad faith during the negotiations and of
attempting to withdraw from the agreement without consequences. He also relied on the
jurisprudence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the Swiss Federal Tribunal
(SFT), as well as Swiss law, to conclude that the Club had terminated the Offer without just
cause.
21. In light of the foregoing, the Player claimed that he was entitled to compensation for breach
of contract in the amount of EUR 529,910.67, being the total remuneration under the Offer
minus the mitigation with Club B for the first season only. He also claimed additional
compensation of EUR 240,000 net, the equivalent of six salaries.
22. The Player’s requests for relief were as follows:
“1. Allowing the Claimant’s claim.
2. Issuing an award as follows:
a. requiring the Respondent to compensate the Claimant 529.910,67-Euro net of
tax amounts;
b. to condemn the Respondent to pav the Claimant an additional compensation
(for six months) of 240.000,00- Euro net of tax amounts;
pg. 6
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
c. to apply 5% interest p.a. from the date of unjust termination, i.e. 13 February
2024; and
d. should the Respondent fail to pay to that it be banned from registering any new
Claimants, either nationally or internationally for three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
3. Independently of the type of the decision to be issued, the Claimant requests that the
DRC:
a. to fix a sum of 20,000 Country C currency to be paid by the Respondent to
the Claimant, to contribute to the payment of its legal fees and costs; and
b. to order the Respondent to pay the whole administration costs and fees”.
b. Reply of the Club
23. On 10 July 2024, the Club filed its response to the claim.
Jurisdiction
24. The Club first contested FIFA’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the present dispute could
not be considered an employment-related dispute within the meaning of art. 22, par. 1, b)
of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations).
The Club argued that there had never been an employment relationship between the
Parties and that FIFA was therefore not competent to decide on the case.
Substance
25. In the alternative, the Club also addressed the merits of the case. In particular, the Club
argued that the Offer did not constitute an employment contract, “but a mere offer that did
not create an employment relationship between the Parties”.
26. The Club made the following submissions in this regard:
•
There are several indications in the Offer stating that it was indeed a letter of
invitation;
•
Person A explicitly told the Agent that the Club was preparing “an Offer”;
•
The file sent to the Agent was entitled “Player A Offer”;
•
The Player confirmed in his e-mail of 8 February 2024 and in the signature added
to the Offer that he was accepting an “offer” and not a definitive contract.
pg. 7
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
27. In light of the above, the Club argued that the common intention of the Parties was clear:
the Offer was not an employment contract.
28. The Club further submitted that the Offer was subject to three conditions precedent: (i) the
completion of a medical examination and fitness examination; (ii) the conclusion of a
transfer agreement; and (iii) the conclusion of an employment agreement between the
Parties. According to the Club, none of these conditions have been satisfied.
29. In particular, the Club emphasised that Person A and the Agent were still discussing the
financial terms of a future employment contract, therefore suggesting that they had not
yet reached a final and binding agreement. The Club also denied that it had participated in
a video conference. It disputed the evidence provided by the Player in this respect.
30. The Club also referred to its e-mail of 8 February 2024, in response to the Player’s
correspondence, and confirmed that it had no knowledge of the existence of a valid
agreement between the Parties – precisely because the only existing document was the
Offer. As a result, the Club denied having breached any pre-contractual obligations and/or
having acted in bad faith at any time.
31. In this context, the Club argued that it was not obliged to register the Player on the basis of
the Offer. On the contrary, it claimed that he had hastily terminated the Offer in order to
secure employment elsewhere – in particular because he was well aware that this
document did not constitute a proper contract.
32. Consequently, the Club requested that the Player’s claim be dismissed.
33. In the alternative, the Club stated that if the DRC accepted that the Player was entitled to
any compensation, any award should be limited to a maximum of two salaries pursuant to
art. 3.1 of the Offer (i.e., EUR 80,000 gross or EUR 53,160 net). The Club argued that the
contractual freedom of the Parties should be respected at least to this extent.
34. Finally, the Club added that if the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) decided to calculate
the compensation on the basis of art. 17 of the Regulations, it should take into account the
difference between the net and gross amounts. In particular, the Club noted that the total
compensation under the new contract between the Player and Club B would amount to EUR
138,089.33 net or EUR 182,277.90 gross.
35. The Club’s requests for relief were as follows:
“In view of all the foregoing, the Club herein requests the Dispute Resolution Chamber
of the FIFA Football Tribunal to issue a decision as follows:
1. To dismiss the Statement of Claim in its entirety.
pg. 8
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
2. To fix a sum of Country C currency 10.000 to be paid by the Player to the Club in
order to contribute to the payment of its legal fees and costs.
3. To condemn the Player to the payment of the whole administration costs and fees”.
c. Rejoinder of the Player
36. On 25 July 2024, the Player filed his rejoinder on this matter.
37. The Player first rebutted the Club’s argument as to the lack of jurisdiction. He stated that
the Offer was a valid contract and that there was a valid employment relationship between
the Parties. He referred to Swiss Law and insisted that the required essential elements were
present.
38. Secondly, the Player challenged the Club’s position on the condition precedent. The Player
argued that contracts cannot be made subject to medical examinations (cf., art. 18, par. 4
of the Regulations) and that the Offer was sufficient as a proper “contract”, irrespective of
any transfer agreement or definitive employment contract.
39. The Player further contested the Club’s argument regarding ongoing negotiations. He
claimed that the Parties had already reached a final agreement and that the Player had
proactively purchased the airline tickets in order to join the Club. According to the Player,
at the time he signed the Offer, the negotiations ceased and the employment relationship
between the Parties began.
40. Similarly, the Player stated that the failure to register by 9 February 2024 (i.e., the end of
the registration window) and the Club’s assertion that it did not recognise the paperwork
amounted to a termination without just cause. As a result, he claimed that he had no choice
but to sign a new contract with another club, on worse terms and before all registration
windows had closed.
41. Finally, the Player also contested the Club’s alternative argument that any compensation
should be determined in accordance with clause 3.1 of the Offer. The Player stressed that
this provision was contradictory and only referred to a minimum of two salaries.
Consequently, he claimed that the DRC should determine the amount due on the basis of
art. 17 of the Regulations. Furthermore, he argued that the remuneration referred to in the
Offer should be interpreted as “net” and that the Club’s position in this regard should
therefore be rejected.
42. The Player reiterated his requests for relief.
pg. 9
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
d. Final comments of the Club
43. On 9 August 2024, the Club filed its final submissions in this matter, reiterating its
contentions that: (i) the Parties had never entered into an employment relationship; and,
in the absence of a valid contract, (ii) there was no entitlement to compensation.
44. The Club stated that the case law cited by the Player involved different circumstances that
could not be applied to the present matter.
45. Furthermore, the Club emphasized that, while an employment contract cannot be made
subject to medical examinations, the same is not true for pre-contracts / offers. The Club
insisted that the conditions precedent had not been fulfilled. Similarly, it argued that the
Offer still left open essential conditions, such as jurisdiction, applicable law, starting and
ending dates, total remuneration (including benefits), payment dates, etc.
46. The Club also reiterated its argument that there was no obligation to register the Player at
that stage and that it was therefore the Player who terminated the Offer without just cause.
Finally, the Club also reiterated its alternative claims regarding the amount of
compensation as well as the requests for relief in its previous submission.
III. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
47. First of all, the DRC (hereinafter also referred to as the Chamber) analysed whether it was
competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter
was presented to FIFA on 10 June 2024 and submitted for decision on 12 November 2024.
Taking into account the wording of art. 34 of the March 2023 edition of the Procedural Rules
Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned
edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
48. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and observed
that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 par. 1 lit. b) of the
Regulations (June 2024 edition), the DRC is in principle competent to deal with the matter
at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension
between a Country A player and a Country B club.
49. At this point, the DRC acknowledged that the Club argued that this dispute did not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Football Tribunal because the contract on which the dispute
was based (i.e., the Offer) was not a valid employment contract and therefore did not
constitute an employment dispute within the meaning of art. 22, par. 1, lit. b) of the
Regulations.
pg. 10
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
50. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber recalled that the jurisprudence of the FIFA
Football Tribunal and the CAS establishes that the definition of “employment-related dispute”
covers a wider range of disputes than those arising from employment agreements (cf.
Commentary on the Regulations – Edition 2023, p. 460 et seq.). In other words, the existence
of a definitive employment contract is not a condition sine qua non for FIFA’s jurisdiction.
On the contrary, such an assessment is part of the merits of a given dispute.
51. While considering the foregoing, the Chamber decided that the present case does indeed
concern an “employment-related” matter with an international dimension within the
meaning of art. 22, par. 1 lit. b) of the Regulations, as it concerns the consequences of an
alleged breach of a contract (i.e., the Offer) concluded between a player and a club of
different nationalities. As such, the DRC pointed out that the assessment of the validity /
enforceability of such a contract relates to the substance of the matter.
52. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the Football Tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter.
53. Finally, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance
of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of
the Regulations (June 2024 edition) and considering that the present claim was lodged on
10 June 2024, the June 2024 edition of the Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand
as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
54. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 13
par. 5 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of
an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the Chamber stressed
the wording of art. 13 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider
evidence not filed by the parties, including without limitation the evidence generated by or
within the TMS.
c. Merits of the dispute
55. Having established the competence and the applicable regulations, the Chamber entered
into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all
the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to
the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for
assessing the matter at hand.
pg. 11
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
i.
Main legal discussion and considerations
56. The Chamber proceeded to the substance of the matter, noting that it concerned a claim
for breach of contract brought by the Player against the Club on the basis of the Offer. The
Club strongly disputed whether an employment relationship existed between them,
however if it is determined that an employment relationship indeed did exist between the
Parties, the consequences of its early termination will need to be determine.
57. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that its task was to determine the following:
a. Was the Offer valid and binding on the Parties?
b. If so, what were the consequences?
58. The DRC then proceeded to analyse each issue in turn.
A.
WAS THE OFFER VALID AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES?
59. As a starting point, the Chamber recalled its established jurisprudence according to which,
in order for a contract to be valid and binding, a contract must not only be signed by both
the employer and the employee, but also contain the essentialia negotii of an employment
contract, such as the parties to the contract and their roles, the duration of the employment
relationship and the remuneration to be paid by the employer to the employee.
60. In casu, and contrary to the Club’s argument, the DRC was satisfied that all the essential
elements were contained in the Offer. In particular, the document provides for the duration
of the employment relationship and the remuneration owed to the Player, as well as it
refers to the Player as a footballer employed by the Club and contains their correct
identification.
61. The Offer was also signed by the Club and countersigned by the Player. Furthermore,
although the Chamber considered that the wording of the Offer could leave room for
further interpretation, the Parties do not dispute that the Player’s acceptance was
submitted by e-mail within the previously stipulated deadline (i.e., 8 February 2024, 00:00).
62. While the Chamber acknowledged that there were still outstanding discussions with
respect to ancillary (minor) obligations (i.e., fringe benefits and training schedule), the
Chamber also found that the essential elements for the formation of a contract, as required
by the jurisprudence, were all present. Moreover, it does not follow from the content of the
Offer that any further negotiations had to take place.
63. In addition, the DRC emphasized that (i) the fact that the Offer refers to the subsequent
signing of an employment contract / transfer agreement does not prevent, in and of itself,
pg. 12
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
the document from becoming effective; and (ii) the mere reference to the medical
examinations to be carried out prior to the signing of such an employment contract is also
not sufficient to prevent the Offer from becoming binding, resulting in a valid and binding
contract.
64. On the contrary, the DRC considered that the chronology of the case suggested that the
conflict between the two Parties had nothing to do with a medical condition and, more
importantly, that the breach occurred before the Player had even joined the Club.
Consequently, the Chamber stated that if the Club wished to validly impose conditions
precedent (e.g. medical examinations) as suggested, it should not have sent a signed
contract to the player, let alone requested his countersignature as proof of acceptance.
65. On the basis of the foregoing, the DRC decided that the Parties had indeed entered into a
valid and binding contract and should be liable for the consequences thereof.
B.
IF SO, WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES?
66. In the Chamber’s view, having established the foregoing, the only possible conclusion was
to find that such Offer was subsequently terminated prior to its actual implementation.
67. In particular, the Chamber found from the case file that:
•
on 7 February 2024, the Club sent the Offer to the Player;
•
on 8 February 2024, the Player accepted and counter-signed the Offer;
•
a few hours later, (i) the Player purchased airline tickets to join the Club on the
same day and requested further instructions; and (ii) the Club replied that it was
not aware of the paperwork;
•
on 9 February 2024, the Player recalled the Offer and argued that if the Club did
not register him within the registration period (i.e., by the end of that day), he
would consider that the Club intended to withdraw from the agreement without
just cause; and
•
as the Club did not respond to his letter, the Player considered that the Offer
had been terminated and signed with Club B.
68. In light of the foregoing, the DRC determined that the underlying issue was whether this
exchange between the Parties could be interpreted as a unilateral termination by the
Player for just cause or, mutatis mutandis, as an acknowledgment of a termination by the
Club without just cause and, in particular, whether it could support the Player’s claim for
compensation for breach of contract.
pg. 13
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
69. In this context, and having carefully analysed the documents in the file, the Chamber first
noted that both Parties appeared to be fully aware of the need to expedite the paperwork
so that the Player could be registered within the same window. In the DRC’s view, this
conclusion was supported by (i) the WhatsApp messages exchanged between Person A and
the Agent; and (ii) the short deadline contained in the Offer, which only allowed for an
acceptance on the same day. Had this not been the case and had the Player’s acceptance
not been time-sensitive, the DRC considered that there would have been no reason to
require the Player to countersign the Offer within hours.
70. Furthermore, the Player had sufficiently demonstrated that, in such a limited period of
time, the Parties were expected to act efficiently to ensure that the Player was properly
registered. This diligence would mainly relate to his registration in TMS in order to
safeguard his right to exercise his profession.
71. The DRC found that, although the Player provided evidence that he had fulfilled his part of
the bargain by formally accepting the Offer and proactively purchasing the flight ticket to
join the Club, the Club could not explain why it decided to change its course of action. In
fact, the Chamber observed that the Club first attempted to discredit the validity of the
Offer via e-mail and, after being confronted by the Player and requested to remedy the
situation within the following day, failed to respond.
72. In this framework and having regard to the Club’s conduct, the Chamber considered that
the Player could reasonably expect that the Club had lost interest in retaining his services.
Furthermore, in view of the limitrophe constellation with the registration windows in
Europe, the DRC considered that the Player’s decision to seek new employment to
safeguard his career could not be interpreted to his detriment – even if he had terminated
the Offer at such short notice.
73. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the Club tacitly terminated the Offer for just cause. As
a result, the Player was entitled to compensation for breach of contract.
74. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of
compensation payable to the Player by the Club. In doing so, the Chamber first
recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of
compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the
contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country
concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the
new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years,
and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
75. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as
to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which
pg. 14
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of breach of contract.
76. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that clause 3.1 of the Offer reads as follows:
“1. In case of Player or Club wishes to terminate this Contract, they can terminate the
contracts with just cause. In case of unfair termination, the party who terminated the
contract unfairly must pay compensation to the other party equal to at least two
salaries. The other party cannot demand any other payments different than this
amount; this amount is the maximum amount for the compensation arises from the
termination without just cause” (emphasis added by the DRC).
77. While considering the foregoing, the Chamber noted that the Player contends that such
clause is not clear, reciprocal, or proportionate, hence shall be null and void.
78. Nevertheless, the majority of the DRC found it decisive that: (i) the above clause did indeed
refer to an amount to be paid by the Player to the Club in the event of breach of the Offer;
and (ii) even if the Chamber initially agreed that the expression “at least” could be
somewhat unclear, the true intention of the Parties could be inferred from the parallel
messages exchanged between them via WhatsApp. In particular, the DRC considered that
the fact that the Agent expressly referred to the amount of compensation in the exchanges
meant that the Player was unambiguously aware of its implications and nevertheless
concluded the Offer – possibly hoping that it would be changed or set aside.
79. The DRC also wished to add that, in the opinion of the majority, the mere fact that the
Player had invoked to the invalidity of the compensation clause in the light of the
Regulations could not, in itself, be held against the Club. In other words, the DRC was not
compelled by the Player’s argument stating that the clause should be annulled because it
was unclear and disproportionate, even though it had been explicitly discussed by the
Parties’ representatives in the exercise of their contractual freedom.
80. In light of all of the above, the majority of the Chamber saw no legal reason to deviate from
the contractual agreement by the Parties and decided that the compensation owed by the
Club to the Player should amount to the two salaries stipulated therein (i.e., EUR 80,000),
which the majority of the DRC considered to be a fair outcome of the case.
81. Finally, taking into account the Player’s request as well as the consistent practice of the
Chamber in this regard, the DRC decided to award the Player interest on said compensation
at the rate of 5% p.a. as of the date of termination (i.e., 13 February 2024) until the date of
effective payment.
pg. 15
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
ii.
Compliance with monetary decisions
82. Finally, taking into account the applicable Regulations, the Chamber referred to art. 24 par.
1 and 2 of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA
deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the
concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or
compensation in due time.
83. In this regard, the DRC highlighted that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to
pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid. The overall
maximum duration of the registration ban shall be of up to three entire and consecutive
registration periods.
84. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that the Club must pay the full
amount due (including all applicable interest) to the Player within 45 days of notification of
the decision, failing which, at the request of the Player, a ban from registering any new
players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and
consecutive registration periods shall become immediately effective on the Club in
accordance with art. 24 par. 2, 4, and 7 of the Regulations.
85. The Club shall make full payment (including all applicable interest) to the bank account
provided by the Player in the Bank Account Registration Form, which is attached to the
present decision.
86. The DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its
complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24 par. 8 of
the Regulations.
d. Costs
87. The Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which
“Procedures are free of charge where at least one of the parties is a player, coach, football agent,
or match agent”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be
imposed on the Parties.
88. Likewise, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 25
par. 8 of the Procedural Rules and decided that no procedural compensation shall be
awarded in these proceedings.
89. Lastly, the DRC concluded its deliberations by rejecting any other requests for relief made
by any of the Parties.
pg. 16
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
IV. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The Football Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim of the claimant, Player A.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club A, must pay to the Claimant the following amount(s):
- EUR 80,000 as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as from [date]
until the date of effective payment.
4.
Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5.
Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated
in the enclosed Bank Account Registration Form.
6.
Pursuant to art. 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, if full payment
(including all applicable interest) is not made within 45 days of notification of this decision,
the following consequences shall apply:
1. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or
internationally, up until the due amount is paid. The maximum duration of the ban shall
be of up to three entire and consecutive registration periods.
2. The present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee
in the event that full payment (including all applicable interest) is still not made by the
end of the three entire and consecutive registration periods.
7.
The consequences shall only be enforced at the request of the Claimant in accordance
with art. 24 par. 7 and 8 and art. 25 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
8.
This decision is rendered without costs.
For the Football Tribunal:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
pg. 17
REF. FPSD-XXXXX
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 57 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request
of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an
anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 17 of the Procedural Rules Governing the Football
Tribunal).
CONTACT INFORMATION
Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Legal & Compliance Division
396 Alhambra Circle, 6th floor, Coral Gables, Miami, Florida, USA 33134
legal.fifa.com | [email protected] | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
pg. 18