Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member
Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player S, from country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club P, from country R
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 1 July 2008, Player S, from country B (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club P,
from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded a “Civil Law Convention
Activity professional footballer” (hereinafter: the contract) together with a
“Financial Annex” which governed the financial terms of the contract
(hereinafter: the Financial Annex), both valid as from 1 July 2008 until 30 June
2011.
2.
According to the Financial Annex, the Claimant was entitled to receive as
remuneration from the Respondent the total amount of EUR 330,000 as follows:
a. For the period between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, a total amount of EUR
100,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 8,333 each;
b. For the period between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010, a total amount of EUR
110,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 9,166 each;
c. For the period between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2011, a total amount of EUR
120,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 each.
3.
In addition, the Financial Annex provided that “These amounts are valid if
Claimant play 75% of games”. Moreover, according to the Financial Annex, the
Claimant was entitled to the following: (i) two one-way tickets country B –country
R and two one-way tickets country R – country B per year; and (ii) “free
accommodation and meals”.
4.
Furthermore, clause 12 of the contract stipulated that “the applicable law is the
law in country R” and that “all disputes, controversies and disagreements arising
from this Convention shall be governed, interpreted and resolved in accordance
with the country R laws in force, as well as the Statutes and Regulations Sports”.
5.
Moreover, clause 13.2 stated that “the parties shall make good faith efforts to
amicably settle any dispute, controversy or disagreement arising out of or relating
to this Convention. If this is not possible, the dispute will be resolved in a
jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football Federation sport and / or
Professional Football League”.
6.
On 15 July 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of
FIFA, requesting, inter alia, the following:
a. To declare null and void the Financial Annex’s provision making full payment
of the agreed remuneration conditional upon the Claimant’s participation in
75% of the Respondent’s matches. In this respect, the Claimant held that the
relevant provision was inserted in the contract without his knowledge;
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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b. To order the Respondent to pay outstanding salaries totalling EUR 96,600
corresponding to: (i) EUR 38,800 for the 2008/2009 season; (ii) EUR 52,800 for
the 2009/2010 season; and (iii) EUR 5,000 for the 2010/2011 season;
c. To order the Respondent to pay compensation for the remaining term of the
contract, i.e. from 15 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, amounting to EUR 115,000;
d. To order the Respondent to pay medical expenses in the amount of EUR
5,300;
e. To order the Respondent to pay interest on each instalment due until
effective payment;
f. To order the Respondent to pay the legal expenses incurred by the Claimant
in the amount of EUR 25,000.
7.
In particular, the Claimant explained that the Respondent failed to comply with
the payment of his salaries since the beginning of the contract, a situation that
“remained practically every month”. In this respect, the Claimant provided a
detailed breakdown of the payments he received from the Respondent since
August 2008 until July 2010. The Claimant explained that during the 2008/2009
season he had only received EUR “60,200” and during the 2009/2010 season he
had only received EUR 57,200.
8.
In addition, the Claimant asserted that despite putting the Respondent in default,
the latter did not respond to his demands. In this respect, the Claimant enclosed
two letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010 where he requested the Respondent to pay
the outstanding salaries as well as the reimbursement of medical expenses.
9.
In continuation, the Claimant argued that he suffered an injury “to the services of
[the Respondent]”, which recovery took from 1 August 2009 until 9 January 2010,
and that he had to undergo surgery. In this respect, he asserts that he left to
country B to treat said injury with the permission of the Respondent and that the
latter “has undertaken to bear all the burden of injury (salaries, travels, surgery
and treatments)”. In this regard, the Claimant enclosed two documents, a letter
dated 17 August 2009 whereby the Respondent authorized him to travel to
country B for “medical treatment and a possible surgery” and that “If surgery is
needed, the hospital will issue a invoice for [the Respondent] to agree on the
expenses” and an invoice of the surgery paid by the Claimant in the total amount
of EUR 5,300.
10.
The Claimant further argues that, due to the failure of the Respondent to pay the
outstanding remuneration and the medical expenses, by means of a letter dated
15 July 2010, he terminated the contract with just cause.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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11.
On 13 October 2010, the Respondent replied to the Claimant’s claim, disputing
the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber on the basis of clause 13.2
of the contract, according to which the competent jurisdictional bodies are
exclusively those of the country R Football Federation and of the Professional
Football League, as the case may be.
12.
Having been requested by FIFA to provide the documentary evidence that there
exists an independent arbitration tribunal on national level, the Respondent
referred to - and submitted - copies of the following: (i) art. 56 of the country R
Football Federation Statutes that stipulates the general jurisdiction of the country
R Football Federation DRC; (ii) art. 26 of the country R Football Federation Players’
Status and Transfer Regulation that stipulates the competence of the Professional
Football League DRC and country R Football Federation DRC as well as the rules
that govern the composition of said bodies; (iii) articles 30-36 of the country R
Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation regarding the
procedure of the Professional Football League DRC and the Appeal Committee of
the country R Football Federation; and (iv) article 41.1 of the country R Football
Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation that stipulates the date when
the regulations came into force.
13.
As to the substance, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim that it had
inserted the conditional payment provision without his knowledge. In addition,
the Respondent argued that due to the Claimant’s absence from trainings from 25
May 2010 it was forced to withhold some of the payment to the Claimant under
the contract, on the basis of the exception of non-performance.
14.
Moreover, the Respondent held that any outstanding amounts due before 4
August 2009 were time-barred according to the one-year time limit set out in art.
25.3 of the Regulations of the country R Football Federation. In this respect, the
Respondent stressed that according to clause 12 of the contract, the contract’s
governing law is country R law and that all litigation arising from the contract is
to be settled according to country R legislation in force. Furthermore, the
Respondent maintained that it had neither agreed to pay for medical expenses
nor for the Claimant’s post-surgery recovery in country B.
15.
The Respondent further argued that since “payment of monthly remunerations
due to [the Claimant] dependant on his participation to at least 75% of the
team’s games”, and in view of the “expiration of the statute of limitations in
relation to the payment of certain amounts and the exception of nonperformance due [the Claimant’s] own failure to the obligations incumbent upon
him” it “does not owe any amount of money to [the Claimant]”.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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16.
On 23 and 26 March 2012, in additional submissions in reply to the Claimant’s
claim, the Respondent provided a detailed breakdown of the minutes played
during the relevant season and the corresponding remuneration due in
accordance to the provision making payment conditional upon the participation
of the Claimant in at least 75% of the Respondent’s games. According to the
Respondent, during the 2008/2009 season the Claimant was entitled to EUR
53,896, while the Respondent claimed to have paid EUR 73,466 between 18 July
2008 and 13 July 2009. Moreover, the Respondent referred to a letter where
supposedly the Claimant acknowledged having received EUR 70,700 from the
Respondent. As for the 2009/2010 season, on the basis of the Claimant’s
participation in the Respondent’s games, the Respondent maintained that the
Claimant was entitled to EUR 45,287, which the Respondent claimed to have paid.
17.
Furthermore, the Respondent argued that on 27 May 2010 it provided the
Claimant with a round flight ticket country R – country B. However, the latter did
not return to the Respondent. Consequently, in the Respondent’s view, the
Claimant terminated the contract without just cause.
18.
Despite having been asked to do so, the Claimant did not make any further
comments.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or
the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 15 July 2010. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21
of the 2008 and 2012 edition of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2012), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on
employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an
international dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be
competent to decide on the present litigation involving a country B player and a
country R club regarding an alleged breach of the employment contract
concluded between the aforementioned parties.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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4.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of article 13.2 of the contract,
which, according to the Respondent, clearly excludes the competence of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber to adjudicate on the present matter.
5.
Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance
with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand,
unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and
respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been
established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a
collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on
an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber
referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the
members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force
on 1 January 2008.
6.
In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of
the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ
than the DRC can settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a
player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant
arbitration tribunal derives from a clear reference in the employment contract.
7.
Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter,
the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost,
analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute
actually contained a clear jurisdiction clause.
8.
Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 13.2
of the employment contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested
FIFA’s jurisdiction. Said article stipulates that “the parties shall make good faith
efforts to amicably settle any dispute, controversy or disagreement arising out of
or relating to this Convention. If this is not possible, the dispute will be resolved in
a jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football Federation sport and / or
Professional Football League”.
9.
In this respect, and regardless of the fact that the relevant employment contract
contains a reference to dispute resolution at national level, the Chamber pointed
out that the relevant article was drafted in a rather vague manner in the sense
that it merely refers to “a jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football
Federation sport and / or Professional Football League” and not to a specific
deciding body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, or
to any similar arbitration body. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber held that
the jurisdiction of the Professional Football League DRC or the country R Football
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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Federation DRC does not derive from a clear reference in the employment
contract.
10.
In view of the foregoing, the Chamber held that art. 13.2 of the employment
contract cannot be considered as a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour
of the country R Football Federation DRC, the Professional Football League DRC
or any other national body in country R.
11.
In continuation and for the sake of completeness, the DRC turned its attention to
the principles of fair proceedings and equal representation of players and clubs
and underlined that these principles are fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in
order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such.
12.
In this context, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented
by the Respondent and noted that the Respondent had provided merely a copy of
art. 56 of the country R Football Federation Statutes and copies of arts. 26, 30-36
and 41.1 of the country R Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer
Regulation.
13.
From the incomplete documentation provided by the Respondent, the Chamber
acknowledged that, apparently, in country R at least two different national
dispute resolution bodies exist, namely, the country R Football Federation DRC
and the Professional Football League DRC. In this sense, in accordance with art. 26
par. 8 of the country R Football Federation RSTP, the jurisdictional bodies of the
Professional Football League, i.e. the DRC of the Professional Football League and
the Professional Football League Review Commission, are the competent bodies
to adjudicate on disputes and cases involving only clubs that participate in the
First League National Championship, and their players. In this respect, the
Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent was, and is, playing in the country R
First League National Championship.
14.
In this respect, the Chamber observed that as to the composition of the
Professional Football League DRC, art. 26 par. 8 merely indicates that it is formed
of five members, two of them acting as chairman and deputy chairman,
respectively. However, no further details are provided as to the composition of
the Professional Football League DRC and therefore the Chamber was unable to
determine whether the Professional Football League DRC complies with the
principle of equal representation between players and clubs.
15.
In view of the above, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent had failed to
prove that the Professional Football League DRC is indeed an independent
arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of
equal representation of players and clubs.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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16.
On account of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber established
that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the
present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is
competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.
17.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as
to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance
with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations (editions 2009, 2010 and 2012),
and considering that the present claim was lodged on 15 July 2010, the 2009
edition of said regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
18.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started
by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation
contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following
considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
19.
First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 1 July 2008, the
parties entered into an employment contract and a Financial Annex in accordance
with which the Respondent would pay the Claimant EUR 100,000 for the period
between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, EUR 110,000 for the period between 1 July
2009 and 30 June 2010 and EUR 120,000 for the period between 1 July 2010 and
30 June 2011. Moreover, said Financial Annex provided that “These amounts are
valid if [Claimant] play 75% of games”.
20.
The DRC further observed that on 15 July 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim
against the Respondent requesting, inter alia, (i) EUR 38,800 for the 2008/2009
season; (ii) EUR 52,800 for the 2009/2010 season, (iii) EUR 5,000 for the 2010/2011
season, (iv) EUR 5,300 as medical expenses and (v) EUR 115,000 as compensation
for breach of contract.
21.
Likewise, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant sent to the
Respondent two default letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010 in which the Claimant
requested the Respondent to pay him the outstanding salaries as well as his
medical expenses, however to no avail.
22.
Furthermore, the Chamber noted that on 15 July 2010, the Claimant terminated
the contract concluded between the parties invoking just cause in view of the
failure of the Respondent to respond to his demands.
23.
On the other hand, the DRC noted that the Respondent rejects such allegations
and argues that the Claimant had no just cause to terminate the employment
contract since, in view of the contents of the Financial Annex, it had the right to
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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subtract the player’s salary. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the
Respondent alleges having paid the Claimant EUR 73,466 for the season
2008/2009 and EUR 45,287 for the season 2009/2010, which corresponds to the
amounts to which he was entitled in accordance with his appearances’ percentage
with the Respondent.
24.
Moreover, the Respondent argues that due to the Claimant’s absence from
trainings from 25 May 2010 it was forced to withhold some of the Claimant’s
salaries, on the basis of the exception of non-performance.
25.
Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the
underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the
allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment
contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the
Claimant, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the
contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently,
it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused
the breach of the relevant employment contract.
26.
Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the members of the Chamber noted
first that whereas the Claimant argues that the Respondent failed to remit his
salaries in a complete and timely manner and that, therefore, he had just cause to
terminate the contract, the Respondent argues that in accordance with the
Financial Annex it had the right to deduct the Claimant’s salary and therefore, it
has no outstanding payments towards him.
27.
In view of the foregoing, the DRC firstly focused its attention on the content of
the relevant clause of the Financial Annex. In this respect and after a careful and
exhaustive analysis of such, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that the
said clause is unilateral and to the benefit of the Respondent only. In this regard,
the members of the Chamber wished to point out that the decision on the liningup of a player in a match is normally left fully to the discretion of the club and
that if it had chosen to not play the Claimant at all, he would not have received
any remuneration according to the relevant clause. Hence, in view of such
potestative character of the pertinent contractual clause, the members of the
Chamber agreed that such cannot be accepted and thus, shall not have any effect.
28.
In this context and for the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber
wished to highlight that, in general, potestative clauses, i.e. clauses that contain
obligations which fulfilment are conditional upon an event that one party entirely
controls, cannot be considered since they generally limit the rights of the other
contractual party in an excessive manner and lead to an unjustified disadvantage
of the latter towards the other.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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29.
Therefore, the Chamber concurred that the said clause of the Financial Annex
does not constitute a reason that can be validly invoked nor a legal basis to
reduce the Claimant’s salary. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the
Respondent’s argument in this respect.
30.
Moreover, in respect of the allegation of the Respondent that the Claimant failed
to attend some trainings, was absent as from 25 May 2010 and that, therefore, it
was entitled to deduct the Claimant’s salary, the Chamber referred to the flight
itinerary provided by the Respondent in accordance with which the Claimant was
to return to country R on 14 June 2010. Equally, the Chamber referred to the
default letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010, by means of which the Claimant had
informed the Respondent about its arrears. In view of the foregoing, and since
the Respondent had not replied to the aforementioned letters, the Claimant had
a justified reason not to return to country R.
31.
Finally, and in relation to the Respondent’s position that it had already paid
certain amounts to the Claimant, the DRC referred to the principle of the burden
of proof contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and established that
the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence that could prove that
it had actually paid to the Claimant any of the amounts which it claimed to have
paid.
32.
Having taken into account the previous considerations and in view of the nullity
of the relevant clause of the Financial Annex, the Chamber decided that it could
be established that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual
obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the
Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of
time and decided that by means of the letter dated 15 July 2010, the Claimant
terminated the contract with just cause.
33.
Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with
the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just
cause by the Claimant.
34.
First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must
fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the
general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the Chamber
decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration
that was outstanding at the time of the termination, i.e. the amount of EUR
38,800 corresponding to the 2008/2009 season as well as EUR 52,800
corresponding to the 2009/2010 season i.e. the total amount of EUR 91,600.
35.
For the sake of completeness, the Chamber stressed that since the DRC is
competent to adjudicate on the employment-related dispute between the
Claimant and the Respondent (cf. par II./16. above), also art. 25 par. 5 of the
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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Regulations shall apply to the present proceedings. As a consequence, the
Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s argument that any amount that fell
due prior to 4 August 2009 is time-barred in accordance with art. 25.3 of the
country R Football Federation Regulations.
36.
Moreover, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant argues
having suffered an injury while rendering his services to the Respondent during
August 2009 which required surgery and which costs amounted to EUR 5,300.
Thus, the Claimant is seeking from the Respondent the reimbursement of said
amount. In this respect, the Chamber observed that whereas the Claimant argues
that the Respondent committed to pay for the relevant surgery, the Respondent
denies having ever committed to cover for said expenses.
37.
Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the
Respondent’s letter of 17 August 2009, on which the Claimant bases this part of
his claim. In this respect, the members of the Chamber came to the unanimous
conclusion that the phrase “If surgery is needed, the hospital will issue an invoice
for the club to agree on the expenses” does not constitute a commitment of the
Respondent to cover any and all of the medical expenses of the Claimant, but
merely a possibility of doing so, which can be concluded from the phrase “for the
club to agree on the expenses”. Therefore, the claim of the Claimant regarding
medical expenses in the amount of EUR 5,300 has to be rejected.
38.
Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber turned its attention to the
consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause
by the Claimant. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the
Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an
amount of money as compensation for breach of contract.
39.
In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for
the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining
on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on
whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
40.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable
by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the
Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the
employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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41.
Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the
Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration
due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the
time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the
Claimant after the early termination occurred.
42.
Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of
the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract
until 30 June 2011. Taking into consideration that the contract was terminated in
July 2010, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 120,000, i.e. the
remuneration for the 2010/2011 season, serves as the basis for the final
determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.
43.
In continuation, the Chamber remarked that the Claimant had signed two new
employment contracts. The first one, with the Club G, from country B, valid as
from 15 August 2010 until 30 November 2010, in accordance with which he was
entitled to a monthly salary of 1,000 currency of country B. The second one, with
Club Q, from country B, valid as from 1 March 2011 until 31 May 2011, according
to which he was entitled to a monthly salary of currency of country B 3,200. All
together, the value of the Claimant’s new contracts would correspond to
approximately EUR 7,400. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice
of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to
mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract
shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for
breach of contract.
44.
In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay
the amount of EUR 112,600 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of
contract, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified
amount as compensation.
45.
In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that
the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on both the
outstanding remuneration as well as the amount of compensation as of the date
on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 15 July 2010, until the date of effective
payment.
46.
Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim
pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules
and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard.
47.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
******
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player S, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club P, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the
date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of
EUR 91,600 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 15 July 2010 until the
date of effective payment.
4.
The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of
notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount
of EUR 112,600 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 15 July 2010 until
the date of effective payment.
5.
In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3 and 4 are not paid by the Respondent within the stated
time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
6.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
7.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Markus Kattner
Deputy Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives
Player S, from country S / Club P, from country R
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