Acórdão do FIFA
Processo 04192234-E_2019-04-01

Data
01/04/2019

Labour Disputes


Texto da decisão

Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 11 April 2019,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Alex andra Góm ez (Uruguay ), member
S tefano S artori (Italy ), member
Daan de Jong (The Netherlands ), member
Muzam m il bin Moham ed (S ingapore), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Play er A, Country B
as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D
as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties

I.

Facts of the cas e

1.

On 5 August 2015, the Player of Country B, Player A, (hereinafter: the Claimant) and
the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent) entered into an
employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 6 August 2015 until 31
May 2017.

2.

According to clause 3.3 of the Annexe to the contract (hereinafter: the Annexe), the
Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent, inter alia, EUR 260,000
payable in 12 monthly salaries of EUR 21,667 each for the season 2015/2016 and EUR
260,000 payable with the same modalities for the following one. Furthermore,
according to the referred clause, each monthly salary was payable on “the 10th day of
the following month”.

3.

In accordance with clause 3.5.1 of the Annexe, the Claimant was entitled to a
monthly allowance of 5,000 “to be used for living costs”.

4.

On 14 June 2016, the Claimant sent a default notice to the Respondent, putting it in
default of payment of the following amounts: (i) EUR 108,335 corresponding to the
monthly salaries as from January 2016 until May 2016 and (ii) 50,000 as “the amount
due for living expenses for the last 10 months”.

5.

Subsequently, on 16 August 2016, the parties signed a mutual agreement
(hereinafter: the termination agreement), in which it was declared that: “the Parties
[…] are now willing to terminate [the Annexe] in an amicable way”.

6.

According to clause 1 of the termination agreement, the parties agreed to
“definitively settle their dispute concerning the outstanding payments of the
2015/2016 season and the salaries of the 2016/2017 season against payment by the
[Respondent] to the [Claimant] of the amount of EUR 270,000 net, payable in twelve
[instalments] as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 September 2016;
EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 December 2016;
EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 January 2017;
EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 March 2017;
EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 July 2017;
EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 September 2017;
EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 November 2017;
EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 January 2018;
EUR 30,000 by no later than 30 April 2018;
EUR 30,000 by no later than 30 July 2018;
EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 September 2018;
EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 December 2018”.

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

2

7.

Clause 2 of the termination agreement reads as follows: “The Parties hereby
undertake not to raise any claim against each other with regard to the Contract,
subject to the terms of [the termination agreement] being duly complied with by the
[Respondent] in due time”.

8.

In addition, clauses 4 and 5 of the termination agreement provide that:
“4. In the event that any of the aforementioned obligations […] is not made by any
of the parties, each party shall have every right to make any claim and/or
demand at any outstanding amounts under the jurisdiction mentioned in article
5 below.
5.

Any dispute arising from or related to [the termination agreement] shall be
submitted to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and shall be resolved in
accordance with the FIFA Regulations”.

9.

By means of a letter dated 6 December 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in
default and requested the club to proceed with the payment of the first instalment
in accordance with the termination agreement, in the amount of EUR 20,000, which
fell due on 30 September 2016.

10.

On 27 December 2016 the Claimant lodged a claim for outstanding remuneration
and breach of contract against the Respondent before FIFA, requesting the total
amounts of EUR 422,502.50 and 62,500, consisting of:
-

-

11.

EUR 162,502.50 as outstanding remuneration, corresponding to the monthly
salaries as from January 2016 until 16 August 2016 in the amount of EUR 21,667
each;
62,500, corresponding to “living expenses allowance” for the period as from
August 2015 until 16 August 2016;
EUR 260,000 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to its
residual value, i.e. all his salaries for the 2016/2017 season, plus interest at the
rate of 5% p.a. until the date of effective payment.

More in particular, the Claimant held that the Respondent did not comply with the
termination agreement. Hence, he argued that: “[as] the [Respondent] failed to meet
any of its obligations under the Termination Agreement, the conditions of Articles 2
and 4 [of the termination agreement] would be met and, consequently, [the
Claimant] would have the right to revert to requesting from the [Respondent]
payment of any and all outstanding amounts and claims under the Contract, existing
before concluding the termination agreement […] as well as the payment in full of
all the unpaid salaries for the [remaining duration] of the employment relationship
[…] until the end of its term, i.e. 30 June 2017, as compensation for its early
termination”.

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

3

12.

In its reply to the claim, the Respondent explained that: “On December 12th 2016,
insolvency proceedings were opened against the company which managed and
operated [the Respondent]”.

13.

Furthermore, the Respondent stressed that: “Insolvency proceedings stop all other
pending proceedings, in order to give equal treatment to all creditors and in order to
avoid any preference of any creditor over the others. […]. It is obvious that the
continuation of proceedings against the [Respondent] may give preference to those
creditors who filed a claim with FIFA over other creditors, which contradicts the
applicable law”.

14.

In addition to the above, the Respondent also replied as to the substance of the
matter. In this regard, the Respondent admitted not having complied with its
financial obligations deriving from the termination agreement and declared that:
“Any claims based on [the contract] for payments of the rest of 2016/2017 playing
season should be banned, since the Termination agreement cancelled [the contract]
for this period. Furthermore, the [Claimant] has left Country D after the Termination
Agreement was signed and began to play for another club, where he surely earned a
salary”.

15.

The Respondent finally stated that: “The [Respondent]’s obligation to [the Claimant]
is for the 7.5 unpaid salary payments, which amounts to EUR 162,502. Any demand
for Living expenses should be banned, since he had no such of those”.

16.

In his replica, the Claimant asserted that, according to clause 5 of the termination
agreement: “any dispute arising from or related to [the termination agreement] shall
be submitted to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and shall be resolved in
accordance with the FIFA Regulations”.

17.

Moreover, the Claimant stressed that: “insolvency procedures in principle do not
affect procedures in front of the DRC as long as the relevant club remains affiliated
to its respective association”. In this regard, the Claimant affirmed that: “the
[Respondent] appears to participate in the current football season 2017/2018 in the
League E […]”.

18.

Furthermore, the Claimant referred, once again, to clause 2 of the termination
agreement and declared that, as the Respondent failed to comply with its financial
obligations upon the termination agreement: “[the Claimant] is perfectly entitled to
revert to requesting from the [Respondent] payment of any and all outstanding
amounts and claims under the Contract, existing before concluding the Termination
Agreement”.

19.

The Claimant finally asked FIFA to order the Respondent to proceed with the
payment of the amounts requested in his claim or, subsidiarily, order the Respondent
“to pay to [him] the amount stipulated under the Termination Agreement, i.e. EUR
270,000 net plus interest of 5% p.a., until full payment”.

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

4

20.

In its duplica, the Respondent referred to its previous arguments and attached a copy
of “The Liquidation Order […] awarded by the district court in Capital F”.
Furthermore, as to the substance of the matter, the Respondent held three different
argumentative positions corresponding to different scenarios:
- Firstly, it argued that: “after [the Claimant] has stated in his claim that the
termination agreement is no longer valid due to the [Respondent]’s breach, it is in
fact Null and Void. Therefore, the termination agreement should be ignored and
the Claim is actually based solely on [the Claimant’s] contract […]. Meaning [the
Claimant] gave his services to the [Respondent] in season 2015/2016 and is due
outstanding salaries for that period in the total sum of EUR 163,502. However,
[the Claimant] left the [Respondent] at the summer of 2016, in mutual consent of
both parties. […]. [The Claimant] cannot be compensated for the remaining of his
contract while he willingly left the [Respondent] and signed, and got paid by
another Club for that same season”;
- Secondly, it maintained that: “if […] the termination agreement is valid – the
consequence of that is that [the contract] was cancelled by mutual agreements, no
liability remained for the period beyond August 2016, that is, the date of signing
the Termination Agreement”;
- Thirdly, it stated that: “if […] the [Respondent] is obliged to pay [the Claimant]
the remaining of his contract for the season 2016/2017, any sums and income he
had that year must be offset from the amount set to be paid to [the Claimant] for
his services for season 2016/2017”.

21.

In his final comments, the Claimant rejected the Respondent’s arguments regarding
its liquidation, since: “The Liquidation proceedings of Country D described in [the
Respondent’s] submission are not supposed to end with the liquidation of the
[Respondent] itself, but seem to be supposed to serve to allow the [Respondent] to
avoid insolvency so that its activities can be assumed by another entity”.

22.

The Claimant further claimed that: “[the Respondent] does not dispute that it has
not paid to [him] any of the amounts stipulated under the Termination Agreement,
i.e. EUR 270,000 [which] has become due and outstanding in full well before the
passing of the liquidation decision in Country D […]”.

23.

Moreover, the Claimant argued that the Respondent is still competing in “the TopTier League of Country D [which] also remains undisputed by the [Respondent]”. The
Claimant finally argued that even if the Respondent has changed its management, it
is the same club since relevant elements such as “the name, emblem or colours” of
the club have remained the same; and that “accepting the argument of [the
Respondent] would lead to a situation that any club can avoid paying its debts by
merely entering into liquidation proceedings and installing a different legal entity to

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

5

manage its activities, which cannot be accepted under the light of the contractual
stability principle”.
24.

In its final position, the Respondent referred to its previous argumentations.

25.

On 13 March 2019 the Claimant informed the FIFA administration that he entered
into an employment relationship with the Club of Country G, Club H, as from 30
August 2016 until 31 May 2018, for a monthly salary of EUR 2,500.

II.

Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber

1.

First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber
or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this
respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 27
December 2016. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the 2015 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at
hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2.

Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2018), the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which
concerns an employment–related dispute with an international dimension between a
Player of Country B and a Club of Country D.

3.

Furthermore, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this
respect, the DRC confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations (edition 2018) and considering that the present claim was lodged in
front of FIFA on 27 December 2016, the 2015 edition of the Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at
hand as to the substance.

4.

The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established,
the members of the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this
respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as
well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However,
the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the
facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand.

5.

In this respect, the DRC acknowledged that, following the conclusion of an
employment contract on 5 August 2015 and a default notice, dated 14 June 2016,

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

6

with which the Claimant put the Respondent in default of the payment of five
monthly salaries and “living expenses”, the parties signed a termination agreement,
on 16 August 2016, by means of which they regulated, inter alia, their financial
relationship.
6.

More specifically, the members of the Chamber observed that, by means of the said
agreement, the parties had decided to set a total remuneration of EUR 270,000 to be
paid by the Respondent in favour of the Claimant, in lieu of the outstanding
payments of the 2015/2016 season and the totality of the Claimant’s salaries of the
following one. According to the said agreement, the Respondent undertook to pay
the Claimant EUR 270,000 in 12 instalments as follows: (i) EUR 20,000 by no later than
30 September 2016; (ii) EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 December 2016; (iii) EUR
20,000 by no later than 30 January 2017; (iv) EUR 20,000 by no later than 30 March
2017; (v) EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 July 2017; (vi) EUR 25,000 by no later than 30
September 2017; (vii) EUR 25,000 by no later than 30 November 2017; (viii) EUR
25,000 by no later than 30 January 2018; (ix) EUR 30,000 by no later than 30 April
2018; (x) EUR 30,000 by no later than 30 July 2018; (xi) EUR 15,000 by no later than 30
September 2018; (xii) EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 December 2018.

7.

Equally, the Chamber noted that clause 2 of the settlement agreement established
that “The Parties hereby undertake not to raise any claim against each other with
regard to the Contract, subject to the terms of [the termination agreement] being
duly complied with by the [Respondent] in due time”.

8.

In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that, according to the Claimant,
the Respondent did not comply with the terms of the termination agreement as it
failed to remit to him the instalment which fell due on 30 September 2016 and,
therefore, he was entitled to outstanding remuneration and compensation for
breach of contract on the basis of clause 2 of the settlement agreement.

9.

The Chamber took into account that the Respondent, for its part, first of all asked
that the proceedings before FIFA be suspended in light of the fact that the company
managing it was undergoing insolvency proceedings. Moreover, the members of the
DRC took note that the Respondent acknowledged having failed to comply with its
financial obligations deriving from the termination agreement.

10.

Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note that, according to the
Respondent – should the termination agreement be deemed null as a consequence
of its breach – the Claimant was only entitled to his outstanding salaries as from
January 2016 until August 2016, since he had left the Respondent in August 2016 to
join another club. The members of the Chamber further noted that, subsidiarily, the
Respondent asked that the Claimant be entitled only to the amounts indicated in the
settlement agreement, i.e. EUR 270,000 or – as a subsequent alternative – to the
amounts indicated in the employment contract, mitigated by the Claimant’s new
income.

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

7

11.

First and foremost, the members of the DRC analysed the Respondent’s request of
suspension of the proceedings before FIFA. In this respect, the Chamber stressed that
– in accordance with both its well established jurisprudence and that of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport – bankruptcy/insolvency procedures do not affect procedures in
front of the DRC. Consequently, and bearing in mind that – according to the
information provided by the Football Association of Country D – the Respondent has
remained affiliated and it is still participating in its competitions, the Chamber
decided that such request had to be dismissed.

12.

The foregoing having been established, the members of the DRC turned their
attention to the substance of the matter and pointed out that it remained
undisputed that the Respondent failed to fulfil its financial obligations enshrined in
the settlement agreement.

13.

Consequently, the Chamber was aware that the underlying issue in the present
dispute was to establish the consequences deriving from the Respondent’s stance.

14.

In this context, the members of the DRC deemed it worth to preliminary remark that,
at the time of signing the termination agreement, the Claimant had accrued seven
monthly outstanding salaries, i.e. as from January until July 2016. Moreover, the
members of the DRC observed that the amount set by the parties in the settlement
agreement as total remuneration to be paid to the Claimant, i.e. EUR 270,000, was
considerably higher that the outstanding amounts he had accrued by the time of
signing it.

15.

Moreover, the Chamber observed that, according to clause 1 of the settlement
agreement, the parties had decided to “definitively settle their dispute concerning
the outstanding payments of the 2015/2016 season and the salaries of the 2016/2017
season against payment by the [Respondent] to the [Claimant] of the amount of EUR
270,000 […]”.

16.

In light of the all the aforementioned considerations, bearing in mind that the
Claimant had already put the Respondent in default of 5 monthly salaries and living
expenses before signing the termination agreement, the members of the DRC were
confident that the amount indicated in the termination agreement was meant to
replace the entirety of the Respondent’s obligations towards the Claimant, i.e.
outstanding remuneration and compensation.

17.

Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note of the content of clause 2 of
the settlement agreement, according to which the parties undertook “not to raise
any claim against each other with regard to the Contract, subject to the terms of [the
termination agreement] being duly complied with by the [Respondent] in due time”.

18.

As a consequence, the members of the Chamber established that the Respondent’s
failure to duly comply with the terms of the settlement agreement violated the
condition set by clause 2 of the settlement agreement in order for the parties not to

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

8

lodge any claims based on the employment contract they had signed on 5 August
2015. Consequently, the Claimant was entitled again to lodge his claim demanding
the consequences of the breach of the original employment contract.
19.

Therefore, bearing in mind that the Claimant was entitled to living expenses in
accordance with clause 3.5.1 of the Annexe to the employment contract in the
amount of 50,000 and that also this amount remained outstanding, the Chamber
decided that the Claimant was entitled to receive the amount of EUR 151,669 and
50,000 from the Respondent in accordance with the terms of the employment
contract for the 2015/2016 season as outstanding remuneration for the period
between 1 January and 31 July 2016.

20.

In light of the above, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the general legal
principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, the Respondent is liable to pay the amount of
EUR 151,669 and 50,000 to the Claimant as outstanding remuneration.

21.

In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s claim, the Chamber decided to award
the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. as of the day in which he lodged his claim until the
date of effective payment.

22.

That said, the Chamber observed that it remained undisputed that, by the time the
parties signed the termination agreement, the Respondent was in gross violations of
his contractual obligations towards the Claimant, the latter was entitled to request
compensation for the early termination of the employment contract.

23.

Consequently, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of
compensation due to the Claimant by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing
so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17
par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in
particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the
dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity
of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and
other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract,
the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and
depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

24.

In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract.
In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was
included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

25.

As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in
application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the regulations.

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

9

Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the
monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract as from
its early termination and concluded that he would have been entitled to receive EUR
260,000 as remuneration had the employment contract been executed until its
regular expiry date, i.e. May 2017.
26.

In continuation, the Chamber assessed as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means
of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the
constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment
contract(s) shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.

27.

In respect of the above, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant concluded an
employment contract with the Club of Country G, Club H, valid as from 30 August
2016 until 31 May 2018 for a monthly salary of EUR 2,500. Hence, he was able to
mitigate his damages during the overlapping period with the contract at the basis of
the present dispute for a total amount of EUR 22,500.

28.

Consequently, the Chamber established that the payable compensation corresponds
to the total amount of EUR 237,500.

29.

On account of all the abovementioned considerations, the specificities of the case at
hand as well as the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damage, the Chamber
decided that the Respondent must pay the total amount of EUR 237,500 to the
Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, plus 5 % interest p.a. as from the
date of the claim of the player, i.e. 27 December 2016.

30.

The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by rejecting any
further claim of the Claimant.

III.

Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber

1.

The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2.

The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, w ithin 30 day s as from the
date of notification of this decision outstanding remuneration in the amounts of
EUR 151,669 and 50,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 27
December 2016 until the date of effective payment.

3.

The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, w ithin 30 day s as from the date of
notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

10

of EUR 237,500 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 27 December 2016
until the date of effective payment.
4.

In the event that the aforementioned sums plus interest, due to the Claimant in
accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 2. and 3., are not paid by the
Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted,
upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal
decision.

5.

Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

6.

The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****

Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne, Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected] / www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
Encl. CAS directives

Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D

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