Acórdão do FIFA
Processo 04190658-E_2019-04-01

Data
01/04/2019

Labour Disputes


Texto da decisão

Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 11 April 2019,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Alex andra Góm ez Bruinew oud (Uruguay ), member
S tefano S artori (Italy ), member
Daan de Jong (The Netherlands ), member
Muzam m il bin Moham ed (S ingapore), member

on the claim presented by the club,
Club A, Country B,
as Claimant

against the player,

Play er C, Country D
as Respondent

and the club,

Club E, Country D
as Intervening Party

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I.

Facts of the cas e

1.

According to the information available in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on
1 January 2017, the Player of Country D, Player C (hereinafter: Respondent), born
on 13 August 1990, and the Club of Country D, “Club E” (hereinafter: Intervening
Party) signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 31
December 2019.

2.

According to clause 8.2 of this employment contract, the Respondent was to obtain
inter alia the following salaries:
a) 30,000,000 for 2017;
b) 40,000,000 for 2018.

3.

On 25 July 2017, the Club of Country B, Club A (hereinafter: Claimant), the
Respondent and the Intervening Party, signed a loan agreement, according to
which the Respondent was loaned by the Intervening Party to the Claimant as from
1 August 2017 until 30 June 2018, without payment of a loan fee.

4.

The loan agreement further read in its art. 6 b. that “The buy option of the
[Respondent] after the loan period is USD 1,000,000”.

5.

On an unknown date, according to the Claimant also on 25 July 2017, the
Respondent and the Claimant signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the
contract) valid as from 1 August 2017 until 30 June 2018.

6.

The contract referred to an annex entitled “Football Player’s Contract Schedule”
(hereinafter: the schedule), which establishes the remuneration due to the
Respondent.

7.

Clauses 2, 3.b and 5 of the schedule provide that the contract had a total value of
USD 504,000, as follows:
a) Salary of USD 40,909 per month over the course of the contract, payable at
the end of each month;
b) USD 54,000 per season for housing, car and flight tickets. In this context, the
Claimant referred to the Financial Control Regulations of the Football
Association of Country B (Football Association F), which inter alia regulate
that the total value of a player’s contract, including housing and travelling
allowances, must be paid in equal monthly instalments.

8.

As per article X.4 of the contract, “If the [Claimant] terminates the Contract without
having just cause, the [Claimant] shall pay to the [Respondent] compensation equal
to the total amount of: Only two months salary”.

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 2 of 13

9.

In accordance with article X.5 of the contract, “If the [Respondent] terminates the
Contract without having just cause, the [Respondent] shall pay to the [Claimant]
compensation equal to the total amount of: (USD 504,000) ...”.

10.

By letter dated 21 December 2017, the Claimant granted all first team players
permission to leave as from 17 December 2017, informing them that work resumed
on 3 January 2018.

11.

By letter dated 3 January 2018, the Claimant warned the Respondent that he had
not returned to the daily training sessions and that “recurrence of such attitude in
the future will be lead to an even more serious action as per the terms of the
contract”.

12.

On 9 January 2018, the Claimant sent the Respondent a second warning letter,
stressing that he still had not returned. The Claimant further informed the
Respondent that it decided to “deduct one-month basic salary”.

13.

On 18 January 2018, the Claimant sent the Respondent a “Notice Letter”, by which
it informed the Respondent that, if he would not return by 22 January 2018, it
would terminate his contract.

14.

On 23 January 2018, the Claimant informed the Respondent in writing that it
terminated the contract “for just cause”. In its termination letter, the Claimant
referred to article X.5 of the contract and gave the Respondent until 30 January
2018 to transfer USD 504,000.

15.

On that same day, 23 January 2018, the Intervening Party wrote to the Claimant
that the Respondent’s wife had a high-risk pregnancy. Furthermore, as per the
Intervening Party, the Claimant had failed to pay the Respondent “in the agreed
terms” and held that it would initiate a disciplinary process against the Respondent.

16.

By email dated 14 February 2018, the Respondent informed the Claimant that he
had not returned to Country B “because of the economic and personal abuse that
[his] pregnant wife and [he] suffer from some club members”. He further requested
a letter of termination by mutual agreement between the parties, to be signed by
the Claimant, by 19 February 2018.

17.

By letter dated 20 February 2018, the Claimant, inter alia, reiterated that it had
terminated the contract on 23 January 2018 with just cause, that the Respondent
was solely responsible for this termination and that there is no need for a
termination of the contract by mutual agreement.

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 3 of 13

18.

According to the information in TMS, the Respondent was re-registered with the
Intervening Party on 31 July 2018, on return from loan.

19.

On 3 April 2018, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the
Respondent maintaining that it had just cause to terminate the contract “at the
sole and exclusive responsibility of the [Respondent]” and requested the following:
a) USD 504,000 as compensation to be paid by the Respondent, plus interest of
5% p.a. as of the date of claim;
b) That sporting sanctions be imposed upon the Respondent;
c) That the Respondent pay the legal proceedings.

20.

In this context, according to the Claimant, for the period during which he stayed at
the Claimant, the Respondent was entitled to five monthly salaries of USD 40,909
each, as well a proportionate amount of the USD 54,000 housing and travelling
allowance. In other words, as per the Claimant, the Respondent was entitled to a
total amount of USD 229,090.45 for the period as from 1 August 2017 until 31
December 2017.

21.

Furthermore, according to the Claimant, the amount of USD 229,090.45
corresponds to 833,889.23.

22.

In this light, the Claimant argued that, for the period as from 1 August 2017 until
31 December 2017, it had paid the Respondent, either directly or via the League
Management of Country B (League G Management), the total amount of
836,181.82 as follows:
a) 149,318 as August 2017 salary;
b) 120,450 via a check dated 12 September 2017;
c) 119,454.55 as salary;
d) 119,454.54 as October 2017 salary;
e) 160,268.35 as November 2017 salary;
f) 167,236.36 as December 207 salary.

23.

The Claimant concluded that these payments exceeded the Respondent’s
entitlements.

24.

With regard to the warning letters sent by the Claimant to the Respondent on 3
January 2018 and 9 January 2018 respectively, the Claimant held that the
Respondent never replied, in addition to not returning to Country B.

25.

The Claimant deemed that it had just cause to terminate the contract due to the
Respondent’s continuous unauthorised and unjustified absence for a period of 3
weeks and stressed that it gave the Respondent three opportunities to resume his
obligations prior to terminating the contract.

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 4 of 13

26.

The Claimant further argued that the compensation of USD 504,000 is based on
article X.5 of the contract.

27.

Despite being invited to reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent has not
submitted any comments in response.

28.

The Intervening Party held that, because of the loan agreement signed with the
Claimant, on 31 July 2017, it signed an agreement with the Respondent by which
the employment contract it had with the Respondent would be suspended as of 1
August 2017 until 30 June 2018.

29.

The Intervening Party further explained that, during the Respondent’s vacation
period, it asked him multiple times that he return to Country B to comply with the
loan agreement, to no avail.

30.

In this context, the Intervening Party stated that, given the Respondent’s refusal, it
began a disciplinary procedure against him.

31.

In this light, the Intervening Party submitted the minutes of the disciplinary
proceedings, dated 23 January 2018 and signed by both the Respondent and the
Intervening Party. According to the minutes, the Respondent inter alia stated that
3 January 2018 was the deadline for him to return to the Claimant, but admitted
that he had not returned.

32.

Moreover, as per the minutes, the Respondent held that personal problems and
salaries owed by the Claimant to him were the reasons why he had not returned.
In addition, according to the minutes, the Respondent held that the Claimant had
not terminated the contract with him and that he knew the consequences for not
complying with the employment contract.

33.

Given the above, the Intervening Party decided “to continue the suspension of the
Respondent’s employment contract and not register him in any tournament
organized by […] the Football Federation of Country D”.

34.

Furthermore, as per the Intervening Party, there has been no employment contract
between it and the player since 14 September 2018, “due to the voluntary player’s
resignation”.

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 5 of 13

II.

Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber

1.

First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand.
In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 3 April
2018. Consequently, the 2018 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter:
Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural
Rules).

2.

Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2018) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an
international dimension between a Club of Country B and a Player of Country D,
with the intervention of a Club of Country D.

3.

Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to
the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with
art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition
2018) and considering that the present claim was lodged on 3 April 2018, the 2018
edition of the said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter
at hand as to the substance.

4.

The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts and
arguments as well as the documentation on file. However, the Chamber
emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts,
arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that, in
accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within
the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any
documentation or evidence generated by or contained in the Transfer Matching
System (TMS), in order to properly assess the issue at stake.

5.

The Chamber firstly recalled that the Claimant and the Intervening Party had signed
a loan agreement on 25 July 2017 concerning the temporary transfer of the
Respondent from the Intervening party to the Claimant as from 1 August 2017 until
30 June 2018. Secondly, the DRC highlighted that the Claimant and the Respondent
had signed an employment contract, valid as from 1 August 2017 until 30 June 2018.
Furthermore, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant terminated the employment

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 6 of 13

contract with the Respondent on 23 January 2018. Finally, the DRC noted that on
31 July 2018 the Respondent was re-registered with the Intervening Party on return
from loan.
6.

The DRC further recalled that, according to the Claimant, the Respondent had
failed to return to the Claimant by 3 January 2018, i.e. the last day of his permitted
leave. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the Claimant deemed to have had just
cause to terminate the contract with the Respondent, since the latter had been
absent for three weeks prior to contract termination and since it had provided him
three opportunities to resume his contractual obligations.

7.

In continuation, the DRC noted that, in its claim, the Claimant requested
compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent in the amount of USD
504,000, in accordance with art. X.5 of the employment contract.

8.

Subsequently, the Chamber noted that the Respondent, for his part, failed to
present his response to the claim of the Claimant, in spite of having been invited to
do so. By not presenting his position to the claim, the DRC was of the opinion that
the Respondent renounced his right of defence and, thus, accepted the allegations
of the Claimant.

9.

Furthermore, as a consequence of the aforementioned consideration, the Chamber
concurred that, in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, it shall take
a decision upon the basis of the documentation already on file; in other words,
upon the statements and documents presented by the Claimant and the
Intervening Party.

10.

In this light, the DRC took into account the position of the Intervening Party which,
inter alia, held that it had made several attempts to convince the Respondent to
return to the Claimant, to no avail.

11.

Given the above, the Chamber understood that the primary issue at stake is
determining whether the Claimant had a just cause to terminate the contract with
the Respondent and to decide on the consequences thereof.

12.

In this respect, the Chamber firstly concluded that it remained undisputed that the
Respondent failed to return to the Claimant by 3 January 2018, as he was instructed
to by the Claimant. Moreover, the Chamber underlined that, between 3 January
2018 and 18 January 2018, the Claimant had sent three warning letters to the
Respondent, requesting him to return to the Claimant. In this sense, the DRC placed
particular emphasis on the “Notice Letter” dated 18 January 2018, in which the
Claimant warned the Respondent that it would terminate the employment contract
with the Respondent if he had not returned by 22 January 2018. Nevertheless, the

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 7 of 13

DRC wished to point out that all the aforementioned letters apparently remained
unanswered by the Respondent.
13.

In continuation, the Chamber took into consideration the Claimant’s allegation
that it had complied with all its contractual obligations towards the Respondent. In
this regard, considering the documentation provided by the Claimant and the fact
that the Respondent had failed to reply to the claim lodged by the Claimant, the
DRC determined that it remained undisputed that the Claimant had fulfilled all its
contractual obligations towards the Respondent.

14.

On account of the above, bearing in mind that the Claimant’s allegations remained
uncontested, and due to the fact that, despite the Claimant’s repeated warnings,
the Respondent remained absent without the Claimant’s authorisation or other
apparent reason as of 3 January until 23 January 2018, the Chamber came to the
firm conclusion that the Claimant had a just cause to terminate the contract with
the Respondent on 23 January 2018.

15.

Subsequently, after having established that the Claimant terminated the contract
with just cause, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the
Regulations, the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant for
breach of contract. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated
that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of
compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for
in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of
the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria,
including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under
the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing
contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or
incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether
the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the
list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria
indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded
to the prejudiced party.

16.

In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract.

17.

In this context, the DRC noted that, in accordance with article X.4 of the
employment contract (cf. point I.8), “If the [Claimant] terminates the Contract
without having just cause, the [Claimant] shall pay to the [Respondent]
compensation equal to the total amount of: Only two months salary”. In addition,

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 8 of 13

the Chamber took note that, by means of article X.5 of the contract (cf. point I.9),
“If the [Respondent] terminates the Contract without having just cause, the
[Respondent] shall pay to the [Claimant] compensation equal to the total amount
of: (USD 504,000)”. Furthermore, the DRC reiterated that the Claimant requested
USD 504,000 on the basis of Article X.5.
18.

After a careful analysis of the abovementioned provisions, the members of the
Chamber agreed that the same are reciprocal but manifestly disproportionate,
granting the Claimant a much higher compensation in case the Respondent would
terminate the employment contract without just cause. Thus, following its well
established jurisprudence, the Chamber concluded that it cannot take Article X.5.
of the employment contract into consideration in the determination of the amount
of compensation.

19.

As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in
application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The
Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of
criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of
compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into
account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for
contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking
into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

20.

Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the
Claimant in the present case, the members of the Chamber turned their attention
to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent under the existing
contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber
to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important
to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC
to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract(s) in the
calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather
indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and
his new club(s). The DRC wished to highlight that, following the standard practice
of the DRC, the relevant compensation should be calculated based on the average
fixed remuneration, i.e. excluding any conditional or performance related
payment, agreed by the player with his former club and his new club, as well as
considering the period of time remaining on the contract signed between the
player and the former club.

21.

Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the
fixed remuneration payable to the Respondent under the terms of the employment

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 9 of 13

contract signed with the Claimant for the period that was remaining since the
unilateral termination of the contract by the Claimant until its expiry, i.e. from 23
January 2018 until 30 June 2018.
22.

In this regard, the Chamber noted that, as per the employment contract signed with
the Claimant, the Respondent was entitled to six monthly instalments of USD 40,909
each, as well as six monthly instalments of USD 4,909, corresponding to housing,
car and flight tickets, for the remaining contractual period, i.e. a total fixed
remuneration of USD 274,908.

23.

In continuation, the DRC equally took into account that during this same period of
time, i.e. from 23 January 2018 until 30 June 2018, the Respondent was not
employed by any other club. An inevitable consequence of such fact is that the
value of “the player’s new contract” should be set to 0. Consequently, the Chamber
concluded that the average of remuneration between the relevant part of the
terminated contract and of the “new contract” amounts to USD 137,454.

24.

On account of the above, and taking into account all the aforementioned objective
elements in the matter at hand, the DRC decided that the total amount of USD
137,454 is to be considered a reasonable and justified amount to be paid as
compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

25.

In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that
the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of
compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 3 April 2018, until
the date of effective payment.

26.

In continuation, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 17 par. 2 of the
Regulations, the Respondent’s “new club shall be jointly and severally liable” for
the payment of compensation. Along these lines, the members of the Chamber
recalled that the Respondent had been registered with the Claimant on loan from
the Intervening Party. As such, in view of the specific circumstances of the case,
namely the loan agreement concluded between the Respondent and the
Intervening Party, the Chamber understood that the fundamental question at hand
is determining whether the Intervening Party can be considered as the new club to
be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of the compensation.

27.

In this regard, the DRC firstly noted that the Respondent was registered again with
the Intervening Party after the breach of contract occurred. However, the Chamber
wished to emphasise that the Respondent was only re-registered with the
Intervening Party on 31 July 2018, i.e. after the expiry of the loan period with the
Claimant, which was 30 June 2018.

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 10 of 13

28.

In this sense, the DRC recognised that, after the expiry of loan period, the
Respondent was again bound to the contract with the Intervening Party until 31
December 2019. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the Intervening Party, by
re-registering the Respondent on 31 July 2018, was complying with its undisputed
existing contractual obligations towards the Respondent.

29.

Consequently, given that the Intervening Party was already complying with its
contractual obligations towards the Respondent by means of the abovementioned
re-registration on 31 July 2018, and considering that, on the contrary, the absence
of such registration would in principle constitute a breach of the Intervening Party’s
obligations towards the Respondent, the members of the Chamber concurred that
the aforementioned truly exceptional circumstances would justify the nonapplication of the automatic liability under art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations in the
case at stake.

30.

Given the above considerations, the Chamber unanimously concluded that the
Intervening Party cannot be held jointly liable for payment of the compensation
for breach of contract by the Respondent.

31.

In continuation, the Chamber focussed its attention on the further consequences
of the breach of contract in question. In this respect, the DRC addressed the
question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent in accordance with art. 17
par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates that, in addition to the
obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player
found to be in breach of contract during the protected period.

32.

Along these lines, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7 of the
“Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates, inter alia, that the
protected period shall last “for three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes
first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded
prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years,
whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such
contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In this regard,
the DRC pointed out that the Respondent, whose date of birth is 13 August 1990,
was 26 years of age when he signed his employment contract with the Claimant on
25 July 2017, entailing that the unilateral termination of the contract occurred
within the applicable protected period.

33.

With regard to art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Chamber emphasised that a
suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches
is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during
the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the
relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 11 of 13

words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility
of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does
not provide for a possibility to the deciding body to reduce the sanction under the
fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances.
34.

Having said that, the DRC was eager to emphasise that the Respondent did not
react to the repeated warnings of the Claimant, nor to the justified termination of
the contract or to its claim lodged in front of FIFA.

35.

Consequently, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the present
matter, the DRC decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the
Respondent is to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility
to participate in official matches.

36.

The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.
*****

III.

Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber

1.

The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted.

2.

The Respondent, Player C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, w ithin 30 day s as
from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract
in the amount of USD 137,454 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 3 April 2018 until the
date of effective payment.

3.

In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid by the
Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted,
upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal
decision.

4.

Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5.

The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the
account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

6.

A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed
on the Respondent, Player C. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the
date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

Page 12 of 13

suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first
official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and
international championships for clubs.

*****

Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of
the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating
the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
Avenue de Beaumont 2
CH-1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal Officer
Encl. CAS directives

Club A, Country B / Player C, Country D / Club E, Country D

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