Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 April 2018,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Takuy a Yam azaki (Japan), member
Tom is lav Kas alo (Croatia), member
Daan de Jong (The Netherlands ), member
Abu Nay eem S hohag (Banglades h), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Play er A, Country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 1 July 2017, the chairman (Chairman E) of the club of Country D, Club C
(hereinafter: the club), made a contract offer (hereinafter: the offer) via email to
the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the player), to conclude a contract
based on the following details:
2.
On 5 July 2017, the player and the club signed a document referred to as letter of
agreement (hereinafter: the letter of agreement), valid ‘for one year with option
of the club for another year’, based on which the player was entitled to receive:
3.
a monthly salary of EUR 4,500 for the duration of ‘the League of Country D’;
contract duration of one year, ‘with option of the club for another year (1+1 2017/2018 & 2018/2019)’;
a bonus of EUR 10,000 ‘in case the club will remain and stay in the league at
the season 2017/18’;
a 25% sell-on fee for the player’s agent, in case the club will decide ‘to sell the
player to other club’;
‘fringe benefits: car, accommodation and fly tickets’.
a yearly salary of EUR 45,000 for the 2017/2018 season;
a bonus of EUR 10,000 in case the club remains in the League of Country D;
25% of the transfer fee (payable to the player), in case he is sold to another
club;
a car, accommodation and flight tickets.
On 25 September 2017, the player lodged a claim before FIFA against the club,
claiming outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract be
paid by the club, broken down as follows:
Outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 4,260, as follows:
EUR 4,260, corresponding to the outstanding part of the salary for the month
of August 2017.
Compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of EUR 46,009.31, as
follows:
EUR 35,834.31 as residual value of the contract in the period between
September 2017 and May 2018, corresponding to 9 monthly salaries of EUR
4,500 each, i.e. the total amount of EUR 40,500, minus the amount of EUR
4,665.69, the player allegedly earned under his new contract with the club of
Country B, Club F;
EUR 10,000 as bonuses related to the non-relegation clause in the offer and
the letter of agreement;
EUR 175 as costs of the flight tickets for the player himself and his girlfriend,
from Country D to Country B.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
2/14
In addition, the player requested 5% interest p.a. on the above-mentioned
amounts. Furthermore, the player requested that sporting sanctions shall be
imposed on the club, as well as that the club is obliged to pay procedural costs and
his legal fees.
4.
In his claim, the player explains that in the period after 5 July 2017, he started
rendering his services and participated in the club‘s training sessions and in two
unofficial friendly matches, as well as in the club’s training camp between 17 and
24 July 2017 in Country G, where he played in three unofficial friendly games.
Moreover, the player explains that after returning to Country D on 25 July 2017, he
played in four matches of the club in the Tournament H, ‘which precedes the
official start of the League of Country D’.
5.
In addition, the player states that on 3 August 2017, he received a part of his salary
for the month of August 2017 in the amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D,
according to the player, corresponding to EUR 240. In this respect, the player
submitted a copy of a declaration of the club, which confirmed that it made a
payment in the amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D in relation to the
player’s salary for August 2017.
6.
Moreover, the player argues that on 14 August 2017, he was contacted by the club,
which informed him that it was no longer interested in his services and that he
would not be registered for the upcoming sporting season in Country D. According
to the player, the club explained him that it was ‘free to take such decision,
because there was no contract between the club and the player’. Further, the
player states that the club also informed him that, even if there would have been a
contract, it would be entitled to terminate the contract, because the player had
allegedly missed a training session.
7.
As a result of the foregoing, the player explains that on 14 August 2017, he put the
club in default, denying the club’s allegations that he missed a training session and
requesting the execution of the contract, however to no avail.
8.
What is more, the player holds that on 15 August 2017, he was allowed to take
part in a training match of the club, but that after said match was played, he found
out that the club official’s took the key from his car, as well as the car. Also, the
player explains that he was forced to leave the apartment the club had provided
him with, and that a teammate was obliged to accommodate him.
9.
The player holds to have insisted on the existence of an employment contract and
argues that in the period between 16 and 23 August 2017, he reported every
morning for duty at the club’s premises, however was denied access every time by
the club’s sporting director, Director L. In this respect, the player explains that on
21 August 2017, he went accompanied by a lawyer (Lawyer M) to the club’s
premises, in order to find an amicable solution, however to no avail, as the club
informed Lawyer M that it had no budget for signing the player.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
3/14
10.
After the aforementioned events occurred, on 21 August 2017, the player put the
club in default, asking for his integration in the team and to let him participate in
the next club’s training sessions, with the explicit warning that he would
unilaterally terminate the contract, if the club would not accept said requests.
11.
Finally, after being refused again to join the club’s training sessions, on 23 August
2017, the player unilaterally terminated the contract.
12.
The player further points out that on 24 August 2017, he booked a flight for
himself and his girlfriend from Country D to Country B, which tickets he had to pay
himself.
13.
In conclusion, the player argues that he signed a valid and binding contract with
the club, which was duly executed by the parties. However, as a result of the club’s
non-fulfilment of the obligations laid down in the contract, the player deems that
he had a just cause to terminate it on 23 August 2017.
14.
In its reply, the club pointed out that as per the registration Regulations of Country
D, it can only register 5 foreign players in the highest league of Country D football
system and that the player was one of the many foreign players, which came on a
trial at the club during the summer of 2017.
15.
What is more, the club points out that the offer was made to the player, because
his agent requested it. Moreover, according to the club, the offer signed between
the club and the player on 1 July 2015 is ‘not a contract, not even a pre-contract
and obviously not a binding agreement’. Furthermore, the club deems that the
letter of agreement signed on 5 July 2017 is not a valid contract as it is ‘very short
and general, and does not hold a single obligation of the player’, but can only be
considered as a pre-contract, ‘subject to the decision of the respondent (club)
whether to hire the claimant (player) services and claimant’s (player’s) decision to
play for the respondent (club)’. Also, the club explains that both documents did not
contain all the essentialia negotii, which are necessary to establish a valid and
binding contract.
16.
In addition, the club explains that it informed the player that in order to enter into
a valid and binding employment relationship, they would need to sign the
standard employment contract of Country D, as well as a standard annex to said
contract. Only if these two documents are approved by the Football association of
Country D, the player and the club would have entered into a valid and binding
contract.
17.
In addition, the club confirmed that the player took part in the unofficial games of
the club, as well as the training camp, however that he did not make a decision as
to whether he wanted to sign the standard documents from the Football
association of Country D. Moreover, the club argues that the four games the player
played in the Tournament H are no official games, as based on the definitions laid
down in the FIFA Regulations, a season is ‘the period starting with the first official
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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match of the relevant national league championship and ending with the last
official match of the relevant national league championship’. Subsequently, the
club explains that based on the registration Regulations of Country D, in matches
of the Tournament H, even ‘foreign players that are registered in other clubs’ can
participate in teams of other clubs.
18.
Also, the club explained that the player was never transferred via the Transfer
Matching System (TMS) and always remained registered with his former club.
19.
Finally, the club states that it decided not to sign an official contract with the
player, due to ‘economic and professional constraints’ and that the amount of
1,000 in the currency of Country D was only paid to the player for his living
expenses. As a result of the foregoing, the club asks for the rejection of all the
claims of the player.
20.
In his replica, the player denies all the club’s allegations and reiterated that he
deems that both the offer as well as the letter of agreement are to be considered
as a valid and binding contract. In addition, the player refers to the first sentence
of the letter of agreement, which holds the following wording ‘this is the
agreement between Club C and the Player A’. The player argues that it follows
from this wording that the parties meant to conclude a binding agreement.
21.
In relation to the payment of 1,000 in the currency of Country D made on 3 August
2017, the player explains that the declaration of the club even specifically refers to
salary, and thus, that said payment was made in the context of an employment
relationship. Subsequently, the player argues that the offer signed on 1 July 2017
and the letter of agreement dated 5 July 2017 hold obligations for him as the club
even mentions in its reply holds that the offer was made to the player ‘for playing
in the club’.
22.
Also, the player pointed out that an employment contract cannot be made valid
upon the signing of a standard contract and/or the approval of contract by a
national sports regulation body.
23.
In its duplica, the club insisted on its previous arguments and asked for the
rejection of all the player’s claims.
24.
After being requested to do so, the player informed FIFA that on 5 September
2017, he signed a contract with the club of Country B, Club F, valid between 25
September 2017 and 20 June 2019, according to which he was entitled to receive a
monthly salary of 1,300 in the currency of Country B gross or 1,013.92 in the
currency of Country B net, which according to the player corresponds to EUR
518.41.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
5/14
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on
25 September 2017. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017;
hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of
the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (editions 2016 and 2018) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to
deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with
an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of Country
D.
3.
Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to
the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with
art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(editions 2016 and 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 25
September 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as
the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the
Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the
facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand.
5.
In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that, on 1 July 2017, the player and the
club signed a document referred to as “official offer”, in which the parties laid
down several conditions for a future labour contract. In fact, according to the
offer, the parties established, among other details, that the employment would
last for the 2017/2018 season with an option for an additional season and that the
player would be entitled to receive, inter alia, a monthly salary of EUR 4,500, a
non-relegation bonus of EUR 10,000, as well as several other benefits, such as a car,
accommodation and flight tickets.
6.
What is more, on 5 July 2017, the player and the club signed a document referred
to as ‘letter of agreement’, according to which the parties agreed upon the
duration of the employment, i.e. 2017/2018 season and that the player would be
entitled to receive a yearly salary of EUR 45,000, a non-relegation bonus of EUR
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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10,000, 25% of the transfer fee in case he would be transferred to a third club, as
well as several other benefits, such as a car, accommodation and flight tickets.
7.
In this respect, the members of the Chamber took note that the player maintained
that by signing the two abovementioned documents, in fact, an employment
contract was entered into between him and the club. As such, the player argued
that, therefore, the club is to be held liable for its early termination, which took
either place on 14 August 2017, the date on which the club informed the player
that is was no longer interested in his services and that he would not be registered
for the upcoming season, or on 23 August 2017, the date on which the player
deems to have terminated the contract with just cause, due to the fact that the
club no longer allow him to take part in the training sessions.
8.
On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the club asserted that no employment
contract had been concluded between the parties, as it considered the offer signed
on 1 July 2017 not ‘to be a contract, not even a pre-contract and obviously not a
binding agreement’, and further explained that the letter of agreement signed on
5 July 2017 can only be considered as a pre-contract, and therefore not a final and
binding employment contract.
9.
From the outset, the members of the Chamber highlighted that - given the
fundamental disagreement between the player and the club – the central issues to
the present dispute are (1) whether by signing the offer on 1 July 2017 and/or
signing the letter of agreement on 5 July 2017, the parties had established a valid
and binding employment contract between themselves, and if so, (2) as to whether
said contract had been prematurely terminated by one of the parties, with or
without just cause.
10.
Regarding the first issue, the Chamber noted that according to the club, as
opposed to the player, no legally binding employment contract had come into
effect between the player and the club, as the parties merely signed a “precontract” (emphasis added) the object of which was simply to set forth the
provisions of a prospective employment contract, which was subject to the final
decision of the club whether it wanted to hire the player’s services.
11.
Consequently, the Chamber, first and foremost, focused its attention on the
question as to whether a legally binding employment contract had been concluded
by and between the player and the club.
12.
In this regard, the Chamber recalled that in order for an employment contract to
be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer
and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment
contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the
employment relationship, the remuneration and the signature of both parties.
After a careful study of the offer dated 1 July 2017 as well as the letter of
agreement dated 5 July 2018, both presented by the player, the Chamber
concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent documents,
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
7/14
in particular, the fact that the documents establish that the player is entitled to
receive remuneration, including a monthly salary, in exchange for his services to
the club as a football player during a specified period of time.
13.
In addition, the Chamber deemed it important to analyse the club’s argumentation
that no legally binding employment contract had come into effect between the
club and the player, as the player did not sign a standard contract and a standard
annex, as per the regulations of the Football association of Country D, as well as
that the documentation signed on 1 July and 5 July 2017, had not been approved
by the Football association of Country D.
14.
In this regard, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations and
considered it relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the
validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the
execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the
registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player,
which are of the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no
influence. As regards the case at stake, the club acknowledged that no ITC was
requested and that the player apparently always remained registered with his
previous club. In this regard, the DRC pointed out that it is the responsibility of the
engaging club to ensure that the player is properly registered with his new club in
order to be able to provide it with his services. Since the club is supposedly
interested in acquiring the rights of the player and in benefiting from his services,
it is also expected from it that it acts accordingly in view of obtaining the player’s
ITC and his subsequent registration. The same goes for the registration and
approval of and a contract by the pertinent Football Association, as well as for the
use of standard forms, which are also administrative formalities with no influence
whatsoever on the validity of an employment contact containing all the essentialia
negotii.
15.
Furthermore, bearing in mind that according to Annexe 3 of the Regulations an
ITC request depends on the new club’s application to the new association to
register a professional, the club is actually in the position to prevent the occurrence
of the condition precedent of receipt of an ITC by willfully choosing not to proceed
with the application for an ITC request. By analogy, the same applies to the
finalisation of documents or procedures related to the transfer of a player, e.g. the
signature of a transfer agreement or the correct registration of a player at the
relevant association. For these reasons, the members of the Chamber decided to
reject the club’s arguments in this regard.
16.
In addition, the Chamber wished to point out that the club’s argumentation that
the player only participated in friendly games are an indication that no valid and
binding contract was signed, cannot be upheld. In the Chamber’s view, said
circumstances are actually a confirmation that the parties had already started
executing the employment contract.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
8/14
17.
On account of all of the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that by
having signed the offer dated 1 July 2017 and the letter of agreement dated 5 July
2017, a valid and legally binding employment contract had been entered into by
and between the player and the club as from the beginning of July 2017.
18.
Having established that a valid and legally binding employment contract had been
in force between the player and the club, the Chamber went on to analyse as to
whether such contract had been breached and, in the affirmative, which party is to
be held liable for breach of contract.
19.
To this end, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that the player stated that the
club allegedly informed that he was dismissed on 14 August 2017, because of an
alleged lack of need of his services, which circumstance is not contested by the
club. The Chamber wished to point out that said reason brought allegedly forward
by the club, does not clearly explain the legal or factual basis of this decision, as it
only refers to an alleged lack of need of the player’s services and the fact that he
would not be registered for the upcoming sporting season, only one month after
the conclusion of the contract. Already at this point, the Chamber deemed it vital
to outline that a legal action, such as the termination of a contract, needs to have
a clear legal basis. Furthermore, only when there are objective criteria which do
not reasonably permit to expect the continuation of the employment relationship
between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. A premature
termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure.
20.
In view of the above, the Chamber further observed that according to the player,
the club also was of the opinion, that even if there would have been a valid and
binding contract, it could still validly terminate said contract on 14 August 2017, as
the player allegedly had missed a training session. Said circumstances are again not
contested by the club.
21.
In this respect, by referring to the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated
in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber observed that there was no
evidence submitted by the club that the player indeed missed a training session.
Furthermore, the cub failed to specify on which date the player had allegedly
missed a training session. Further, regardless of the question whether the player
indeed missed one training session, on an unspecified date, the Chamber was of
the firm opinion that the club did, in any case, not have just cause to prematurely
terminate the employment contract with the player, since such alleged breach
could not legitimately be considered as being severe enough to justify the
termination of the contract, and that there would have been more lenient
measures to be taken (e.g., among others, a suspension or a fine) in order to
sanction the absence of the player for only one training session.
22.
For the sake of completeness of its analysis, the Chamber wished to emphasise that
the alleged unsatisfactory performance of a player and/or the lack of need of the
player’s services, is a purely unilateral and subjective evaluation made by the club.
Said circumstances cannot, by any means, be considered as a valid reason to
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
9/14
terminate the contract of a player – namely not to start its execution –, as they are
the result of a purely subjective perception, not measurable in objective criteria.
23.
Finally, the Chamber analysed the player’s argumentation that on 23 August 2017,
after he tried to find a solution for the situation of not being allowed to take part
in the club’s training sessions, he terminated the contract with just cause. In this
respect, the Chamber deemed that from the information on file, it could be
established that already yon 14 August 2017, the club informed that the player
that he was no longer welcome at the club, and that said date can be considered
as the actual date of termination of the contract. What is more, from all the abovementioned facts and circumstances, the Chamber deemed that said unilateral
termination of the contract by the club on 14 August 2017, was made without just
cause.
24.
Having established that the club terminated the contract without just cause, the
Chamber established that the club is to be held liable for the early termination of
the employment contract without just cause on 14 August 2017, and focused its
attention on the consequences of such termination.
25.
First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the club must fulfil its
obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the general legal
principle of “pacta sunt servanda” and it has to pay all outstanding remuneration
due to the player, if any.
26.
However, in this respect, the Chamber referred to the fact that from the
information on file it appears that the player was entitled to receive 10 monthly
salaries of EUR 4,500 during the League of Country D, and that the player
acknowledged to have received, on 1 August 2017, an amount of 1,000 in the
currency of Country D, corresponding to EUR 240, out of the amount of EUR 4,500
due to him for the month of August 2017. In this respect, the Chamber established
on the one hand that the club’s argumentation that this amount was only paid as
living expenses could not be upheld, as the documentation provided by the player
and issued by the club, clearly refers to a salary payment. On the other hand, the
Chamber noted that on the day of termination of the contract, i.e. on 14 August
2017, the salary for the month of August 2017 had not yet fallen due. Based on
the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the salary for August 2017 shall
therefore be included in the possible compensation to be awarded to the player
and established that, at the moment of the unilateral termination of the contract
by the club, no remuneration was outstanding.
27.
In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1
of the Regulations, the player is entitled to receive from the club compensation for
breach of contract.
28.
Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of
compensation payable to the player by the club in the case at stake. In doing so,
the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in
particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the
dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the
specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the
remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract
and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a
maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls
within the protected period.
29.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that first of all, it had to
clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of
contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause
was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
30.
As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of
compensation payable by the club to the player had to be assessed in application
of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber
recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria
to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation
payable.
31.
Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the player, the Chamber
proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the
terms of the employment contract until the end of the 2017/2018 season, taking
into account that the player was entitled to receive a yearly of EUR 45,000, to be
paid in 10 instalments of EUR 4,500 each, in the period between August 2017 and
May 2018. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that on 14 August 2017, the day on
which the contract was terminated, although the salary for August 2017 had not
yet fallen due, the player had received an amount of 1,000 in the currency of
Country D, corresponding to EUR 240 out of the monthly salary of EUR 4,500.
Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUER 44,760 serves as
the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of
contract.
32.
In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the player had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by
means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income.
According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new
employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount
of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.
33.
According to the information brought forward by the player, and which is
confirmed in the TMS, on 5 September 2017, the player found employment with
the club of Country B, Club F. In accordance with the pertinent employment
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
11/14
contract which has been made available by the player, valid between 25
September 2017 and until 20 June 2019, the player was entitled to receive a
monthly salary of 1,013.92 in the currency of Country B or approximately EUR 518.
Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment
contract concluded between the player and Club F for the period between 5
September 2017 and 31 May 2018, amounted to approximately EUR 4,665.69, as
calculated by the player.
34.
Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the
specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the club must pay the
amount of EUR 40,094.31 to the player, which was to be considered a reasonable
and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.
35.
Furthermore, considering the player’s claim for interest and taking into account
the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the Chamber ruled that the club must
pay 5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 40,094.31 as from 25 September 2017,
the date the claim was lodged by the player.
36.
Furthermore, as regards the player’s claim pertaining to EUR 10,000 as bonus for
the non-relegation of the club, the Chamber concluded that such claim of the
player is not backed by any corroborating documentary evidence, and therefore, in
line with the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the
Procedural Rules, it decided to reject this part of the player’s claim.
37.
Finally, as regards the player’s claim pertaining to air tickets, and taking into
account the player’s claim and the documentation provided by him, the Chamber
wished to outline that, in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence in this
respect, any amount awarded to the player would be due in USD – and not in EUR
as per the player’s claim –, as the copy of the air tickets submitted by the player
only mention a price in USD and not in EUR.
38.
Based on the foregoing, the Chamber decided that - on the basis of the
information and documentation provided by the player and referring to the
relevant terms of the contract - the club can only be obliged to pay the costs of a
flight ticket for the player, and not for the costs of an air ticket for his girlfriend.
As a result, the Chamber concluded that the club must pay to the player the
amount of USD 104.02 for an air ticket from Country D to Country B.
39.
Additionally, taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the
Chamber decided that the club has to pay 5% interest p.a. on the amount of USD
104.02 as from 25 September 2017, the date the claim was lodged by the player.
40.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claims lodged by the player are rejected.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
12/14
III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant w ithin 30 day s as from the
date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the
amounts of EUR 40,094.31 and of USD 104.02, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 25
September 2017 until the date of effective payment.
3.
In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned number 2. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit,
the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
4.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
5.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the
account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to
the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a
copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
13/14
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Encl: CAS directives
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
14/14