Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 27 February 2014,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Todd Durbin (USA), member
Mohamed Al Saikhan (Saudi Arabia), member
Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member
Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player G, from country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club K, from country P
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 21 January 2011, Player G, from country B (hereinafter: the Claimant), and
Club K, from country P (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an employment
contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 21 January 2011 until 30 June
2014.
2.
In accordance with the contract, the Claimant was entitled “for the whole period
of the contract paid in currency of country P in the amount equivalent to:
1.025.000 EURO net (…) will be paid in monthly period in the amount of 25.000
EURO net payable in arrears by the 10th day of the next calendar month”.
3.
Furthermore, the Claimant was entitled to match bonuses for every match played
in which a point was obtained by the Respondent, as follows:
-
EUR 1,000 for each point while playing the full match;
EUR 1,000 for each point divided by the number of minutes on the field,
in case the player did not play the full match.
EUR 200 for each point in matches in which the player was selected for
the team, but did not play.
4.
Art. 3 par. 3 of the contract stipulates: “Should the obligations stipulate in
paragraph 1 or 2 be violated the Management Board of Club K will be entitled to
file a motion with the Disciplinary Department of country P Football Association
to charge the Player with disciplinary penalty, according to the procedure
specified in Section VII of the Act of no. ii/12 of May 19, 2002 of the Board of the
country P Football Association, as well as to penalize the Player in accordance to
Disciplinary Regulations of country P Football Association and other valid rules
and regulations.”
5.
Art. 7 par. 3 stipulates that: “In matters not regulated by this Agreement,
provisions of the Civil Code shall apply.”
6.
Art. 7 par. 4 stipulates: “Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any
disputes arising from the execution of this agreement shall be settled amicably,
and in cases of a lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the
jurisdiction of Club K except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an
exclusive proper for the jurisdiction”.
7.
Art. 7 par. 6 stipulates: “The agreement is bilingual (…) in case of any doubts and
interpretation problems between those two versions the country P language
version shall apply. Moreover each party has the right to refer the matter in
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 2 of 16
question to the FIFA’s Players Status committee or FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber”.
8.
On 20 March 2013, the parties concluded an “Agreement-Debt Restructuring”, by
means of which the Respondent acknowledged having the following debts to the
Claimant:
-
9.
EUR 113,200 net as salary and performance bonuses;
EUR 12,445 gross as bonus payments for UEFA Europa League
qualifications.
According to art. 2 of the above-mentioned agreement, the Respondent would
pay the Claimant his outstanding debt as follows:
-
EUR 87,000 net by 31 March 2013;
EUR 26,200 net by 7 September 2013;
EUR 12,455 gross by 7 September 2013.
In turn, the Claimant confirmed that, for the duration of the agreement, he
would not take any actions “towards vindication of aforesaid debt from [the
Respondent]”.
10.
On 17 July 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the
Respondent, explaining that the latter had not fulfilled its contractual obligations
towards him. The Claimant clarified that, in order for the Respondent to obtain a
license for the 2013/2014 season, it had acknowledged its debt for the year 2012
in the aforementioned debt agreement. Thereafter, the Respondent had paid him
his salaries for September, October, November 2012 and half of the salary of
December 2012.
11.
However, the Respondent subsequently failed to pay the other half of the salary
of December 2012, the salaries of January 2013 to May 2013 as well as various
bonuses.
12.
As a result, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondent on 10 June 2013
requesting i) payment of the amount of EUR 137,500 regarding his monthly
salaries and ii) the payment of his bonuses, until 14 June 2013 at the latest.
13.
However, no payment was received, following which the Claimant terminated the
contract on 17 June 2013 in writing. The Claimant outlined that, on the same day,
the Respondent put on its website that the Claimant had terminated his contract.
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 3 of 16
14.
On 18 June 2013, the Respondent contacted the Claimant’s agent by e-mail
proposing to terminate the contract by mutual consent, offering to pay the
Claimant the amount of EUR 118,024.44, which e-mail remained unanswered by
the Claimant. By means of a letter dated 18 June 2013, which according to the
Claimant he received on 20 June 2013, the Respondent disputed the legitimacy of
the Claimants claims, asking the latter to attend the Respondent’s training
sessions as well as asking him to attend “negotiations”.
15.
On account of all the above, the Claimant deemed that he had just cause to
terminate the contract on 17 June 2013 and, after amending his claim on 2
October 2013, requested the total amount of EUR 350,342, calculated as follows:
- EUR 12,500 for part of the salary of December 2012;
- EUR 125,000 for the salaries of January to May 2013;
- EUR 13,333.44 for the salary of 1 June 2013 until 16 June 2013;
- EUR 5,187 for bonus payments;
- EUR 38,655 for the “Agreement-Debt Restructuring” (EUR 26,200 + EUR
12,455);
- EUR 149,666.56 as compensation for breach of contract (for the period of 17
June 2013 until 30 June 2014 taking into consideration the deduction of the
amounts earned under his new employment contract);
- EUR 6,000 as legal fees.
16.
Equally, the Claimant requested 5% interest on all amounts as from the relevant
due dates.
17.
In reply to the claim lodged against it, the Respondent first of all contested FIFA’s
competence to deal with the matter, asserting that according to art. 7 par. 4 of
the contract, the competent body to deal with the matter is a court proper for the
territorial jurisdiction of the registered seat of the Respondent, which means a
civil court in the city of country P or the Football Court of Arbitration of the
country P Football Association.
18.
To its submission, the Respondent
documentation:
enclosed a copy of the following
- Extract from the National Court Register;
- Resolution No. ii/12 of 19 May 2002 adopted by the management Board of the
country P Football Association;
- Resolution No. ii/25 of December 2012 adopted by the Management Board of
the country P Football Association – the Bylaw of the Court of Arbitration for
Football.
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 4 of 16
19.
Primarily, the Respondent deems that the country P civil court in the city of
country P is competent, “bearing in mind the wide meaning of the term of
employment-relation in the context of art. 22 of the Regulations”. Alternatively,
the Respondent deems that the NDRC of the country P Football Association is
competent referring once more to art. 7 par. 4 of the contract, to art. 1161 par. 1
of the Act of 17 November 1964 and to art. 1 of the Resolution No. ii/25 of 12
December 2012 of the Management Board of the country P Football Association
on the adoption of the Rules of the NDRC of the country P Football Association.
20.
Art. 22 par. 1 and 2 of Resolution No. ii/25 of 12 December 2012 stipulates:
“1. Review and resolution of disputes filed for resolution by the Court of
Arbitration shall be by three-person Adjudication Boards.
2. Either of the parties may appoint one arbitrator and, in the event of an
obstacle, one replacement arbiter from the list of members of Court of
Arbitration, the two so appointed arbiters shall appoint one Presiding Justice,
who shall preside over the Adjudication Board”.
Art. 11 par. 1 states: ”The Court of Arbitration for Football is composed from 25
to 27 arbiters appointed by the Management Board of the country P Football
Association.”
21.
Also, the Respondent asserts that, in accordance with art. 7 par. 3 of the contract,
the dispute should be adjudicated in accordance with country P law.
22.
As to the substance of the matter, the Respondent indicated that the Claimant
was a successful player during the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 seasons, but that his
efficiency “fell down” afterwards, scoring only 4 goals. The Respondent outlined
that the reason for the decline in performance is unknown to it, but that it may
well be that it was caused by the lack of commitment of the Claimant.
23.
Furthermore, the Respondent indicated that, due to a temporary lack of financial
liquidity, it owed the Claimant money, reason for which it concluded the debt
agreement. The Respondent pointed out that the Claimant already received the
first installment whereas the second installment was only due on 7 September
2013.
24.
The Respondent acknowledged having received a letter from the Claimant on 10
June 2013, however, the Claimant had not warned the Respondent that, in
absence of a payment, he would terminate the contract. On 18 June 2013, the
Respondent proposed a settlement to the Claimant, which remained unanswered.
Likewise, the Respondent’s letter of 20 June 2013 remained unanswered in which
the Claimant was informed that, in accordance with the regulations of the
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 5 of 16
country P Football Association, the termination of a contract is only possible by
mutual consent.
25.
In this context, the Respondent stressed that there is a lack of grounds for the
unilateral termination of the contract, for the following reasons:
a) According to the Resolution dated 19 May 2012, which is an integral part of
the contract, there is no possibility of a unilateral termination of the contract;
b) In case of a serious violation of the contract, the other party can only submit a
motion for termination to the NDRC of the country P Football Association.
Such application must be made in writing and it has to be submitted no later
than 30 days after the breach. Since the player did not comply with this
formality, the club deems that the contract is still binding and effective;
c) The player did not “ask to pay outstanding salaries with notification that in
case of lack of payment he will terminate the contract”. In the club’s view, a
notification for termination is required;
d) Even if there is an effective unilateral termination, there is no basis for the
payment of compensation as the player did not provide a basis for such claim,
nor is there a basis under country P law or in the Regulations;
e) According to country P law, it is necessary to prove “a damage to the property
of his assets within a specified dimension”. Since the player started playing for
a new club, it must be assumed that he did not lose any income “and even if
does, he did not proved the height of his loss”.
26.
In a subsequent statement dated 16 September 2013, the Respondent also
disputed the existence of any debts towards the Claimant, but even if a debt
existed, the Respondent argued that the amount claimed by the Claimant is too
high “because the offsetting results from the Claimant’s unhealthy during the sick
leave within a period from 28.02.2013 to 14.03.2013 and from 01.05.2013 to
14.05.2013 were not taken into account”. According to the Respondent, the
correct amount should be EUR 111,983.47, calculated as follows:
-
27.
EUR 12,500 for half of January 2013;
EUR 24,107.14 for February 2013;
EUR 13,709.67 for March 2013;
EUR 50,000 for April and May 2013;
EUR 11,666.66 for June 2013.
In his replica, the Claimant rejects that country P law is governing the present
dispute and insists on the competence of FIFA to hear the present matter stating
that:
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 6 of 16
-
Art. 7 par. 4 does not contain an explicit jurisdiction clause in favor of civil
courts in country P;
Both parties acknowledge the competence of sports arbitration bodies;
The NDRC of the country P Football Association is not an independent
sports tribunal, in particular, all arbitrators are selected by the
management board of the country P Football Association.
28.
Furthermore, the Claimant contests that he was not performing well and insists
that he terminated the contract on 17 June 2013 with just cause. Also, all the
argumentation in relation to the compensation should be disregarded; he was not
unjustifiably absent from work between 28 February 2013 and 14 March 2013,
since he was having back problems but was still participating in the training of
the club. In any case, the Respondent was anyhow not entitled to deduct salary,
even Resolution No. ii/25 of December 2012 states that the player shall receive his
entire remuneration during illness.
29.
In its duplica, the Respondent insisted on the competence of a country P civil court
proper for the territorial jurisdiction of city of country P. Furthermore, the
Respondent holds that the NDRC of the country P Football Association is a duly
constituted arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players.
30.
Finally, the Respondent repeated its previous argumentation and reiterated that
art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is not applicable
“because of the lack of its primary validity conditions, that is the termination of
the contract without a just cause”.
31.
On 4 November 2013, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 31 October 2013, he
received two payments from the Respondent totaling the amount of EUR
34,669.67, for which, however, it is not clear to which outstanding debt it
corresponds. Nevertheless, the Claimant assumes that these payments correspond
to the obligation deriving from the “Agreement-Debt Restructuring”, while
stressing that the Respondent still owes the remaining amount of EUR 3,985.33 as
well as 5% interest as from 7 September 2013 and 5% interest on the amount of
EUR 34,669.67 as from 7 September 2013 until 31 October 2013.
32.
Upon request, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 19 June 2013, he signed a new
employment contract with Club L, valid as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2016, in
accordance with which he was entitled to currency of country B 26,404 per month.
II.
Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or
Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 7 of 16
this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to
FIFA on 17 July 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21
of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2012) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on
employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an inter
national dimension.
3.
As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be
competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a country B player
and a country P club regarding an employment-related dispute.
4.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 7 par. 4 of the contract
alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the
relevant employment contract is either the civil court in the city of country P or
the Football Court of Arbitration of the country P Football Association
(hereinafter: the NDRC of the country P Football Association).
5.
On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the
competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the
Respondent.
6.
Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance
with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand,
unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and
respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been
established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a
collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on
an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber
referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the
members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force
on 1 January 2008.
7.
In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of
the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 8 of 16
than the DRC is competence to settle an employment-related dispute between a
club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the
relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear
reference in the employment contract.
8.
Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter,
the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost,
analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute
contained a clear jurisdiction clause.
9.
In this respect, the Chamber recalled that art. 7 par. 4 of the employment contract
stipulates that: “Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any disputes arising
from the execution of this agreement shall be settled amicably, and in cases of a
lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the jurisdiction of Club K
except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an exclusive proper for the
jurisdiction”.
10.
Having examined the relevant provision, the Chamber came to the unanimous
conclusion that art. 7 par. 4 does not constitute a clear jurisdiction clause in favour
of one specific court or arbitration tribunal in country P, since it only referred to a
court “proper” for the jurisdiction of the Respondent. The foregoing conclusion is
even supported by the Respondent’s statements which itself does not seem to be
aware which judicial organ is competent; either the civil court in the city of
country P or the NDRC of the country P Football Association.
11.
However, the Chamber emphasised that even more pertinent is the provision
contained in art. 7 par. 6 of the contract which makes a clear reference to the FIFA
DRC. Indeed, art. 7 par. 6 stipulates: “The agreement is bilingual (…) in case of
any doubts and interpretation problems between those two versions the country
P language version shall apply. Moreover each party has the right to refer the
matter in question to the FIFA’s Players Status committee or FIFA Dispute
Resolution Chamber”.
12.
On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s
objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to
be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis
of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to
consider the present matter as to the substance.
13.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the
matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1
and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) and,
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 9 of 16
on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 17 July 2013.
Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2012 edition of
the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the
Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
14.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber
continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the
documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in
the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and
documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the
matter at hand.
15.
First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 21 January 2011,
the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid as
from 21 January 2011 until 30 June 2014 in accordance with which the player was
entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 25,000.
16.
The Chamber further observed that the Claimant unilaterally terminated the
contract in writing on 17 June 2013 invoking just cause, and that he subsequently
lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent seeking payment of the
amount of EUR 350,342 plus interest, corresponding to his alleged outstanding
remuneration, compensation for breach of contract as well as legal fees.
17.
The Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant held that his salaries had not been
paid from December 2012 until May 2013 and that he had put the club in default
in writing on 10 June 2013, but that no payment was received following said
default letter. Therefore, the Claimant deemed that he had terminated the
contract with just cause on 17 June 2013.
18.
Furthermore, the Chamber observed that the Respondent, for its part, was of the
opinion that, on the basis of the Regulations of the country P Football Association
and country P legislation, there was a lack of grounds to terminate the contract
unilaterally and that there are no damages, since the Claimant had been
employed by a new club.
19.
As to the debts towards the Claimant, the Respondent stated that due to a
temporary lack of financial liquidity, on 20 March 2013, it had concluded a debt
settlement agreement with the Claimant. As to the other alleged debts, the
Respondent contested that any such debts existed, but even if it had any debts to
the Claimant, those were limited to the amount of EUR 111,983.47 “because the
offsetting results from the Claimant’s unhealthy during the sick leave within a
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 10 of 16
period from 28.02.2013 to 14.03.2013 and from 01.05.2013 to 14.05.2013 were not
taken into account”.
20.
In this respect, the DRC recalled the basic principle of the burden of proof, as
stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party
claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of
proof.
21.
In relation to the preceding paragraph, the Chamber noted that the Respondent
however did not substantiate its defence, as it did not present any evidence in
respect of any payments it sustained to have made to the Claimant prior to 17
June 2013. Equally, in relation to the Respondent’s argumentation concerning the
Claimant’s sick leave, the Respondent had not been able to refute the statements
of the Claimant that, although having had back problems, he continued to
participate in the Respondent’s training sessions. Equally, the Respondent had not
indicated on the basis of which provision in the contract it would be allowed to
deduct salary in case of the Claimant’s sick leave.
22.
As a consequence, and taken into account the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber
determined that, due to the lack of documentary evidence provided by the
Respondent, it could be established that on 17 June 2013, the following payments
were outstanding: i) EUR 137,500 for the salaries of (half of) January 2012 until
May 2013, and ii) EUR 5,187 concerning the bonus payments.
23.
Having taken into consideration the previous considerations, the Chamber
considered that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual
obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the
Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of
time. Therefore, the Chamber considered that the Respondent was found to be in
breach of the employment contract and that the breach was of such seriousness
that, in line with the Chamber’s long-standing and well-established jurisprudence,
the Claimant had a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contractual
relationship with the Respondent on 17 June 2013, having previously put the
Respondent in default of payment of the outstanding amounts.
24.
On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Claimant had
terminated the employment contract with just cause on 9 November 2012 and
that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination
of the employment contact with just cause by the Claimant.
25.
Furthermore, and in relation to the arguments of the Respondent that the
termination had not been done in accordance with the country P law and country
P Football Association Regulations, the DRC wished to point out that when
deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 11 of 16
law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasized that the main
objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all
the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This
objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national
law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. This should apply, in
particular, also to the termination of a contract. In this respect, the DRC wished to
point out that it is in the interest of football that the termination of contract is
based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary
considerable from country to country. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not
appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to the termination
of the contract but rather the RSTP, general principles of law and, where existing,
the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.
26.
Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with
the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just
cause by the Claimant.
27.
First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must
fulfill its obligations as per employment contract in accordance with the general
legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber decided that
the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was
outstanding at the time of the termination i.e. the amount of EUR 142,687,
consisting of the monthly salaries of half of December 2012 until May 2013 and
the bonus payments. Equally, the Chamber noted that during the course of the
present proceedings also the amount of EUR 38,655 stipulated in the
“Agreement-Debt Restructuring had fallen due. Finally, the Chamber recalled that
the Respondent had made one further payment to the Claimant after the
termination of the contract, more specifically, the Respondent had paid the
Claimant the total amount of 34,670 on 31 October 2013, which amount should
be deducted from the outstanding remuneration. As a result, the Chamber
determined that the Respondent has to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR
146,672 as outstanding remuneration.
28.
Furthermore and considering the Claimant’s claim for interest, the Respondent
must pay 5% interest on the amount of EUR 146,672 as from the respective due
dates.
29.
In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par.
1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent
compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding remuneration
on the basis of the relevant employment contract.
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 12 of 16
30.
In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise
provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for
the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective
criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining
on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on
whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
31.
In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to
clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable
by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the
Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the
employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
32.
Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation
to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account
the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment
contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the
professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this
respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of the
employment contract, the contract would run for another 13 months.
Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as
from its early termination by the Claimant until the regular expiry of the contract
amounts to EUR 325,000 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final
determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.
33.
In continuation, the Chamber remarked that the Claimant had found new
employment with Club L, from country B, as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2016.
In accordance with the employment contract signed between the Claimant and
Club L, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly salary of currency of country B
26,404 per month, which corresponds to approximately EUR 13,444. As a result,
the total remuneration the Claimant would receive from Club L for the 12-month
period between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014 amounts to EUR 161,328.
34.
Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution
Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages,
such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into
account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 13 of 16
35.
In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay
the amount of EUR 163,672 to the Claimant, which is considered by the Chamber
to be reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract.
36.
In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that
the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of
compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e., 17 July 2013,
until the date of effective payment.
37.
As a consequence, the DRC concluded that the Respondent is liable to pay the
total amount of EUR 310,344 to the Claimant, consisting of the amount of EUR
146,672 corresponding to the Claimant’s outstanding remuneration and the
amount of EUR 163,672 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract.
38.
Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim
pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules
and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard.
39.
The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter
by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
III.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player G, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club K, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the
date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of
EUR 146,672, plus 5% interest until the date of effective payment as follows:
a. 5% p.a. as of 1 January 2013 on the amount of EUR 12,500;
b. 5% p.a. as of 1 February 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000;
c. 5% p.a. as of 1 March 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000;
d. 5% p.a. as of 1 April 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000;
e. 5% p.a. as of 1 May 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000;
f. 5% p.a. as of 1 June 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000;
g. 5% p.a. as of 17 July 2013 on the amount of EUR 5,187;
h. 5% p.a. as of 8 September 2013 on the amount of EUR 3,985.
4.
The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of
notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 14 of 16
of EUR 163,672 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 17 July 2013 until
the date of effective payment.
5.
In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated
time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
6.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
7.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS,
a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Jérôme Valcke
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 15 of 16
Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives
Player G, country B / Klub K, country P
Page 16 of 16