Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 January 2018,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Roy Verm eer (Netherlands ), member
Tom is lav Kas alo (Croatia), member
Pav el Piv ov arov (Rus s ia), member
Daan de Jong (Netherlands ), member
on the matter between the player,
Play er A, Country B
as Claimant / Counter-Respondent
and the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent / Counter-Claimant
and the club,
Club E, Country B
as Intervening Party
regarding an employment-related dispute
arisen between the parties
I.
Facts of the cas e
1.
On 7 May 2013, the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant /
Counter-Respondent or the player) and the club of Country D, Club C
(hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant or the club) signed an
employment contract (hereinafter: the first contract) valid as from 1 June 2013
until 31 May 2014.
2.
According to the first contract, the player was entitled to a remuneration of
EUR 1,650,000, payable as follows:
a)
EUR 330,000 on 1 July 2013;
b)
EUR 1,320,000 in 11 instalments of EUR 120,000, each payable on the first
day of the month as of 1 August 2013 until 1 June 2014.
Furthermore, the club committed to provide “Business Class [flight] Tickets for
the Player and his family”.
3.
On 29 April 2014, the player and the club signed a second employment contract
(hereinafter: the second contract), valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015.
4.
According to the second contract, the player was entitled to a remuneration of
EUR 1,420,000, payable as follows:
a)
EUR 320,000 on 15 July 2014;
b)
EUR 1,100,000 in 11 instalments of EUR 100,000, each payable on the first
day of the month as of 1 August 2014 until 1 June 2015.
Furthermore, the club committed to provide “Business Class [flight] Tickets for
the Player and his family”.
5.
Pursuant to art. 2 of the second contract, the player “is subject to the following
specific obligations:
a) to participate in all Club games and practice, in training, whether generally
provided for or specially arranged, in all player conferences and any other
arrangements for the purpose of preparing for games and competition […];
f) to conduct himself in public and in private in such a way as to not harm the
image of the Club, the Football Association of Country D and football in
general, and to refrain from commenting to third parties on internal Clubrelated matters; similarly, the Club acknowledges the right of the player to
free expression, provided it discredits neither the Club nor the game of
football”.
6.
Art. X of the second contract stipulates the following:
“[…] 2. The Club and the Player shall be entitled to terminate this Contract,
before its expiring term, by fifteen (15) days’ notice in writing for just cause
according with the FIFA Regulations governing this matter as well as the Law of
Country D.
3. When the termination of the Contract is not due to a just cause or a mutual
agreement between the Parties concerned: the parties shall be entitled to
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
2
receive from the other party in breach of the Contract a compensation for all
the remaining full amount”.
7.
On 19 May 2014, the player travelled from Country D to Country B for the
summer holidays.
8.
On 22 July 2014, the player sent a letter to the club, reporting the following: “I
am truly sorry and embarrassed about the delay in joining the team because of
some personal issues. Hence, my mother’s illness due to the breast cancer is the
main reason not to meet the deadline for joining the team”.
9.
On 31 July 2014, the player requested the club to provide him immediately with
return flight tickets to Country D and the payment of EUR 320,000, which fell
due on 15 July 2014.
10.
On 1 August 2014, the player, via his lawyer, reiterated the same request,
granting the club 15 days in order to comply.
11.
On 2 August 2014, an interview released by the player was published on a
newspaper of Country D, whereby he explained that he was delaying his return
to Country D due to his mother’s health conditions and to the club’s refusal to
provide him with return flight tickets to Country D. In this context, the player
also stated that the club had outstanding payments towards him.
12.
On the same date, the club sent a letter to the player, by means of which it
terminated the second contract with immediate effect. In particular, the club
alleged that the termination was justified by the fact that the player was absent
between 1 July and 1 August 2014 without justified reason. Moreover, the club
stated that the “pertinent tickets (Country D/Country B/Country D) were
addressed to [his] attention by email” and that the player never provided “a
reasonable reason […] despite of the fact [the player] have been twice formally
warned by Club C (on 20/07/2014)”. Finally, the club alleged that the player
released an “outraged interview” to a newspaper of Country D on the same
date, without the club’s consent.
13.
On 26 October 2014, upon request of the player, he and the club met in Country
D for a mediation meeting under the auspices of the Football Association of
Country D, however to no avail.
14.
On 26 November 2014, the player lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the
club for breach of contract, requesting the following:
a)
EUR 540,000 as outstanding salaries, plus interest of 5% p.a., broken-down
as follows:
i. EUR 120,000 for the last instalment provided in the first contract, plus
5% interest p.a. as of 2 June 2014;
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
3
b)
ii. EUR 320,000 for the signing fee provided in the second contract, plus
5% interest p.a. as of 16 July 2014;
iii. EUR 100,000 for the first instalment provided in the second contract,
plus 5% interest p.a. as of 2 August 2014.
EUR 1,000,000 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to
the remaining value of the second contract, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of 3
August 2014.
15.
In his claim, the player alleged that, despite his repeated requests, the club
neither provided him with the flight tickets to come back to Country D, nor paid
him the last instalment of the first contract and the sign-on fee and the first
instalment provided in the second contract.
16.
In particular, the player stressed that, when he left Country D on 19 May 2014,
he received only one-way tickets to Country B from a club’s employee at the
airport.
17.
Moreover, the player emphasised that the club did not send him any default
notice pursuant to art. X par. 2 of the second contract, before the contractual
termination by the club (cf. point 6 above). Consequently, the player argued
that the club terminated the contract without just cause on 2 August 2014.
18.
In its reply, the club rejected the player’s arguments and lodged a counter-claim
against him for breach of contract.
19.
In its counter-claim, the club requested the payment of compensation for
breach of contract in the amount of EUR 1,300,000, plus 5% p.a. interest as of 2
August 2014, calculated as follows:
a)
EUR 1,420,000 corresponding to the remaining value of the second
contract; minus
b)
EUR 120,000, to be deducted for the last instalment of the first contract,
which the club acknowledged having not paid to the player.
Furthermore, the club requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the player
for breach of contract during the protected period.
20.
As to the facts of the case, the club held that it instructed all the players to
return to Country D on 1 July 2014, for the preparation of the new season. In
this regard, the club affirmed that the club’s travel agency sent the player
round-trip flight tickets via email and the latter eventually “called the Club’s
travel agency and managed to re-book the returning tickets to 10 July 2014, in
lieu of 1 July 2014”. In particular, as evidence about the club’s instructions for
the starting date of the new season, the club submitted a witness statement
from the alleged club’s secretary. Furthermore, the club also submitted an email
sent from a travel agency to the email address “XXX”, containing round trip
flight reservation for “Mrs F”, leaving from Country D on 19 May 2014 and
returning on 10 July 2014.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
4
21.
In continuation, the club explained that, on 16 May 2014, the club’s secretary
delivered the round-trip flight tickets to the player and, upon the latter’s
request, on 18 May 2014 he sent him the relevant flight code numbers to his
phone. In this respect, the club also submitted a screenshot of the secretary’s
phone message, sent to the alleged phone number of the player, containing
code numbers only.
22.
Moreover, according to the club, on 10 July 2014 it sent a letter to the player, to
his address in Country D. In said letter, the club requested the player to
immediately return to Country D, as the starting date of the preparation,
allegedly already communicated to him, was 1 July 2014. The club, nonetheless,
affirmed that “nobody was there to receive it”.
23.
The club also argued that, a “few days later”, the player phoned a club’s staff
member and “alleged personal problems in order to justify his delay to return
to Country D”.
24.
In continuation, the club affirmed that, on 20 July 2014, it sent a further letter
to the player to his address in Country D and to the alleged “new mobile’s
number of the Player in Country B” as well. By means of said letter, the club
notified the player a fine that it had imposed on him in the amount of EUR
140,000 and requested him to come back to Country D within three days.
25.
In this context, the club argued that the player’s letter on 22 July 2014 proved
that the previous club’s default notices were received by the player as, in such
letter, he apologised for his delay mentioning only “personal problems” and did
not make reference to the alleged non-delivery of the return flight tickets to
Country D (cf. point 8 above).
26.
Furthermore, the club stressed that the interview published on 2 August 2016
was released by the player without the club’s authorization and was “publicly
defaming the club”.
27.
Along those lines, the club argued that the above-mentioned interview and the
player’s delay to return to Country D caused an “irremediable breach of
confidence in the employment relationship” and justified the club’s unilateral
termination of the contract. Moreover, the club also pointed out that the
player, within the same interview, affirmed that his mother’s disease had
appeared two years before. As a consequence thereof, the club argued that the
player did not explain why such circumstance prevented him from complying
with his contractual obligations lately only.
28.
In addition, the club maintained that, even in the not admitted case that the
club did not provide him with the flight tickets, such circumstance could not
justify the non-compliance of the player’s contractual obligations.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
5
29.
Regarding the outstanding payments, the club added that it “withhold” the
payment of the signing fee provided in the second contract “in view of the
Player’s default to return for the pre-season on time”.
30.
In his replica, the player rejected the club’s arguments and reaffirmed that the
non-delivery of the return flight ticket by the club prevented him from
complying with his contractual obligations.
31.
In this regard, the player affirmed that he neither received the return flight
tickets via e-mail from the club’s travel agency nor from the club’s secretary. In
this respect, the player pointed out that the e-mail submitted by the club as
proof of transmission of the round flight tickets was actually addressed to the
secretary’s e-mail address and not to his own (cf. point 20 above).
32.
The player also remarked that he requested the aforementioned flight tickets in
several occasions to the club’s president and to the club, but to no avail. In this
context, the player submitted phone messages allegedly sent to the club’s
president on 13, 15 and 16 May 2014 and on 25, 27 and 29 July 2014. The player
also submitted e-mails sent to the club on 25 and 29 July 2014, reiterating the
same request.
33.
Moreover, the player stressed that the club did not pay him any remuneration
for three months and requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the club.
34.
In continuation, the player affirmed that he could not have received any of the
club’s default notices, as such letters were allegedly sent to his address in
Country D while he was in Country B. What is more, he underlined that the club
did not provide any proof of transmission of the letter dated 20 July 2014 to
him.
35.
Furthermore, the player argued that his letter on 22 July 2014 did not mention
the alleged club’s default notices and, thus, did not prove that he had received
them. In particular, the player affirmed that such letter was an attempt to calm
tensions and find an amicable solution.
36.
In addition, the player argued that the club neither submitted evidence that the
players had been informed about the starting date of the preparation on 1 July
2014, nor that any return flight ticket had been issued for or received by the
player himself.
37.
The player also admitted that, on 18 May 2014, he received from the club’s
secretary a phone message, but argued that such message only contained code
numbers which he did not understand. What is more, the player emphasised
that, from such message, it was not possible for him to know that they
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
6
corresponded to a flight ticket let alone the details of a return flight (cf. point
21 above).
38.
In addition, the player emphasised that he provided the club with evidence of
his mother’s health conditions, but argued that his absence depended on the
non-delivery of the flight tickets from the club only. In particular, he argued
that he had no other choice than remaining with his mother in Country B while
he was waiting that the club delivered him the requested flight tickets. In this
respect, the player submitted medical certificates dated 3 July and 17 July 2014
attesting that the player was with his mother on those dates.
39.
As to his interview published on 2 August 2014, the player denied that it was
defaming the club and that it was released without the club’s authorization. In
particular, the player alleged that only the club was in possession of his phone
number in Country B and, as the interview was allegedly made on the phone,
the journalist had obtained said number from the club. In view of that, the
player affirmed that the interview was conducted with the club’s authorization.
Additionally, the player asserted that in the interview he maintained his
intention to comply with the contract and to return to the club.
40.
Finally, the player, in addition to his initial claim, also requested the following:
a)
EUR 20,000, for financial, professional and moral damages allegedly
suffered by him because of the unjustified termination of the contract by
the club;
b) EUR 5,000 as reimbursement of legal expenses;
c)
EUR 341,667 as reimbursement of the taxes and social contributions
payable in Country B. In particular, the player affirmed that he had moved
his residence to Country B and, as a consequence thereof, said taxes an
social contributions would be applied, pursuant to the Country B law, on
the amounts requested by the player as compensation for breach of
contract (i.e. EUR 1,000,000), damages and reimbursement of legal
expenses.
41.
In its duplica, the club insisted on its previous arguments and on its
counterclaim.
42.
In particular, it alleged that the club’s head coach informed the player about
the starting date of the new season’s preparation, set on 1 July 2014. In this
respect, the club submitted a statement allegedly released by the club’s head
coach, confirming such circumstance.
43.
Moreover, the club reaffirmed that the club’s secretary sent the codes of the
flight tickets to the player via phone message as the player requested him to do
so. In this respect, the club submitted a further statement allegedly issued by
the club’s secretary, confirming such circumstance.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
7
44.
Furthermore, the club stated that the default notice sent by the player’s lawyer
on 1 August 2014 did not contain any power of attorney. Hence, the club
argued that, as the player never contacted the club via a lawyer before, it had
no information if, in that case, the player was actually being represented by a
lawyer.
45.
In continuation, the club averred that the club’s president decided “to step
aside from the (direct) management of the club” at the end of the season
2013/2014 and passed the management of the club to the CEO. The club
affirmed that the player was aware of this situation, as the second employment
contract and the club’s default notices had been signed by the club’s CEO.
Consequently, the club stated that the player’s requests to the club’s president
after 25 July 2014 proved the player’s bad faith.
46.
Finally, the club affirmed that, on 1 January 2016, the player entered into an
employment contract with the club of Country B Club E (hereinafter: the
Invervening Party or Club E). Thus, the club requested that Club E shall be jointly
and severally liable with the player to pay compensation for breach of contract
to the club.
47.
Upon request of the FIFA administration, the player informed that, after the
termination of the second contract by the club, he did not conclude any
employment contract with other club until 23 December 2015. On that date, he
signed a new employment contract with the Club E, valid as of the date of
signature until 30 June 2016, providing a monthly salary of 15,000 in the
currency of Country B.
48.
The Intervening Party submitted its comments on the present affair and stated
that it negotiated the contract with the player only after that he informed Club
E of the termination of the previous contract by the club on 2 August 2014.
49.
Moreover, Club E emphasised that its contract with the player was concluded
more than one year and a half after the termination of the previous one and
argued that it had no responsibility for such termination. In particular, Club E
emphasised that the remuneration provided in the new contract was
significantly lower.
II.
Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as: the
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 26 November 2014. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the
Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2014;
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
8
hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of
the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the
Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2018), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal
with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with
an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of
Country D, with the intervention of a club of Country B.
3.
In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable
as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in
accordance with art. 26 par. 1 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 26
November 2014, the 2014 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations)
is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this
respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts
as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties.
However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will
refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it
considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
5.
First, the Chamber noted that the parties entered into two different
employment contracts:
a) the first one valid as from 1 June 2013 until 31 May 2014, providing a total
salary of EUR 1,650,000; the last instalment of which amounted to EUR
120,000 and was payable to the player on 1 June 2016;
b) the second one valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015, providing a total
salary of EUR 1,420,000, payable as follows: i) EUR 320,000 on 15 July 2014,
ii) EUR 1,100,000 in 11 instalments of EUR 100,000, each payable on the first
day of the month as of 1 August 2014 until 1 June 2015.
In this context, the Chamber took note that, for each of the two contracts, the
club committed to provide “Business Class [flight] Tickets for the Player and his
family”.
6.
Moreover, the members of the Chamber duly noted that, pursuant to art. X,
par. 2 of the second contract, each party was entitled to terminate the contract
“by fifteen (15) days’ notice in writing for just cause”.
7.
In continuation, the DRC acknowledged that it remained undisputed by the
parties that, on 19 May 2014, the player left the club and eventually did not
return. Along these lines, it also remained undisputed that, on 22 July 2014, the
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
9
player sent a communication to the club by means of which he apologised for
his delay due to alleged personal issues (cf. point I.8). Furthermore, the DRC duly
noted that, on 2 August 2014, the club terminated the second contract.
8.
Bearing in mind the above, the members of the Chamber took note that the
player requested outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 540,000,
corresponding to the last instalment provided in the first contract (i.e. EUR
120,000) and to the signing fee (EUR 320,000), as well as the first instalment
(EUR 100,000) provided in the second contract. The Chamber equally noted that
the player requested EUR 1,000,000 as compensation for breach of contract, EUR
20,000 for financial, professional and moral damages as well as the
reimbursement of legal expenses as well as taxes and social contributions.
9.
Having stated the above, the DRC proceeded to analyse the claim of the player
who argued that the club only provided him with one-way flight tickets for
leaving the country on 19 May 2014 but, despite his requests, it did not provide
him with return flight tickets; in this way, preventing him from complying with
his contractual obligations.
10.
What is more, according to the player, the club neither sent him any default
notice pursuant to art. X, par. 2 of the second contract, nor it paid him his
salaries since the month June 2014. Consequently, it was in breach of contract
and therefore terminated the latter without just cause.
11.
In continuation, the Chamber took note of the reply of the club which, on the
one hand, acknowledged that the last instalment of the first contract was still
due to the player but, on the other hand, it affirmed that it withheld the
payment of the signing fee provided in the second contract in view of the
player’s delay to return “for the pre-season on time”. In this respect, the club
alleged that it instructed all the players to return to Country D on 1 July 2014
for the preparation of the new season.
12.
Moreover, the members of the Chamber noted that, according to the club, it
provided the player with the requested return flight tickets before he left
Country D on 19 May 2014 and also sent him default notices before terminating
the contract on 2 August 2014. In this respect, the club maintained that such
termination was justified in view of the player’s delay to return to Country D.
13.
The Chamber further acknowledged the position of the club whereby it asserted
that the player’s actions caused “an irremediable breach of confidence in the
employment relationship”. As a consequence thereof, the club maintained that
it terminated the contract with just cause and requested the amount of EUR
1,300,000 as compensation for breach of contract by the player, corresponding
to entire value of the second contract (i.e. EUR 1,420,000), minus the last
instalment of the first contract (i.e. EUR 120,000), which the club acknowledged
was due to the player.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
10
14.
Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note of the position of the
player’s new club, Club E (hereinafter: the intervening party or Club E), which
affirmed that it negotiated the relevant new employment contract with the
player only after that he informed it about the termination of the second
contract with the club. However, Club E emphasised that such new contract had
been concluded more than one year and a half after the termination of the
previous one and, thus, concluded that it could not be held accountable for such
termination.
15.
In view of the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Chamber
highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the diverging
position of the parties, was to determine whether, on 2 August 2014, the
second contract had been terminated by the club with or without just cause and
to determine thereafter the consequences of said termination.
16.
Subsequently, the Chamber proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances
surrounding the present matter, the parties’ arguments as well the
documentation on file, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in
accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact
shall carry the burden of proof.
17.
With the above in mind, the members of the Chamber first turned its attention
to the main arguments invoked by both parties that the contract was
terminated on 2 August 2014 without or with just cause, i.e. the alleged delivery
of return flight tickets and of three default notices allegedly sent to the player
by the club.
18.
As to the first argument, the Chamber first noticed that the club alleged that it
provided the player with return flight tickets before he left Country D on 19
May 2014. Having noticed the above, the members of the Chamber, referring to
the aforementioned art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, concluded that it was
up to the club to prove that indeed said flight tickets had been delivered.
19.
In this context, the members of the Chamber concurred that the club did not
provide sufficient evidence in order to prove that the aforementioned flight
tickets had indeed been sent to the player. In particular, it remained undisputed
that the e-mail which allegedly contained the flight reservation was not
addressed to the player, but rather to the e-mail address XXX and it contained a
flight reservation for “Mrs F”. In this regard, the members of the Chamber did
not fully understand why this flight reservation was not addressed to the player
himself. What is more, the alleged code numbers sent to the player’s phone are
not ideal to demonstrate, in and of itself, that indeed the club reserved flight
tickets for the player to come back to Country D.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
11
20.
In continuation, with reference to the second argument, i.e. the three default
notices allegedly sent by the club to the player, the DRC recalled the abovementioned principle set out in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and
concluded that, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the club, the latter
did not to demonstrate that said default notices were received by the player. In
particular, the members of the Chamber were comforted with such conclusion
by the fact that said documents had been addressed to the player’s address in
Country D after he had already left the country. What is more, the club was
aware that the player was not in Country D at that specific point in time and
that the latter expressly acknowledged that “nobody was there to receive it”.
21.
On account of the above, the DRC concluded that the player neither received
the aforementioned flight tickets nor the above-mentioned default notices
from the club. As a consequence thereof, the members of the Chamber
concurred that the clause under art. X par. 2 of the second contract was not
applicable to the present matter.
22.
In view of all the aforementioned considerations, the Chamber concluded that
the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment
contract on 2 August 2014 and, therefore, decided that, in principle, the club
would be liable for the early termination of the employment contract without
just cause.
23.
Notwithstanding the above, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion
that the present dispute involves certain peculiarities which need to be assessed.
In particular, the Chamber focused on the player’s letter of 22 July 2014
whereby he not only apologised for his delay, but also acknowledged that he
did “not to meet the deadline for joining the team”. In the Chamber’s view, it
was quite surprising that the player did not raise the issue of the flight tickets in
this letter. What is more, the player appeared to have been aware that he was
supposed to come back to the club at an earlier stage. In other words, it seems
as if the player was aware that he was in breach of contract. In this regard, the
Chamber was not convinced by the argument of the player that this letter was
an attempt to calm tensions and find an amicable solution.
24.
For the Chamber it was also equally telling that the player did not react to the
code numbers sent by the club’s secretary. In particular, the Chamber considered
that the player should have had taken a more pro-active stance in order to
comply with his contractual obligations towards the club and not just “sit and
wait” for the club to send the relevant flight tickets.
25.
On account of the aforementioned considerations and, in particular, keeping
into account the player’s stance after he left the club on 19 May 2014, the
members of the Chambers concluded that, due to the specificities of the matter
at hand, the player is not entitled to receive compensation for breach of
contract.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
12
26.
Notwithstanding the above, the members of the Chamber emphasised that he is
entitled to receive the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the
termination. Along these lines, in view of the fact that the club acknowledged
that it did not pay any remuneration to the player as of the month of June
2014, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda,
the Chamber decided that the club had to pay the player the amount of EUR
440,000, corresponding to: i) the last instalment of the first contract – i.e. EUR
120,000, due on 1 June 2014; and to ii) the signing fee provided in the second
contract – i.e. EUR 340,000, due on 15 July 2014.
27.
In addition, taking into consideration the player’s request as well as the
constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the
members of the Chamber decided to award the player interest at the rate of 5%
p.a. on the outstanding amount of EUR 440,000, as requested by the player:
a.
b.
as of 2 June 2014, on the amount of EUR 120,000;
as of 16 July 2014, on the amount of EUR 340,000.
28.
As to the player’s request for the payment of the first instalment of the second
contract, corresponding to the salary of the month of August 2014, the
members of the Chamber considered that, taking into account the date of the
termination as well as the aforementioned considerations, he was not entitled
to any outstanding remuneration for such period.
29.
Furthermore, as to the player’s request for legal expenses, the Chamber referred
to art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as to its long-standing and wellestablished jurisprudence, in accordance with which no procedural
compensation shall be awarded in proceedings in front of the Dispute
Resolution Chamber. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the player’s
request in this regard.
30.
The members of the Chamber concluded their deliberations by rejecting any
further claim of the player as well as the counterclaim of the club.
III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Player A, is partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant /
Counter-Respondent, w ithin 30 day s as from the date of notification of this
decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 440,000, plus 5%
interest p.a. as follows:
a.
as of 2 June 2014, on the amount of EUR 120,000 until the date of
effective payment;
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
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b.
as of 16 July 2014, on the amount of EUR 320,000 until the date of
effective payment.
3.
In the event that the aforementioned amount plus interest is not paid by the
Respondent / Counter-Claimant within the stated time limit, the present matter
shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for
consideration and a formal decision.
4.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected.
5.
The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Claimant / Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent /
Counter-Claimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the
remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every
payment received.
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be
sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and
shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by
the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the
expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a
brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf.
point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the
following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected] / www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Encl.: CAS directives
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D / Club E, Country B
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